"The "Command Radius"" Topic

I should point out, to those of you who don't know, that all of the above ACW examples are from the second day at Gettysburg.

Birney's division constituted half of Sickle's Union 3rd Corps, which advanced (against Meade's wishes) to the high ground along the Emmitsburg Road just before Longstreet's Confederate 1st Corps arrived with orders to attack up (northeast) the Emmitsburg Road to Cemetery Hill. Birney's division held the left end of Sickle's V-shaped line, running from the point, at THE Peach Orchard (actually there was more than 1) where the Emmitsburg Rd met the road Longstreet's column was coming in on, and extending back almost to Little Round Top (which he calls Sugar Loaf).

Caldwell's division belonged to the Union 2nd Corps (Hancock) but had been sent as a reinforcement to Sickles when the latter was attacked by Longstreet. Barnes division and Ayres division both belonged to the Union 5th Corps (Sykes) and had also been sent as reinforcements.

Out of curiosity …

Does anyone have examples of what units a given rules set would have deemed outside CR did (in similar examples)?

Cheers,

The Bandit

I can.

As the ACW seems to be the most favored recent topic, lets have a look at Gettysburg. Lee's attack on the 2nd day was an eschelon attack beginning with Longsteet radiating north intended to draw Union reinforcements from Cemetary Hill, after which, denuded of units, it then was to be attacked and overrun by Ewell. Thus, unhinging the entire Union position.

Things were going swimingly. As Lee intended, Willard was ordered south, thinning the reserves on the northern flank, to counter the attack – which he did burning out his brigade – as Lee intended.

Next up was Pender's division. But Pender got shot and no one replaced him and Hill was ill and not available.

The chain of command having been broken (see Napoleon's Battles command rules), his brigades were now out of command radius and sat in place because none of the brigade commanders felt they had the authority to move grand tactically and execute the attack they were aware they were supposed to make.

Thus, ended Lee's plan and his last chance for victory.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

well that is pretty historical and in sinc with what would happen in a simulation to me…

Bill G:

What you give are two very pertinent examples. In the first, McLaws leaves the head of his divisional column, his senior brigade Kershaw, where he is expected to be according to the regulations, to hurry along the rear of his column. Certainly a valid exercise by the DC. However, in steps Longstreet to Kershaw,[why? No McLaws] and tells him what he is to do, which is a change of orders and not in line with the situation before him. Kershaw, deployed along the line waits for more than a half hour, maybe as long as an hour, before he is given orders to advance and carry out Longstreet's order. The order comes from Longstreet. McLaws never really returns to Kershaws brigade.

Kershaw has been give orders that create a conflict: he is supposed to remain in contact with Hood's left flank, even though Hood is moving farther east than orders intended, and he must keep his left flank on Emmittsburg Road. Barksdale has gone off on his own, losing contact with Kershaw. Kershaw's brigade breaks into two wings, though the gap is less than 200 yards. The left wing attacks the Peach orchard, the right Union guns near Zook.

And here is a good example of the voice command relay breaking down. The right wing is nearing the Union artillery, which prepare to hurriedly retire. Just then an order from Kershaw to the Left wing is passed down their line by officer voice--K. should like this-- The right wing hears the orders, and duly passes them down and then follows them, thinking they are for the whole brigade [as the split happened unintentionally] The right wing swings away from the artillery. The Union artillery thanks the war gods for the miracle and pours iron into Kershaw's ranks.

Now, here is the question. Was Longstreet a +1 help? and was McLaws out of command radius, or did he give up directing his division to hurry up the rear?

One reason that Division commanders avoided acting like brigadiers and Corps commanders like DCs or brigadiers is to avoid the cross-communication that could result when neither commander knew what the other was doing.

I am sure that there are protocols for the US Army today that attempt to avoid those kinds of dustups.

The Military Artist, Don Troiani knows this, which is why he spends so much time in research. "If an historical painting is not accurate, then it is worthless as both art and an investment." That is a quote from his website.

Somebody better tell all those owners of artists like Butler that they overpaid as the paintings are monitarily worthless. Bayeux Tapistry- no better than a tablecloth.

The Scotsman wrote:
"Not once do either commander say they contacted ANY of their brigades in the line, even though the brigades are seriously engaged and required reinforcements."

Oh really?

I agree that division commanders often left tactical deployments up to their brigade commanders, when they had full confidence in their abilities as I think Caldwell and Birney did, and they did respond to requests from their brigade commanders. But that certainly doesn't mean they were simply nodal points behind the center of the divisional line to passively process requests between the frontline and the reserves/reinforcements. They were in fact ACTIVE interventionists WHEN they thought it necessary.

Here's an example of Birney himself intervening directly into his center brigade.

Report of Colonel P. Regis de Trobriand. Fifty-fifth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade (Birney's Center)
"Our skirmishers soon after having been hardly pressed, and the fire becoming more brisk, I was ordered to detach a regiment to their support, and while our artillery was opening fire I sent the Third Regiment Michigan Volunteers, which, under the command of Colonel Byron R. Pierce, proceeded forward to a peach orchard close to the road to Emmitsburg, and, deploying rapidly, checked any farther advance…"

This is clearly is a direct intervention by the division commander, Birney, into the command radius of his center brigade commander, de Trobriand. It suggests that Birney was well aware of the status of his frontline units—even though behind the frontline-- and was ready to "meddle" and redirect when he thought necessary by ordering another regiment out as skirmishers from the center brigade. The 3rd Michigan's report supports this conclusion, as they state they were ordered out as skirmishers, not they reported to another brigade commander to fulfill a request.

Here's another direct intervention by the division commander, again Birney.

Report of Major General David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding First Division of, and Third Army Corps
"The Seventeenth Maine Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Merrill, was driven back from its position by overwhelming force, but, responding to my personal appeal, again charged the enemy across the small wheat-field, and retook their position."

And here's the confirmation by the 17th Maine

Report of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Merrill, Seventeenth Maine Infantry
"At this point, Major-General Birney rode upon the field and directed our line to advance. With cheers for our gallant commander, the regiment moved quickly forward, and pouring into the enemy volley upon volley, their advance was checked."

Of course, these are the most clear cut examples of a DC's direct intervention, but when you realize that Major-General Birney also had a full brigade—Burling's from the 2nd Division, III Corps—close at hand waiting to be parceled out as BIRNEY saw fit one can begin to understand the frustration in General Burling's report:

Report of Colonel George C. Burling, Sixth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Third Brigade. Second Division, 3rd Corps
"I now received orders from General Birney to detail two of my largest regiments to report to General Graham, in compliance with which I detailed the Second New Hampshire and Seventh New Jersey Volunteers. Shortly after this, I received orders from General Birney to detail the strongest regiment to report to General Humphreys for picket, in compliance with which I sent the Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, leaving me three small regiments. I was now ordered by General Birney to form a line across a small wheat-field on my left, to connect two brigades of the First Division. Before I had executed this order, I received an order from General Birney to send the largest regiment to General Ward's support, on my left, and while I was attending to that, the Eighth New Jersey Volunteers was taken from me without my knowledge, leaving me with the One hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, numbering 140 muskets. My command being now all taken from me and separated, no two regiments being together, and being under the command of the different brigade commanders to whom they had reported, I, with my staff, reported to General Humphreys for instructions, remaining with him for some time."

If Gen. Birney didn't "directly contact" his brigade commanders that may have been because he felt it entirely within his command radius to intervene DIRECTLY OVER THEM by sending them forces when he saw fit, whether they requested them or not. Wouldn't you agree that this was a very strong probability? Or is probability not scientifically accurate enough for a simulation?

The Scotsman wrote:
"Just then an order from Kershaw to the Left wing is passed down their line by officer voice--K. should like this-- The right wing hears the orders, and duly passes them down and then follows them, thinking they are for the whole brigade [as the split happened unintentionally] The right wing swings away from the artillery. The Union artillery thanks the war gods for the miracle and pours iron into Kershaw's ranks."

Sounds to me like the regulating battalion mechanic worked fine until Kershaw actually got ENGAGED, then it completely backfired on him. Just another reason to discard the notion on the table top.

"Just another reason to discard the notion on the table top."

Unless, of course, you want to build a handicap into the sytem…

… would be a serious disadvantage to have to engage using the regulating battalion mechanic. Perhaps this was in fact encountered in the Napoleonic Era, pre-Wagram ?

BD:
Of the three examples you provided for Birney, I need to point out something that in two, Birney wasn't helping directing the brigades do anything like advance. In one he was redistributing a part of de Trobriand someplace else, as he did with Burling's entire brigade piecemeal. The other one is indeed an example of him ordering a single regiment to charge. Would that be an example of the DC becoming 'attached?' or do you believe he was ordering regiments into actions up and down the line, or that this was an exception? Ordering regiments up and down the line into individual actions would really cause problems for brigadiers and the battle line.

BD wrote:
>>>Sounds to me like the regulating battalion mechanic worked fine until Kershaw actually got ENGAGED, then it completely backfired on him. Just another reason to discard the notion on the table top.<<<

First of all it wasn't an example of the regulating mechanic backfiring. Second it was an example of poor orders creating a problem and the VOICE COMMAND process being used by a very experienced brigade going wrong. Third, IF we discarded all 'notions' used by armies to command and communicate because we had examples of them failing, we wouldn't have any notions to work with.

Both mechanisms were the basics of brigade and division operations.

They were developed long before the SYW, were used in exactly the say way to move and communicate with battalions brigades, and then columns or divisions, and those regulations were then copied by the French well into the 1870s, which were the basis for all American regulations from 1800 to through the civil war. Take the 1791 French regulations and Hardee's and Casey's regulations, and you see that the latter two are in most ways simply clearer renditions of the former.

Last Hussar wrote:
>>>>[quoting me] The Military Artist, Don Troiani knows this, which is why he spends so much time in research. "If an historical painting is not accurate, then it is worthless as both art and an investment." That is a quote from his website.<<<<

>>Somebody better tell all those owners of artists like Butler that they overpaid as the paintings are monitarily worthless. Bayeux Tapistry- no better than a tablecloth.<<

LH: I think you might be confusing an artwork done in the past by artists motivated by different goals with a current painter's desire to present an accurate understanding of some specific history. I doubt that the group of weavers of the Bayeux tapistry, recording a current event had the same intent and criteria for success that Don Troiani is speaking of.

It is, after all, the artist's intent that circumscribes the goals and criteria for his/her art's success which is why Don says what he does.

How many of you guys actually use the concept of the regulating btln or Brigade EVERY time you play? if you do not know then stop and think about it. Every time you go to push your little btlns across the table you begin by pushing one btln, usually on one flank and then placing it where it should be. What is the next thing you do? You push the next unit along to a position relative to the one before it and so on down until the formation is totally moved. This to me is exactly what TheScotsman is talking about and we unconsciously do it EVERY single time we touch and move our little toy soldiers. WE are actually regulating our formations and their movement constantly and without thought and this is without any rule or guideline or usually any dice roll, we just do it as a matter of course.

All this talk about the, "Regulating Battalion" and or the, "Regulating Brigade" and so on brings me to another point I have already made vaguely earlier. TheScotsman talks about the regulation use of this formation and we all agree, it was used, it is realistic, historically correct and used as a form of Command Control, I think we all agree there.

But it is also seen by a few here to be used in the maneuvering and movement of a greater formation so as to keep the other units within that formation aligned to each other and heading in the right direction with minimal need for the actual commander to have to intervene to any great detail unless things went wrong. Now, what could go wrong, contact with the enemy for one thing…For me, these btlns or brigades were used for movement and maneuvering and that is it, to align the formations and keep them relative to each other, nothing more. As someone else stated, once the bullets start flying things become a little chaotic and individualistic. Formations and units still need to align themselves with each other but individual commands are barked out by the commander who needs to be everywhere at once at times. Thus the use of CR's in some systems and the reasoning for their use.

When the commander is advancing towards engagement range with the enemy using Regulating formations and units he is pretty much in cruise control, the formation is set and the command, "advance" given. He might make minor adjustments or watch flanks and all that but since the order is set and given he is on auto pilot. It is when the formation becomes engaged that suddenly he must take hold of the controls once more and begin to issue commands, that are imperative to the security of his command or to push an assault or Attack. This is the crucial part of his job, hands on and controlling all of those under him like an orchestra conductor. If he does not control the situation things go wrong, if he is on one flank of a formation controlling a threat things could go wrong on the other flank and soon, thus why CR's are important in some systems which use them.

Is the term, "CR" military in context ? no, so what? Is is an artificial mechanic to show the "limit" of the "influence" of the commander in a particular time frame i.e. the scale turn of the game. If a game system gives a 300yd CR for a 10min turn I am sure another system with a 20min turn would (I would hope) have a CR at 600yds if the scale was ratio'd correctly. This, however I do not think is very well scaled in all systems and suspect for some because of the differing radii in so many systems even with the same time frame per turn and scale.

Shane

Bob wrote:
Things were going swimingly. As Lee intended, Willard was ordered south, thinning the reserves on the northern flank, to counter the attack – which he did burning out his brigade – as Lee intended.

Next up was Pender's division. But Pender got shot and no one replaced him and Hill was ill and not available.

The chain of command having been broken (see Napoleon's Battles command rules), his brigades were now out of command radius and sat in place because none of the brigade commanders felt they had the authority to move grand tactically and execute the attack they were aware they were supposed to make.

Bob:
I thought that:
1. Ewell's attack was early.
2. From what Pender's brigadiers report, they didn't just sit there. Because Pender was killed while 'out of position', i.e. not in communication or sight of his brigades, it did take longer for everyone to discover and inform the chain of command of his death. The brigadiers did send for orders and clarification*, but like the order process that lost at least one hour of Longstreet's march to the right flank, the orders never arrived in time and when they did, the situation had changed to the degree that the orders were useless.

*Several brigadiers were new, replacing officers lost the first day so it was not clear who was the senior brigadier or the next in command.

3. And Lee's plan for Longstreet's attack was out of date before the advance began. The whole plan was based on old or non-existent information.

I wouldn't call that a plan going along 'swimmingly' at any point.

Bill G.

Looking at the examples of Corps and Division commander activities compared the Fire & Fury CR rules, I think there are some observations to make:

First, as Rich H. hasn't told anyone but you [or at least made it general knowledge] what the CR rule is supposed to represent, it is impossible to either know why it is there, let alone see how it relates to history. I t reminds me of a debate on another game list over what the kill or survive aspect of the counter battery fire results represented. A huge number of posts were generated and lots of good ideas. I finally suggested the designer let folks know what the rule was designed to represent. The designer's reasons HADN'T EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED by any of the posters. Of course, once it was known, the discussion was over. No need for it. That dynamic seems to consume a lot of time as most designers don't explain their rules, let alone identify what history it represents.

Second, If I understand your explanation, that the CR rule is meant to represent those actions by Corps and DCs somehow aiding individual brigades from time to time where they could see the target of their help, then it certainly could represent that--however: [You just knew that was coming…]

1. Corps Commander and DC interventions into the operations of individual brigades or regiments was not done very often, generally because such help wasn't always generate a positive result--sometimes it was interference or just plain bad, producing more confusion and scrambled messages, as Longstreet's intervention shows.

2. Because Corps commanders and DCs had other jobs than moving individual brigades along, having a positive effect in movement every half-hour for every brigade in their sight is over the top.

3. I suspect that part of the reason is, again keeping those brigades together and not wandering all over the place. As a brigade's physical relation to the DC's 'range' and line of sight weren't the methods of or limits to a DC's control or influence, particularly across @ 1500 yard front in a half hour, the command methods purposely not depending on those two factors, it is hard to justify a positive modifier for the DC being where he should be on a line that could just as well be longer than 1500 yards and under his 'influence'. When Caldwell races to each end of the line to take care of the flank 'connections', It would have taken him less than five minutes to traverse the entire line, no more than seven to complete the entire journey from the middle to the right, and back again to the left, so 'mounted distance' or a command range of a mile in a half hour seems to be an odd black box for the range of a DC's influence--assuming he went to an individual brigade and not off on division business. Again, that is all based on the notion that a division's frontage had something to do with how far away the DC could throw his influence, which it wasn't.

The Scotsman,

That Pender was not where he was supposed to be is not relevant. That he was mortally wounded is relevant. The question is, because of this were his brigades out of command radius? The answer is yes! The question is what did they do? The answer is nothing.

Swimmingly. No plan survives contact with the enemy and Lee had been around long enough to understand this. Sickles' move changed things but it did not upset the overall eschelon attack. Personally I think Sickles saved the Army of the Potomac by advancing.

Neither was the attack perfectly coordinated. Nevertheless, it had the intent of destroying the Union line and had Pender attacked it had a reasonable "chance" to do so.

The best case was if Sickles had remained in place and Longstreet's attack got to the top of Cemetary Ridge in its first leap. Williard's success was for Lee a worse case. But by moving Williard the Union began to dance to Lee's tune and with Pender Lee was prepared for a worse case.

What Lee was not prepared for was the collapse of command causing the attack to come to a halt.

Using Napoleon's Battles command radius rules, the brigades sit there and the attack comes to a halt.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

"First of all it wasn't an example of the regulating mechanic backfiring."

Yes, it was.

Scotty,

Yea verily on Rich. For whatever reason – and he has told me this directly – he is just not interested in designer's notes or answering questions and the like. There are several BOFF list serves out there, but he is not a member of any and likely will not ever be. Just his personality I guess.

Nevertheless, when I went over this point as regards CR, he never once mentioned to me it was for herding brigades. It does seem to accomplish that intent, but not overly so as when things go to Hell in a handbasket, players seem not overly angsted about igoring the issue. The +1 in most cases just isn't that decisive, and perhaps that's the way it should be.

Otherwise we can agree to disagree. The act of a DC or his aide temporarily (because we are not talking about attaching here) intervening to assist brigade movement may well be worth a +2 or +3 on an individual basis. But sometimes it didn't work, and it didn't happen often, so we dropped it to a +1. If we disregard the DRM altogether, then we don't account for those times the DC or ADC did tweak the situation. I think this is a good compromise, a good rule that has sound historical basis, works well and I am comfortable with it.

And for an example from the Napoleonic period, recall GdD Vandamme at Austerlitz who sent CPT ADC Seron down to the 24th Legere (which seemed to be acting as its own brigade) to direct that the regiment immediately march to the aid of the 4th Ligne which was hard pressed by Russian cavalry. It did happen.

Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

BD wrote:
"First of all it wasn't an example of the regulating mechanic backfiring."

Yes, it was.

BD:
? Kershaw's line didn't split up because of any problem with the regulating regiment or the system, but because of conflicting orders and Hood's constant move away from the Emmittsburg road.

The regulating process is different from the practice of calling out the orders down the line--one is not determined or directly connected by the other. The voice command can be done from anywhere. It was this calling down the orders that was passed on accidentally.

Shane,

It would appear that no one has yet done so… may I comment on your last post?

You say that… "…we unconsciously do it EVERY single time we touch and move our little toy soldiers. WE are actually regulating our formations and their movement constantly and without thought and this is without any rule or guideline or usually any dice roll, we just do it as a matter of course."

Well, that is we do, because the reasons for keeping distance and intervals the same as they appear in maps of the period (and in accounts too!) enable those formations to fight more effectively.
Or rather that is true until players start being creative (and unhistorical) with their battle arrays….
eg: last night at the local club we played Colluden… both forces were deployed on table as per the historical event… but in the game, the English commander had the lines close up; reducing the distance between lines of battle.
So when one, or two of the English battalions were pushed back onto the second line and even the third (reserve) they were too close and could not properly support the first and second lines.
So the distances between lines and intervals between units in line are important.

When the brigade is moving the controls are actually fully turned on and the other battalions` officers are watching their right to take their cue from what the regulating unit is doing.
The command-control of the brigade is not relaxed at this point in time… and so when the bullets start to fly it is not as if the brigade-general suddenly wakes up and switches the auto-pilot off and has to start to do something.

But if the brigade-general has to do something else, taking him away from the regulating battalion, then the limit of his influence is his command.
How long it would take him to get from one flank to another (give, or take 2-3 battalion lengths) ?
Not long at all within a ten minute turn!

Regards,

Mike.

Bill,

In Soult's Corps the first brigade of each division was a single light regiment of 2 battalions commanded by a brigadier.

Thus, the 24th Legere was not acting as a brigade it was a brigade, the 1st Brigade of Vandamme's division. Its brigade commander was General de brigade Schiner.

This Brigade moved under the command of Vandamme, via a verbal order carried by his aide, to support the left flank of the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Ferey. It consisted of the 4th Regiment, which was amid the vines on the Stary Vinorady.

This did not help the 2nd battalion of the 4th which despite its square was run down by the Russian Garde du Corps. The 24th advancing in line under the premise that cavalry could not effectively charge in the vinyards was in its turn run down by the remaining 3 squadrons of the Garde du Corps. It was this action that led Vandamme to state, "It is impossible to make a good omlette without breaking a great many eggs!"

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Yup, that's the one.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

In response to Bandit's question about how different rules manage this here is some excerpts from rules Elan Deluxe, note there are also morale bonuses for Units under Command in given circumstances, or having Generals or ADC's attached to the unit (eg being Charged):

307. All units must be fielded under the command of a General, including Artillery. The Command Radius of a General is 400mm/350mm.
309. A Divisional Commander may override (nullify his command rating) a Brigade Commander within his Division at any time as long as the Brigade Commander is within
the Divisional Commander's command radius (400mm/350mm).
310. A unit must be visible to its General or a member of his Staff and within the Command radius of the General figure to be in command.
311. A player can position an ADC to see the units of his command which are out of view from the commanding General. These units are then "visible" to their commander. Orders are assumed to be relayed through Aides or Couriers (the latter not represented).
312. Aides de Camp can be used in the game to boost morale and help ensure orders are followed and received by units in their Brigade. This is done by attaching Aides to the Unit.
313. Aides that are killed cannot be replaced, but can be re-distributed throughout the Division by the player during a game by normal movement.

Example: The Divisional Commanders Capable rating can be used by a unit attempting to charge rather than the Brigade Commanders Inept rating if the Divisional Commander is within 400mm/350mm of the Brigade Commander.

314. A single unit cannot be transferred from one General to another during the course of a game. But a Brigade may be transferred from one Division to another Division during a game.
315. A General of a particular arm (i.e. Artillery, Infantry or Cavalry) cannot command or exert influence on units of another arm.

Example: An infantry Brigade Commander cannot influence a Cavalry Brigade. However, a Divisional General can command and influence different arms in his command.

Brigades and Units without Command
331. If a Unit is out of command either through being out of sight or command radius or due to the death or wounding of its commanding General it will react depending on how his staff were rated:

-Units of an Exceptional or Capable General of Brigade will continue to behave the way they were when the General of Brigade was killed, eg: if stationary, they will stay halted, if advancing, they will continue to do so.
-Units with an Inept General of Brigade will halt. They can perform normal responses, but cannot declare Charges but can Counter-Charge if charged (if capable of doing so). If retreating, they must test whether they will rout.

332. Units within a Brigade can move out of the command radius of their Brigade Commander although it is recommended players avoid this.

Hi Mike,

What I was explaining in my post was that players, when moving their units have to start with the movement of one btn, sliding it across the table to its new location as the entire formation continues to move or advance. When he has set that btln down in its new location he usually picks up the next btln and slides it into a location relative to the last one he moved and so on down the line until he has moved all of his units within that formation.

To me, this is exactly what happens with the term, "Regulating btln" only that the movement of all is simultaneous, a player can really only move one unit at a time. So, most players are using one unit as the regulator when they move it first and then all others are moved succinctly with it.

There are two occasions when this goes down the gurgler, when the player deliberately decides to break off one or more units to cover a threat, which is usually on a flank or exposed position to the active brigade (formation) and secondly, when the formation actually becomes engaged within say 300yds or less of the enemy.

When I talk about the term, "auto-pilot" I am talking about the actual movement orders and the relegation of the regulating btln and the act of moving all of the formation as a consequence. This is usually before the formation becomes engaged thus when the formation is in the act of advancing from its prior position to the contact point (engagement range) of the enemy. When following movement orders in this situation the Brigadier is found directly traffic yes but only if need be, he might be so happy with his deployment that all he is currently doing is riding his horse with his staff discussing his retirement plans. If the movement orders are set prior, and so they should and a point of aim set the only thing to do is follow those orders until the situation changes and the Brigadier needs to intervene to correct, align or take over control of individual btlns to cover some threat or change direction for example.

Thus when I talk about auto-pilot it is simply the act of following movement orders robotic-ally between order or direction changes, nothing more.

When the formation makes contact with the enemy or a perceived threat is noticed the commander takes control again of the entire formation or part thereof to cover the threat or when contact is made within engagement range to take back the control once more to direct the formation or parts of it when the bullets begin to fly. Plugging gaps, re-aligning btlns, making sure all flanks are protected, personally controlling the fire or one btln or the next and so on.

The myriad of commands he might be barking out is infinite and can cause him to focus on the activity in front of him rather than over seeing the whole. If he becomes involved in directing a particular btln or line he he not available to cover other threats or changing situations within his comand or to the flanks etc. It really depends on where he is and what he is doing.

Yes I know it would not take the general 10 mins to ride from one flank of his line to the other but that is not really the point, it is more so how deeply involved he is within his formation in a particular point of his line and how critical a threat has become. If he is personally involved in a dire situation and needs, "time" to remedy or fix the situation he cannot be at another point on the line where he might be needed. So it is not about distance at this point so much as what he is doing and how involved he has become.

This is why in my own system I have rated the CR's at 500yds, this is because that distance, for my scale is to show time delay for order relay each turn. But when you are down into the Brigade level the CR is reduced to 300yds because the Brigadier can tend to become more involved in the minute details of a combat and is limited to what he can do at any given turn due to his deeper involvement within his brigade. Saying that, a Brigade commander, like any other commander can still ride 500yds in a single turn which is usually more than enough to race to the aid of one flank or the other in a single turn. What stops him is if he is pushed, by the player into taking "personal command" of an individual unit or part of the line and cannot break off to remedy another part in trouble because he might be already deeply involved somewhere else.

The Chain of Command CR's to him and from him to his superior Divisional commander is still 500yds for order relay and delay but his own CR is only 300yds for his influence within the Brigade. It does not mean that he loses control if a unit in his Brigade is over 300yds away, it simply means he cannot intervene in the same turn if a threat or dire situation occurs. Simply put, a delay of one turn occurs before he can take control. But, like you say, a frontage of Brigade btlns is usually not very wide so a 10min turn is usually more than enough to cross the distance to take control. But like I said, if the Brigadier is already deeply involved in a occurring situation he cannot race off to another point in the line to fix the problem if so deeply involved.

The only negative for not being within 300yds is that the units outside of that range do not get the benefit of a +10% morale bonus for him being close. So a Brigadier in my system and his 300yds CR is more so just a Morale buffer than anything else, he is simply placed strategically behind the line to cover the front of his line and radiate a +10% Morale bonus to his entire Brigade.

But when the player decides to use the Brigadier (or any rank) to personally take charge of an individual btln his abilities and bonuses inflate while in personal command of that unit "for that unit only" and the bonuses etc increase markedly for that unit under personal control. However, his sphere of influence and control, "CR" for the rest of the line shrinks to zero yards. He will still continue to give out a +10% Morale for all units within 300yds that can see him but he cannot control the entire brigade, change the situation or re-direct a change of orders or activate new orders and so on. This cannot happen again until he steps back from the personal charge of that unit and is in a position to control the entire brigade once more.

This is the way we play it and it works well for us, it takes a little getting used to for some players but that is in the training of them over time. It teaches players to be careful of how they use their commanders and make decisions as to how deeply they want to involve that commander into actual combat over directing the whole formation. Commanders like Ney for example have a tendency to get involved in the fighting and as a consequence control of the whole diminishes, but is personal contributions to the combat when he becomes deeply involved might also be the deciding factor in the actual combat outcome. You have to weigh up the odds so to speak.

Shane

Shane,

Mostly I think I was trying to say that players have a tendency to bunch units together in columns especially because many rules allow several columns to "gang-up" and fight more effectively than one unit that is deployed… they will also close up the distance between lines of battle because of support rules.
As a spin-off here, I believe that rules are needed to control this… lines of battle were formed by columns with no deployment intervals and brigades and divisions formed columns of deployed lines, but they were used in very particular circumstances and they were not really quite the super-weapon beloved of some napoleonic wargamers and they had their disadvantages.

Also, I said that the brigadier`s influence extended to units within his command and this is not determined by a set game distance… someone else here questioned unrealistic radius effects which may encourage players to keep their units in very short lines or close together …keeping them "in command-control" an expression which may well originate from some wargames rule book of the 1970`s – I`m guessing?

& by the way, I do agree with you about the costs of having generals get themselves involved in the fighting, rallying or management of individual units… and I have catered for this in rules too!

Mike.

Bill G. wrote:
>>>>Yea verily on Rich. For whatever reason – and he has told me this directly – he is just not interested in designer's notes or answering questions and the like. There are several BOFF list serves out there, but he is not a member of any and likely will not ever be. Just his personality I guess.<<<<
Bill G.:
I can understand the sentiments, but it makes it nearly impossible to figure out what might be 'historically accurate' about Rich's game or even why the various mechanics are there. I would never have guessed what Rich wanted his CR rules to represent.

This kind of mystery is a fatal handicap for any simulation. If you don't know what's being simulated, how can you properly relate to it as a simulation? It's like having a flight simulator with none of the game mechanics identified, or identified in such a way that the wrong assumptions are made about what they actually represent.

It's not hard to see why many gamers ignore any history questions and just play the game, or why such a mystery is in the end called an 'illusion' or 'delusion' by others. It can also explain why large numbers of gamers can play ACW and Napoleonic wargames and never really come to an understanding of the basic history of either.

Richard's "accurate history" is a waste of time if no one knows where it is in the game or worse, players can easily assume it represents something else entirely. You're willingness to explain your thinking with AOE is a major reason for its success, and players' enjoyment of it, regardless of whether folks agree with your particular conclusions or not.

Scotty

Bill G. wrote:
>>>>>Nevertheless, when I went over this point as regards CR, he never once mentioned to me it was for herding brigades. It does seem to accomplish that intent, but not overly so as when things go to Hell in a handbasket, players seem not overly angsted about igoring the issue. The +1 in most cases just isn't that decisive, and perhaps that's the way it should be.<<<

Bill G.
I don't see this as an issue of what history was ignored. I don't particularly angst over that either. It is a question of what IS there, whether the accomplished 'intent' of the rule actually models the designer's chosen history. I also don't believe it's an issue of how thin the history is spread. The question is whether it is a 'reasonable' taste of the Napoleonic. [I know, a tortured simile].

Various examples of division commander actions have been offered in this thread. They pretty much survey what I have seen in my reading. Basically, DCs [and Corps Commanders at their level] did four things during battle, and I list them below in order of their frequency on the battlefield:

[And the aide-de-camps too, who were only helping do the DCs job. I can give lots of examples of that relationship.]

1. DCs directed the ENTIRE command, the division, and made sure it was well-positioned.

Examples of this were mentioned, including Birney moving his division forward while engaged and Caldwell checking the division's flanks to make sure they were 'connected.' This is the primary work of a division commander. It takes time.

2. When engaged, DCs Committed the division's reserves, called for reinforcements:

This is taking uncommitted units and engaging them at critical points. Once a division was engaged, this became the primary occupation of a DC. All but one of the examples show this committing specific reserves/supporting units to combat, which is also what I have found. Lots more time burned up by this activity. It is specific instructions to specifically unengaged units.

Your example fits here. Vandamme commits a reserve/support/second line of unengaged units. The 4th Ligne was first pulled from the unengaged second line to meet a specific threat developing on the 24th Legere's left flank. [The 24th Legere WAS organized as a separate brigade.] When the 4th is later threatened by Russian cavalry, Vandamme again commits the closest UNENGAGED unit, now the 24th Legere, to return the favor. During that time Vandamme is not influencing the movement of all three of his brigades, with or without his ADCs.

3. DCs shored up hot spots with a whole brigade or individual regiments and battalions.

Now, as I understand it from your explanations, the last three are 'to some degree' represented by the F&F and AOE CR rules.

The second activity is related to very specific situation, and it is the example you offer.

The third activity is not seen that often, which is why it is mentioned by regimental officers and such. I would think would be represented by the 'attached' rule. This is where officers like Ney are criticized for getting too involved in the small stuff, and abandoning their real responsibilities. It is important to note that if a divisional commander carried out two of #2 in a half hour, that was a critical situation, and if he or his ADCs carried out two of #3, a very serious situation, one like that faced by Birney and Caldwell, where both divisions are basically destroyed for the duration. Remember those are combat situations and there already are modifiers for DCs and CCs when combat is resolved.

4. DCs sent information or orders to individual units they could see.

You gave one example of this. The DC or CC is an informational conduit. This occurred the least of all the DC or CC actions. It is a rare event, happening less than once an hour, if that—depending on the situation—but still a rare occurrence. Part of the reason it is a rare occurrence is that it had a definite potential for screwing things up further. For instance, the commander on the hill seeing the cavalry that the battalion can't. He doesn't know if the brigadier saw the cavalry too and has ordered his battalion to move from his isolated spot. Longstreet intervened with Kershaw at Gettysburg, and created more problems rather than a positive influence. Intervening was a slippery slope and not done on a regular basis.

Rich H., and then your CR rule is meant to represent the particular help that a DC or CC can provide outside their basic business—I understand that it is generic, and simplified.

The rule's function implies that DCs and CCs--not potentially--but actually DID influence [in a small way] EACH AND EVERY brigade they could see within 900 to 1600 yards every thirty minutes, and they specifically influence a unit's ability to move to their full ability. That is regardless of formation--regardless of the proximity of the enemy--that is all the time. AND TACTICALLY, that is the way the players use them.

Even as a simple compromise, is that rule a 'reasonable' model of what was actually being done, COULD be done by a DC or CC in a 30 minute period?

Does that model anything of what those DCs WOULD do every half hour, even mildly? Would they even attempt to influence the activities of every brigade in their command?

Saying that it is a small effect doesn't negate the question, and perhaps skews the history represented even further. Can we reasonably say that commanders applied their "influence" in such a blanket fashion—generally to such mild affect?

If we are modeling DCs and ADCs tweaking 'a situation', we have to know what kind of situations they primarily focused on among the myriad possibilities found on the battlefield—not blanket them all with a mild positive nudge, particularly if a 'tactical flavor' is the goal.

The rule doesn't show what particular situations were a 'tweaking' priority. The rule doesn't reflect the fundamental practices of how and why DC's and CCs 'tweaked' a tactical situation. For instance, in every case given here, where a DC or CC committed unengaged units, there never was a failure to do what was ordered.

>>>Otherwise we can agree to disagree. The act of a DC or his aide temporarily (because we are not talking about attaching here) intervening to assist brigade movement may well be worth a +2 or +3 on an individual basis. But sometimes it didn't work, and it didn't happen often, so we dropped it to a +1. If we disregard the DRM altogether, then we don't account for those times the DC or ADC did tweak the situation. I think this is a good compromise, a good rule that has sound historical basis, works well and I am comfortable with it.<<<

Yep, we can agree to disagree. I am not saying the rule doesn't work because it is the wrong thing to simulate, or because it lacked enough +1s. Nor am I saying that such command considerations have to be represented in a wargame for it to work as a simulation. Designers are free to simulate whatever they want.

I am saying the compromise doesn't work because the original "historical logic" on which it was based and attempts to model isn't a reasonable simulation of what ACW or Napoleonic command actually spent their time doing, or actually could do in the first place, particularly when such things as 'attached' commander rules are already in place.

[This kind of mystery is a fatal handicap for any simulation. If you don't know what's being simulated, how can you properly relate to it as a simulation?]

Fire & Fury has been one of the most successful wargames of all time, selling out of three printings, with more than fifteen thousand happy customers. It was released more than 17 years ago, and is still the most popular ACW set.

You, alone, appear to regard it as a "fatal handicap." The rest of the hobby is quite satisfied that F&F was a brilliant design, and is content to let it rest there.

[It can also explain why large numbers of gamers can play ACW and Napoleonic wargames and never really come to an understanding of the basic history of either.]

It would probably be very ill-advised to rely upon games to learn about history. If you want to teach people about history, then do the research and write a book.

[You're willingness to explain your thinking with AOE is a major reason for its success]

The reason AOE is a success is that it's a good game, based upon a good game. If it weren't a good game, then no amount of Colonel Bill's philosophizing about his intentions for the design would suffice to make it successful. There are *plenty* of people who have designed bad or unsuccessful games, who are more than happy to talk about them ad nauseum on the internet, and who might have very sound historical theses to expound for why they designed them the way they did. That doesn't make their games good or successful.

Arty Conliffe hasn't emerged from his Cone of Silence in nearly 8 years now, yet people still play and love his games by the tens of thousands, and are obviously quite content with their value as games, simulations, whatever.

Personally, I regard it as something of a mistake to have tried to include designer's notes. It is probably a lot smarter to simply let the game stand on its own, and let the players decide what it means to them.

Phillipaj,

"Brigades and Units without Command 331."

This is a hard one for me to either accept as correct or offer a better solution to. A commander may do something random. "Good" vs "Bad" tends to be "did they do the thing we wanted in retrospect," not "did they do X or Y predefined thing."

Thus, a good commander may halt or continue, a bad commander may halt or continue. Lots of bad officers continued to follow orders even if their commander was killed.

But, like I said, I am unsure how to change this. One could (and some do) set ratings for various characteristics, deeper than "good or bad." But this does quickly increase the overhead of a rules system.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Shane wrote:
>>>>All this talk about the, "Regulating Battalion" and or the, "Regulating Brigade" and so on brings me to another point I have already made vaguely earlier. TheScotsman talks about the regulation use of this formation and we all agree, it was used, it is realistic, historically correct and used as a form of Command Control, I think we all agree there.

But it is also seen by a few here to be used in the maneuvering and movement of a greater formation so as to keep the other units within that formation aligned to each other and heading in the right direction with minimal need for the actual commander to have to intervene to any great detail unless things went wrong. Now, what could go wrong, contact with the enemy for one thing…For me, these btlns or brigades were used for movement and maneuvering and that is it, to align the formations and keep them relative to each other, nothing more. As someone else stated, once the bullets start flying things become a little chaotic and individualistic. Formations and units still need to align themselves with each other but individual commands are barked out by the commander who needs to be everywhere at once at times. Thus the use of CR's in some systems and the reasoning for their use.<<<<<<

Shane:
I think I understand your issue, but I don't see any evidence of your conclusions. We are talking about how commanders controlled their divisions. The methods and the limitations. When a division is engaged, the officers don't abandon the communication and command system simply because things go wrong. Nor do they start depending on another altogether. When Birney's divisional battle line is engaged, you quote him as writing:

"The first Brigade, which had been longest engaged, had expended all its ammunition, when I ordered Colonel Brooke to relieve it. He advanced with his usual gallantry, and drove the enemy until he gained the crest of the hill, which was afterward gained by the whole of my line. In this advantageous position I halted, and called upon General Barnes, who was some distance in the rear, to send a brigade to the support of my line."

He commits the reserve and then says 'which was afterward gained by the whole of my line. In this advantageous position I halted…. "

His division has been engaged long enough for a brigade to run out of ammo. Do you see Birney and his aides running up and down the line telling each regiment or brigade to move forward, then repeat the process to halt? Is that the sense you get? It simply didn't work that way.

One of the basic, fundamental responsibilities of a regimental or brigade commander was to maintain alignment. If lost, it was seen as a critical priority to re-establish. If alignment is lost, it is the very first thing to fix. When regulations like Dundas's or Casey's speak of the vital importance of maintaining 'order', they are speaking of both internal and external order, and alignment is fundamental to the external order. It is one thing that lines stop to re-establish.

Certainly, ADCs and the General rode up and down the line to take care of problems AT TIMES. There is Caldwell riding to one end of his engaged division to the other to check on the division's connection to supporting divisions. Seven minutes total travel time.

There are only three basic reasons a DC would leave his designated spot in the division: respond to or give information, deliver orders to a certain point, including committing reserves, or to speak to his superior.

The problem with leaving the middle of a division or the regulating battalion is that it is harder for him to respond to or give information, receive information and orders, or commit his reserves.

The DC was supposed to leave an aide behind to direct any communication, but that only worked if he actually went to and only to the point he said he was going. It was one reason a DC had a flag with him—so he could be found, which might be a problem even if he remained at the center of a moving divisional line a mile long.

>>>>>>>>Formations and units still need to align themselves with each other but individual commands are barked out by the commander who needs to be everywhere at once at times. Thus the use of CR's in some systems and the reasoning for their use.<<<<<

Actually divisions conformed to each other and there would be a regulating division, depending on the plan. The reason such a fuss was made about getting Laws up to the front of Hood's division column on the Second of July was that he was the senior brigade. Hood was the senior division, which is why Kershaw made such an effort as Mclaws senior brigade to keep in contact with him.

Knowing that a Divisional Commander couldn't possibly be 'everywhere at once' at any time, command systems were designed to avoid that necessity if at all possible.

By the time a divisional commander HAS TO be everywhere at once, the system has broken down, including the use of ADCs. One reason you see Birney with the 17th. Things have aready gone pear-shaped. Games sometimes show this dynamic, where the command figures that aren't used much in the game suddenly become needed everywhere when the order is lost and units are giving way.

"Command Radius" distances simply weren't a primary control concern of commanders. Neither Birney or Caldwell express such worries, even though their commands were driven in. Civil War and Napoleonic divisional commanders controlled divisions made up of between two and six brigades.

With the entire division in line, it stretched between 600 and 2000 yards long, between .3 and 1.25 miles on average.
Where do you see commanders 'angsting' [a new word] over the length of the line in terms of communication and control? Did CSA divisional commanders with six brigades have more ADCs than US divisional leaders with two brigades? No, and some times less. The same is true for Napoleonic divisions.

IF distance were a primary limitation to communication and control for division commanders, then one would think there would be an enforced limitation to the number of a division's brigades in line, some relationship between the number of brigades and a Division's command structure, number of ADCs etc. There isn't any, either in the military writings, or in practice, Napoleonic or Civil War.

How "thin" the line was, remained much, much more of a concern, which Birney voices in his battle report. His line is over a mile long--I can communicate? No, it's my god, the line's too thin. That 'thinness' and whether the division had reserves/support dominated the thinking on the length of a line, not the actual distance.

So, absolutely, yes: divisional and corps commanders found it necessary to be at certain points in the line for a variety of reasons, or they sent an ADC, but it wasn't that often and the distance of any travel wasn't seen as the limit of the commander's control. If it had been, then employing CSA divisions with six brigades was dooming two or more of them to being out of control— according to all the command radius rules I have seen—whenever the division went completely to line—which they did regularly.

There is a lot of 'juice' around the picture of divisional commanders galloping up on and down the line on horse back, issuing a few orders and dashing away again, if they don't then lead the nearby regiments in a charge or stiffen their ranks with a Grand Gesture. It is this image that led the makers of the movie of "Gettysburg" to have Hood shot down while pointing his sword at the enemy and yelling his boys onward. Far too managerial and ho-hum in image to be knocked out of the saddle by a shell burst when simply riding behind the lines to his senior brigade behind the lines.

I have a question I think is valid. Now remember, I'm only an SFC in the US Army who has been to Iraq for three tours and Afghanistan once so I don't have the vast Divisional, Brigade, or Regimental command experience of a man like "the Scotsman" but I have commanded soldiers in the field "recently", and I was the NCOIC of my Troop.

Do any of you "experts" ACTRUALLY HAVE EXPERIENCE COMMANDING TROOPS IN THE FIELD?

I believe my question is valid. From actual combat experience on the modern battlefield I can tell you there is a "verbal command radius" that surrounds each individual responsible for issuing orders. That radius applies when the COM/NET goes down. That happens more than I think you want to know. Runners are perhaps the equivalent of staff officers of your period on "MY" battlefield.

SFC Danson NCOIC, Bravo Troop, 2nd Bn, 30th Infantry, 4th Brigade, 10th Mtn.

In the unlikely event that everyone's decided to hide his light under a bushel:
TMP link

"In the unlikely event that everyone's decided to hide his light under a bushel:
TMP link"

Hey, we've had two or three contributing veterans to this thread already, myself NOT included, but I still won't be hiding any lights under a bushel…

"Do any of you "experts" ACTRUALLY HAVE EXPERIENCE COMMANDING TROOPS IN THE FIELD?"

Well, that's why I prefer the term "historian" over "expert".

Were you at Waterloo, Belgium June 18th, 1815 ? Or Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 1-3, 1863 ?

Some of these people know those battles better than many of the participants did.

Remember that scene in the movie "Patton" when Old Guts ‘n' Glory is visiting the ruins of I think it was Carthage? and is describing the Roman sack of the city in great detail? His chief-of-staff turns to him and says , "General, you talk as though you were there" and Patton--George C. Scott--replies, "But I was, Dick, I was…."

Shane
>>>>>When Birney's divisional battle line is engaged, you quote him as writing:<<<<<

Scotsman, you are mis quoting me again….I did not write the passage you are replying to.

>>>>>Do any of you "experts" ACTRUALLY HAVE EXPERIENCE COMMANDING TROOPS IN THE FIELD?<<<<<

Not in actual combat but yes, limited but I have.

>>>>>I believe my question is valid. From actual combat experience on the modern battlefield I can tell you there is a "verbal command radius" that surrounds each individual responsible for issuing orders. That radius applies when the COM/NET goes down. That happens more than I think you want to know. Runners are perhaps the equivalent of staff officers of your period on "MY" battlefield.<<<<<

that is about the most logical thing I have heard on this thread, well said rabbit.

Shane

Wilbur E. Gray
Colonel, US Army (Ret)

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

If a full bird colonel is using command radii in war gaming simulations I am not so sure Thescotsman has really got a leg to stand on in telling us we are all wrong in using the mechanic?

Not trying to be facetious here, just making a point in asking the question.

Shane

silly rabbit wrote:

"verbal command radius"

Hard to argue with that. Sounds like the foundation of CR to me.

silly rabbit wrote:

"From actual combat experience on the modern battlefield I can tell you there is a "verbal command radius" that surrounds each individual responsible for issuing orders. "

There's a great description somewhere from a southern veteran about what it was like on the ACW battle field. I remember him saying there was a lot more talk--yelling to each other--on the battlefield than people would have expected, not only by the officers, but by the men. It was their version of the COM/NET, especially when the line ceased to be a parade ground formation.

If I come across it again, will definitely make the notation.

Two summers West Point football camp and a few games of skirmish.

BA & MA History, MA Teaching & Instruction (in progress)

Jim

Shane,

Your question is not valid. Command on the Napoleonic battlefield has absolutely nothing to do with command on the modern battlefield.

Up to 8% of each battalion on the Napoleonic battlefield consists of cadre which girdles the infantrymen preventing them from running till the unit is reduced to mush via combat and oozes out between the cadre as mud oozes between the fingers of a clenched fist. When you ad to this the Division General, the brigadier and the corps general and all their sisters, their cousins and their aunts – whoops wrong venue – all of their staff and aides, there are alot of guys controlling those infantry.

That aint the way it happens on the modern battlefield. I haven't seen a dead army commander since Walker fell off of his jeep in Korea. Generals sit in command vehicles, which is their proper place, far from danger speaking by radio to their battalion and company commanders who are capable of communicating directly with the air and artillery support.
At the lowest level each infantryman is directly connected to his squad leader by radio, see the little microphone on their helmuts, the squad leader is connected to the platoon leader etc.

If you want to believe otherwise be my guest. But do expect me to accept your premise as valid because it is not.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Mr. Coggins, Your rules were my first required reading when I came onboard my current assignment. My boss handed me several boxes of 15mm Napoleonic figures and your rules and told me to sit down with one of the other members of our team and learn to play "that game".

I respect your grasp of warfare at the level of your rules, and I mean no disrespect, but you clearly do not understand how the military functions on today's battlefield for you to make the statement you've just made regarding where modern commanders "sit" during an engagement.

My direct boss worked in "The Bug", the command center for the 1st Marine Division during the 2003 move to Baghdad. MGen Mattis (Division and Task Group commander) nearly spent less time there(his HQ complex)than he did on the ground right behind the lead elements of his command (in a Hummer using an unsecured cell phone to issue commands or issuing verbal orders to runners, staff members, or the commander of the unit he was watching) or in the air, over the same lead elements, directing them by radio or by landing and issuing verbal orders.

Communication by radio net sucked in Iraq in 2003. MGen Mattis went through Iridium Satellite Cell Phone Batteries at a prodigious rate during the drive north because that was the only way, besides face to face, he was able to keep contact with the fast pace of the battle.

His command of well over 20,000 Marines and 10,000 other troops required him to issue face-to-face verbal orders many more times than he wished, but that is what he had to do. His Huey or his Hummer took the place of the horse or his feet of the Napoleonic period, but it terms of ground space covered of his deployed forces I'd bet a months salary he had a command control radius of different sizes appropriate to which method of transport he used regardless of the radio net, which at that time was highly unreliable.

The man in command having to talk face-to-face during a battle has not changed since time began. A commander forced to do so can only directly influence those around him within the range of his voice, the distance a runner can travel on foot, horse, vehicle, etc… within a reasonable time. That amount of time can probably be defined as the time between when a commander realizes he needs to make a change in his battle plan and when the actual change takes place, or the enemy forces a change, which ever is shorter.

I may only be an Sgt. First Class, but I have watched men and women in combat have to issue orders in all the ways mentioned above due to the circumstances under which they are forced to operate. The friction of live fire on the modern battlefield is much faster paced than it was during the period covered by your rules, but it is no less critical to the command of troops in the field.

SFC Danson, JRTC

You guys asked how the conforming process might be represented in a game. I have seen/played three different methods put together by others, though I have heard of more, and I and my colleagues are working on our own—each has its attractions:

1. SIMPLE: Brigades had a regulating location, left, right, or center. It is the first stand moved and then all the rest with the terrain and other units, combat and such creating the complications. Any stands unattached by this were 'out of command' and could only be brought back into command by either the DC attaching himself to the disconnected stands, or they caught up to their brigade and reattached. This has been used with Volley and Bayonet, F&F and another ACW set with a smaller scale that I can't remember.

2. SMALL ADAPTIONS of another rule set: I have played it with both F&F and AOE and Shako where the CR is done away with entirely, but the Attached Rule is kept. The brigade has a regulating point in the front line [center, left, or right] or with the column of the brigade, on the right center or left. They used the 'breakthrough' figure with a flag to denote the location. The first 'regulating' stand is moved to where the player wants the brigade or division, if several brigades are working together, or several divisions for that matter. The entire line is then moved. IF stands are blocked from moving, or slowed because of terrain, then every stand past that point away from the regulating stand are delayed.

The player has the very same choice at this point as the contemporary commanders: You either stop the line and wait until all the stands are aligned again [each side touching the adjacent stands]. Or the commander can move ahead next turn and the remainder is on its own. IF only a partial brigade, then the ONLY things the stands could do were 1. remain where they were until an officer moved them, or attempt move in a straight line to reattach to the parent brigade each subsequent turn—and couldn't stop until it did reattach or was met by a command officer.

With this system, only brigades that were regulating brigades rolled on the F&F/AOE maneuver table. Obviously, having them in a long chain upped the odds of moving. If alone, a brigade was automatically a regulating brigade for itself—as it would be historically. The +1 was added to the regulating brigade if the divisional commander was attached.

IF the divisional commander attached himself to another regulating brigade, then they got the +1. In every case the DC was treated as attached and moved with the unit. A DC could detach and move to a unit needing to reorganize or rally, in which case, the DC didn't add it's +1 to the maneuver roll of any other brigades. No officer movement was used per se. When DCs were moved, they were simply moved from where they were to where the player wanted them to be within the division.

3.DETAILED RULE SET: This has been done by other gamers. The regulating battalion here also is formed right or left in front, which controls which way it can from a line facing the enemy from a column. The basing and formation are much as Shako. This right and left in front can be annoying. If you don't approach the enemy on the correct side, then when you face the enemy, you are inverted.

At Perryville, a Division commander raced a Union brigade into position to face the oncoming Confederates, only he hadn't bothered to see whether the brigade was right or left in front. When he commanded 'Face front', the entire brigade turned their backs to the enemy, leaving many of the officers between their own troops and the enemy. Turning around left them inverted, ass-backwards.

In these rules the Divisional commander can attach to a brigade to influence them period. Movement or combat are the two 'influences'. How much or whether it is positive is rolled for. Negative possibilities are highest in combat, but generally low. Again, brigades are in command if aligned and out of command if not. If different brigades have different lines of advances or different objectives, then they are separate commands.

SO WHAT?
That is the question. These kind of rules not only mimic the actual movement mechanics of brigades, division and corps, but they also illustrate the actual problems when the system goes south. A line that has its alignment broken by combat or terrain or just command errors, becomes partially immobile, partially out of command. Without all the 'chance' problems that might slow a brigade or keep it from operating, the system naturally provides that. A division attempting to advance will find they can't go at full speed because part of their line has become unhinged.

Artillery can now slow an advance by simply slowing one brigade—or break the advance up with a 'disorder' when the DC decides to race ahead anyway, like Hood at Gettysburg.
When a division is engaged, brigades will retreat and advance, lose their alignment, basically rendering the division immobile. After an engagement, a player/commander will have to take time to reorganize his division before it can move as a division on a new objective. When the wheels come off, the 'out of command' troops have as their #1 priority: get back into command, which is again, the real choice seen on the battlefield and in the regulations.
And when the wheels come off, the DC [player] is faced with the similar decisions for his division and where to spend his time [as basic tasks, not distances] as the historical generals. It is easy to find historical accounts discussing the same issues and generals working on the same problems in battle.

These aren't the only ways to represent this, or even "the best" ways. They are functional models of what they are supposed to represent. I can tell you what I'm personally working on if you are interested.

Ratisbon wrote:
That Pender was not where he was supposed to be is not relevant. That he was mortally wounded is relevant. The question is, because of this were his brigades out of command radius? The answer is yes! The question is what did they do? The answer is nothing.

Ratisbon:
One reason Pender's death was such a problem was that the right people didn't know he was wounded or dead. His unknown location created that. It's not like the loss of a Divisional commander was such a unique experience for CSA command structure. A smooth transition was handicapped by other factors, like where he died. The remaining general officers didn't all just stand around wringing their hands for several hours repeating "what will we do, what will we do?", did they? Where he died was was quite relevant to the problems that ensued.

[This kind of mystery is a fatal handicap for any simulation. If you don't know what's being simulated, how can you properly relate to it as a simulation?]

Sam wrote:
>>>>Fire & Fury has been one of the most successful wargames of all time, selling out of three printings, with more than fifteen thousand happy customers. It was released more than 17 years ago, and is still the most popular ACW set.

You, alone, appear to regard it as a "fatal handicap." The rest of the hobby is quite satisfied that F&F was a brilliant design, and is content to let it rest there.<<<<

Sam:
Gosh Sam, I didn't know that about F&F. I didn't say it wasn't a good game, I said it kinda hard for a simulation to work if the participants have little or no idea of what they are supposed to be simulating. Where "Accurate History" is never identify, it is difficult to understand, let alone simulate. It's even harder if the players are forced to guess and get it wrong. That is the 'Fatal Flaw' for a simulation. Players have to know what they are simulating before the simulation can actually work. Obviously, it works just fine as a game.

[It can also explain why large numbers of gamers can play ACW and Napoleonic wargames and never really come to an understanding of the basic history of either.]

>>>>It would probably be very ill-advised to rely upon games to learn about history. If you want to teach people about history, then do the research and write a book.<<<<

Really? I will have to let all those training and educational companies, the military and teachers know that. ;-\ Simulation games teach when the artificial environment relates to a real environment. If the players don't know anything how the game environment relates to the historical environment, then yes, nothing is learned.

[You're willingness to explain your thinking with AOE is a major reason for its success]

>>>>>>The reason AOE is a success is that it's a good game, based upon a good game. If it weren't a good game, then no amount of Colonel Bill's philosophizing about his intentions for the design would suffice to make it successful. There are *plenty* of people who have designed bad or unsuccessful games, who are more than happy to talk about them ad nauseum on the internet, and who might have very sound historical theses to expound for why they designed them the way they did. That doesn't make their games good or successful.<<<<<<<

Sam, I said it was A major reason for its success, not THE reason. But we can agree to disagree on this. I know how many folks are on Bill's AOE List and how much action it gets, and I know how many folks are on your GA list and how much action it gets. If you don't believe that difference has something to do with Bill G.s willingness to explain the history simulated in his design, Okay.

>>>>Arty Conliffe hasn't emerged from his Cone of Silence in nearly 8 years now, yet people still play and love his games by the tens of thousands, and are obviously quite content with their value as games, simulations, whatever.<<<

Same comparison with AOE, same results.

>>>>>>Personally, I regard it as something of a mistake to have tried to include designer's notes. It is probably a lot smarter to simply let the game stand on its own, and let the players decide what it means to them.<<<<

Yes, I can see why you would say that. I do agree though, a game can stand on it's own if it's just a game. Monopoly doesn't need designer's notes. Battle Cry and Memoir '44 don't.

It has to do with the intent of the designer--what is the design supposed to do? And as a game, I am quite willing to play GA. However, your designer's notes claim that GA presents "the way it was" on the Napoleonic battlefield.

Silly Rabbit wrote:
Do any of you "experts" ACTRUALLY HAVE EXPERIENCE COMMANDING TROOPS IN THE FIELD?

I believe my question is valid. From actual combat experience on the modern battlefield I can tell you there is a "verbal command radius" that surrounds each individual responsible for issuing orders. That radius applies when the COM/NET goes down. That happens more than I think you want to know. Runners are perhaps the equivalent of staff officers of your period on "MY" battlefield.

SR:
It is a very valid question. And for those that haven't experienced actual combat during the Napoleonic Wars and the Civil War etc., we are kinda dependent on those that have experienced it. There are probably any number of common experiences in combat and military operations across the centuries, but we could only know that by paying attention what the historical accounts say to identify the commonalities.

For instance, in Casey, Hardee and Duffield's regulations, every order description for company up to division commands follow with the words 'then is rapidly repeated' by the officers in the subordinate commands. Obviously there is a verbal command radius. There was a required distance between brigades and divisions of 20 yards--all three regs. say this. So with the positions of the officers, there would be at least one in the voice radius [@ 20yards] of the next officer.

But each regulation also says : "As voice commands may be lost in the noise of battle" and they then give the fall-back actions an officer should take when voice commands were lost. The first was 'follow the directing battalion by copying the actions of the company, battalion, brigade on your right or left, depending on the side the regulating unit is on. The very last option, if all others have failed, is to send a runner--first to find the adjacent units--and if that failed, then to the higher command. This would have been on foot, until you get to brigade or division were mounted couriers would have been available.

Bill (Haggart), I don't think I've ever 'met' anyone as obsessive as you. You've spent Seven Freakin Years ranting on and on about one sentence in an obscure corner of my designer's notes. You've mentioned it something like 4-5 times on this thread alone. Nobody else on God's Green Earth gives a tinker's cuss about it. *I* haven't even played Grande Armée in the last four years, much less hung out on the GA Yahoo site; I long ago moved on to other things.

You need to, too.

And if you really believe that the success of a wargame is based upon the degree to which the designer indulges an obsessive gadfly on a Yahoo site, then you're in for some rude shocks if and when you do ever produce a game of your own and try to sell it.

Different people get different things out of the hobby. For some, it's mostly aesthetic. For others, it's competitive. For others, it's about camradery and beer. And for some people, apparently, their hobby is primarily talking about the hobby. As a designer you will have to deal with those people. They pride themselves on never being satisfied, and always having to have the last word(s). Fortunately there aren't many of them, but they compensate for a lack of numbers with incredible verbosity.

Colonel Bill is much more patient than I am; good for him. But since he and I have the same publisher for GA and AOE, I do happen to know the sales figures for both, and GA has outsold AOE by about 3:2. But even if you add all GA & AOE sales together, we're still collectively dwarfed by Shako – a game which has sold more than both of ours, combined, by a designer who doesn't even speak to the public at all!

Which brings us back to your contention that Rich Hasenhauer's declining to hang out on the internet and philosophize about his game is a "fatal handicap" to Fire and Fury as a simulation.

Perhaps, Bill… just perhaps… You are the only person who has ever worried about it.

Or, perhaps I'm wrong. In which case, I recommend that you gather together all those like-minded folks who long for the ideal simulation, and the designer who will talk with you about it for the rest of eternity, and start your own Yahoo Group!

Bandit-

Yes I know its not an ideal mechanism, but a couple things to factor in when considering this rule:
- there is provision for wounded/killed Generals to be replaced, through battlefield replacement/promotion, so the effect of the rule would be very temporary
- it also forces players to think about the command/control risks of exposing their staff. They can, such as attaching to a unit to ensure a critical charge goes home, but the risks are enormous.

As much as I'd like to see this thread reach 600 posts I think its turned a little toxic so will bow out now from it,
happy gaming all!

cheers

Phillip

Scotsman (Bill?),
Could you fill me in on the details of "Hood at Gettysburg" (post #542) please – is that an example of a command or part of a command being slowed after becoming disordered by artillery fire?
Also, I wonder if you have to hand any Napoleonic examples of this happening by artillery fire?
Mike.

Sam,

Actually you don't know the sales numbers. Dave has really never given me or Rich a consistent answer on what he sold (it seems to change from post to post), and I have been self publishing and selling them seperate from Quantum for about a year now.

About the only pat on the back I ever give myself is that Dennis of OMM made an off the cuff comment that AOE was long his best seller. Regardless, I do know what BOFF and NB sold, and we ain't close.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Mike wrote:
Scotsman (Bill?),
Could you fill me in on the details of "Hood at Gettysburg" (post #542) please – is that an example of a command or part of a command being slowed after becoming disordered by artillery fire?
Also, I wonder if you have to hand any Napoleonic examples of this happening by artillery fire?

Mike:
Yep, it's Bill. I am not sure that I made a connection between Hood at Gettysburg and artillery fire slowing an advance, did I? I certainly can provide Napoleonic examples of advances being slowed by artillery fire, specifically battle lines stopping or slowing to re-align themselves.