"The "Command Radius"" Topic

Oh heck.

Shane, my question is NOT ABOUT YOU. My question is NOT ABOUT SHANE'S RULES.

Do you read posts before you reply? Seriously man, this isn't about *you* at all.

YOU SAID: "I am playing devils advocate here and defending other designers reasoning for using the mechanic is all."

Now when I ask you to explain the reasoning you keep referencing your rules (I can't tell you how little I care at this point) and direct me to go ask them …

Geeze man, consistency?

Cheers,

The Bandit

>>>>>Thus I do not see how this piece of evidences supports the use of CR<<<<<

And if you read my post you will find I agree with you…

Like I keep saying, there are reasons other game designers use CR's so ask them why, I am pointing out some reasons why they might use them this way, does not mean I agree with them for gods sake…

>>>>>Shane, my question is NOT ABOUT YOU. My question is NOT ABOUT SHANE'S RULES<<<<<

And again, I am not talking about my rules, this does not seem to be sinking in is it for you?

I am telling you some reasons WHY "Other" designers "might" use the mechanic, "CR's"….

we done yet?

I am just about over this thread now.

"I am pointing out some reasons why they (game designers) might use them (CR) this way" – Shane

Yet when pressed for such reasons you refer to your own rules or say you don't use CR. You confuse the heck out of me, I really don't know what to say.

Shane: game designers may use CR for good reasons of which I can think of many
Me: what would those be?
Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: awesome, but those reasons you mentioned, what would those be?
Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: was I dreaming during the first couple hundred posts when you kept defending CR or taking issue with those posters who questioned it?
Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: ok, gotcha, war of attrition, I give up

Regarding Decker – there are 1,565 military history books at Amazon written by or about a "Decker". Can you clarify at all?

Cheers,

The Bandit

'And again, I am not talking about my rules, this does not seem to be sinking in is it for you?

I am telling you some reasons WHY "Other" designers "might" use the mechanic, "CR's"….' – Shane

When exactly did you stop talking about your rules when asked about the general question of CR?

Cheers,

The Bandit

(Below is *just* from page 9 alone, seems "I am not talking about my rules" must have occurred on the top of page 10).

2/16/2009 @ 6:28 PM PST
Thus the reason why rules designers introduce mechanics to show "Friction" on the battlefield. This is why I use CR's coupled with Activation Rolls, if ya don't like it then it is fine with me. I will keep using it and the guys keep enjoying the system and as far as we are concerned and several others it is realistic enough for us.

2/17/2009 @ 6:16 PM PST
Not sure why you are asking this question, I have provided so many words already as to why I use CR's. Time – motion and distance. If the scotsman does not agree then that is his business. I do not use CR's like many other designers such as William for example does but they have the right to use the mechanic and declare it as a legitimate way of showing some aspect of Napoleonic war gaming. More than enough people here already have defended the concept already, including me, I have no desire to repeat myself again.

2/17/2009 @ 6:47 AM PST
…my use of CR's is to do with order relay and delay based on time and motion. I do NOT use CR's for any other reason.
… I do NOT use CR's for herding sheep, coralling units or for any other reason, therefore I cannot answer your question at all.

2/17/2009 @ 6:52 AM PST
This leads me to my point, I use CR's for order relay and delay only, so if a brigade or division or even a btln strays outside its intended regulated place inside the parent formation for any reason then the CR as I use it comes into play to show, yes that's it, Order relay and delay…due to the possible extra distance it has strayed. Does this answer your question?

2/17/2009 @ 7:59 AM PST
I have already said that I would not use CR's for command control BUT They, (other designers)have the right to use CR's as a game mechanic, you will have to take it up with them as to why they use it as they do. Ask them.

P.S.
If you go look at my questions on page 9, I never reference your rules in any way. I ask for the reasoning behind CR, the last thing I wanted was for you to bring up your rules, they were not the focus of my question.

Shane – I long ago lost the desire to trawl through 400 posts of people trying to bat on you, so pardon if this has been asked/answered before.

If Command Control relied on adjacent units relaying the orders – then the CR is broken by a sufficient gap in the group. Perhaps it may be said by being outside the radius.

In addition the 'go' was, I think, said not to occur until all units had received the order (presumably by having it relayed back that xx unit had received?) So the delay in the order being properly activated is relative to the distance the command is spread out, further delayed if an adjacent unit is separated enough that someone has to run across and yell in the Commanders ear to overcome the battle noise.
CR…time…distance…delay.

I'm beginning to think the length of a thread is proportional to the possible number of angels on its pin head.

Jeff

>>>I have learned quite a bit, gained some perspective on the history and other views (some of which were uncomfortable because they changed what I thought was the best explaination), found some new sources of original material and enjoyed some of the point-counterpoint exchanges.<<<

Well, Praise the Lord something positive has come out of all this use of electricity! :o)

What this thread also illustrates to me is a problem inherent in historical study and the way it gets tangled up in wargames.

Finding "sources of original material" to show the mechanics of command, control and battle in general, is not easy.

Language gets in the way for one thing (if you have only one) and another is its not all written down in one place but above all, historians write about history, not the components of historical events in a fashion that's of real use in debates like this one.

This maybe because the majority of them are not that interested in the evolutions of the French 1791 Regulations, or even more likely they don't have the time to do the research, while doing their day jobs and writing books that the limited historical market will support and even more importantly, publishers might take a punt on!

If the will and the knowledge were out there, second hand copies of Imperial Bayonets would not be changing hands for $175 USD on eBay!

So the owners of this knowledge tend to be people who dig all this stuff up for their own interest and to kick it around on sites like the Napoleon Series Forum.

Some of those there get into print but again seldom on the ‘this is how they fought it' level, as even geeks need a publisher!

The point of this is that when the likes of The Scotsman, Ned and others (Hell, even me) start to explain what we have gleaned ourselves and from others, folks have never heard of it, don't believe it or just plain disagree.

The whole sheebang then turns into a Punch and Judy Show because its not possible to say – Look, read Joe Soap's book, its all in there, because such a book does not exist.

The history is there, the provenance is there but it's been hewn out of rock in a way you can't get from Amazon!

Now, I'm not talking about rules, rules writers or anyone who has taken part in this thread, or their Sainted Mothers. I'm just offering my take on why we get 450+ posts and a lot of acrimony on this and other forums when esoterically documented reality, hits wargames in the kisser!

Wow, this thread is still going? I will check back in next week and see how it is going.

Can't wait for the sequel to this thread: Beyond the Command Radius ;)

For what its worth, in my rules, Elan, I use a command radius- the reason?

1. Its a device to mitigate and limit the effects of a little the all seeing eye that gamers have over the tabletop and their troops.

2.It also reinforces the need to keep units of a particular formation, like a Brigade in something like a historically close distance to their fellow units- they can wander off, but suffer penalities for doing so

3. Finally, and just for fun (its supposed to be a GAME after all) its provides a use for all that Staff eyecandy figures, so for instance, you can detach ADC figures to assist units to charge home, or ensure the command effect is intact by ensuring the subordinate units are visible to their staff.

>>>>>Shane: game designers may use CR for good reasons of which I can think of many
Me: what would those be?<<<<<

I have already provided a few reasons, the authors of those other rules have also shed light on their reasoning. TheScotsman has already (many times) discussed why he thinks those reasons are wrong, simple as that. I am done trying to discuss it.

>>>>>Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: awesome, but those reasons you mentioned, what would those be?<<<<<

Like I said, speak to those that designed them.

>>>>>Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: was I dreaming during the first couple hundred posts when you kept defending CR or taking issue with those posters who questioned it?<<<<<

No, I only too kissue with TheScotsman because he dismissed the concept of CR's rso readily, I don't think that is a crime to have a discussion with him on an open forum about this. I had no issue with anyone else, that is your words, not mine.

>>>>>Shane: I don't use CR like that, my rules are wholly different
Me: ok, gotcha, war of attrition, I give up<<<<<

Mate, gave up awhile back, care factor is nil now.

Can't wait for the sequel to this thread: Beyond the Command Radius ;)

Your own fault for not using regulating battalions :)

Phillipaj,

From your description it sounds like you use CR based on the game play impact and not on historical representation. Do you feel that CR represents certain historical happenings, procedures, doctrine, concerns or rather you feel it does not represent any of those but it causes players to do things that you consider historical?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit – a good question, the latter basically- which was a decision based on the culture of gamers I was familiar with- on point writing a game no one was going to play right?

To give an example, the late period Prussian Army had prescribed regulations for the Brigade (Division sized formation)layout and formation of each unit in given situations. Such a such fusilier battalion there, artillery battery to the left, etc etc.

They were the extreme of the period as far as I know in terms of spelling that level of detail out, others were more flexible in layout of formations, but still a Brigade wasn't spread over a vast amount of real estate, it had to be kept in sight and mind of its commander for practical purposes.

Now that's all peachy, but not many gamers either know or care about those sorts of things, or don't like being boxed into being told how they should set up their battalions etc on the tabletop.

So one way to influence gamer behaviour to at least keep units in the same brigade or division in coo-ee (as we say in Oz) of each other and maintain some sort organisational boundary is a command radius device.

Phillipaj,

Gotcha. Followup question is, do you think that implementing alternatives to CR based on operational doctrine could accomplish the same thing? For instance regulating battalions, deployment spacing requirements to keep units within a certain distance of each other to avoid a penalty or gain a bonus … and do you think that CR offers some sort of playability bonus that other methods would not?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Shane wrote:
>>>I can see the use of CR's in different contexts and uses even if you think they are a poor representation of Command Control. What I am saying is, just because "you" think that the use of CR's is wrong or poor simulation does not make you right, all it does is show you have an opinion. You are entitled to your opinion but not too many here are going to drop their use simply because you think CR's is a waste of time.<<<<
Shane:

For me, this hasn't been about what the CR's could be. It hasn't been about heir possible contexts. It sure isn't about what "I" think is the 'correct way'. This isn't about my opinion. It is about what the DESIGNERS say their CR rules ARE, the specific context THEY say is applied.

Anyone can draw a portrait of a man in a bicorne hat and call it art. Someone may draw him with long blonde hair, a beard, scars and an eye-patch. It's their right, and I may or may not like it as art, but that's it.

However, IF this artist CLAIMS that it is a portrait of Napoleon Bonaparte when he crossed the Alps—THEN my disagreement with the artist is NOT based on my opinion, or personal taste in art. It will be based on historical evidence, art and written accounts.

The Military Artist, Don Troiani knows this, which is why he spends so much time in research. "If an historical painting is not accurate, then it is worthless as both art and an investment." That is a quote from his website. He provides the research that establishes his painting as accurate. The word 'accuracy' has a finite, technical meaning for him. This is a concern of Don's because Don CHOSE to paint "historical paintings." The exact same thing is true for Designers who claim historical accuracy, who claim that their game mechanics model particular aspects of history.

If a wargame designer claims to simulate history with his rules, that it's 'historically accurate', that is a technical assertion, and technically verifiable, not someone's opinion.

Shane wrote:
>>>Long after this thread dies a natural death and sinks to the bottom of the page and then the next those that use CR's are going to continue to do so. Your crusade against CR's, although commendable and consistent is not going to change the hobby, people will not care how right you think you are. Players are going to continue to do just what they like, you might wanna come to terms with that.<<<<

Shane, you have said this other posts. Who are you trying to convince? You don't have to convince me… I came to terms with it along time ago.

What I have been saying here isn't about my being 'right', or whether others have the right to do what they want, or even if they are going to continue to do what they want regardless of what I think.

It is about wargame designers claim to be simulating Napoleonic warfare and have no historical evidence to support that claim, and appear to have no idea how simulations work. So, regardless of what people think, I will from time to time point out that the emperor has no clothes.

I hope you will understand it is difficult to remain silent. I have designed functional training simulation games for many years for education and business. I had to prove the games were actually simulations using methods that are universal to simulation design. And they had to be fun to play too, or no one would buy and use them.

It is irritating to hear Sam and others say it can't be done. It is frustrating to read posts from gamers who insist that it is all just a matter of opinion. The unnecessary and rather pointless debates are hard to ignore too, even as you say, they change nothing. Simulation design isn't magic, and it isn't opinion. A good portion of history isn't either. The history and simulation information is available to anyone.

I certainly don't believe saying this is going to win me huge popularity points. Some folks have been annoyed that I have pointed out what they claim to be doing is a delusion. Some have, after claiming 'historical accuracy', deny that it even exists. others insist nothing can be proven. Some feel I am attacking them personally. Others feel, regardless of what designers claim, that I am ruining their fun by simply asking for evidence of those claims--I have no right to stick pins in their illusion balloon.

Happily, some actually have historical evidence to support what they say, which has happened; and some 'get it' or already know about simulations and the history involved.

My Real Hope is: Regardless of what folks do for fun in our hobby, what they claim and believe they are doing will match what they ARE doing. *Call me a dreamer*

If we are just pushing lead around and having a good time, enjoying the illusions produced by pretty figures and pretty tables. TERRIFIC—let's get on with it. Then we can all then agree with Sam that orcs and troll games offer the same game experience with the same kind of games using different figures. There is no difference because they all use the same game rules. I've played Warhammer and those rules with the uniformed figures of French rabbits and British foxes until recently and enjoyed it. I enjoy the illusions as much as the next guy. Why not?

If, on the other hand, we think we are going for a different experience with "historical wargames", playing game rules that actually represent something other than a designer's fantasy in game form, let's do that without all the smoke and mirrors.

There is enough known about history and simulation design to create functional simulations of Napoleonic warfare that would be no more complex or un-fun that the current lot of game rules.

[If, on the other hand, we think we are going for a different experience with "historical wargames", playing game rules that actually represent something other than a designer's fantasy in game form, let's do that…]

Bill, you've been saying that for SEVEN YEARS. At great length.

Great, great length.

In that time, I, and countless others, have enjoined upon you to put your money where your mouth was, and go ahead and design that historically-accurate simulation of Napoleonic warfare that you have always so passionately insisted was entirely feasible and necessary.

So: how is your game coming along? When can we expect to see the results?

Followup question is, do you think that implementing alternatives to CR based on operational doctrine could accomplish the same thing?

For instance regulating battalions, deployment spacing requirements to keep units within a certain distance of each other to avoid a penalty or gain a bonus … and do you think that CR offers some sort of playability bonus that other methods would not?

A: What are moving to here is discussing whether we are playing a game or a simulation. I would suggest that the more dictates you give a player about how they setup, move units, what formations they must be etc, the closer to a simulation you get and the less variables players are able to influence during the game.

In my experience, most gamers want to be the 'hero' and control their units on the table to achieve victory. I'm not sure many would want to be 'rail roaded' into how they armies look/behave on the tabletop.

So in short I think what we lose in historically accuracy (as far as we can agree on what that is!) we gain in playability. To that end, the CR is a tool (albeit imperfect) that is superior to a strict representation on the table of formations etc.

A final thought- if you had such as system, how do you manage the control of units once those formations start to break up during combat in response to actions of the enemy? I don't know, but you'd still need to model that somehow.

cheers

Phillip

Sam wrote:
Bill, you've been saying that for SEVEN YEARS. At great length. Great, great length.

In that time, I, and countless others, have enjoined upon you to put your money where your mouth was, and go ahead and design that historically-accurate simulation of Napoleonic warfare that you have always so passionately insisted was entirely feasible and necessary.

Sam:
So I have to produce a game to prove to you personally, and 'countless others' [I think that means you haven't counted them. What four, that I know of?] what simulation game designers do all the time? Is that it?

If, for the last seven years those designs and designers have been out there, and you a competent researcher and continuing game designer of 'the way it was', haven't bothered to see if I was right about their existence--or even asked me where they might be, why would I bother doing something far, far more involved for you, to simply prove what has already been proven? You don't need my game to establish whether my claims are true.

Part of any delusion is not wanting to know.

And my game designs? As usual, they are coming along just fine--work taking priority over hobby fun. When time and money allow, it will appear. And I just know you won't like it.

Holy crap! 470 posts! On COMMAND RADIUS???????

And I still have yet to figure out how you bards know when Sam changes his User ID!

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

>"Also, the divisions of Hood and McLaws from the 1st Corps achieved a pretty good coordination with Anderson's of the 3rd Corps on day 2."

That's still PARTS of 2 corps, totaling 3 divisions, or 1 corps-worth. While the rest of the 3rd Corps and all of the 2nd Corps failed to pitch in.

>"Gettysburg had no longer a front than say Austerlitz or 2nd Manassas, which were supposed well-coordinated battles for the French and Confederates."<

I'm certainly no expert on Austerlitz, but my impression is that it did not go the way either side planned or expected, and that it was a series of division- or corps-sized fights that were not particularly well coordinated with each other.

As for 2d Bull Run, it was not very well coordinated on either side. (In fact a total fiasco on the Union side.) For the Confederates, Jackson fought defensively while Lee and Longstreet held back because Longstreet's flank was threatened (unintentionally) by Porter's 5th Corps. When Longstreet finally did attack, his divisions and brigades advanced piecemeal, and Lee couldn't get Jackson to counterattack until Longstreet had shot his bolt.

[So I have to produce a game to prove to you…]

Well, actually producing something certainly demonstrates that one actually can practice what one preaches… and preaches… and preaches…. Otherwise, one runs the risk of coming across as simply a gadfly who loves the sound of one's own voice.

Anyway, I (very much) look forward to seeing the finished product.

The Scotsman wrote:

"If a wargame designer claims to simulate history with his rules, that it's 'historically accurate', that is a technical assertion, and technically verifiable, not someone's opinion."

So, if the war game designer removed the claim to "simulate" history and replaced it with something less precise, like "to game history" or "to capture the historical feel" of Napoleonic battle, while attempting to be as "historically accurate as possible"… then you wouldn't have such an issue with command radii ?

As I understand your regulating battalion argument, the Napoleonic brigade or division commander… perhaps even the corps commander… commanded via the regulating unit.

A couple of questions:

1. Wasn't this kind of command used primarily for the advance PRIOR to engagement?

2. Once engaged, where is the historical evidence that the brigade, division or corps commander continued to command via the regulating unit, if another part of his line began to have difficulty ?

3. When on the defensive--or simply no longer advancing--where is the historical evidence that the brigade, division or corps commander commanded via the regulating unit ?

Maybe I'm wrong as far as the Napoleonics are concerned, but as far as I know good commanders moved around a bit once they got engaged, part of keeping an eye on things and being ready to deal with problems as they arose. Either way, it's a real stretch of the imagination to think that a commander regulating the battalion by the right, would be able somehow to correct or cope with a problem developing on his left by issuing a new set orders to the rest of the command THROUGH the regulating battalion. But I'm open to hearing examples of it being used during an actual engagement and NOT simply an example of an advance to an engagement.

Here are some of your first examples:

08 Feb 2009 3:08 p.m. PST
"We see Napier at Coruna relate how he spent his time making sure that he was still aligned with the other brigade battalions. He never sees his brigadier. Moore is behind him and he goes to him and asks permission to deploy a second company of skirmishers."

So, Napier is trying to keep aligned with the other battalions? Why isn't he keeping aligned with the regulating battalion ? Moreover, why isn't Moore with the regulating battalion ? Moore is somewhere behind Napier… probably observing the entire length of his line? Pardon my ignorance, but this sounds like a defensive battle.

08 Feb 2009 3:08 p.m. PST
"The battalions in Colborne's brigade at Albuera advance, all attention on where the regulating battalion, the 3rd is and what it is doing."

OK. Accepted. The ADVANCE was made with a regulating battalion, but where's the evidence that after the general engagement began the regulating battalion continued to hold the attention of the other battalions? Your remaining historical examples cite only the movements made before battles and do nothing to demonstrate how command and control was exercised during an ENGAGMENT. If you want historical simulation to simulate more than the prelude and movements prior to battle, you have to account for how command and control was exercised DURING the battle. I think Command Radii fills the "engagment" void in your argument much better than the regulating battalion procedure which you argue is a somehow more historically accurate representation of command & control DURING a battle. I don't think so.

"That's still PARTS of 2 corps, totaling 3 divisions, or 1 corps-worth. While the rest of the 3rd Corps and all of the 2nd Corps failed to pitch in."

And it took the better part of three Federal corps to stop it. It was a massive attack along an extended front and was very well coordinated. I also think it would've gone around the horn if Lee wanted it to.

Bottom Dollar, very well said.

William:
I appreciate the attempt, but Sam and my differences of opinion are long standing and here certainly not based on what kind of model is being chosen, simulation or game. He says one model is impossible and I say that both models are identical, if the intent, tools, and outcomes are the same. Kind of a wide gap there.

William wrote:
>>>>I think the real issue here is not CR but what the result on the table is. So it is not CR that is the question but rather what process are we using to model a battlefield, are we going the game rout or the simulation rout. Both are valid models depending on what you want from your Wargames.<<<<
What is the difference between "the game rout" and "the simulation rout"? If you use game mechanics to model a Napoleonic battlefield, how does that avoid building a simulation [which is described as a 'model'] of a Napoleonic battlefield? You are not going to find that distinction recognized by either professional game and simulation designers outside this hobby. I haven't heard of that particular distinction in the hobby until now.

There is no difference between a simulation using game mechanics and a game. The tools are the same, the processes are the same, the goals are the same. The major difference is what they do or don't model. Here are the two quotes I offered before from professionals:

For game designers, "A game is one or more causally linked challenges in a simulated environment".

For simulation designers, A simulation allows players to safely make real-world decisions and develop skills in an unreal environment."

I can provide any number of identical definitions stated by 'countless' commercial [fun] game designers and professional simulation designers of all stripes.

I know there are some that would insist that our wargames are 'different', and what methods and technologies developed by either professional game developers or simulation designers don't apply, even though BOTH are heavy into designing games for the entertainment industry and don't believe that for an instance. This notion is often based on the belief that miniatures, charts, and dice are never used by such folks and those particular materials are inherently incapable of simulating anything.

And then there is the issue of 'valid model'. How do you establish that for a game? I can tell you the methods for establishing a simulation's validity in process and results, but I can't think of how you would accomplish it with a historical game and NOT use the same methods as those for a simulation.

I agree that the results on the table remain the real issue, but what 'results' are those? Regardless whether you take a large number of variables and represent them as a single variable or rule [the blackbox or 'results' driven approach] or represent each variable as a separate entity [the process-driven approach], the designer still has to have the result or results relate to the history modeled in 'valid' manner. For simulations, there are two basic approaches. In the first, the designer establishes the historical or environmental 'results' parameters for each variable or mechanic result—in other words, the validity of the parts of the model is compared to the actual historical dynamics. In the second, the process and end results of the entire model are tested against the target data, or historical environment and events.
While there are two basic approaches, there are eight or more ways of establishing validity within them each. IF a simulation designer wants to establish validity, that means that the historical data used is actually modeled, he or she uses both approaches and at least four of the methods. These methods have been proven over decades to the point that if the model passes the tests, there is a confidence of +80% that the model does indeed simulate the intended processes. Obviously,
>>>>So always we have process but the question is what is a specific mechanic modeling, is it a stand alone aspect of the game that helps model the battlefield or is it part of the process and the real goal is to have a game that looks like a duck and quacks like a duck!!!!!<<<<
Yep, you do have to establish that your goals have been achieved, and it helps if you know what the duck looks like and how it behaves.
I haven't commented on your outline of your CR rules as I didn't want this to be 'too' long. Even so, there is no guilt involved….

>>>>>So, if the war game designer removed the claim to "simulate" history and replaced it with something less precise, like "to game history" or "to capture the historical feel" of Napoleonic battle, while attempting to be as "historically accurate as possible"… then you wouldn't have such an issue with command radii?<<<

Shane:
No, because you are saying the very same thing with less precise words. Exactly how do you "capture the historical feel" or "game history" without modeling Napoleonic battle?
I have seen games credited with having 'accurate historical flavor' too, but all that does is make the claim so vague, no one knows what you are talking about or where it can be found in the game. It's just a feeling or flavor.

It is Rune's rule: If you don't care where you are, you ain't lost" and its corollary, Thomas's escape: "If no one knows where you are supposed to be, they can't say you're in the wrong place."

>>>A couple of questions:

>>>1. Wasn't this kind of command used primarily for the advance PRIOR to engagement?<<<

Not that I know of, depending on what you see as the initiation of an engagement. I am assuming when bayonets cross or a stand-up firefight begins? What kind of command process would it change to in an engagement?

>>>>2. Once engaged, where is the historical evidence that the brigade, division or corps commander continued to command via the regulating unit, if another part of his line began to have difficulty?<<<

Yes, one comes to mind right now. Divisional Commander Stuart at Albuera. When Colburne is pushed forward against the French under fire, there are all sorts of problems with the deployment and advance [created by him], but Stuart remains with the directing battalion, the 3rd, until just before the French cavalry hit it. The wheels come off because he is driving too fast.

>>>3. When on the defensive--or simply no longer advancing--where is the historical evidence that the brigade, division or corps commander commanded via the regulating unit?<<<<

No, because the regulating unit was the steering wheel. Once at rest, particularly in a defensive position, it wasn't really necessary. But as I mentioned before, a divisional command could and did leave the regulating unit to 'fix' problems, but if the division was still advancing, it was on auto pilot, there are examples of the possible problems that created too. If it wasn't moving, with no plans to, no reason to stay with the directing unit.

The regulations I have seen places the divisional commander in the center of his division's 'line of battle' IF they aren't moving forward. In the ACW "School of the Brigade" it is interesting that the reason given for having the divisional commander [and brigade commanders] in the center of their line is "so others will know where to find them."

In other words, with few exceptions if the division is moving, any messengers would know where to find the CinC--the regulating brigade, and if the division is motionless, the center. Kind of important for communications: knowing where to find the recipient.

>>>Maybe I'm wrong as far as the Napoleonics are concerned, but as far as I know good commanders moved around a bit once they got engaged, part of keeping an eye on things and being ready to deal with problems as they arose.<<<

Are we talking about Divisional commanders? Are we talking about a general engagement of the whole division? If so, a good commander would do what he feels is necessary, and at any one moment, that could be any number of things. But if he decided to give the whole division orders while engaged, or attempted to move the entire division, there were specific methods mentioned in the "School of the Brigade."

What are you thinking of?

>>>>Either way, it's a real stretch of the imagination to think that a commander regulating the battalion by the right, would be able somehow to correct or cope with a problem developing on his left by issuing a new set orders to the rest of the command THROUGH the regulating battalion. But I'm open to hearing examples of it being used during an actual engagement and NOT simply an example of an advance to an engagement.<<<

History has a way of demanding that imagination exercise. What do you think are the orders a divisional commander might want to issue to the entire division, particularly if the problem was on the left and he was on the right? I think I can answer you're question, if you are more specific.

>>>>Here are some of your first examples:

08 Feb 2009 3:08 p.m. PST
"We see Napier at Coruna relate how he spent his time making sure that he was still aligned with the other brigade battalions. He never sees his brigadier. Moore is behind him and he goes to him and asks permission to deploy a second company of skirmishers."

>>>So, Napier is trying to keep aligned with the other battalions? Why isn't he keeping aligned with the regulating battalion ? Moreover, why isn't Moore with the regulating battalion ? Moore is somewhere behind Napier… probably observing the entire length of his line? Pardon my ignorance, but this sounds like a defensive battle.<<<<<

Well, first he IS attempting to remain aligned with his regulating battalion, going to check on it several times, mentioning that he knows it has refused its right flank. AND he works to remain connected to his left too. One of the MAJOR concerns for a battalion commander was keeping his line attached to his left and right--but in movement he followed the right….

And as you said, it is a defensive battle and the line isn't moving. Moore is the ARMY commander. He wouldn't be with any directing battalion unless he thought it necessary for a move.

>>>>>>>08 Feb 2009 3:08 p.m. PST
"The battalions in Colborne's brigade at Albuera advance, all attention on where the regulating battalion, the 3rd is and what it is doing."<<<<

>>>>>OK. Accepted. The ADVANCE was made with a regulating battalion, but where's the evidence that after the general engagement began the regulating battalion continued to hold the attention of the other battalions?<<<<<<<<

Here is one account:

Colonel Clarke, was a company captain in the 66th at the time. He says the following about his regiment and Colborne's deployment: [Battles of the Nineteenth Century by Archibald Forbes. 1897 P. 283]

"Colborne, a cool, skilful, and experienced soldier, wished to deploy before ascending the hill, but General Stewart, full of ardour, would not wait for his manoeuvre, and the brigade advanced in column of companies, each regiment deploying in succession as it reached the summit. The Buffs on the right were the first formed, and opened fire: the 48th on their left were the next to deploy, then the 66th."

General Stewart created problems because he advanced the 3rd into combat [an engagement?] without waiting to align the entire brigade, the regulating unit, and each battalion afterward had to deploy and attempt to 'catch up'. One officer mentions the anxiety of seeing the 3rd head to their right and their entire battalion attempting to quick march to align--even under fire that was their first priority.

This is all was done under fire, "engaged"?, and preparatory to a charge--or seen as the actual charge depending on who is writing about it. Stuart didn't make the same mistake with Hoghton's and Abercrombie's brigades later. He deployed them before he brought them under fire.

>>>>Your remaining historical examples cite only the movements made before battles and do nothing to demonstrate how command and control was exercised during an ENGAGMENT.<<<

Well, give me an idea of what you mean by engagement, and I'll see if I can't answer it.

>>>>If you want historical simulation to simulate more than the prelude and movements prior to battle, you have to account for how command and control was exercised DURING the battle.<<<<

I would think so.

>>>>I think Command Radii fills the "engagment" void in your argument much better than the regulating battalion procedure which you argue is a somehow more historically accurate representation of command & control DURING a battle. I don't think so.<<<<

Some examples of this difference during an 'engagment'? e What do you see a divisional commander doing during 'an engagement'? What kind of command and control would he have or attempting to maintain?

You are quoting me now TheScotsman but none of the above is actually originally from me, from memory.

This thread is way too long now…

One thing that seems evident is not only does CR mean different things to different people, there are times when it seems to be used more as a term of convenience. Take AOE for example . . .

Rich Hasenauer and I sat down before I wrote this thing and he explained to me every process of BOFF and the historical reasoning behind it. At that point I made a decision to keep, discard or modify. In BOFF/AOE the CR is based on line of sight, and is not traced in a straight line, ie, its not a 12 in radius, but can be blocked and must be traced around the enemy and impassable terrain.

What it represents is the area where a division commander (or his aide) would be able to move to and exert some termporary, personal command influence over the course of a 30 minute turn. Units within CR get a +1 to their manuever die roll. Its only a +1 because things like orders, doctrine, regulating battalions and the like should mitigate the +1 DRM if it disappears in most, but not all cases (eg, sounds of firing to the right, and the commander is unavalible to inform the lads its actually reinforcements arriving). It really begins to impact as units begin taking -2 DRMs for casualties and fatigue.

Seemed accurate to me, and players like a little bit of tactical flavor if the rules don't bog everything down, so we left it in. Now I'm almost thinking the use of CR here is more of a friction generator than a pure C2 mechanism, but my thought is although there may be another way to replicate this concept, it seems to work so why not a CR?

BTW, just took a look at the STATS page. Looks like Sam or whoever he is today is top poster with over 11,000, while our own Scotsman is 3d in the long winded category (I'm impressed, Pat Condray is number 1). Heck, I'm betting we beat the Moving Historicon thread.

Be afraid, be very afraid . . .

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

I like that description of your use of CR's Bill, very simple but effective use of the mechanic indeed.

Shane

[BTW, just took a look at the STATS page. Looks like Sam or whoever he is today is top poster with over 11,000, while our own Scotsman is 3d in the long winded category]

Ah, I appreciate the nomination, but in fact I'm #59 on the list, having posted @5600 times in 8 years. I'm not Top-10 Material. Those guys are hard-core.

In the "Most Longwinded" category, however, you're right: Bill the Scotsman is #3, with an average post length of over 1800 characters. But there's hope for you, Colonel Bill! You made the list with an honorable #79! I, alas, have a childlike attention span, and didn't make the "longwinded" list at all.

Now, if they had a "Most Member Names" category, I'd walk away with that award!

TMP link

Oh, I'm so sorry, I thought the top spot was another of your personas :).

Sigh – I am so confused!

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Shane, yeah Scotsman was quoting Bottom Dollar, or was meaning to.

Bill, the issue with using CR as a distance from commander to division, going around obstacles and what-have-you, is that it appears historically it was unnecessary for most officers in most situations to move between units in order to maintain command, thus while what you claim to simulate / represent using CR appears to be accurately reflected, that thing did not actually happen. So you are representing something that isn't historical.

Thoughts?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Well, darn, I was shooting for #1 in the 'long-winded' category. Of course, I tend to insert extensive material from other posts, so I am cheating after a fashion.

Bottom Dollar:
Hmmmm. Seems I addressed my response to your post to Shane. My apologies…

Bandit,

Not really, which is why I almost hesitate to call it a C2 mechanism. The CR is really an area of avialability. Notionally, the commander may actually be doing nothing but watching the lads properly move forward in any given turn, and outside the CR things may really work fine due to doctrine, which is why the imnpact is only a +1.

A historical example comes out of Austerlitz IIRC where an adjutant was sent to a French regiment to form square as their position in a high crop field precluded them from seeing the Chevalier Guard preparing to charge. However, thier commander could see this, so sent a major to force a formation change.

Squares don't function this way exactly in AOE, but the commander seeing the danger and having an adjutant available to run to the troops and mitigate the situation is what the +1 really is. It doesn't mean its happening each turn.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Bill G. wrote:
Rich Hasenauer and I sat down before I wrote this thing and he explained to me every process of BOFF and the historical reasoning behind it. At that point I made a decision to keep, discard or modify. In BOFF/AOE the CR is based on line of sight, and is not traced in a straight line, ie, its not a 12 in radius, but can be blocked and must be traced around the enemy and impassable terrain.

What it represents is the area where a division commander (or his aide) would be able to move to and exert some termporary, personal command influence over the course of a 30 minute turn. Units within CR get a +1 to their manuever die roll. Its only a +1 because things like orders, doctrine, regulating battalions and the like should mitigate the +1 DRM if it disappears in most, but not all cases (eg, sounds of firing to the right, and the commander is unavalible to inform the lads its actually reinforcements arriving). It really begins to impact as units begin taking -2 DRMs for casualties and fatigue.

Seemed accurate to me, and players like a little bit of tactical flavor if the rules don't bog everything down, so we left it in. Now I'm almost thinking the use of CR here is more of a friction generator than a pure C2 mechanism, but my thought is although there may be another way to replicate this concept, it seems to work so why not a CR?

You also noted to Bandit:

Not really, which is why I almost hesitate to call it a C2 mechanism. The CR is really an area of availability.

Notionally, the commander may actually be doing nothing but watching the lads properly move forward in any given turn, and outside the CR things may really work fine due to doctrine, which is why the imnpact is only a +1.

Bill:
Okay, it seems accurate. Accurate compared to what? What historical target has it hit? What does a 'little bit of tactical flavor' means that doesn't bog everything down, when the point is that 'everything' providing that historical flavor?

The CR rule you describe assumes certain things about divisional command and how it worked, what you referred to as Rich's 'historical reasoning.' From what I can see they are:

1. Command control was dependent on the LOS from the position of the DC.

2. Command control was dependent on the proximity of the Divisional and Corps leaders--that availability. Obviously, the likelihood of a brigade in a division not moving is increased when a DC is more than a "Full Mounted Move" of 18 inches. We got horses again.

3. Things like orders, doctrine, regulating battalions and the like should mitigate the +1 DRM if it disappears in most, but not all cases (eg, sounds of firing to the right, and the commander is unavailable to inform the lads its actually reinforcements arriving).

Here, I am not clear on what you mean by mitigate… Doctrine etc. allows the +1 DRM to remain when the DC isn't available?

4. The addition of this rule increases the 'tactical flavor'
of game, so it assumes that the rule describes in some fashion the influence of the DC on brigade movement and order on the tactical level. Right?

5.The basic assumption here is that in this period, how close a DC was to a brigade increased the likelihood that it was 'in command' or at least able to benefit from the DC's command.

The basic question is "what DID a Divisional commander do during a battle, and how did he do it? What were is responsibilities and the methods for carrying them out?" Of course, we are talking about the basic way things were done. And included in that is what a DC or Corps commander did to 'be available.'

We should know that before creating rules to model it in any fashion, yes? If we know that, we can then compare them to the CR rules you described and see if the 'flavor' is there.

Now, I realize the CR rule for F&F and AOE is meant to be an umbrella mechanism covering any number of DC or Corps command actions within that 30 minute period, just as the maneuver table is meant to cover a number of different kinds of events that would slow up a brigade.

It would seem from your description that what the CR models is just that notion of a DC or Corps commander's 'availability' to intervene, and maybe not even the basic functions. And again, the core point is if he ain't within horse trot distance, he ain't available.

So Bill, have I got the basic thinking behind the CR rules as you [and Richard] described them?

Yes, pretty much and umbrella mechanism is good as well. To clarify no 3 above, by mitigate we mean this is why the modifier is only a +1 as opposed to a +3 or +4 or something. Some board games mandate half movement if you are outside of CR, but our thought was that orders already given, doctrine and so on would take hold, so while there should be an impact, not as great as we have seen in other systems.

BTW, tactical flavor is an interesting concept, and often lies in the eyes of the beholder. In that regard what I have found is although there might be ways to model a tactical function such that the player is totally excluded (since its "built in" the the game system), players like to do a little fiddling on their own. Thus some game functions are retained soley because players ecpect and like to fool with it.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

"Sam or whoever he is today"

Bill,

No its a whatever.

He is a Trout at the moment, for some reason.

And no, I don't know why he does it either! :o)

I'm thinking of writing some rules to game (or simulate -- your preference) the Shane-Scotsman War. No-doubt they should make use of the "variable-length" post. What scale do you think would be best? Metal or plastic? Is there an Osprey volume out yet?

lol Don,

I am over it and out of it, I will watch the movie though, if it hits the big screen.

The Scotsman wrote:

"Some examples of this difference during an 'engagment'? e What do you see a divisional commander doing during 'an engagement'? What kind of command and control would he have or attempting to maintain?"

Here are two:

Report of Major General David B. Birney, U. S. Army, commanding First Division of, and Third Army Corps:
As the fight was now furious, and my thin line reached from Sugar Loaf Hill to the Emmitsburg road, fully a mile in length, I was obliged to send for more re-enforcements to Major-General Sickles, and Major Tremain, aide-de-camp to the commanding general, soon appeared with a brigade of the Second Corps, which behaved most handsomely, and, leading them forward, it soon restored the center of my line, and we drove the enemy from that point, to fall with redoubled force on Ward's brigade. My thin lines swayed to and from during the fight, and my regiments were moved constantly on the double-quick from one part of the line to the other, to re-enforce assailed points…

Report of Brigadier General John C. Caldwell, U. S. Army, commanding First Division of the Second Army Corps:
The first Brigade, which had been longest engaged, had expended all its ammunition, when I ordered Colonel Brooke to relieve it. He advanced with his usual gallantry, and drove the enemy until he gained the crest of the hill, which was afterward gained by the whole of my line. In this advantageous position I halted, and called upon General Barnes, who was some distance in the rear, to send a brigade to the support of my line. He readily complied, and ordered the brigade of Colonel [Sweitzer] forward onto the wheat-field. I then galloped to the left to make a connection with General Ayres, and found that I had advanced some distance beyond him. He, however, gave the order to his line to move forward and connect with my left. Thus far everything had progressed favorably. I had gained a position which, if properly supported on the flanks, I thought impregnable from the front. General Ayres was moving forward to connect with my left, but I found on going to the right that all the troops on my right had broken and were fleeing to the rear in great confusion…

It sure sounds like both division commanders were pretty busy somewhere behind their respective battle lines on horseback, moving along its length, calling up reinforcements, placing reserves, redirecting units from one part of the line to another… in short exercising something of a command radius and not a regulating battalion mechanic.

The above quotes bring another notion to mind. If the goal is to encourage cohesiveness of a formation so that it looks like the maps and so that units do stay close together, could not this be achieved by lessening the effect of support from different commands?

ie, you only get morale effects from units in your brigade supporting your flanks. Other brigades just cannot be coordinated enough to be reliable.

Only allow reaction in support if a charged unit belongs to the same brigade/division?

Bottom Dollar:

Those are great accounts by Division Generals. Both Birney and Caldwell were stationary and on the defensive in their accounts. Note that no time span is mentioned. Also note that they were careful to say what they as individuals did as separate to what was happening to their divisions. If Birney and Caldwell were following doctrine, they would have been in the center of their division's line. So, each account:

Birney: The only thing that is clear that Birney did was call for reinforcements, as he was trying to cover a wide front, and as a consequence, his line was thin. A Corps aide-de-camp shows up and the aide leads the brigade forward to restore what? The center of the line, where Birney stayed the entire time. There is no indication that he did anything while the lines swayed and regiments plugged holes. [Something that was probably handled by the brigadiers.] He might have, but I don't think you can assume that from his account. We don't know. In any case the ONE thing that Birney says he did, is considered the primary acts of any commander once his units are engaged: Call on reinforcements and commit reserves.

Caldwell: Again, Caldwell too is careful to say what he did as compared to others. So what he says he did is:

1.He calls up reserves twice.

2.He halts the division's forward motion. It doesn't sound like he had to ride down the line to tell each brigade to do that, or even if he moved from the center while his division is engaged. He DOES tell us when he moves though.

3.He rides to 'connect' with Ayre's division on the left. He's worried about his alignment with regards to Ayre's division.

4. Not once do either commander say they contacted ANY of their brigades in the line, even though the brigades are seriously engaged and required reinforcements. It appears that the 1st Brigade contacted General Caldwell, which would be typical. Brigade needs were the responsibility of the brigadier to communicate to the DC, not the DC to run around finding out himself. Another reason to hold to a particular position when at all possible.

Only the reserve under Colonel Brookes. Birney's brigade reinforcement from the Second Corps is led in by another officer and Caldwell doesn't even bother to contact Colonel Sweitzer once that he hears that Barnes has ordered his brigade to support Caldwell. Doesn't that strike you as odd? No mention of doing anything with the actual engaged battle line. There is a reason and doctrine concerning this point.

I think it can be assumed from his comment:

"I had gained a position which, if properly supported on the flanks, I thought impregnable from the front. General Ayres was moving forward to connect with my left, but I found on going to the right that all the troops on my right had broken and were fleeing to the rear in great confusion"

--that Caldwell rode to the right flank of his division to see if it was secured as was the left. He moves to deal with a very specific issue and reports no reports reaching him or him sending out ANY runners.

So, from those two accounts, the division commanders called on their own reserves, called for reinforcements and with Caldwell, left the center of his line to 'connect' his division's flanks with divisions there. With the exception of Caldwell's right to the flanks on a specific mission, both DCs are in the center, where doctrine says they need to be, so others know where they are. IF Birney had been running up and down his mile long line, how was it that he was there to meet Major Tremain, or that the Major knew where to find Birney? There is alot not said, but assumed in the accounts. They are:

1. How reinforcements etc. found the two DCs.
2. How the brigades and regiments weren't being contacted by the DCs--not one comment about either of them actually directing a brigade in the battle line--Birney doesn't even lead the reinforcing brigade into position, but leaves it to Major Tremain. Colonel Brookes is left to actually accomplish the relief of the 1st Brigade. There is no indication that the DCs themselves moved any of those regiments [Birney] or Colonel [Sweitzer]brigade [Caldwell]
3. The customs in after action reports, where the DC's actions are always identified. This is done from regimental reports to Corps.

From what I have read, Birney and Caldwell's accounts do compare well with regulations. I think, from those two accounts, that one would be hard-pressed to suggest Divisional commanders usually ran up and down the line getting directly involved in their brigades' operations when engaged on the battle line. IF Birney and Caldwell's are typical or cover all the major actions, only once is there any suggestion of communication with the brigades in battle line [Caldwell's first brigade running out of ammo.]

Perhaps we can come up with some more examples to broaden the base here. Just to conclude: DCs and Corps commanders were given particular responsibilities and regulations provided the ways they would accomplish them, while keeping the entire operation functioning. Running up and down the line over and over again wasn't the way to accomplish them most of the time.

I'll take the plunge with more examples, of which I have several. However, I also want to make clear that I don't think that such intervention was all that common, which is why the Command Radius DRM in AOE is only +1.

Anyway, MG Lafayette McLaws on Gettysburg, to the Southern Historical Society:

My head of column soon reached the edge of the woods, and the enemy at once opened on it with numerous artillery, and one rapid glance showed them to be in force much greater than I had, and extending considerably beyond my right. My command, therefore, instead of marching on as directed, by head of column, deployed at once. Kershaw, a very cool, judicious and gallant gentleman, immediately turned the head of his column and marched by flank to right, and put his men under cover of a stone wall. Barksdale, the fiery, impetuous Mississippian, following, came into line on the left of Kershaw, his men sheltered by trees and part of a stone wall and under a gentle declivity.Besides the artillery firing, the enemy were advancing a strong line of skirmishers and threatening an advance in line. I hurried back to quicken the march of those in rear, and sent orders for my artillery to move to my right and open fire, so as to draw the fire of the opposite artillery from my infantry.I will here state that I had in my division about six thousand, aggregate--which, I think, is over the mark . . .

General Kershaw in his report says, his brigade being at the head of my column, that General Longstreet came to him while marching, and told him that his (General Longstreet's) desire was, that he (Kershaw) should attack the enemy at the peach orchard, turn his flank and extend along the cross road with his left resting towards the Emmettsburg road. You can see by the accompanying map what a very different state of affairs existed from what General Longstreet must have thought really did, as it would simply have been absurd for General Kershaw to have attempted to do as he was required or desired.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

4 more posts to 500!!

I'm tempted to start an argument with myself to get to the magic 500th!

Bill,

There's a couple of other things here too.

One, that regardless of Longstreet's interference both Brigadiers deploy their brigades ‘on line' in defensive positions, to ensure force security, before anything else.

Two, McLaws is the one who orders up the artillery (by messenger), as it's a Divisional asset. So that's one thing BOFF gets right in terms of CR representation. ie. Artillery has to be in CR of Army/Corps/Division commander.

Its a pity it cops out later on by allowing "any number" of batteries to be attached to a Brigade and letting the Brigade commander order deployment instead.

True, though I can't tell from McClaws' description whether the two brigadiers did so automatically, or whether McClaws directed them to do so. I think likely the latter, as they came up, but can't verify.

Regardless, its the availability of the commander to do this sort of tweaking that the +1 represents.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

So, when is the paperback version of this thread coming out?

(actually, just wanted to be the 500th post and couldn`t think of anything constructive to say)