"Variable length bound & George Jeffrey" Topic

You kids better shut up, or I'll stop the car and come back there!

This does confirm my thought that more trees have been cut, more bandwidth consumed, more ink cartridges emptied, and more time wasted on VLB than any other non-existent rule set in the history of wargaming.

It is the black hole of wargame design.

Gentlemen, perhaps, if we cease to engage in tangental discussions such as the value/price of wargames rules by famous/unheard of authors, and philosophical arguments as to whether one contrary example is sufficient to refute or invalidate a generalization, we might make more progress.
We seem to be agreed that, in its original form, Code Napoleon is unworkable, not least because of its sheer length, but also because GWJ devised rules that were 'bottom up', based upon individual battalions and batteries, rather than 'top down' [a common feature of many tabletop wargame rules until recently] which meant that players had to undertake calculations that were both inappropriate to the perspective of the army or corps commanders they were pretending to portray, and unduly brain-taxing to make the game a pleasurable experience.
Maybe, if we were to strip out all that detail, and use a straight die roll – along the lines of the Proportional Dice in Kriegsspiel – to determine the outcome of close combat, linked to another die roll to determine how long a combat lasted, and then dice to dee whether casualties are light or heavy, we could create some manageable rules?

Arthur,
That sounds plausible. VLB might work, but the rules now available aren't exactly inviting.

The keyword here is "simple": If you want to test new mechanics like VLB, it's better to keep all the other mechanics of the game easy to use and learn. With easy, I mean something that even people who don't usually play napoleonics could try it. That way the game actually gets played and tested by lots of people. When most of the problems have been ironed out, you can start putting more details into it.

"My final word. The K/D rules and Code Napoleon are not played because they are not playable."

As regards CN, I actually agree.

As regards the K&D rules, that is your opinion and you are fully entitled to it. Perhaps you would do me the courtesy of allowing me to have a different opinion to you?

I have played them, you apparently haven't, and nothing you can do or say can disprove it.

Shane Devries wrtoe (From Ned I think)

(If Derek H is Derek Hodge, he would be an example, if I remember correctly.).

I am he. But I've stayed out of this debate which, as others have said, has not really involved anyone saying anything that has not been said a hundred times before.

To me it's a real shame that George died when he did – so soon after getting back into wargaming. I think he still had a major contribution to make.

He never really had the time to get to grips with many of the new rules ideas that had emerged during his period away from the hobby – but he was interested.

I spent a very stimulating evening in the pub with him discussing some of them the week before he died. I suggested that some of these new ideas were well worth looking at and might be used to give some of the effects he was after – whilst also providing a better game than his beloved Code Napoleon

I even lent him copy of Piquet – though I never did get to hear what he thought of it.

">"after a while of his non appearance his superior commander would start to send messengers."<

I was speaking (writing) of the "superior commander" in the first place. And, how long "a while of his non-appearance" constitutes a CoS?"

One of the events that can trigger a COS in the K&D rules is:
"Your current orders expire or are overtaken by events"

In this particular case, I would say that the non-arrival of a subordinate's force at a pre-determined location at specified time is a COS on that basis. Along the lines of "Where the *** are you?".

"Maybe, if we were to strip out all that detail, and use a straight die roll – along the lines of the Proportional Dice in Kriegsspiel – to determine the outcome of close combat, linked to another die roll to determine how long a combat lasted, and then dice to dee whether casualties are light or heavy, we could create some manageable rules?"

Excellent idea, Arthur!

[One of the events that can trigger a COS in the K&D rules is:
"Your current orders expire or are overtaken by events"]

Exactly. That's the one we called the "Do whatever you want rule."

Any player with a double-digit IQ could rationalize, at any given moment, why "events" had "overtaken" his current orders, and he thus now had a COS, and could do something different.

Mike, over the course of these 200+ posts you've brilliantly dissected all the fundamental flaws in the "system."

* You can always have a COS when you need one, and thus always change your orders whenever you want.

* You don't have to obey the orders of your superiors if you don't want to.

* Time breaks down in increments equal to the length between COSs…. But those COSs can happen pretty much all the time. Thus time always breaks down into the smallest-possible increment allowed by the VLB game, which in the case of the K&D rules was 10 minutes. Thus, as soon as units became engaged, it became a game with 10-minute turns.

We rapidly understood that there was no command system at all, and the game moved a lot faster if we stopped pretending there was.

And since it ended up being a game with time-discrete turns, anyway, by default, we figured we might as well use a system with longer turns (10 minutes was a drag for a grand-tactical game), and better-defined sequence of play.

In short, it was vastly inferior to game systems that had a better-defined organization of time, and which didn't waste our time forcing us to go through the motions of a command system that couldn't be enforced.

"Your current orders expire or are overtaken by events"

"Exactly. That's the one we called the "Do whatever you want rule."

Sam, I assume you haven't got a copy of Dennis and Knight(why do people always quote these two the wrong way round?)or you would see that to each COS there are specific allowed responses.

In this case the options are:

"Send a message to your immediate superior"

"Move your commander figures"

Care to explain how that constitutes a "Do whatever you want rule."

"Any player with a double-digit IQ could rationalize, at any given moment, why "events" had "overtaken" his current orders, and he thus now had a COS, and could do something different."

In the example cited, the event that overtakes his current orders is the non-arrival of the subordinate at the right place and the right time. Until that time he could do nothing (indeed why should he, his plan is apparently working fine). As Trajanus pointed out at this COS there are only two possible actions.

"You can always have a COS when you need one, and thus always change your orders whenever you want."

No. COSs only occur at defined points in the action. You can't "have one when you need one". In the previous example that would mean the commander deciding that he wanted a COS before the ETA of the subordinate. He can't do that.

"You don't have to obey the orders of your superiors if you don't want to."

That's perfectly logical and historical. I've seen it happen in other non-VLB games too. Why is it a problem here?

"Time breaks down in increments equal to the length between COSs…."

Yeah, that's why it's called VLB.

"But those COSs can happen pretty much all the time."

No. See above (and pretty much all of this thread).

"Thus, as soon as units became engaged, it became a game with 10-minute turns."

If I have let's say 3 brigades attacking and each is involved in a separate tactical engagement. The possible durations of those TEs are 10, 20 or 40 minutes. (If I have more brigades I would still only have 3 possible durations). So the divisional commander gets a COS (for the end of a TE) at 10, 20 or 40 mins after they started (assuming they all hit the enemy line at the same time. They might all finish at the same time, in which case he only gets one COS. So you see that is by no means certain that he will get a COS every 10 minutes. In fact he probably won't.

You are of course choosing conveniently to ignore the hour's artillery bombardment before the attack went in (1 COS at the start, 1 at the end) and the half hour it took the attackers to come to a TE. Of course COSs will come thick and fast when the fighting is tactical (but not every 10 minutes as I have shown).

Sam,

Well expressed. Clear and accurate and better than I.

Bob Coggins

Sam wrote:
"We rapidly understood that there was no command system at all, and the game moved a lot faster if we stopped pretending there was."

I would never say that the US playtesters should be faulted for not understanding something in CN, because the rules were written poorly. Whether the problem was a system flaw or an explanation failure is irrelevant here – the point is the command system was not understood. (BTW, I must share blame here, since I was the one who kept asking for more from GWJ and also interjected my own tables, charts, or explanations where I thought they would clarify things).

However, if anyone is interested in seeing what GWJ's command system philosophy was and how that meshed with his interpretation of how a Napoleonic battle was fought, go to the VLB site and to its Files section and read The Napoleonic Battle. It will give you some background on how George interpreted the battlefield, and thus influenced his game design choices. This is not a set of rules, but I am positive you will find it interesting reading.
Go to:
Files – Ned's Bits – document The Napoleonic Battle. There is a word doc and also a text version of that essay by George.
He wrote this in response to a request from me. His original Blue Book did not use terms like "Command Group Commander" and "Command Group Commander Superior" like this essay did. I was trying to work with him to create some clarifying definitions and procedures that I did not see in the Blue Book, so terms like these would be found in early rewrites of the CN rules and thus appeared in the Napoleonic Battle paper.
If you would like to see the essay but not mess around with the VLB site, email me ( nedz@mindspring.com )and I will send it to you.

- Ned

Arthur wrote:

"Gentlemen, perhaps, if we cease to engage in tangental discussions such as the value/price of wargames rules by famous/unheard of authors, and philosophical arguments as to whether one contrary example is sufficient to refute or invalidate a generalization, we might make more progress."

Arthur, if you interested in this, I would suggest you join the free VLB Yahoo Discussion Group and post any ideas you have there, where I am sure they would create a response and discussion. Indeed, that is the express purpose of the site.

I would further WILLINGLY stipulate that people on TMP have had FAIR WARNING by several people that any such discussions are doomed to failure:

a) because the VLB concept may sound great, but is inherently flawed and therefore cannot be made to work. Some people recognized this theoretical reality immediately when they heard of it a quarter of a century ago,

b) 25 years ago very intelligent people expended a lot of time trying to make the rules work and failed. They offer the voice of experience for anyone just now hearing about GWJ. Those who are ignorant of history are doomed to repeat it – and will have no one to blame but themselves,

c) it is no more than common sense that if it could be done it would have been done by now. Playable rules designs exist now at different levels of play using concepts that are different from "the old days" and players accept some things now that they may not have accepted in 1981.

d) because the integrity of the VLB site, and its contributors, has been questioned here,

e) anyone who does go to the VLB site to work with the true believers should understand that any discussion there that "sounds good" should not be believed; in fact, if one insists on going to that site (even if it just for a quick look due to curiosity) it would probably be wise to come back to TMP or somewhere else to get an unbiased-by-VLB-enthusiasts-objective-opinion that will show them what is wrong with the "sounds-good-idea".

f) TMP is a good place for people to debate the assertions of others on the VLB topic (until people get bored and the thread dies, of course). People can try to "correct" what they see as inaccurate interpretations of others. It helps if there are people available who have the knowledge to provide some facts and data to inform the opinions expressed in the debate, of course.

This way, TMP can still be a place to express opinions, give some examples of background, interpretation, and try to recruit or dissuade or inform people about George W. Jeffrey and his VLB concepts, and to talk about other related topics or rules. This would be a fine place for the tangents, leaving rules development or details to another site. (There may not be that many TMPers that interested in the subject anyway! Or, if there are, all they need to know is where to go if they do want to work on it, while others can stay here and go off on as many tangents as they want. Others may not care about the rules at all, but just enjoy good old-fashioned TMP free-for-all discussion).

It is my opinion that everyone here – including me- is in the same hobby or gaming glass house – everyone's game or rules involve personal opinions, taste, compromises, unreality, interpretation, rationality and irrationality, etc etc.
I think people's hackles get raised when someone begins to think that theirs is the only right way, or when someone else advertises or claims something that they cannot back up, or encounters the hypocrisy of a person who sees or proclaims (rightly or wrongly) the flaws of someone else and fails to see his own.

When those hackles get raised, TMP gets some interesting threads. TMPers don't necessarily stop repeating the same things 10 different ways, but they can be fun or aggravating to read.
Thus my suggestion to you at the top of this posting. Those who wish to explore an idea have the VLB site for that purpose. Those who think that others should not do that, or are foolish for doing so (both valid opinions) have the TMP platform available to them to express those feelings. (I am no expert, but I do not see what gratification or status gain they would experience, or personal necessity they would have to come repeat their TMP assertions on the VLB. )

Best regards,
Ned

Ned, I've been a member of the VLB yahoo group for a couple of years, but visited it less and less as the discussions became focussed on the minutiae of period drillbooks and tactical doctrine. Albeit interesting and erudite, the contributions did not seem to be making a workable VLB game any more likely – quite the reverse.
My interest in VLB was reawakened by this thread, so I may revisit the VLB group more often in future. I may even have a go at devising a very simple/simplistic game along the lines I've suggested earlier.
All the best to you, Arthur

Don wrote:

"NedZed: an interesting capsule history! (Although primarily of only the miniatures aspect of the hobby.)"

Hi Don,
Thanks.My boardgaming days were primarily in junior high school and high school before I got involved in the miniatures aspect, though I kept up magazine subscriptions like The General and S&T longer than that.So I am less competent to speak of the boardgaming world's history. (For a while I even got a DIPLOMACY publication). I know I was aware of your name in those days and I think I recall you had also published a Napoleonic miniatures set. There were magazines like Panzerfaust and Campaign so I "knew" names and influences even if I didn't know people personally, such as Lou Zocchi. Guys like Larry Brom (Sword and the Flame) and Ed Mohrmann, and their rules, were people I learned of from their articles or mentions of them. It was from Chris Wagner's S&T (before it was sold to the Dunnigan/Simonsen guys) that I saw serialized Napoleonic rules by Ray Johnson that got me gluing Airfix plastic Color Guard figures to cardboard to fight Napoleonic battles. It was so frustrating to NOT have the musketry rules published with the rest of the rules. (Many, many issues later, I think, they were finally printed).
I haven't actually played any miniatures games since the '80s. Design theory still fascinates me, but not the painting/playing. This may also explain why my VLB discussion is so theoretical and may miss out playability or practical aspects so necessary to a good design.(It was around the late '80s or '90s I think when Dick Bryant told me, "Ned, you are not really a miniatures gamer". :^)
Sincerely,
Ned

Arthur wrote:
"My interest in VLB was reawakened by this thread, so I may revisit the VLB group more often in future."

I think that would be very interesting. This TMP thread has also crystallized some ideas for me. Your mention of a simple die roll for example is one I tried once when Bob Wiltrout (whom I met at Wally Simon's) once visited and wanted try some VLB. I tried to use a sort of player agreement discussion (what I thought at the time was a Paddy G. muggergame type of approach) and a die roll to resolve combat instead of GWJ's charts.
I think the "close-combat" system I have in my Vive l'Empereur! rules might work for the tactical engagement if it can be modified. Move the grande bodies up to a tac engagement, then the single close-combat dice roll is made that gives the winner/loser/draw and good/order/disorder/pursuit results. Then a separate roll gives you the losses which are based on the results of the earlier dice roll. It would just need to have a duration added. Tom Dye also has some interesting "cohesion" ideas that might be used.
But I digress… this is better left to the VLB site.
However, Mike's discussion of Peter Dennis's version of a Nap VLB set, got me thinking. Even though Peter credits me with some help in the design ideas, I never played his set with anyone here. Thanks to Mike pointing out some of the explanations that Peter used to simplify GWJ (ie, always resolve at the highest level possible – which is hugely important) it got me thinking about some of George's explanations in his original set that I (and others) didn't understand and had him rewrite.
Over the last several years I have come to the conclusion that I need to look again at his Blue Book. In 1981 most players did not want to use brigades as a basic unit (James Arnold excepted – kudos to him). My rules used a notional "regiment" as a basic unit which I thought a step in a playable direction.) I had tried to get GWJ to use a brigade as a "basic unit" in the late '80s unsuccessfully, but in 2001 he was open to the idea.
Now that Mike is explaining Peter's rules, and I have been answering questions by email, I took another look at the Blue Book. Sure enough, his rules had "general" orders and the game already was supposed to have large formations moved to contact to create tac engagements.
However, the set did not define a "general order" very well. Later I got him to tell me that he meant orders from one general to another… which matched with what he was also later telling me that he was throwing around brigades, divisions and corps. So the Blue Book needed some of the explanation and definitions that Peter used.
When Sam and I here at TMP talked about the mass of COSs that happened because the game went to battalion level it was because the "grande formation" use of the game was obscured by George's use of battalions of squadrons as tokens on the table. He also talked about executive and tactical orders.
However, with 25 years of hindsight, and players today willing to play games at abstracted brigade games levels, I think that going back to GWJ's Blue Book and starting over might produce some interesting results.
The question would remain, though – can a dialogue/COS system work when the the rest of the rules are simpler, or is that still the fatal flaw. Mike's experience with the Dennis and Knight rules suggest the former,but you'd have to wait and see.

Best regards,
-Ned

Wow, a lot of posts for a game that "does not work." So many people know about it. Such strong feelings. Does any other game generate this intensity?

Kyoteblue wrote:
"COS 219……"

Sorry, I did warn you I would post this weekend. I am known for being one who will never use one word when I can use four, and for being in love with the sound of my own voice. So you might as well click "219" well forward right now.

Longwindedly,

Ned

Ned,

I always enjoy your posts, almost as much VLE. It plus Empire III gave me the inspiration to work with Craig Taylor on our set of grand tactical rules.

You and I are going to disagree on CN, D/K and the VLB. A read of the posts reminds me how out of date some of George's ideas are when compared with more modern rules. Nevertheless, good luck.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

>"Send a message to your immediate superior"<

Umm… You mean Josephine?

>"Your current orders expire or are overtaken by events"<

"overtaken by events" is a bit vague, don't you think? It sounds like an "invent your CoS" invitation to me!

Ned: "I think I recall you had also published a Napoleonic miniatures set."

I suppose you refer to Grand Army, which I wrote with Pete Bennett, back in the day. They were for both Napoleonics and ACW. Very out of day these days.

link

">"Send a message to your immediate superior"<
Umm… You mean Josephine?"

No! :-) The senior ranking general on the table does not have a superior.

">"Your current orders expire or are overtaken by events"<
"overtaken by events" is a bit vague, don't you think? It sounds like an "invent your CoS" invitation to me!""

Again, no. It simply means that for some reason you are no longer able to carry out your orders. The most obvious example is when a unit of your force breaks or when a new hitherto unforeseen enemy threatens your force.

The question would remain, though – can a dialogue/COS system work when the the rest of the rules are simpler

It can work very well with the right sort of players.

But not with people who could start a fight in an empty room.

Bob Coggins wrote:
"I always enjoy your posts"

Bob, how can I flounce around in a state of high dudgeon with a scented handkerchief to my nose complaining about attacks on my VLB virtue if you insist on saying things like that?
You are right that we disagree, but there is nothing illegal about that, and you are also correct that… at least some ;^) … of GWJ's ideas are not up-to-date.
That being said, I am extremely flattered that in some small way my ideas were of use to you in your design, which has certainly had a larger audience for a longer period of time than mine ever did. And it may sound corny, but I really did want my rules published in hopes others might use or expand on my ideas. (It sure wasn't money – my royalty agreement was 'the standard contract' at the time!).
You are aware from personal experience of what it takes to get rules successfully written, published, played, and widely accepted – which is actually a fairly exclusive club, and not an insignificant thing.

Thanks for your good wishes,

Ned

PS: Mr. DeMille, I'm ready for my closeup now…Mr. DeMille?"

Sorry, Ned, Mr. DeMille has left to work on the Variable Length Movie, where the movie continues until the last audience member gives up and leaves. He says he is inspired by VLB.

He also muttered something about, "Ned Zuparko is still big, it's the wargames that got small!"

Ned,

I always liked to think of rules design as a continuum – but for there would not have been. Who knows? Somewhere down the road there might be a solution to the VLB.

Good gaming and keep on flouncing. I'll just cover my eyes.

Bob Coggins

Bob, it isn't a continum, more cogitum interuptus. BTW the solution to VLB is:

{VLB∛)-∏r2+✕=∞ Only Fermat's Last Theorem remains!

Sorry. It's gone too. Well, everything's discovered and proved as Rudy would say. Could this mean the world will now end? I'm going outside to see if the stars are still there.

>"…Grand Army, which I wrote with Pete Bennett…"<

Oops, I should have said with Pete Rice, although Pete Bennett did write the original "Aux Armes" rules that Grand Army grew out of.

I must be getting old, getting my Petes mixed up…

Bob Jones wrote:

"Sorry, Ned, Mr. DeMille has left to work on the Variable Length Movie"

Then I guess I better hurry if I want to catch up to him. You have tried unsuccessfully before to turn me from the dark side and save me from myself, but I'm afraid it was too little, too late. Like Bob and Sam you are in the exclusive club I mentioned above so I probably should have listened.
But to leave VLB – what, and quit Show Business?
If I run to the platform right now, and catch the Battage Express before it leaves the station, I might still be able to catch up to Mr. DeMille. ;^)

Best regards,

Ned

Sam,

Were you in one the CN playtest groups years ago or just part of a group that tried VLB or Peter's rules on its own? I wondered if you may have been connected in any way to Arty Conliffe or Jim Mauro when they were playtesting CN.

Best regards,

Ned

Oops, I should have said with Pete Rice, although Pete Bennett did write the original "Aux Armes" rules that Grand Army grew out of.

I must be getting old, getting my Petes mixed up…

For Pete's sake get it right! :-) Sorry couldn't resist that one.

I wrote earlier:
"Arnold tried to do just that but was unable to do so. I do not recall the time spent but I believe it was perhaps (my memory fades here) a month or maybe a couple of months, but not much longer"

My memory HAD faded. I am going through a box (a 12" high stack of papers) of printed material from those days, playtest circulars, etc and a correspondence register and finding that the time frame was longer than that, and that the roles of different people were more complex than I had suggested. Even the basic "Blue Book" I refer to had two basic versions from the word go(one for 15mm one for all scales) that were almost identical but had some important different wording in the playing procedure and operational/tactical sections). As I look at them now I'm not sure which preceded the other and which I sent to Dick and Arnold Hendrick. When that is combined with different drafts that GWJ prepared for me in hopes of getting a set to Arnold that would not be modified by GWJ and only edited by Arnold, even more rules sets were floating around. So some playtest groups began early on (like Wally's) while others were sent newer modified drafts. So different playtest groups were getting their formative understanding of VLB concepts and different times. For example, I have a 10-22-82 circular from Dick with comments from Wally and Dave Mazovick, and then a letter (I think by Jim Mauro) many years later about Peter Dennis's skirmishing suggestions near the end of the project, prior to Peter finally making his own set.
Of course, just because the groups had different formative experiences doesn't mean they didn't come to the same "unplayability" conclusion about CN. ;^) But it does mean that their understanding of how a COS or the command system should work might be in error, and how someone like Snorbens or Trajanus does understand it correctly.

Some of the debate here, especially on COS, might be helped by a top-down view of the CN command system, because players tend to look at it from the POV of units or the troops rather than from the point of view of the generals. Using an example from the middle of the chain of command misses what happens above and below that particular example.
There is the VLB "system theory" that should be applicable to any era (bounding ahead from critical event to critical event); then there is GWJ's interpretation of how the Napoleonic command structure worked (who could tell who what to do and how those Changes of Situation ("COS") would be the "critical events" for his game; then there are his game design definitions of what would cause a COS for a commander and what he could do in the game at those times.
Note that a different designer might choose to implement a "VLB design" of bounding ahead to critical events for any era, including Napoleonics, but have his own definitions of what a COS would be, who (or what) would receive them, and then how those decisions would be carried out in his own rules set.
That is one reason for the confusion in some of the debate in this thread – disagreeing with the definition of "COS" is different than discussing whether or not the game can or should bound forward to critical events and thus have "variable length bounds". Arguing about the playability of the rules for a firefight is really about the designer's choice of how he carries out his combat results tables mechanics, and not necessarily that COSs are a good or bad thing. If we can keep those differences in mind, people new to the thread or the VLB concept will better be able to understand where CN failed to explain itself or failed to work, whether or not it was the "system" or the author's implementation of it, and whether or not that failure was inherent and inevitable.
BTW, if the British Army or anyone else had invented or were already using VLB, George would not dispute that. He said he stumbled on the idea in trying to get games like WRG to move beyond 2-minute moves. From people like Paddy Griffith and groups like Wargames Development and other players he learned of some aspects of things like critical event theory and used that to frame his explanation of how his "Variable Length Bound" system worked. In writings I have seen he credits friends like Derek Sharkey, David Burnett, and Robin Peck also. So he never claimed to be a genius from whose forehead VLB sprung full-blown like an Athena from Zeus. (I TOLD you I am wordy!).
Code Napoleon ("CN") was intended to reflect George's command and control ideas about Napoleonic generals and their role in Napoleonic battles. (This is why in a previous posting I said that CN DID have a "command system".
When I first encountered him I saw the phrase "Command & Control" or "Command Control" bandied about in all sorts of rules and articles (including my own), but his was the first wargame writing I saw that actually defined Command and Control as two separate entities in a way that made sense to me and had a real effect in a game.
GWJ said that in the Napoleonic chain of command a general (or any officer, really) was simultaneously a Commander and a Controller. That is, as the superior officer to a subordinate he CONTROLLED that subordinate by issuing him orders. By the same token, he COMMANDED his own formation in reponse to the orders (and Control) exercised upon him by HIS superior officer.
Once we started to edit CN, I wanted that concept to get across to the reader, so for at least one version of the rules, he used the acronyms CGC (Command Group Commander) and CGCS (Commmand Group Commander's Superior). My eyes used to cross every time I saw those in print – they just confused me!
The idea here was a top-down philosophy. A general "commanded" his own troops (whether it was a Corps, Division, or Brigade) as his own body of troops in accordance to the instructions given to him by his own superior.
Siumultaneously, that officer "controlled" his subordinates. The Corps general controlled his Divisional generals by sending them orders and telling them what they should do with their Divisions. They would then "command" their individual Divisions in such a way as to try to carry out the orders of the Corps commander. The Divisional generals commanded their Divisions in accordance with the Corps orders, but then controlled their brigadiers by sending them orders that were within the mission as defined in the orders Division got from Corps. (For example, if Division had been told by Corps to attack, Division would control the brigadiers by telling them where to put their brigades. The brigadiers would then "command" their own brigades in the attack.
In a sense, the command group a general "commanded" did not belong to him – it belonged to his (controller) superior officer. It was up to him to act as that controller's representative to make sure that the controller's wishes (represented by the orders he sent) were carried out.
Thus, subordinates would try to carry out the plan of their superior by using their own command to do that, and to do that they had to issue orders to "control" what their own subordinates were to do.
(To be continued in the next post).

1st CONTINUATION from my last post…

In his CN game GWJ intended that players begin with the army commander (or whoever the highest ranking battlefield officer was in the game – if Napoleon was not there commanding, maybe it was a Marshal with part of the army, or maybe it was a corps commander). I'll call him the Battlefield Commander (BC) here.
The BC (Napoleon in this example) surveys the table at the beginning of the game or perhaps does a recon, or gets reports or uses a map etc. From whatever knowledge he has he is now in an initial 'Situation". Based upon that current situation he creates a plan for his OWN command (which is the whole army – the "command group" he is responsible for). He controls his subordinates (the corps commanding generals) in the next level on the chain of command by sending them their initial "battle orders"
(Note that Napoleon is not sending orders to the "corps" themselves, but to their commanders. It is the commanders who will experience "changes of situation" not "the troops" or their "units" in this GWJ game-interpretation-of-Napoleonic-command. George used to say that the officer had to fight against his own men and against the enemy at the same time. He wanted to carry out the plan his superiors had given him to defeat the enemy, who could not be expected to voluntarily cooperate, but also had to overcome any resistance the troops in his own command might have to following orders that might get them killed! So in the CN game players are representing commanding generals, not their commands. )
Corps commanders receive their orders, which is a change of situation ("COS") for them. That COS means they must now decide if they need to give orders or not to their subordinates in order to carry out the mission given them by Napoleon. (Being told to hold their position, or receiving no order is deemed to mean that are to hold their current position). If they do need to issue orders to their Divisional generals in order to obey and carry out the Emperor's plan, they send the orders to the divisional generals.
Divisional generals get their orders, giving them a COS, and they can then send battle orders to their brigadiers.
In this example, Brigadiers have no subordinate generals so they obey their Divisional bosses by commanding their own "command", and forming line of battle, or a grand column, etc etc.
Thus, initial orders get "interpreted" at the Brigade level where the miniature lead figures are placed on the table. There was a brigadier COS and he laid out the troops in a particular formation, with particular gaps and intervals, facing a certain direction, etc. That physical layout IS the interpretation made by the Brigadier of his part in the plan that emanated from the Emperor, based upon the "situation" he saw at the time he received his orders from the Divisional CGC (who is HIS CGCS).
If the orders from Division included instructions to move and attack at a particular time, the Brigadier would do that at the appointed time. If the orders told him to move and attack but gave no time, it would be up to the Brigadier to decide when to do that. If he then chose to do it immediately, he would do so (and thus create a potential COS for his enemies). If he were not going to do it immediately, then at this Brigadier COS he would have to issue the order to his command to march at "x" future time.
Therefore, no matter which of those choices is made, the PLAYER has COMMITTED himself to an interpretation of the orders received from above and to a course of action (or lack of action).
This is an example of a COS where "disobeying", "being stupid", or "misunderstanding" orders might take place. In a multi-player game, the brigadier may have laid his troops pointing in the wrong direction and its movements may cause messages and future corrective orders to flow at a later date. In a single-player game, the single player must interpret his own orders at each level and COMMIT himself to it. Then, if later in the dialogue he sees he made mistakes, he cannot just "reinterpret" the order on the spot in the dialogue without waiting until COS occurs for him, then going through that COS process according to the rules(which may cause it take too long for him to effectively react to the enemy's actions in time anyway).
TO be continued for processing the Grand Tac game, COSs and tac engagement (if I have the energy)…

NedZed: Interesting explanation. I agree that his terms were confusing. I would say that a general, if not the battlefield commander, is both a commander (of the officers below him) and a subordinate (of the general above him in the chain of command).

I would add that, in "real life," orders can and will be "interpreted" at each level of the chain of command after the first, not just by the brigadier. The problem here, in game terms, is that often one player plays many if not all of these rolls; he is the battlefield commander AND the corps commander(s) AND the division commander(s) AND the brigade commander(s), etc. Therefore he will probably not MIS-interpret his own orders (as other real-life generals and/or other players might), unless he chooses to willfully misinterpret them in order to change them unfairly. So what's to keep him from "correcting his mistakes" BEFORE the brigadier commits himself -- for instance, changing an order from attacking a certain unit to attacking a certain position (or vice versa). By this I mean that the player, as brigadier, can willfully misinterpret or disobey the order he originally intended without changing its wording. (e.g. The order said to "charge the Portuguese brigade," but as brigadier he decides what he really "meant" was to charge a certain hill.)

I believe someone said a CoS should be resolved at the "highest level possible." This looks good until you ask yourself, what IS the highest level possible? Such generalities need to be defined with concrete specifics. Examples are always helpful.

I agree that it should be possible (and helpful) to "bound ahead from critical event to critical event." The problem is in defining what is or is not a critical event, and deciding what should be done, and by whom, when one is encountered.

Eagerly awaiting the next installment of your post.

Don

Oh, My! Ned. It is much worse than I thought! I feel for you and can plainly see you have caught the Muir/Dye disease which is inevitably fatal in 60-70 years. Your only hope is to grab every scrap of paper written on VLB, any photographs or mementos of George, the Courier, or Dick Bryant and burn them-now!

Then resign from the VLB Forum and run, my friend, run like hell because otherwise your next COS will be Bellevue or Bedlam!

Many a man stronger than you has been ensnared by Vengeful Life-stealing Baal (AKA as VLB) and they end up babbling on about guiding elements, arcane irrelevances of drill and command, and the mystic truths to be found in the study of the Battle of Salamanca. Unit Cohesion becomes a mantra muttered over and over and over' til their eyes glass over and they are in thrall.

Ned, the past is done. It wasn't really that good except in overly nostalgic minds. Most rules from the 70s and 80s really sucked! You are a bright guy who has given much to the hobby, but this one will literally eat you up. Move on before you get caught in that vortex and lose the present and the future. Start anew.

Invent a set of rules that starts from totally different premises; It would be invigorating and refreshing. This horse died 20 years ago, and the carcass is starting to stink.

Don wrote:
" I agree that his terms were confusing… I would add that, in "real life," orders can and will be "interpreted" …not just by the brigadier. The problem here, in game terms, is that often one player plays many if not all of these rolls;… So what's to keep him from "correcting his mistakes" BEFORE the brigadier commits himself -- for instance, changing an order from attacking a certain unit to attacking a certain position (or vice versa)…"

Hi Don,
Not only were definitions and acronyms confusing, over 7 years of playtesting George often changed them – not what he meant by them, but changed their names or the jargon,always looking for words he thought we would understand better.
This is why I try to be consistent in the terms I use or include or repeat definitions or abbreviations in my explanations, so others will know precisely what I am talking about. It is also why I will pedantically insist that there is only one"right" definition of VLB, or will try to get debaters to use the same meaning for the same term that GWJ used. If two people try to use the same term,assuming the other guy shares his meaning of it when they really don't, we get really screwed up.
In the CN context words like critical events or COS can be interpreted differently by different people based on everyday language or their past experience. Therefore I have to insist on defining the GWJ term the GWJ way according to the GWJ rules, and then giving my explanations in that form. It could be that "Change of Situation" is a poor term to use, but changing it only makes discourse harder.
Your point about one player having many roles in the game is a crucial one. This goes back to the whole question of using umpires, written orders, dialogue, "doing whatever you want", the 200 ft tall general, needing cooperative players etc. etc.
This is a basic design problem dealt with in many ways. Some games handle it by requiring an umpire. Some say you have to play with friends and not rules lawyers. Others sort of "randomize" the game's mechanical actions to prevent a player from having too much control and to prevent the need for interpretation. Some try to limit the amount of options, or will prescribe the allowable actions for a given situation. Issues like having too much knowledge compared to reality, being committed to actions, or being free to make choices at only one, or at any level of command exist in some form in almost all games.
Consider "disobeying orders" – in a multiplayer game this is pretty much unstoppable if a player really wants to do it, in some form, it is difficult to stop. Some rules sets force it to happen with a die roll, especially if it is a single-player game. There are rationalizations for it pro and con.
Also, being on a tabletop (as opposed to pixels on a screen) it is very difficult to prevent even the most honest player from occasionally making a mistake when transferring mental intent onto a 3-D game using figures, bases, and different types of model terrain.
George intended this set to run without an umpire, so all can do is tell you how he chose to deal with this problem. Players may disagree with the way he did it, or interpret their history differently than he did, but everyone makes design choices on these issues.
George's choice was to let players have lots of knowledge, but then restrict the opportunities they would have to do anything about that knowledge through the COS system, which might limit how often he could experience a COS, and then, if he did have a COS, in some cases restrict the options he would have to choose from at that time, or in some cases the COS would occur so late that it would be too late to have a meaningful response when he did have a COS.
First, in the example I gave of initial battle orders, I agree that not only brigadiers could deliberately or accidentally mess up the order that reached them. I used brigadiers as an example, but certainly, in a multi-player game, the Corps commander or the Divisional cmdr could have improperly, deliberately, or accidentally carried out his role in the Emperor's plan.
In fact, if he did, the players who are subordinate generals to him would probably further his plans, because they would be writing orders to try to fit in with their immediate superior!
In the case of the single player who "gives himself orders" playing everyone from Napoleon to the brigadiers for those initial Battle orders" does that at the beginning of the game before there really any COSs. These are like pre-battle orders, in a sense, that will be used to begin the game with.
So even though he will follow his own orders, that isn't much different from other single-player games where every unit on the table is controlled by the same brain of just one player who knows what he intends to do.
And, as I said, this is just at the start of the game.
All commanding generals in the game now are under orders, based upon what was seen or known at the time the initial Battle Orders were acted upon. This is now the "current situation". Play continues on, with the miniature lead generals continue continuing to do what they were told to do in the Battle Orders.
They have no reason to change, because the Plan was formulated in this environment and each can assume that whatever he is doing is what he should be doing in that plan. That could very well involve attacking an enemy, or getting shot at, or ignoring certain enemy or friendly troops on the assumption that things that are happening to them are part of the plan, too.
It could be that while his metal minions are marching across the table, the 200 foot tall player realizes too late, or sees an enemy corps appear that is going to destroy him. He now realizes that his in initial Plan is flawed and needs to be modified. However, just because THE PLAYER sees this does not mean he can claim it as a COS and therefore intervene in the game and issue new orders for a general somewhere.
COSs are for the little generals, NOT for PLAYERS. That is an important distinction. Your belief that PLAYERS should not be allowed to jump in to get themselves out of a bad situation whenever they want is absolutely correct.
So GWJ's rules require that certain eligibility conditions be satisfied for a general to be able to claim a COS and therefore give the player a chance to intervene and give new orders for that general. Now, if it is the crucial general who is the only guy who can stop the enemy, and he can see or learn of the enemy action and thus claim a COS and then give timely orders, that is a Good Thing for the player. If it is a COS for a different general, the player can perhaps jump in then and send a message to the "right" general and hope he gets it in time; or if it is the boss of the "right general" perhaps he can earn a COS and use it to send orders to the crucially-placed general.

COSs usually are of two types; when one receives an order or message from a friend or superior, the other when a general is put under threat and may need to respond in self-defense.
In the first case, one uses his COS to see if he needs to change orders or not to keep going with "the plan" in light of the communication he just received. For example, if he were ordered to attack someone he wasn't previously attacking, he would issue orders to his subordinates to do so.
In the second case, he still wants to carry out his plan, but enemy action threatens him and he may have to use that COS to suspend his participation in the current plan, and act in self-defense temporarily. Once the threat is dealt with, the general will return to carrying out the plan as before.
In the game rules this means the options for the "Threat" COS will be more limited; ie, change formation, stay in place, but not be able to make new orders that allow him to move offensively all over the tabletop.
This last, of course, is the toughest thing to define in game terms, since the designer has to restrict the "threatened" commander to some plausible actions,but try to avoid letting the PLAYER to take advantage of that COS and use it inappropriately elsewhere on the tabletop. In the many iterations of CN those restrictions have been defined differently in different versions. Staying in one place and doing different things in place is easy to mandate, it is always the range and extent of movement or offensive actions that can be allowed that are hard to decide on.
I should say they are easy to write and enforce – it is tough to decide how "realistic" or how "arbitrary" the designer wants to make them. I will say that in 1981 that was a harder decision to make than now, when more players are willing to abstract or simplify things like brigade representation and combat results mechanics.

Best regards,

Ned

>"COSs usually are of two types; when one receives an order or message from a friend or superior, the other when a general is put under threat and may need to respond in self-defense."<

The first type seems straight forward, assuming you have some way of knowing when orders or messages reach each level of the chain of command.

The second type, however, needs to be precisely defined. What, exactly, constitutes a threat that is serious enough to trigger a CoS? How big an enemy force? How close? (I assume when you say "when a general is put under threat" you mean when his command is put under threat, not just him personally.) And can all potential threats be imagined and then defined in advance?

2nd Continuation from Jan 25 post:

"TO be continued for processing the Grand Tac game, COSs and tac engagement…"

George called the first phase in his Blue Book the Grand Tactical Engagement. The conduct of this phase resulted from the issuing of "General Orders" . General Orders were to be acted upon by "command groups" which was defined as the lowest force on the chain of command with separate general orders (later simply explained as orders sent from one general to another). So the usual "basic unit" would thus be the brigade because its brigadier would be the lowest guy who could receive"general orders".
(However, he might not get separate general orders in a game. For example, if the Divisional commander had his division in a grand column he could operate it as one body by his own order, since he was the "commander" of that Division.
So we now have a situation where brigades or a whole Division might be the "playing token" which is moved across the battlefield as one command group. That would mean that its formation, intervals, frontage, etc would be defined or interpreted by the way the lead figures were laid out on the table. It would also mean the player could, for the Division in this case, just announce that the Division would march across the valley to yonder enemy-held hill, and then just picked up whole and laid down at the hill in the same formation/layout as it began with.
In addition, in that example, the "division" could not have a COS if the proper circumstances arose during the march, but the Divisional Commander might (rather than 10 battalion commanders having COSs).
If the Divisional Commander had decided that formation change was needed to carry out these orders, the rules listed a menu of about 13 "Grand Tactical" formations/evolutions that the Divisional Commander could have the entire division perform at one command from him. The rules also gave a formula to determine how much time one of those Grand tactical evolutions would need before it could go on to another action.
The Grand Tactical Phase of the battle would, for the most part, see these large grand tactical command groups being picked up, moved, and dropped off at the enemy positions.
When these Grand Tac command groups reached the a point near the enemy position (the rules cause this distance to vary, but on average perhaps 100 yards away) a morale test would become necessary. It ended the Grand tac Engagement, and began the Tactical Engagement phase.This would be a Tactical Engagement COS for the command group commanders.
It was GWJ's opinion that most battles would see most of the action as one side attacking the other until it won, was repulsed, or was counterattacked. (On a battlefield many miles across there could be several of these attacks at one time, but even if you had 6 corps you likely weren't attacking at any one time with more than 2,3, or 4 at any one time). If the attacker was hurling brigades, divisions, or whole Corps at a position, there would not be too many "tactical engagements" arising from these attacks.
Only the opposing formations in the Tac engagement were involved in the tac engagement – "outside" command groups did not receive COSs from it or its processing. (Though playtesters didn't see how to stop it).
So at the Tac Engagement COS the generals would issue "tactical orders" for their units (suppose a brigade was in the tac engagement, the general would make a quick sketch showing the movement tracks of the battalions in his brigade that he was ordering to move against the enemy unit.) This is where the "battalion resolution" of the game was to be found. Sketches would be compared, movement and formation change times found on a chart, and the CRTs used to figure out which side would break first and how many minutes that would take.This could be carried out simultaneously in many tac engagements at once in a multiplayer game to speed up game time.
That would determine when the end of the Tac engagement would take place – which meant that one side would break at that time causing an automatic Grand Tactical COS at that time for the commanders in those engaged formations (because, obviously, their situations had changed).
That meant the Tactical engagement phase was over, and at this Grand Tac COS players could issue new Grand Tac or General orders.
Players then began the Grand Tac Engagement of carrying out their new orders, or continuing with their old ones if no new ones had been received, and look to see where the next COS would occur.
One wrinkle that we kept asking about was artillery – what if it was firing during the Grand tac phase?
GWJ's combat tables were all in rates per minute.If a command group was sitting still and being shot up GWJ would know the rate per minute – from that a player would compare that rate to his breakpoint (when the artillery opened up on him it was a COS for him) and he could decide to sit and do nothing, ask his superior for permission to withdraw, or say that after "x" minutes he would take some defensive action if the artillery was still firing then.
If a command group was moving to a tactical engagement (ie, across a valley to attack an opposing hill) coming under fire was a COS where he would have to estimate if he could reach the enemy line prior to reaching his breakpoint (based upon the rate per minute of his losses), and act accordingly.
With this interpretation of a battle, GWJ could just "dialogue" and have the two sides tell each other what they saw and mutually figure out where the next COS would occur. Then they would Grand Tac "bound" whole brigades, divisions, or corps forward to the enemy battle line(s), carry out the needed morale test and issue needed tactical orders via sketch for the Tactical Engagement; calculate the result and lenngth of time the tac engagement(s) would take, and then return to Grand Tac play.
So an unsuccessful attack by a corps might cause it to rout 1000 yards to the rear and take an hour or two to reform while another one went into the attack.
This was the flow of the game as envisaged by GWJ who was, from the top down, throwing "largest possible" or at least "large" command groups around, while we testers kept breaking into battalions and threats and COSs from the ground up. Neither could figure out how the other managed to do what they did.

– Ned

Don wrote:
"What, exactly, constitutes a threat that is serious enough to trigger a CoS?… (I assume when you say "when a general is put under threat" you mean when his command is put under threat, not just him personally.) And can all potential threats be imagined and then defined in advance?"

Hi Don,
Yes, you are correct that the definition of a threat to a commander involves a threat to his command. In GWJ's Blue book he did not define a threat. He just said players had a GT COS if they needed to issue general orders "in respect of events within sight of the relevant command figure". He did say that new orders could not conflict with existing orders their formations already had. He added that commanders could only act contrary to their existing orders to preserve their force from enemy action, returning to their previous orders "when the treat was removed".
So when we asked to clarify that for publishable rules "direct threats" meant an enemy action was seen that, if it continued, would bring the enemy into physical contact with a General's command group,while an"indirect" threat was an enemy change in a rate of movement or fire, or direction or formation; or if a friendly command group broke.
Later this was changed to "threat" . However, in all cases there was a limited, specific set of reactions allowed in response to a threat. You can see one set of such a list on a Threat Response Sequence flow chart I put together. For the VLB site Chuck Hamack put it in the Ned's Bits of the Files section as first chart or Second chart or something like that.
Exact definitions and responses varied in different playtest rules versions.

Best regards,
Ned

BJ wrote:
"their eyes glass over and they are in thrall."

Ahhh, at last you get it, Bob. They are not dragging ME down – I am dragging THEM down. THEY are in thrall to ME!! Suckers! I haven't played miniatures games for 20 years. My gaming for the last several years has been in email games with Paddy Griffith and his cohorts. I just ran a Reign of Terror game (which I hadn't modified well – I hope to redo it someday as The Trial of Citizen Capet). VLB? Bah! You don't see ME with a set of published VLB rules, spending weekends bent over some stupid pingpong table covered with a green baize cloth, do you?

Don't you see? I pull these poor souls into the VLB swamp. I pop up in sites like TMP pretending to be a gentleman, but secretly seducing new morons into giving up their wargaming lives for NOTHING! And who helps me in my scheme for total domination? YOU DO! A few mentions of VLB here and there in the online water, perhaps a compliment to Bob Coggins, and Presto! The Jones shark crashes in, attracted by VLB blood, in a frenzy to rip up GWJ yet again. It doesn't matter where I go on the internet, every time you do that I gain more sympathy and more acolytes. More attention for me, ME, ME, I TELL YA!!

You fool – thanks to you and others like you, soon all will be under the VLB spell, with me as their lord and master. No more "Oh, you're that Neil Zuprako guy. Tell me – did you know George Jeffrey PERSONALLY?"…"Gee, too bad you don't have a cool Scottish accent like George".. "I've heard of VLB but Vive l'Empereur? Sorry…" It won't be long before they all think I wrote their precious VLB, the Tactics and Grand Tactics Book, the French Regulations of 1791, Table Top Talk AND Wargamer's Newsletter.

My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare

For a set of rules which don't work this certainly generates a lot of text.

I just wanted to stretch it to six pages….

Don't you see? I pull these poor souls into the VLB swamp. I pop up in sites like TMP pretending to be a gentleman, but secretly seducing new morons into giving up their wargaming lives for NOTHING!

This COS came too late for me. I'm already too deep in the VLB swamp!

Steven,

Aye, I am that "traveller from an antique land" whose "passions read
Which yet survive, stamp'd on these lifeless things," and are still subject to
"The hand that mock'd them".
My story is V(ery) L(ong) & B(rokenhearted) !

One question: Commander gets a COS if he receives new orders from his superior or if his command comes under new threat. If however commander sees a large enemy formation threatening his command, but his superior doesn't see it, can he give a COS to his superior by sending a request for assistance?

"Louis, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship."

Gosh! Just saw this thread. I am on the VLB yahoo group and have been since sometime in 2001. I read the two or three articles in the Courier as well earlier in the 80s. I think the concept could be incorporated into something computer moderated but at what cost. It is interesting to note the number of Napoleonic game designers who were influenced one way or the other as a result of VLB. There are many more here and on the yahoo group who are more qualified to speak on the concept then I so I will leave it to them.

Now it seems what VLB is now is the renewed interest in the concept that happens on the Yahoo group about once every two to three years.

My head hurts again after reading this thread. I think I will go lay down.

VR
James Mattes