"Strength of Soviet Armour" Topic

Soviet armour always is represented as weaker than NATO. The most striking example of this is in Modern Spearhead, where an average NATO tank – M1, Leopard 2 etc gets +3 on the attack roll on a d6. This gives
1- Auto miss
2- Suppress
3+ Killed

Was Soviet armour really this bad, or are we relying too much on data from the 'monkey' versions they exported to places like Iraq? Conversely Soviet tanks are at -1, so can't get an outright kill, and suppress on a 5/6 (a 2nd suppress before rallying is a kill)

Books like 'Team Yankee' and RSR show T-xx's dying by the dozen. Is this realistic, or is it something we told ourselves because the idea of being outnumbered 5:1 was just too scary? In MSH the Nato player gets 1 brigade- 4 x 3/4 stand companies. The WP players need virtually a division- approx 4:1.

I spent too many years watching the antics of the U.S.'s armor/anti-armor analysis and development, as we made stuff up, misconstrued what we found out, tested stuff, ignored the results of tests, and generally did whatever was necessary to put as many bucks in the pockets of defense contractors as we could.

I'll try to tell you what I think, 'cause I still can't tell you what I know. Yes, I'm cynical.

In the '70s, US tankers were holding the soiled end of the stick, if we had to go to a shooting war in Europe. We could put holes in them, they could put holes in us, and there were a whole lot more of them than us.

We decided to get better. So did the Soviets. We did a better job, overall. We built tanks that were very survivable (a great relief to U.S. tankers), but they could still get knocked out on the battlefield, as recent events show.

By the end of the '80s, we could put holes in most of their stuff, and they would have a hard time getting a *catastrophic* kill against our stuff; that doesn't mean they couldn't hurt us. There were some logistics issues at that time cncerning the availability of our best penetrators. Given the disparity in numbers, it still wasn't a warm and fuzzy place to be in.

More importantly (but this is the stuff that wargames miss), the Soviets had an integrated strategy and sophisticated operational art aimed at negating many of our tactical advantages. We stayed focused on the tactical level and hoped that the Air Force would fix everything if the shooting started. It would have been darned interesting (if one were emotionally unattached) to find out if their system worked as well at the big-picture level as *I* think it might have.

Having a field day against export models in Gulf One didn't do much to fix the conventional wisdom about the armor balance. But then, neither did made-up nonsense about the FSTs. We sort of ignored the fact that the Soviet Union (and then Russia) was bankrupt, and that we weren't… yet.

"Team Yankee", "Hammerheads", and anything by Tom Clancy fall into the genre of military porn for the enthusiasts who sit in their barracks rooms sharpening their Gerbers and drooling over "Soldier of Fortune"--even though the're supply clerks. On the wider level, those works of popular fiction served as a sugar pill to sweeten the wealth we were pouring into the defense industry. And that's why Clancy was the darling of the services, and received unprecedented access: he was the de facto DoD Public Affairs Officer.

I'd put more weight into something like "Red Army" for a realistic look at how the unfought war might have turned out. Ralph Peters hadn't gone so far around the bend back then.

Nowadays, we've got a darn good tank (so do the UK and the FRG, and our various clients). A very expensive one. You could say it's more than we need, but I'm the last person to put a price tag on the life of an armor crewman. The Russians have a pretty good tank, too. It doesn't fit their overall doctrine so much any more. They're still suckered into an arms race, it seems. And they can't afford that many, unless they can sell a lot--and depending on the global oil situation, and what they can tap into to maintain their income stream.. A future conflict between NATO and Russia probably isn't going to get to the tank-on-tank level, anyway.

So…. treat most modern armor games as a sort of fantasy, and you can't go wrong. Or experiment with something like Dirtside II, where you can whicker with capabilities to reflect what you think is right.

Allen

Thanks Allen. This partly came up because I was trying to get it into Dirtside. The old TTG games- Challenger II and OMG had the Soviets not as far behind. I'm working from the TTG Ultra Modern List (1985!!) as the numbers it gives are easily divided intoDS2 speak. My main problem is Soviet Firecons, and which guns to make HVC and which HKP (as I have posted before, recently)

"The old TTG games- Challenger II and OMG had the Soviets not as far behind."

For tanks, maybe! I wasn't impressed by Challenger's understanding of Soviet artillery, CM/CB radars, etc., compared to NATO.

Sounds like you're on the right track!

Allen

It's tanks and APCs I'm starting with. No one *plays* TTG unless they are accountants missing the Tax Return season.

I like Spearhead, but frankly, the game has always had a pretty severe bias against the Russians. I think this was carried over into the Modern version. I wouldn't place much weight on the game statistics as representing any kind of a reality.

Of course the flip side is the equivalent of Shermans (M60) vs Tigers(T-72)

Numbers versus Quality!The Reds have 22831+ tanks!Even if half of them are junks it"s not a question how quickly they die but how quickly you will run out of ammo!

LAST HUSSAR,

Maybe this link may help you for DS2 stats for modern vehicles:

link

T-62, T-72, and T-80's took a serious beating from Russian made RPG's in Chechnya. The T-80 in particular proved worse than the 72 in taking top and rear shots.

I have found that in MSH the russians aren't so far behind. Arty is good, divisional operations works, and more often than not they work as expected. Tank on tank it will not be pretty for both sides. duple suppression result in a kill…

One thing that a lot of player miss is that game statistics aren't the gospel. you have to take them in the game.

Once we run a division agaisnt reinforced brigade game. The initial NATO line has only two cacalry troops. They got heavily suppressed by starting barrage. Then two regiment bore in…

I was able to burn some T62s (I had M1A1 enemy a full MRD with T62 in the MRR and T72 in the TD…) then pull back… reinforcements were coming M1 vanilla and M60… not a pleasant surprise. Often I was force to spend ocmpanies (usually armor) to get the mech infantry in position.

In the end the soviet broke through with reasonable losses.

Affter a lot of plays we have decided that in the end MSH is more effective than other accountant games.

One interesting thing we have noticed is terrain… mofre often than not is channelling sovivet approach (we tried to use real terrain)and negate overwhelming superiority and fancy maneuvers.

(I have found that often FRG terrain doesn't cope well soviet operational doctrine…)

A sidenote about numbers. Numbers are misleading. A bolt of the blue scenario with WP attack out of the barrack was unlikey, and would have been a confused (I do not buy Kamps idea of a perfect and smooth movement out of battack stations on a whim for both sides). With some time to prepare NATO would have had at least some REFORGER units and partial mobilization (the Royal Nethelands Army was capable to mobilize in 2 days the bulk of its mobile formatrions and even tested it. 50 series german reserve units were not too far from it.

The bulk of the soviet reserves were in soviet union… each train carrying a division west would have competed with train carrying supplies… division numbers of readily available formations in the vicinnity of the front is not so favorable to soviet units. Alos NATO units were usually bigger.

You need to note that the Modern Spearhead author issued revised Soviet organisations and ratings from those in the initial rulebook. They are freely available on the web ( PDF link ) , and it would be wise to use them as a starting point for a critique. This is not a case, as with some rulesets, of the author making bum calls and then refusing to change them when better information came along. The authors acknowledged that they were working off Cold War-era estimates when drafting the rules, and that information available more recently was, in some cases, better. Moreover, the MSH author points out that, as a platoon-stand game, the ratings of platoons do not solely rely on estimated armour values but include other factors such as platoon tactics and training. While you might disagree with the author's perceptions on that score, it is an entirely different subject than guns-versus-armour alone.

Its not immediately apparent how much Last Hussar knows about modern tank design, but the sweeping generalisation of the opening salvo is not promising. What specific Soviet tank is being considered, and of what era? As aecurtis points out, there are marked differences in the periods of the 1970s-early 1980s and the mid/late-1980s. Comparing a 1985 M1A1 ( attack 12 in MSH ) with a 1976 or earlier T-64A ( defence 9 ) is spurious. Or, we might say the outcome is unsurprising and appropriately modeled by the rules.

When the subject of the Arab-Israeli wars or Iraq is raised in relation to this subject, the Russians always claim that they had inferior export models and were not using the correct Soviet tactics and doctrine.

So what about Angola?

Admittedly, the T-55s supplied to Angola were not first-rate MBTs, but they were infinitely better than a Ratel-90 in terms of firepower and protection and the South Africans only fielded a single squadron of Olifant (i.e. Centurion) tanks late in the campaign (briefly reinforced by a second squadron right at the end of the campaign). The Angolans were also supplied with the best SAMs that money could buy, the highly effective MiG-23 ML model and large numbers of proven artillery systems such as the D-30 and BM-21. There were no 'export models' there.

The Angolan FAPLA troops were trained by Soviet and East German advisors and during 'Operation Saluting October' in 1987 were actually led by Soviet officers at battalion, brigade and higher level, with many Soviet advisors at lower level. Their air defences were run directly by the Cubans.

Operation 'Saluting October' was run according to Soviet operational principles, yet fell apart within days due to harassing air and artillery attacks, UNITA guerillas armed with RPGs and Milan ATGMs. By the time the South African 'Operation Modular' was launched, the FAPLA troops were already going onto the defensive and very soon the Soviet officers were flown out to avoid capture.

It cannot be claimed that this was just another foreign misuse of Soviet equipment and tactics – it was Soviet trained, indoctrinated, planned, led, equipped, supported and supplied from top to bottom, yet it failed spectacularly in the face of inferior numbers with inferior equipment, but superior training and tactics.

Allen sez

"I'd put more weight into something like "Red Army" for a realistic look at how the unfought war might have turned out."

Having recently re-read it, I'd have to agree – based on no more than a relatively well-read layman's intuition, that is. Some things worked well, others didn't at all, but a lot hinged on planning and logistics. I found it interesting that the Americans didn't make much of a showing directly in the book – they were about to smash into the southern flank of the Soviet salient when the Germans rolled over. So, he kind of danced around the question, to a degree.

But I'd highly, highly recommend the book for anyone gaming the period.

treat most modern armor games as a sort of fantasy, and you can't go wrong.

Isn't most of historical wargaming sort of fantasy, anyway?

Griefbringer

Soviet armor was very strong, with some severe drawbacks.
Fighting against T64A and T64Bs would have been a difficult proposition in the 1980s. The average American round in the period… the M735 and even the first DU round the 774 would have had great difficulty in penetrating either tank. It would have done ok at very close range against the hull of the T64A….The 833 was the first round that had a decent chance vs the T series of tanks. It was very slow to be fielded and had development problems. Some 105mm units didn't get it till GW1.

Nato Allies were significantly worse. The best allied 105 round till about 1986 was a copy of the M735.

Russian tank rounds were scary. The Soviet BM22- a round introduced in 76 and probably in most tank units by 1980 would kill any American tank that it would hit…. period.

The M1 at best would present about 400mm of steel equivalent armor. The BM 22 would penetrate this reliably at 2000m.

The allies here were slightly better. The Germans were building Leo2s at a good rate. It could take a hit from the Soviet rounds…

So, yes the Sovs were scary. The Tseries did however had weaknesses…
The tank is small and front armor has fairly large weakened areas… the drivers hatch.. the gun mantel (or lack thereof), the upper part of the turret. Soviet rounds were also lacking in accuracy do to poor manufacturing and some due to design (though they hit harder). The fire control was a mix of good and bad. The autoloader was slower on average than a human loader. The Tseries tends to brewup if penetrated…

Sov crews weren't as well trained as German/US or British.. though of course some were outstanding.

All for now…

Joe Collins

"Operation 'Saluting October' was run according to Soviet operational principles, yet fell apart within days due to harassing air and artillery attacks, UNITA guerillas armed with RPGs and Milan ATGMs. By the time the South African 'Operation Modular' was launched, the FAPLA troops were already going onto the defensive and very soon the Soviet officers were flown out to avoid capture."

I would argue that the FAPLA operation was conducted entirely *against* Soviet operational principles!

All the following quotes are from Morgan Norvals's "Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy".

>>> "In August [1987] four brigades of Soviet and Cuban-led FAPLA forces (47th, 59th, 16th and 21st Brigades) moved again from Cuito Cuanavale in a slow methodical advance to the southeast towards Mavinga. The advance was proceeding along the road-actually it was nothing more than a dirt track cut through the bush-from Cuito Cuanavale southeastward to Cunjamba; between the Conzumbia River and Cunjamba the advance would turn south, cross the Lomba River and capture Mavinga. From there the advance would proceed south, capture Jamba and destroy the UNITA movement once and for all. That was the Soviets' plan."

>>> "The communist forces advanced slowly and methodically, preceded by a screen of infantry to clear the area of UNITA ambushes. The bulk of the armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers would slowly follow behind the dismounted infantry sweeping the bush. The whole column would advance in this manner for six to eight kilometers per day Each evening, they would stop, and set up a fortified, dug-in defensive position before settling in for the night. The next day they would continue in the same manner, reminiscent of the advance of an ancient Roman Legion-march a certain distance, then build a fortified camp before spending the night."

>>> "Caution wasn't the only thing causing the advance to proceed at such a snail's pace. The terrain and the dirt track that passed as a road was slowing the movement of armor and vehicles that were designed for combat on the plains of Europe not the African bush. The non-existent roads in southern Angola took their toll on both men and equipment of the communist forces."

The South Africans mounted three consecutive operations ostensibly to prevent the annihilation of UNITA forces, who had been doing pretty well on their own, which might possibly have something to do with the terrain! Having CIA advisers with Stingers and French advisers with Milans probably didn't hurt, either.

The UNITA forces had already fought their enemy to a standstill, counterattacking on September 26th, and causing enough casualties to force the FAPLA columns to retreat on Spetmeber 29th.

>>> "The South Africans responded and a mechanized force, led by the veteran of Operation ASKARI-61 Mechanized Battalion-moved over the border from Rundu and headed northwest to intercept FAPLA's 47th Brigade.

>>> "The South African force was under the command of Colonel Deon Ferreira. He had received three sets of orders for his force to carry out: (1) to halt and reverse the FAPLA/Cuban advance on the UNITA strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba-Operation MODULAR; (2) to inflict maximum casualties on the retreating enemy-Operation HOOPER; and, (3) to force the enemy to retreat to west of the Cuito River-Operation PACKER."

>>> "Near the junction of the Lomba and Cuzizi Rivers the South Africans met and utterly destroyed the 47th Brigade, removing the communist screening force from south of the Lomba River. The South African attack caught the communists by surprise as they were expecting any attack by the South Africans or UNITA to come from the east in the area between Cunjamba and the Lomba River. This was the area they had sent their 16th and 21st Brigades to defend against the expected attacks. Instead the attack had come from an unexpected direction-the south."

One battalion task force counterattacking and destroying a brigade: indeed, that would be what we would have hoped to accomplish in a defense of Europe. But the Soviets never planned to allow regiments to be destroyed sequentially.

>>> "Contributing to the success of the South Africans was their undisputed superiority in artillery. The advantage was not measured in numbers of guns -FAPLA and the Cubans actually had more artillery pieces than both UNITA and the South Africans combined. What carried the day for the South Africans was the tremendous technological superiority of their G5 and G6 155mm howitzers.

>>> "Most informed military experts throughout the world consider the G5 to be the best 155mm howitzer in the world. Its performance in southern Angola justified that belief. What made the G5 and the G6-the newer selfpropelled upgrade of the G5 system-so effective was their great accuracy at extreme range-approaching 40 kilometers. FAPLA/Cuban counterbattery fire was ineffective because they were outranged by the South African artillery. FAPLA's counterbattery radar could determine the bearing from which the shells were coming, but they could never determine how far away the guns were, making locating them impossible. Nor could the enemy's Soviet MIGs find the guns. The Soviet planes searched in vain often thousands of meters short of the actual gun locations."

This is why comparing tanks doesn't tell the whole story. FAPLA artillery was completely outranged by the South Africans. As a result, the South Africans achieved significant levels of destruction--not merely harassment.

>>> As the FAPLA/Cuban offensive was stopped, the South African/ UNITA force went over to the offensive ending MODULAR and beginning Operation HOOPER. HOOPER's task was to inflict as much damage as possible on the retreating communist forces. The long, strung-out columns of retreating FAPLA/Cuban vehicles were hounded from the flanks by UNITA's guerrillas. They were pursued by the mobile UNITA units and the South African mechanized forces and pounded unmercilessly by the deadly G5 and G6 artillery fire."

Again, artilery superiority is a good thing to have. The South Africans were able to take advantage of this with impunity, as there were no FAPLA assets able to counter them. It would have been quite different in a European war.

By the way, two companies of Oliphants were employed during HOOPER.

>>> "The bulk of HOOPER's activity was to support UNITA's drive towards Cuito Cuanavale and to clear the area east of the town between the Cautir and Chambinga Rivers of all FAPLA forces. On January 13, 1988, they attacked FAPLA's 21st Brigade and sent them fleeing for safety west of the Cuito River. During this battle over 250 FAPLA soldiers from the 21st Brigade were killed and large quantities of arms were captured or destroyed, including fourteen tanks."

>>> "On February 14,1988, HOOPER forces launched a second attack against FAPLA's 59th Brigade. The brigade withdrew with 230 FAPLA soldiers killed and nine more Soviet tanks destroyed."

Again, it's good to be able to engage your enemy piecemeal.

… "On February 25, 1988, South African and UNITA forces attacked positions manned by FAPLA's 25th Brigade south of the Tumpo River, twenty to twenty-five kilometers east of Cuito Cuanavale. The attack ran into an extensive anti-tank mine field, which stopped the tank-supported South African/UNITA attack with the loss of two Olifants. In spite of this, the intense artillery bombardment and infantry assaults inflicted heavy casualties and pinned down the FAPLA survivors."

>>> "Even though some FAPLA forces remained on the Tumpo River the South African/UNITA force succeeded in capturing the tactical highground in the area, the so-called "Chambinga heights." This high ground dominates Cuito Cuanavale and its nearby territory UNITA still holds the Chambinga heights.
At this point HOOPER was effectively over and Operation PACKER was in full swing."

The South Africans swapped out one armor company; two were again employed during PACKER.

>>> "PACKER was on-going with much of HOOPER in that its objective was to drive the FAPLA/Cuban force back across the Cuito River to its west bank. From the South African's last position twenty to twenty-five kilometers east of Cuito Cuanavale, including the Chambinga heights, the G5 and G6 artillery took on the task of chasing the enemy forces west of the Cuito River. They were successful in this mission: "We'd succeeded in dispersing the entire enemy force, save one battalion, to beyond the Cuito River," said Colonel Ferreira."

>>> "Foreign observers were quick to comment on the effectiveness of the South African artillery at Cuito Cuanavale. Janes Defense Weekly said: "Since 10 January, 170 to 200 shells have hit targets in and around the town (Cuito Cuanavale) daily."

I'll not belabor the point; the narrative does quite well!

Regardless of the extent of Soviet and Cuban advisers and support, the FAPLA units were composed of very young, inexperienced, and often unwilling troops.

The armor-heavy FAPLA offensive was completely unsuited to the terrain.

The greatest destruction of the FAPLA forces was accomplished by South African artillery, which was able to operate with impunity. Consider also the moral as well as the physical results.

The South Africans were abole to engage and destroy FAPLA brigades separately and sequentially: a tribute to SA leadership, but another FAPLA failure to achieve overwhelming superiority at the critical points on the battlefield.

So I'm cheerfully diagreeing with you on parts of your assessment:

"It cannot be claimed that this was just another foreign misuse of Soviet equipment and tactics…"

Putting tanks in that terrain was certainly a misuse, and I don't see evidence of Soviet tactics.

"…it was Soviet trained, indoctrinated, planned, led, equipped, supported and supplied from top to bottom…"

Not so sure about all that. As mentioned, it deviated from Soviet principles on multiple levels.

"…yet it failed spectacularly in the face of inferior numbers with inferior equipment, but superior training and tactics."

And I don't agree about inferior equipments (given the G5 and G6), but agree that superior training and tactics--for that environment--prevailed.

But as the course of the campaign indicates, it was never really a conflict of armor against armor. The armor-less (but Milan-equipped) UNITA forces has stopped and turned around the FAPLA attack before SA armor ever entered the fray.

It's also interesting to note that, as a later RAND study observed, the presence of a "superior" armor force in this campaign caused the South African government to re-assess the role of its own armored force in its defense strategy.

Finally, some pics, because everybody likes pics!

link

Allen (being contrary, even with someone whose knowledge he respects highly!)

Allen, if you'd allow me to pick your brain a bit more on this…

I would argue that the FAPLA operation was conducted entirely *against* Soviet operational principles!

What would have been done differently, if it had been conducted according to Soviet priniciples?

More importantly (but this is the stuff that wargames miss), the Soviets had an integrated strategy and sophisticated operational art aimed at negating many of our tactical advantages.

How could this be represented at the level of, say, MSH/CWC/FFT, or Modern Crossfire?

We stayed focused on the tactical level and hoped that the Air Force would fix everything if the shooting started.

I remember hearing about a cartoon late in the Cold War: Two Soviet officers sit at a cafe in Paris. One asks the other, "So, who won the air war?"

"What would have been done differently, if it had been conducted according to Soviet priniciples?"

Well, it might not have happened at all! A dirt track is not a good avenue of approach for a brigade-sized force. Consider that in Operation Bagration, Marshal Rokossovski didn't go barging through the Pripet Marshes.

I'd look at the possibility of an air assault, followed up by fast-moving infantry columns.

"How could this be represented at the level of, say, MSH/CWC/FFT, or Modern Crossfire?"

Hard to do. The things that shape the battlefield at the operational level, if they're successful, don't make for very enjoyable scenarios at the tactical level. Flipping the page, you don't see a lot of people wargaming Gulf One, do you?

But the U.S. Army's professional simulations modellers weren't awfully good at it, either. You saw an awful lot of hand-waves, implementing the automatic success of air interdiction, not to mention automatically ensuring the arrival of stateside reinforcements, units getting out of garrison to their GDPs, etc. Combat developments simulations were generally set to ensure that everything has gone right for NATO in the buildup to war, with no surprises. Yeah, right.

The only realistic simulation I ever saw was one a contractor did for the Center for Naval Analysis. A US carrier battle group was attacked by long-range aviation from the northwest Soviet Union. The naval aviators successfully held off the first wave of Backfires, expending all their air-to-air missiles. Then the second wave arrived on station, and the battle group ceased to exist.

Allen

"The things that shape the battlefield at the operational level, if they're successful, don't make for very enjoyable scenarios at the tactical level. Flipping the page, you don't see a lot of people wargaming Gulf One, do you?"

True.

Would it be reasonable than to not have as much of the 'off-table' restrictions that are usually placed on the Soviet forces? (flank marches and the like)

Certainly in a meeting battle/meeting engagement scenarios, there are a lot more tools available in a Soviet commander's toolbox than are frequently represented on the tabletop.

When it comes to attacking a prepared defense, scenarios in which appropriate amounts of fire support have degraded the defenders would be more interesting (to me, anyway) than having everyone present, mustered, and bright-eyed at the beginning of Turn One. But I like unbalanced scenarios.

Allen

"Certainly in a meeting battle/meeting engagement scenarios, there are a lot more tools available in a Soviet commander's toolbox than are frequently represented on the tabletop."

What do you recommend should be there?

Tactical air assaults, operational maneuver groups, forward detachments, reconnaissance detachments, enveloping detachments, outflanking detachments, mugs, pugs, thugs, vipers, snipers… and Methodists.

Oh, wait.

Pull out Dave Glantz's "The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive" for a start; it's even online:

link

Allen

All situation-dependent, of course!

Allen

Allen,I think we may have lost the war on spelling…..
Glad to see you changed 'for atart' to a start lol

check out diagreeing or should that be disagreeing…..

seems i'm not the only one to miss out letters in haste..

Finish instead of Finnish seems to ring a bell…

Regards

Unsurprisingly, Allen has it pretty much down pat.
-Kle.

Steelback: Every so often I have to make the conscious effort to stay down to TMP standards!

Thanks, Kle.!

Allen

LOL

Allen

Your post on Soviet armour was very interesting and informative,to the point as allways………

Regards

Allen…

one thing that soviet\cubans were stating at the time (and still say… with some american university professor in support) is that they were in full control of the situation having relegated inept FAPLA leadership to menial task…

Now it could be the case that:

1) the guys sent in angola were utterly incompetents sent to a sun scarred african country to being get rid of…

2) the soviet operational theory is constantly violated by poor staff

3) Equating the generals of the great patriotic war and their operations to late cold war soviet officers is comparing apples to oranges (and even then some of the invincibles had fumbled badly).

Again you are showing us a lot of good points; certainly Clancy and the others stack too much the odd on blue team's favor (but to be quite honest Clancy in RSR seems to me much better even handed that other people the soviets were actually good and capable, it is their logistical system that unravel…), but sometime you seems like a 10 footer tall…

If the ruskies were soo good why they havent crossed the wire in 86-88 to get some more breathing pace? Kicking West Germany out of NATO (not occupying it, only doing a favorable settlement) would have eased the pressure on their machine and get them some breathing without, probably, going nuclear.

I am still persauded that after the ealry 80 balance of forces was swinging in NATO favor and very heavily.

Alos NATO was putting everything smooth on their manuver, but also WP ones were heavily scripted, with communist units getting out from barracks like clocks..

Intersting reading guys. A point that seems to be coming out here is that Soviet armour 1 for 1 ain't upto its western counterparts. And if you look at Soviet battle tactics, its fairly clear that the CPSU knew that as well.

1987 was when you see a published change in soviet military doctrine. If you get the chance, check out Vorobevs' new weapons and tactical principles and Novikovs' high precision weapons against tanks.

They basically re-format the deep battle methodology, adding a vertical airland concept (ind of a juxtaposition to the US led concpet) and increased manouvre. The general idea seems to be measured non engagement against superior (in quality) armour, go over or go round, operate a fluid first echelon that has to be capable of doing the job without bringing 2nd echolon to the main combat area. Isolate these high quality enemy pockets and don't give them a battle. Easier said than done of course.

This looks like a mixture of running scared and developing the late war principles learned against Nazi Germany.

Of course, this all falls on its arse when you look at the assets the USSR had as allies. Only the NVA had a comparable level of competency to NATO and even then had no offensive capability.

"They basically re-format the deep battle methodology, adding a vertical airland concept (ind of a juxtaposition to the US led concpet) and increased manouvre. The general idea seems to be measured non engagement against superior (in quality) armour, go over or go round, operate a fluid first echelon that has to be capable of doing the job without bringing 2nd echolon to the main combat area. Isolate these high quality enemy pockets and don't give them a battle. Easier said than done of course.

This looks like a mixture of running scared and developing the late war principles learned against Nazi Germany."

I'd call that a fair summary. Add in (as you allude) the impact of high-precision weapons (when used en masse, assessed to have equivalent effects to weapons of mass destruction), and weapons based on new physical principles, and you have pretty much the state of affairs when the Soviet Union ceased to be.

Allen

Thanks Allen,, some very informative posts, as always :)

Collins, I'm hurt- look a bruise :-)

Its not immediately apparent how much Last Hussar knows about modern tank design, but the sweeping generalisation of the opening salvo is not promising.

I was not stating my opinion, I was saying how games/books represent it. I realise where I did go wrong was not specifying period- I'm looking Mid-late 80's. Before everyone send howls of derision at me, I would say in my defence that it was when I started wargaming at 19/20, in 1989. I did buy a Dutch army to be different (everyone seemed to buy USSR, UK, US or FRG), and basically got into the period from there. The army I got from the Guardroom was a Mid 80's one, so I had ran with that- remember I knew nothing about the Cloggies to start with. Later a freind gave me a FRG Leo 2 Bn (in 1:1 figure scale), and all the stuff I was buying, and all my freinds were predecated on the 80's, as well as the fiction- Team Yankee, RSR.

When I compared above I was comparing the stuff that would be generally available from '85ish- not the "latest" '87 M1A1. MSH does give a distinct advantage to NATO- not my opinion- the numbers (yes I do have the update- must get the tippex out at some point- I've skimmed them but little of it improves WP gunnery). When I have played FRG Leo2 kill WP at will (well see the original post), while requiring 2 hits at 5 or 6 to kill a FRG platoon (ie 2 suppress). Did a quick compare for the Mid 60's and it is a lot closer.

The Soviets won late 80's games by weight of numbers.

Not quite sure why I need to 'know about modern tank design'- I understand principles and trade-offs, and the concept of the design triangle, but I was asking were the stats often quoted reasonable- difficult that much of the data is still classified (The MoD tends to get a bit funny if you phone up and ask how far an L30A1 DS round can penetrate a 60' glacis!)

It sounds like the average FAPLA trooper wasn't a very good soldier. When surprised or under attack and things were not going according to plan they collapsed like a house of cards. I wonder if the Soviet and Cuban leaders would have faired better if the rank and file had come from their own countries? Do the Soviets establish SOP for retrogade, ambushes and other assorted disasters?

"The only realistic simulation I ever saw was one a contractor did for the Center for Naval Analysis. A US carrier battle group was attacked by long-range aviation from the northwest Soviet Union. The naval aviators successfully held off the first wave of Backfires, expending all their air-to-air missiles. Then the second wave arrived on station, and the battle group ceased to exist."

And my question is…what does this mean? How many Backfires were lost in the first raid? Was the CBG operating by itself, or in concert with other CBGs? How about the BG's air defense assets? How many AEGIS cruisers FREX? What about land based air assets…any F-15s flying out of Reykjavik? What are the Norwegians or Danes doing? Or the Brits? And (most important of all) is this style of Soviet assault SUSTAINABLE?

I'm just wondering how much handwaivium goes on here…on both sides!

Damon.

Damon, at that time, there were only two or three Aegis cruisers in the Navy. It was 1985, I think. The analysis was to justify buying more than just the first group! At the time, you may recall, their effectiveness was questioned. Edit: See also "…put as much money in the pockets of defense contractors as possible…") above. There are always large stocks of handwavium on hand when there's a budget to be justified.

Dragon Gunner, if you go digging, you can probably find some comments that the FAPLA conscripts initially did better in 1987 under Soviet advisors than they had done previously; the Soviets had been providing advisors in-country since 1978 and had seen a lot of running away; for example, in Operation PROTEA in 1981:

link

On the other hand, Soviet officers probably didn't have a real high opinion of their charges (take this with a grain of salt):

link

Allen

without going to o/t re: soviet armour I took par in a few atlantic exercises post 85, usually playing orange forces. The meant red, but blue vs red… ooooh its too close to the real thing. So it was purple vs orange.Purple never won. EVER. The Norway, UK, Iceland line wouldn't hold for long enough for the Americans to come to the rescue.

The one thing I learned be it air, sea or land assets (and had it confirmed by knowing a shed load of Russian military types) is that manpower appears on the equipment column as an expendable asset. They had done the calcs and in many ways the Atlantic war was just the deepening of the european battle front. The M1A2 cannot kill much in the way of armour when its logistic supply is strangled.

Just to note, and to show how thick I am, the 1st time I saw a 3D radar display I thought the screen was broke as it didn't have an update line going round and round it!

Mid-late '80s is harder for Soviets (IRL and in MSH) than most other periods of Cold War. You make your chances better in MSH as a Soviet player (which those on the Spearhead list will know I usually am) if you use T-72B for that period or T-80U. Take earlier generation tanks up against late model NATO tanks and you deserve all the lumps you get. For comparison, no WWII gamer would bleat about the rules if his Matildas failed to cut it against Panthers. T-72B/T-80U will fire on their 1985-equivalent Abrams at evens (11 versus 11) in Modern Spearhead.

Leo2 is rightly represented by the game as a real leap forward. When it was introduced in late 1979 there is little doubt it was a massive advance on all competitors in service at that time. This is in all areas: firepower, protection and mobility.

If the ruskies were soo good why they havent crossed the wire in 86-88 to get some more breathing pace?

US doctrine at the time was "if a Soviet soldier accidentally pees over the border, we nuke every population center in the USSR".

Kind of made adventurism a large gamble.

Besides, they had plenty of problems (so did we, of course) – they just weren't as weak as a direct technical comparison of the T-72 to the Leopard 2 makes it seem.
-Kle.

Actually this wasn't the doctrine I had been briefed. In the 80' the nuclear release line was getting pushed far back.

As to the supply lines… Soviet fleet was not desgined to do that. It was a sort of large coast defense force. Their aim was to kill CVBG heading toward the rodina, maybe supporting the north and south flanks with landings agaisnt turkey and norway and denmark.

Also if the soviet system worked for the army iud didn't work for the navy. Quoting professor Andrew Lambert "the russian sailor does not like the sea, he wants to see land, possibly on both sides".

Ghorskov and Breznhev were naval adventurist, but their navy was already failing in early 80 and being replaced by a CVBG killer thing. Even the Subs were to work in that framework and to protect the bastion. Despite being operationally offensive russian strategic direction is\was defensive. After WW1 and mainly WW2 they are paranoid about western invasions on their countries.

Logistically speaking the bottleneck would have been deembarkation ports and moving the stuff where it was needed rather than crossing the atlantic. Like the logistic nightmare for the reds would have the railway network from russia proper and ukraine. The same lined were supposed to carry supplies and mobilizing units… Probably the Atlantic SLOC would have been more efficent in wartime than the russian one (this is one of the reaosn I think RSR did a good job. Clancy and Bond represented a much more relistic soviet naval approach than Hackett massive battles in the atlantic, even with the keflavik coup).

Also russian manpower could have been considered expendable (and I have my doubts on that) but if they couldn't replace it (again along the same rail lines used to carry supplies), it would have been simply wasted. . Also airmobile units weren't available everywhere to allow each local commander to perform according to the theory and also pretty much one shot weapons if not used correctly and with care. Tha lead us toward a scenario were the bolt from the blue was improbable and every effort to mobilize the ruskies would have given time for REFORGER and other NATO mobilization to work.

As last note I have a lot of doubts on how good was soviet implementation of their doctrine. Their deep battle approach is wonderful and they were eaons ahed with theory even before WW2, still in practice they often misused it. Also how many juniors were involved in theory opposed to western armies?

Also I fear that Last gunner is missingf the point. A NATO 4 tanks top of the line platoon was usually the point. But this is not the point. Soviet gunnery was worse than NATO. Soviet formations were smaller and the "wingmen" usually fired on the leader target…

but Soviet tanks were not designed with the same target than NATO ones… as Allen pointed out fighting an even odd clash of armor was not the point. MSH celarly show that… but accountants often missed the point… <evil grin>

Do you know- I never even thought about gunnery practice being factored in despite knowing the Soviets were considered poorer! (Though is that a fact? The source I have is the late '80s Osprey, Tank war central front, even as I type salt mines are cranking up production.) Got to shoot (Mrs Hussar calling). Will post again after looking at errata et al.

Last Hussar,

MSH authors clearly states that the valued aren't a simple product of hard data… It always happens when you move from 1:1 rules up to the chain :P

And I can assure you that properly led the soviets are scary in MSH. Once I an my regular oppenent worked at crazy game. We planned in advance the soviets in real detail discussing every move and countermove. Then we played the NATO (west german mixed battalion with some attachments) cooperatively… despite the Soviet actin on "AI" they were able to thrown us back…

The strength of the soviets was that they would have probably attacked with a large elemnt of suprise--gaining the initiative and hitting where they want!!--Even though Abrams, Cheiftains and Leopards destroy loads of T72s on a tactical level a few tank armies are charging towards the Rhine in the gap that the inadequate amount of forces have left open!!

Lets face it.
A set of wargames rules written by russians would weight the armour the other way.
There was a long period of time from 1985 to 2005 when the M1A2 was considered invunrable, and the fact that thousands of burnt out soviet armour was in their wake lent weight to that myth.

We have to condider that the quality of the Iraqi tank crews was only slightly higher than if they had been crewed by a collection of Jim Hendersons muppetts, and indeed a few of them were. Also a shedload of the dead tanks were T55/T60/T64 and consequently not first line russian kit.
A lot of it you could poke holes in with a bayonet it was so rusted to crap and back.

Western Kit in contrast has been shown to be very good. Sure theres a graveyard in Iraq full of M1 wrecks, and a Chally two, took 17 RPG's and ground to a halt, but they are still excellent machines.

The superiority really comes into play with the excellent optics and software that allows 95% hits. And the training that means the crews work together as a unit as a team and in support of infantry.

One challenger leaped over a berm at 40 MPH and within 20 seconds killed three T54's at 900m then leaped back in support of infantry. many similar stories exist.

Lets not slate modern russian kit. Lets just slate poorly trained crews/ unmotivated and panicy crews and say that it's untested.

When the M1 was untested it was the "best tank evar" the pudding has been eaten and its tasty, but thats not to say CIS armour is crap. If it was so bad why would pirates capture them? I mean Pirates! Would they use crappy gear? nowai!

Thanks to Joe Collins, Tommiatkins and Allen. I am (genuinely) put out by some of the answers given here that are telling me I don't know anything, when they are not addressing the question I asked. The trouble is the net isn't a great way to communicate subtlety of language, so I will assume they were not as dismissive as I read them.

MSH stats (even with the amendments) give NATO tanks an advantage. (Also remember that a stand in MSH often represents 5 WP tanks- a half company, rather than a 4 tank NATO platoon).
Other sets of rules also give a NATO advantage. The WW3 fiction also gives a NATO advantage- Companies take on battalions, and not only stop the attack, but lose only 1 or 2 tanks in the process.

My question wasn't about doctrine (though obviously doctrine will affect performance). It was 'Are NATO tanks as good as they were made out to be'. In MSH US tanks have an advantage in most periods (using the dates given in the notes Column). It isn't such a massacre as the original stats, but where two bases are maneuvering in the open (ok I know unlikely, but it is the 'levelest playing field') then NATO will come out top more often than not.

Arrigo- sounds like you have some good games. I have overwhelmed NATO lines (and have been overwhelmed) but the WP have taken huge casualties in the process. What sort of force ratios do you use? How did you do the Automatic Enemy game, given the defender will know the attacker plans?

Tommi- That Berm leaping Challenger- I or II and which Gulf war-1 or 2?

Last hussar,

usually my take is one NATO battalion (usually cross attached) against a soviet regiment give you a very basic encounter… addo more arty to the reds (usually the attacking regiment could count on divisional arty…) and things start to work…

better games (if you have space and time) are a WP division agianst a NATO brigade (even funnier if the BDE is mixed with various nationalities).

IF nato is on the attack give them 1:1 or a bit less and there will be fun.

Also remeber one thing… never use only top of the line stuff for NATO… people often complain that NATO best tanks are too powerful, but again there were still some M60A3 in 89' in europe. Not every german leo was a 2A4…

Use terrain… germany isn't flat… covered approaches help the russian close range… use smoke (also remember that soviets were known to mix WP in smoke screen to degrage thermal, usually I gave them some thermal defeating fire mission in the game).

About the automatic opponent… MSH is fun beacuse you have to write orders in advance… a team agaisnt the "AI" requires honest play and a group of people who are willing to Role play a little instead of winning. We discussed the red plan for more than an hour thinking also about NATO reactions and how to pre-empt force them… also the terrain was a bit constricted there was only a good axis of attack (table limitations) so there weren't too much surprise. IT was more to see if with skillful play the german recon was able to delay. the soviets had 4 bns of T64 and one motor riofle with BMP1 (it was the Tank regiment of a MRD reinforced by the DTB for an exploitation attack) with pleny of arty… the NATO was a mix of leo2 and some 1 plu grenadier in marder…

Again tank platoon vs tank platoon (or tank company vs tank company) NATO is scary… but usually you will never field full tank units and tanks are pretty useless in urban areas and other close terrain.

BTW a T64 is better than a T72….

T64/T72-I kenw that Did I type something stupid- If so apologies- its a typo, sorry (and sometimes my T72 masquerade as other similar looking tanks)

Oddly enough I have a Soviet Division. I also have a FRG Bridage, some of which started as a Dutch Brigade (Leo2's) so can still do a Cloggie (YPR 765s)or a Dutch/German mix. The masscre of the Soviets was the FRG Bde vd Division (3 tank, 1 MR Regiments)

Its Leo2 because I bought a Dutch army, not knowing what was in it- just being different, then a freind gave me all his german stuff (LOTS), so I can't really do the 'honest' thing and go Leo1- I can't justify rebuying a brigade (Ok maybe I will buy a few). I actually got the '72s because I didn't want the Top of the Line.

3/4 years ago I bought, painted and based in secret a British Brigade for my stepson for Christmas- Challengers (Royal Scots), Chieftans and Warriors (Green Howards) into an actual Brigade (ad Hoc not withstanding)- all labeled up correctly. He was deeply chuffed, but between College, work (a cinema) and his girlfreind, they have never been out of the box. When we see him I do say we have to, but he doesn't have the time.

The leaping Chally was GW2 mate, 2003 and a MM was won in the action by the supporting infantry.

just as a gaming aside, I showed this thread to my chums Paul, Robert and the father in law. Paul was an instruction officer in Pzr Rgt 9 NVA, Robert was GRU technical in MSR24 and my in law was ex Sov military and part of the development team in the Omsk tank complex. Their findings are exactly like yours, but 180 degrees the other way, if you get my drift! Pauls concerns were how to use the terrain of the DDR to hold off NATO spearheads pushing towards westberlin. He pointed out interestingly, that the NVA would have been the ones to liberate westberlin, but didn't have any offensive capability to engage the FRG. Lack of bridging kit, lack of fuel and ammo logistics wagons, lack of long range tactical air assets etc…

Roberts views were and still are typical GRU. The US would be pushed into the sea and frankly wouldn't have the willingness to fight a conventional war to get back into Europe. The Americans, British and French didn't step into the DDR in the early 1950's reactions against socialism, so the americans wouldn't if mainland europe went a bit red. The key for DDR and USSR units was to stretch the supply lines of NATO in an offensive war. Also in the early to mid 1980's the intelligence services of the warsaw treaty member states spent a lot of time examining not just the combat effectiveness of NATO, but also the mindset of the people in these countries. Clearly it doesn't effect the movement of little bits of metal and plastic round a board, (and nor should it, as its just a game, lie monopoly or connect 4 really) but this "waffen und klassen bruderschaft" did effect the overall combat strategies of the warsaw treaty member states.

The in law was very interested in the views of the soviet air land technique. His counter was also interesting. NATO pushed against the DDR. DDR fights and folds. NATO pushes against Bulgaria, they fold. The rest surrender or change sides. Big deal. Now you are next to the USSR. If USSR pushes, west germany folds. Denmark folds. Norway gives up. Turkey and greece give up. Italy gives up. NATO collapses and the US have to get across the sea where they belong. The air land technique doesn't have to work well against everybody. Just against some of the weaker NATO states. Not sure I agree with it, but there we are. For example, if the Soviets had forced a decision in the med, and opened up italy, france and spain, (they were relying on a politically unstable greece, to collapse internally and the communists to take over) then that would make the whole Fulda gap scenario a bit tricky. Just a generally summary of my friends 2 ostmarks worth.