"Gettysburg. Day 3. What should Lee have done?" Topic

Starting to do a lot of reading on the American Civil War, which is interesting from a foreigners perspective.

I think everyone can agree that Picketts Charge didn't stand any reasonable chance of success.

But what should he have done instead?

Whats the verdict on the battle?

Should have listend to Longstreet on day 2, force the union forces to attack, somewhere else.

Dont know if that directly answers your question, about day three.

jon

If you get a do-over on day 3, why not on day one and avoid fighting at Gettysburg altogether?

Dave

Should have take the defensive stand and let Meade come to him. Pickett's charge was the recverse Fredricksburg situation.

Once Lee has committed to battle at Gettysburg he is in a fix. Since he is dependent on foraging for supplies he can't just dig in and hope that Meade will attack. Meade can still draw supplies and reinforcements from nearby railheads in Harrisburg, Hannover and York. Meade can afford to sit and wait, Lee cannot. Lee has made a promise to Jefferson Davis that an invasion of the North will produce many good results, possibly including the relief of Vicksburg. Lee cannot just admit that the campaign has not worked out and return to Virginia. His word and his reputation are at stake. He MUST have a decisive victory or he has failed. So, he has no choice but to attack. The attacks on July 1 & 2 came close to victory, but fell just short. So he has to attack again on the 3rd. But where and how? Not an easy question to answer. We know for certain one plan that will NOT work. But is there any plan that could have worked? I don't know. An attack on the center is out. An attack on the left (Culp's Hill) doesn't look like a great choice either. The Union is well dug in there, has reserves close by and even if forced back, they would be falling back on their supply lines. Not much chance for the big victory Lee needs. So, I'd have to say that a modified Longstreet plan might be the best. Longstreet wanted to disengage and move around to the right and find a new position. Well, assuming that Lee would not agree to completely disengaging then perhaps a renewed and enlarged July 2nd attack. Pull Ewell back during the night of July 2/3 and shift him to where A.P. Hill's corps is. Shift Hill to where Longstreet is and Send Longstreet (with Pickett) as far around the Union flank (behind the Round Tops) as he can get. Give him Stuart's cavalry and try to roll up the Union Left. It's still a long shot, but it could hardly fail any worse than the reality. Plus, in the event of failure Lee has a better route of retreat. Just my two cents.

Gen Lee should have told his troops to lay down their arms and beg forgiveness for their traitorous ways, other then that he should have listened to Gen Longstreet.

The whole idea was poorly thought out.

How does one "force" the Union army to attack one's dug in troops as Longstreet wanted to do? Yes, it makes sense, but how does one arrange it?

Even if one thinks that Lee really thought he could force a battle on the Union army, having a very long supply line with several rivers accross it, limited artillery ammo and out numbered, what was the plan? Its always seem a muddle to me in that Lee had no real objective (i.e., that it was a great raid in which he hoped something would break his way).

As stated above, unless one backs up to day one, what is the point of attempting to re-write history. And, if one cannot prove how a overwhemming victory on day 1 would have made a difference in the war and completed the total destruction of the AOP, why bother there?

I've always believed that there is a deep wanting to beleive that the Union would fold at any time by Confederates at the time (and their well wishers today) if they could just figure out how. Few realize that without a complete and total victory in the field (which only happened to Hood in reverse at the end of the war), there was no tipping point that would have led to the Union giving up, or the European powers intervening.

Dan

Lee was committed to fighting on the ground he was given. Resolved as he was to pushing the center, he should have sent sappers forward during the predawn morning hours to tear down the fences that were in Pickett's path of march. Many of the Confederate casualties were inflicted by Federal artillery when the charge stalled when the charge stalled to cross the fence line. Whether it would have made a difference is speculative. I believe it would have given the Rebs a better chance in the assault. Salut y'all!

Bruce the Texas Grognard

I've always believed that there is a deep wanting to beleive that the Union would fold at any time by Confederates at the time (and their well wishers today) if they could just figure out how. Few realize that without a complete and total victory in the field (which only happened to Hood in reverse at the end of the war), there was no tipping point that would have led to the Union giving up, or the European powers intervening.

Woah Dan, a harmless what-if about Gettysburg doesn't nessesarily translate into a "The South would have won if.." postulation. Your right that the South is doomed at the outset and I don't think there was ever any serious contemplation on the part of France or Britain to intervene. Interesting what-if's for wargaming scenarios though.

Dave

I think all 3 corps in motion is a prescription for a big SNAFU.

I recall some Confederate generate suggesting (I forget which one) that the attack should have been made on Cemetary Hill rather the the ridge, since Confederate guns could get converging fire on the point and an attack would have its flanks covered on the way in. But this would have gone through the town, a difficult task.

I don't think a breakthrough there would destroy the Union Army, which is what Lee needed. His best shot was destroying them in detail after a big win on day 1 – a bigger win that he got.

Stop rolling 1's.

Oh, wait. That is what I need to do differently.

By Day 3, options dwindling a lot

I agree with Scott, disengaging with a "modified Longstreet" plan probably the best option, making use of abundant deception to keep Meade in place as long as possible

He should have listened to Newt.

Dave, don't get your undies in a knot. You're reading more, much more in what I said then is there.

The problem with the Gettysburg campaign is that it is a no starter for the Confederates for all the reasons listed by others and myself.

There appears to be no real reason for the invasion other than gathering supplies. As I stated, what exactly would Lee have had to do to intice the AOP to attack the AOV if one wants to play the Longstreet option?

The AOP was going to stay between Lee and Washington, Baltimore & Philly. Does anyone think that Lee would have crossed the river to destroy Harrisburg? He was out on a small branch as it was at Gettysburg.

Meade and before him, Hooker, were totally in defensive mode. Unless he could have trapped part of the AOP and destroyed it, they were never going to be forced to attack him. Meade's following Lee up after the battle demonstrate that he had no real plans to trap and attack Lee given a choice.

A better scenario (in my opinion) might be to reverse the question and ask, "What could Hooker, or Meade, have done to win a decisive victory that might have ended the war?".

Dan

But what should he have done instead?

GO HOME!!!

The army that fights and runs away, runs to fight another day!

>"Gettysburg. Day 3. What should Lee have done?"<

Fall on his sword?

A few points:

Trimble said that Lee told him, a few days before the battle, that he hoped to catch the Union forces piecemeal as they came hurrying up to Pennsylvania, road-weary and all strung out on the roads. And that's what (accidentally) happened on 1 July. After that the chance was gone. If that really was his strategy he should have chosen a spot and been there waiting (all the roads converging on G'burg would have made it an obvious choice). Instead, he wasn't ready when the Federals did come up piecemeal. The real problem was that Meade stole a march on him while Stuart was out of position to report it.

Longstreet's attacks on 2 and 3 July were essentially the same plan (Lee's plan): a converging attack on Cemetery Hill (tho his definition of Cemetery Hill possibly included the higher parts of C. Ridge). Lee did not see it as a frontal attack but as an attack on a salient (C. Hill). Both attacks broke down when units of the 3rd and 2nd Corps failed to advance. Part of the problem was his method of leaving the tactical details to his corps commanders. This breaks down when more than one corps needs to be involved.

A tactical move around Meade's left (south) flank would have been highly risky as Lee didn't know where all the Union units were (and the 6th Corps was back there). A turning movement on a wider scale was a better option. IF (and thats a capital IF) he could have interposed his army between Meade and Washington he might have forced Meade to attack. A tactical move around Meade's right, to cut the Baltimore Pike might have borne fruit, but again was risky.

Meade's supply situation was not good, but it was bad in a different way that Lee's. Lee was a long way from his source of supplies, but had with him a tremendous amount of food and other supplies his army had gathered from the surrounding countryside. Ammunition was his limiting factor; he had enough with him to last quite a while (3 days at least, obviously), but once that was used up adequate resupply was very unlikely without returning to Virginia.

Conversely, Meade's base was much closer but his supplies on hand were more limited, and Stuart had cut up the rail lines east of G'burg. His base was at Westminster MD, but he didn't have enough wagons to bridge that gap with an adequate chain supplies. So his stocks were constantly dwindling until Haupt could get the railroad repaired into G'burg from Hanover Jct. Basically the AoP fought G'burg with the food and ammo it brought with it, as did the AoNV.

The short answer to the original question, given Lee's inability to co-ordinate his balking corps commanders: Fall back to the South Mountain passes and hope Meade attacks your prepared positions. If not, return to Virginia.

>"A better scenario (in my opinion) might be to reverse the question and ask, "What could Hooker, or Meade, have done to win a decisive victory that might have ended the war?"<

Once Lee was backed up against an unfordable Potomac without a bridge, Meade should have crossed enough of his army to the south side of the river (HE had bridges) to block Lee from EVER crossing, while leaving a "corps of observation" on the north side to keep him bottled up or at least protect Washington and Baltimore.

He should have listened to Newt.

They mostly come at night…mostly.

"Why don't you put her in charge?!?!"

"Gettysburg. Day 3. What should Lee have done?"

Left Town!

Read the Gettysburg trilogy by Newt Gingrich and
William Forstchen…

"Gettysburg. Day 3. What should Lee have done?"

Realized he should have cancelled on Day -20.

Lee started Day 3 with a completely untouched division, Pickett's, and a relatively untouched division, Johnson's. So Lee still had some striking power available and Stuart's "return to the fold" gave him a cavalry screening and search capability that was strongly lacking on the first 2 days. Keeping this in mind, Lee should have pulled Johnson and the rest of Ewell's Corps back to west of Gettysburg, kept Pickett as a reserve in case of an Union assault, had Stuart rest for a day, and straightened out his various trains for a trip back through the South Mountain passes. Then he should have withdrawn back through the passes and decided whether to continue his "big raid" or call it quits. Calling it quits would have preserved over 15000 troops he would sorely need in the future that were wasted in the attacks on Day 3 on Culp's Hill and Pickett's Charge.

He defineately should have cut his losses and looked to either go home or find another place to fight, this time keeping Stuart where he could see him.

This was probably the better option for day 2 also, having failed to stop the Union gaining the high ground.

Left and gone home. Try again in Sept.

Have we discussed this before?? Some subjects can be overdone, but maybe this one is of such consequence that someone will ask the same questions and generate the same responses 100 years from now on some forum. Likely a little tiresome for us old F--ts, but still a very vital and valid area of inquiry for the newer and younger set. Welcome to "the show that never ends" !

I think everyone can agree that Picketts Charge didn't stand any reasonable chance of success.

But that is all 20/20 hindsight. On the ground, at that time, the actual strength of the Union center was underestimated. Longstreet feared, Lee felt confident. Lee was wrong.

But what should he have done instead?

Probed the flanks harder, longer. Refrained from an all-out attack in the center, surely. Gotten more information before making any attack at all.

Whats the verdict on the battle?

I am no ACW aficianado, but I do have a morbid interest, watch the movies, read books once in a while. I've read up on Gettysburg, been to the battlefield.

If the battle had gone the other way, the civil war would have ended with the South independent. I do believe that very likely.

I like the Washburn scenario I am going to do something along those lines in JRIII sometime down the road at a convention. Researching the OOB for Union positions and what forces from Longstreets other two divisions and perhaps part of Penders divison were combat effective will take some time. I think Hood and McLaws Divisions were pretty much used up.

VR
James Mattes

Dan Cyr 20 Oct 2008 11:34 a.m. PST wrote:
….How does one "force" the Union army to attack one's dug in troops as Longstreet wanted to do? Yes, it makes sense, but how does one arrange it?……

Easy the same way we got into a war such as Iraq. Political Pressure. The elements in Washington have been pushing commanders of the Army of the Potomac for the past two years to engage Lee. Meade would have significant pressure from Washington to engage Lee. He would not wait too long but I think three days would be about the maximum that Lee could affort to dig in and wait.

VR
James Mattes

Also it is important when looking at Picketts charge the role the Confederate artillery played. Had they been on target and not overshooting the union forces and had they advanced with Pickett as the plan originally called for the charge might have been a different story. But win or lose it is hard to believe that they could have held or even advanced further one the Confederates broke the center.
VR
James Mattes

Well, James, Meade proved that all the political pressure in the world from Washington was not going to make him attack Lee. Neither during the actual battle, or in the "pursuit" did Meade make any real effort to attack Lee's badly damaged or retreating army.

Day 4 I've always thought would be an interesting scenario with Meade taking the offense. Lee is short of artillery ammo, burdened with wounded, out numbered and the weather was fair. Meade has superior numbers, artillery ammo and more troops arriving both at the battle site and on the flanks and rear of Lee's LOC.

Dan

If you believe that the South was doomed anyway, in the long run, then that means Lee did the right thing. There's no point in "going home" if remaining on the defense will ultimately result in your defeat. He had to take a high-risk / high-gain option.

On the other hand, if you believe that the South had a long-term chance of winning, somehow, then obviously he should never have invaded the North.

punted!

>"Lee started Day 3 with a completely untouched division, Pickett's, and a relatively untouched division, Johnson's."<

Johnson's Div. (2nd Corps) attacked Culp's Hill late on the 2nd and took about half of it (because most of the Union 12th Corps had been sent to Meade's left), but it was counterattacked early on the 3rd and pushed off by the returning 12th Corps, even tho reinforced by 3 brigades. So it was pretty battered by noon of 3 July and at least not-fresh as of dawn 3 July.

Only half of Pender's Div. (under Trimble) took part in "Pickett's Charge" although the other 2 brigades were available and relatively fresh. Also about half of Rodes' Div. was available (half was with Johnson). All of Anderson's Div., 3rd Corps, was available. All of these were supposed to get into the fight on 3 July one way or another, but none did except Wilcox's and the Fla. Brig. of Anderson, who advanced after it was too late and got cut up for their trouble. Mahone's and one other brigade of Anderson's Div. (I forget which) started to advance as supports but were halted on Longstreet's orders, as he felt (probably correctly) that they were too late.

Lee actual plan was differnet to what actually happened and it is forgotten the Lee was still unwell and therefore Longstreet should have been more forceful in his worries, also Lee had many new commanders who had niot yet got used to their roles.

IF Ewell had attacked on time,
If the Guns had of been more effective.
If Hill had been engaged.
If Longdtret had put his energy into the assault and reinforced it at the right time.

Theres just too many variables to what could have happened, but I think after Longstreet didn't turn a blind eye and sent a division around the Round Tops, the Confederates should have over the night of July 2nd and 3rd swung the army SW and threstened Washington by placing the army between Meade and Lincoln.

The government would have panicked and ordered attack after attack and may even have led to the destruction of the Army of the Potomac.

thats my pennies worth anyway.

Short Answer:
Lee made the right choice based upon what he knew.

I apologize for such a long reply but the OP is a difficult question to answer. I will try to be as brief as possible. Forgive me if I oversimplify a number of issues. We are gamers and don't necessarily put into prospective the problems of politics and logistics that concern those in command of Armies.

Long Answer:
Up to and including the "Gettysburg Campaign" the intelligence reports for the both the Union and Confederacy were extremely flawed. Due to how the intelligence was gathered and disseminated the Union greatly over-estimated the strength of the Confederate Army while the Confederacy greatly under-estimated the strength Union Army. It is hard for us to understand that fact now that we "know" the real troop strengths but both sides thought the Confederate Army was numerically superior. By the "Gettysburg Campaign" both side we in the final stages of realizing how far off their intelligence reports were.

Today Robert E. Lee is a universally adored and loved personality in the South, in spring 1863 out-side of the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia he was not well liked. In the Confederate Government he only had one ally, Jefferson Davis I guess he is the only one that matters; the rest of the executive branch of the Government, especially the cabinet, held him in disdain and were active in looking to replace Lee as the commander of the most important Confederate Army. In the spring of 1863 James Seddon, the Secretary of the War for the Confederacy, requested the Jefferson Davis replace Lee with Longstreet. Davis refused.

Prior to the Battle of Chancellorsville the Confederate Government was planning the campaigns of 1863. In the last eight months of 1862 there were fourteen major engagements in Virginia, if 1863 followed suit than the war was lost before the first snows. The "Battle on their own ground" strategy was problematic for the south; while it allowed their inferior numbers to cope with superior numbers of the Union (they didn't realize that was the case) it played havoc with the Confederate ability to grow crops. The Executive Branch drew up objectives that they felt needed to accomplish in 1863. After many meetings the Cabinet drew up a series of objectives.

The primary objective was to pull the Union Army out of Virginia for the summer and early fall months. This would allow the crops to grow and be harvested without threat of the Union Army destroying them in field. It is important to remember that Virginia was the "breadbasket of the Confederacy" and that at least 1/3 of agricultural crops were grown in such a small section of the country. They needed that year's crops to survive as a nation that winter.

The second objective was to force the Union Army to redeploy on a grand tactical scale. Remember that the Confederate Army was believed superior in numbers and that because of Confederate forces defending Mobile, Knoxville, Charleston, Little Rock and dozens of other minor outposts they were more spread out. This is a much longer topic but for this discussion I am just paraphrasing what takes whole books to discuss in any detail.

The third objective was to relieve the pressure along the Mississippi Corridor. The Armies of Mississippi, Missouri, Western Louisiana, as well as Gardner's and Ruggle's Commands (in Port Hudson and Corinth respectfully) were all threatened by Grant's position in Southern Arkansas.

Multiple plans were presented including two competing plans by Lee and Longstreet. Lee suggests what becomes the Gettysburg Campaign while Longstreet plan suggesting taking his Corps from the ANV and create an independent army to streak at what becomes Burnside Command in Lexington Kentucky than moving Southwest and pushing Rosencran's between himself and Bragg. Longstreet's is the plan approved by the Cabinet but over ruled by Davis and Lee's plan is approved.

Lee understands the pressure placed on his position. Of course Lee's plans fall apart on May 10, 1863 when General Jackson dies of his wounds. Lee is forced to rework his plans and organization. However he has little time to rethink and replan as he is forced to move by the first week in June.

While I will skip the tactical movements from June 3rd to July 3rd I will talk a little bit about supply. The ANV was used to moving light and had three days of supplies at all times. This includes both food and ammunition. Every day foraging parties would return with at least another days worth of supplies while on the move. The Union Army had large amounts of supplies available in depots but not necessarily enough on the actual man. As an example it took a week to issue three days worth of supplies in early June to allow the AOP to start the full pursuit. This difference was amplified by the actions of J.E.B. Stuart cavalry as it disrupted the Lines of Communication in southern Pennsylvania and Central Maryland. This slowed down the movement of the Union Army allowing the ANV to get a much larger head start and more space than anticipated.

Between June 26th and when Meade assumes command the AOP, Jun 28th, the AOP stole a march on ANV. This movement of an additional 20 miles may not seem like much in modern terms but it is all that it takes to take the initiative away from the ANV. On the 28th Meade doesn't realize how much the last 48 hours have changed the course of the campaign.

Somewhere between May 10th and June 28th a new tactical aim was added to Lee's laundry list. He had to wreck the Army of the Potomac. In this era of Napoleonic ideas wrecking the opposing Army meant a titanic Battle in the mold of Napoleon's victory at Marengo or Austerlitz. However a more appropriate battle to examine would be Hohenlinden (Dec 3, 1800) in which French General Moreau catches the Austrian Army of Archduke John and is able to surround and destroy the Austrian Army in a piecemeal fashion. Austria sues for piece shortly thereafter.

One the evening of the 28th Lee decides to assemble the Army near Cashtown PA, this movement moves all three corps from behind the Blue Ridge/South Mountain Ranges to the same side as Union Army thus removing his screen.

After Day 1 at Gettysburg, Ewell made a tactical mistake by note pushing the disordered Union defense at Culp's Hill. Any hope of regaining the initiative for the AVN is lost. Thus Lee must make a plan to attack on Day 2. Again it is important to remember Lee believe the Union to number to be at most equal to his own and maybe slightly less. If you ever play out the battle using Lee's estimates of Union Strength you understand why he had the grand attack on Day 2 and then the follow up on Day 3.

Another issue that is rarely brought up but is an important factor here, Lee was very solitary person and he rarely kept anyone fully in his confidence. On Day 2 Longstreet didn't know the exact plan for Ewell and vice versa. It can be argued that because he saw specters of failure and ultimately his replacement around every corner or if just didn't have the staff many of his orders were not recorded in the same fashion as that of the Union. We depend on the writings after the war by Generals like Longstreet to GUESS at what Lee was thinking. After the War Lee only wrote once on the conduct of the war and that was to defend Longstreet when southern writers were looking to blame someone militarily for the failure.

On Day 3 Lee had to make a choice. He was facing a force that he believed was his equal in numbers and had historically had short term supply issues. They were strung out over about 15 miles from Buford's command south of the Peach Orchard to Gregg's command five miles east of Gettysburg. His spies reported that the Union had reinforced the wings of the line. In the center he estimates the strength of not more than 5,000. 5,000 would have been the correct number had the AOP numbered only 75,000 not the 95,000 there really was.

All said if we had to make Lee's decision on the Third Day we probably would have made a similar choice because based on the information Lee had it is the best choice.

As a minor follow up:
We don't know is exactly what Lee ordered Stuart to do when he issued his VERBAL orders on the morning of the 3rd. Stuart dies before the end of the War and there is no written record of the exact order. What we do know is that Stuart Cavalry which has had a running battle with the Gregg's Cavalry (Less Buford) since June 26th mounts up and moves against the extreme right of the Union. There are a number of books on the premise of what was supposed to happen, including "Lost Triumph" by Tom Carhart, the most recent that I am aware of.

Whether it is by chance or fate or simply because the Confederate Cavalry hasn't slept more than a few minutes at a time in over a week, the attack doesn't achieve its objective. Whether it is supposed to be a break through or simply to force the Union to move reserves to the right flank or anything else that you can come up with; while we don't know exactly what the order was all we do know is it didn't work.

Thus as Sally Pickett tells us, Pickett's Division goes forward (along with two others) and the high-water mark of the confederacy is achieved.

Lee has a number of options on the fourth day of battle, one in which both sides stare down each other. Lee misses his last opportunity to regain the initiative as the AOP in the field has virtually no supplies. Many men were without ammunition, food was scarce and water was in short supply. Lee whose Army was still in good supply and was ready to take the fight to the Union again decided to withdraw.
It takes the AOP two days to resupply and begin the pursuit.

When you move beyond the battle and beyond the Lee's retreat we are left to look at the objectives laid out by the Confederate Government.

1) Pull the Union Army out of Virginia. This was done with great success. It allowed the Confederate Crops in Virginia to harvest in the end of the summer stockpiling almost 16 months supply as estimated later in the year. It was a very prophetic answer since the Confederacy last only 16 more months in the east.
2) Force the Union Army to redeploy. The union army was not forced to redeploy any units, not because the plan was wrong but because the intelligence used to generate the plan was faulty. By the end of 1863 both the Union and Confederacy remake their intelligence agency and reports and get more accurate numbers on their advisories.
3) Relieve pressure in the Mississippi Corridor.The plan failed to remove any pressure from the Mississippi Corridor and Vicksburg surrenders on the same day that Lee decides to withdrawal from Gettysburg. This is of course is for a number of reasons, being too far east, too late and simply too little in terms of numbers.
4) Wreck the Union Army. The AOP lost 25% of its strength hard not to call that wrecking, considering its noext major engagement is in May 1864 (The Wilderness).

However as the Army achieved the most important objective and Lee acknowledged his own mistake and accepted blame (as well as many of his contemporaries blamed Longstreet) Lee stays in command of the ANV until its surrender at Appomattox.

As Gamers' an interesting scenario would be to allow Lee to Attack on the Fourth Day (July the Fourth) and using some sort of supply rules to determine whether units in the AOP were supplied or not.

A number of people (both in this discussion and other works) have suggested that Lee move the ANP to the SW and attempt to get between the AOP and Washington.

The are at least two problems with that suggestion.
There is no "north-south" movement. The road network is in a shape of an X and moves in a SW/NE or SE/NW pattern. Any movement by the ANV takes them further away from Washington and the AOP always will have a shorter route. Example: While it is about ten miles from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg and then another 10 miles to Tannytown it is only 8 miles from the Gettysburg to Tannytown. Unless you could steal a march (very tough to do in such close quarters) there is no way to out maneuver the AOP.
The second problem is more problematic, after day one Buford's Cavalry is arrayed from the Emmetsburg road west cross country towards Fairfield. You'd have to fight your way and that blocks any chance of stealing a march.

I myself would have carried out a manouvre as such, on the night of 2nd "my order" (which can be different from the real events) would be for Ewell to march through the night and be in a position to effectiveley block the southern route South and South East of the Round tops this would have put pressure on the supply lines and wagon largers of the union.

Meade made well have felt this manouvre was a grand scheme of Lee's and reacted accordingly. If Meade did not attack I would have ordered Hill to do the same thing the next night and place himself on Ewells right this again may have triggered an assault by the union, the final order on 4th July would have been for all units to fall towards Taneytown and the next best defensive line. Lee may weell in the union eyes have been better placed to fall on Baltimore or even threaten Washington.

I am guessing Political panic would have influence dthe next decisions, I guess something like "You must attack Lee and prevent him attacking Baltimore" this would have been enough to cause the union to attack, hindsight is wonerful.

Your thoughts?

bgbboogie,

I am not sure I understand your plan.
You would have Ewell's Corp (after an exhausting day of battle for Culp's Hill) march behind A.P. Hill's Corps and Longstreet's Corp to push South along the Emmitsburg Road? This would have resulted in Ewell's Corp finding Buford's Brigade of Cavalry on southern Pickets deployed just south of Round Top cross country towards Fairfield.
Even if successful in breaking away from AOP at Gettysburg the Emmitsburg road moves the force SW away from the AOP and Washington. The AOP just moves down the Tannytown road and sets up a new defense at Tannytown. The Battle of Gettysburg is repeated.

The only way to get to a road moving South East (Tannytown Road or Baltimore Turnpike) is to fight your way through the Union lines.

When the ANV withdraws from Gettysburg they withdraw via Cashtown Road (Longstreet*) and Fairfield Road (Ewell* and A.P. Hill) and not down the Emmitsburg Road, there must be a reason for this.
*I may have these two Corps backwards.

GG: An interesting post. I do have a few quibbles:

>"What we do know is that Stuart Cavalry which has had a running battle with the Gregg's Cavalry (Less Buford) since June 26th mounts up and moves against the extreme right of the Union."<

Buford's 1st Division was not part of Gregg's 2nd Division. (Pleasonton was the commander of the Cavalry Corps.) Stuart's "running fight" had been with Kilpatrick's 3rd Division, at Hanover, after which he was not pursued by the Union cavalry. He skirmished with Baldy Smith and Union militia at Carlyle on 1 July and Hampton's brigade fought with Custer's (part of Kilpatrick's div.) at Hunterstown,just northeast of G'burg, on the 2nd.

>"The AOP lost 25% of its strength hard not to call that wrecking…"<

Yes, but Lee lost 33% of his strength; what do you call that?

>"Whether it is by chance or fate or simply because the Confederate Cavalry hasn't slept more than a few minutes at a time in over a week…"<

The got a few hours of sleep on the night of 2 July.

>"When the ANV withdraws from Gettysburg they withdraw via Cashtown Road (Longstreet*) and Fairfield Road (Ewell* and A.P. Hill) and not down the Emmitsburg Road, there must be a reason for this."<

The main reason is that the Gettysburg-Fairfield, Hagerstown road led to the crossings of the upper Potomac that Lee needed, especially Falling Waters, where he had left his only pontoon bridge. (He didn't know that the bridge was being destroyed by Union cavalry that very day.)

I suppose a few minor mistakes is what I get for not pulling out all my source material…..
Sorry about that.

>> "Whether it is by chance or fate or simply because the Confederate Cavalry hasn't slept more than a few minutes at a time in over a week…"<

> The got a few hours of sleep on the night of 2 July.
Here my comment is more about the horses than the men. An experienced rider (as I am sure they all were0 could almost sleep in the saddle. Yet A few hours of a sleep isn't going to help the horses, even if they managed to get any. Many a horse would need reshoeing, repair to the saddles and tack and so on.

As for the route I will have to pull out the source material.

Good point about the horses. Of course, Jenkins' Brigade had been with Ewell all along and should have been somewhat more rested -- but then they fought dismounted on 3 July. :)