"Battle-line at Agincourt" Topic

How did you arrive at the idea that ¾ of the French faced the archers?

All the sources talk of the field as not wide enough to take the French army, that they stacked up their battles one behind the others and filled the space between the woods. That means that the c. 250 yards that the English men at arms occupy in the middle of the field leaves the rest of the French vanguard facing the archers, who also reach to the trees. I was going with "1,000 yards" as the frontage (widest possible estimate).

I see no inconsistencies at all.

….4. Monstrelet was talking about the Erpingham affair.

Why am I not surprised. Now you will bend your own words until you can claim that you didn't mean what you said, even though the context clearly says otherwise. The "Erpingham affair" (as you call it), happens AFTER the "initial setup" (as you call it); which can only mean the first position of the English army, prior to their advance, etc.

As to writing as though I know more than you, I do know more than you about medieval culture and medieval battle tactics. I've spent years studying these things.

Abundance of injested factoids, resulting in papers of accreditation, do not wisdom make. You are obviously a very knowledgeable sort of guy. And the conclusions you draw from that abundance of factoids are open to argument. If you don't like that, tough toenails. Get over it: people can know things, a lot of things, without going the same path as yourself.

And I have spent my entire adult life studying medieval warfare; but, as I said up front, as an aficianado, not as an "expert" or "authority."

Your theory here, as also your "fell as rain" interpretation, etc., I take exceptions to, and call you on certain details you espouse. And here we are….

Proximity does not prove attachment. That the archers were placed next to the battles does not prove attachment. Especially when they were later removed.

Proximity, AND direct association: the French battle plan, Rich, the PLAN, says that the knights and squires are to control where and how the ignoble elements are to be placed beside themselves. Command control, Rich, is evidenced in such terms: you have ZERO source-based evidence to show otherwise. We have only your assertion that the archers on either side were some kind of separated command structure. And since the assertion is yours alone: so too is the assertion, that moving archers all over the place -- twice changing their O.B. as it related in the first position to the men at arms -- does not conflict with Livius and P. Elmham. If such maneuvers do conflict with their statements, then you are utterly mistaken to claim that "the Erpingham affair" removed the archers: rather, what is described would have to relate to ordering the archers into a configured formation, where they stood in relationship to the men at arms, such that they proceeded "in front" of, or "first", in relation to the men at arms: which, as we have been saying, is perfectly doable if the archers are in "wedges" (projected lines connecting at the ends of each "wing").

Your vision of archers screening 1/6th of the total army is not supportable by any other example I can think of.

And if archers were "vulnerable" as you assert, it would be folly in the extreme for Hal V to send 5/6ths of his total strength out there to be charged by cavalry and mopped by dismounted men at arms!

The English army advanced together. This is clear. They stop several times to rest and redress their ranks, i.e. keep together. The archers did not go ahead, directly into the face of the enemy, leaving their own men at arms behind "protected." And they did not move off to either flank, in the face of enemy cavalry, to then form "wings" to a center of men at arms who only showed up to take their places after said-"wings" were finally formed.

Rather, what happened is that the entire English army advanced, with the archers slightly projecting ahead of the men at arms. Once within c. 300 yards, they stopped for the final time, the archers refixed their stakes, then advanced beyond them to shoot at the "wings" of French cavalry. The battle began.

Hi

Rich. I am trying to not digress here. The version of clout you promote is both wrong and right. That is, the more modern examples we have, say 19th century brits, involved weapons with such a flat trajectory, that the aimpoint difference at 200 and 100 yards wasn't important.

The problem with your understanding is that arrows are much more of a problem. Assuming(that is for mike) the field is 700yds wide(or give me your favorite number) the first 5000 french deployed across the field produces a body 7 yards deep at a maximum. At a normal walking speed, they cross your clout kill zone in 10 to 15 seconds. Meaning that to maintain the "hail of fire", the aim must be dramatically changed at best every 30 seconds.

If the archers are on the wings, you have a zone in the middle of the field where none of the french are at risk!

The issue is, I think, in the terms "in front" during the advance. First position is in 3 or 4 wedges, which make sense, and the problem comes in the advance. IF the wedges are in front of the MAA with gaps at the rear for the MAA, the tradtional deployment outlined in Oman and others, you have a couple military advantages. One, the local sergents can redirect the fire easily. Second, the wedges zone of effect produces good overlap with no safety zones. Third, during the final closing phase, the attacking french have a difficult tactical problem. Attacking the bow first exposes their flanks to a rush by the MAA, which would answer your vulnerability issue. And second at that point, given the culture, the exposure and the ransom, makes the attack on the british MAA reasonable and likely. I think the old writers from 1800 or so were correct. That the army advanced with its wedges in front who planted their stakes and answered your third problem of exposure during the moving. With stakes in hand, in wedges, there is no real exposure.

And there is no issue in the difficulty of moving "mob left and mob right" when using troops with no real drill mechanism.

Rocky

"Assuming(that is for mike) the field is 700yds wide(or give me your favorite number) "

Don't know where you get 700yds from. I have always said that the field was 950 – 1000 yds wide.

"If the archers are on the wings, you have a zone in the middle of the field where none of the french are at risk! The issue is, I think, in the terms "in front" during the advance."

Which is why it makes sense that the archers were not only on the wings but also between the MAA and ALSO in front of them (as we have discussed earlier).

I will say this, Mike: if I was deploying and didn't have troops enough to go as deep as I needed to and also run a "skirmish" line of archers across the front of my men at arms, I would go for the depth. If I had enough archers to do both, I would; rather than go even deeper than I felt I needed to, or look for clever ways to use some "extra" archers (e.g. the meadow ambush near Tramecourt).

There is this single problem with your idea (that there actually were archers in front of the men at arms as a "skirmish" line): unless the Gesta considered such a screen part of the battleline as a whole, your hypothetical screen is two lines, and the Gesta specifically says that the English army only formed a single battleline.

(Rich, of course, relegates that to the "first position" only, ignoring the Gesta's clearly stated reason WHY there was only a single battleline in the first place: "…in view of [Henry's] want of numbers, he drew up only a single line of battle,…" Therefore, why would that condition suddenly go away, allowing Henry to change his mind and advance in two lines? -- when Livius and P. Elmham so clearly say that the army advanced in the same order as at first: the Gesta's O.B., which Rich allows was legit "at first", but changed because Rich says archers always screened the advance as SOP. And because Rich's schoolbook knowledge of "70 late medieval battles" tells him what SOP always was, he retrofits his knowledge of SOP onto what he thinks the Agincourt sources say.)

"There is this single problem with your idea (that there actually were archers in front of the men at arms as a "skirmish" line): unless the Gesta considered such a screen part of the battleline as a whole, your hypothetical screen is two lines, and the Gesta specifically says that the English army only formed a single battleline."

Since the archers actually in fornt of the MAA (assuming they were there) would only have been 2 ranks, they would not have been considered as a separate battleline in the same way that skimishers deployed ahead of a Napoleonic battalion were not considered separate but regarded as part of a single formation.

From a tactical point of view, NOT deploying archers directly in front of the MAA would have left some French less exposed to archery than others, surely not a desirable situation?

Assuming that archer companies would shoot as directly into the enemy as possible, i.e. the shortest range possible (always a desireable thing!), what you say is technically true.

But as each battle of men at arms was at most c. 125 yards across its front, no part of the "columns" approaching the battles of men at arms would have been spared: I am sure the archers would target the closest forming threat directly, even if it was mainly from the flanks.

There's this other possible fly in the ointment too: any archers posted directly in front of the battles of men at arms would be also directly in the path of the approaching French columns and would have to skedaddle briskly to avoid getting contacted: this would require that the men at arms behind them be in open order until the archers had passed through to the rear: a very dicy proposition of timing, don't you think? How long would archers placed in such a dangerous position be able to keep shooting? I am guessing that they would have to turn and make for the rear before the French got within c. 40 yards, thus losing half of the best killing range of the longbow. This may not have been a cost-effective use of the archers, and added to the risk of disruption and botched timing (getting the men at arms back into close order in time to meet the French attack), might have been too "trick" to warrant using it.

And finally, our most immediate eyewitness, the Gesta, describing the last yards of the French advance and the exact moment of contact, doesn't even allude to the possible presence of archers in front of the men at arms: just the French columns making straight for "where the standards were". It is possible that he's only describing what he sees: the French coming straight at himself as he sat a horse behind Henry's battle; allowing for variations, in front of the van and rearguard, to what he said.

Here's a question too: if the object of the archery was to "funnel" the French into the center, causing compression and disruption, wouldn't archers shooting smack into the front ranks tend to work against that funneling effect?

"But as each battle of men at arms was at most c. 125 yards across its front, no part of the "columns" approaching the battles of men at arms would have been spared: I am sure the archers would target the closest forming threat directly, even if it was mainly from the flanks."

True, but what is the logic behind NOT deploying archers across the whole front of the army?

"There's this other possible fly in the ointment too: any archers posted directly in front of the battles of men at arms would be also directly in the path of the approaching French columns and would have to skedaddle briskly to avoid getting contacted: this would require that the men at arms behind them be in open order until the archers had passed through to the rear: a very dicy proposition of timing, don't you think? How long would archers placed in such a dangerous position be able to keep shooting? "

Passing one rank through another is not a complex military manouvre and had been practised since Roman times if not before. At the word of command the archers file back through the MAA behind them and form up in the rear of the archers to the flanks.

"And finally, our most immediate eyewitness, the Gesta, describing the last yards of the French advance and the exact moment of contact, doesn't even allude to the possible presence of archers in front of the men at arms: just the French columns making straight for "where the standards were".

The fact that he doesn't mention them doesn't mean that they could not have been there. "Where the standards were" makes no implication about the presence of archers or not.

"Here's a question too: if the object of the archery was to "funnel" the French into the center, causing compression and disruption, wouldn't archers shooting smack into the front ranks tend to work against that funneling effect?""

The sources do not allude directly to a funnelling effect. That is an interpretation by modern readers.

Hi

A thin archer screen changes me to agree with Rich. If that was the deployment, they should have had losses because SOME would have been caught and killed.

So, the French were stupid to not attack the vulnerable archer.

And history is replete with units passing through each other and being caught and the disruption destroying both units. As for "since roman times". That is a formal checkerboard drill and something documented for romans, but not for medieval yeoman. Documented for Byzantines, but not normans fighting them.

So, toss in the thousand yards, and I go back to the 3 or 4 wedges of archers moving forward and planting stakes makes more sense than ever.

But I think the field has widened since then.

Rocky

Doug, "Why am I not surprised. Now you will bend your own words until you can claim that you didn't mean what you said, even though the context clearly says otherwise. The "Erpingham affair" (as you call it), happens AFTER the "initial setup" (as you call it); which can only mean the first position of the English army, prior to their advance, etc."

For you information, the first position was the initial setup.

Doug, " Proximity, AND direct association: the French battle plan"

What direct association?

Doug, " Rather, what happened is that the entire English army advanced, with the archers slightly projecting ahead of the men at arms. Once within c. 300 yards, they stopped for the final time, the archers refixed their stakes, then advanced beyond them to shoot at the "wings" of French cavalry. The battle began."

Warmed over assertions, which I have already rebutted.

When you don't get your own way, you try bullinging, turn churlish and rude. If you wish to discuss the French battle plan, fine. Otherwise I'm finished discussing the battle with you.

Rich

Rocky, "Rich. I am trying to not digress here. The version of clout you promote is both wrong and right. That is, the more modern examples we have, say 19th century brits, involved weapons with such a flat trajectory, that the aimpoint difference at 200 and 100 yards wasn't important."

Rocky, the version I promote came from a medieval military historian who is an archer.

Rocky, "If the archers are on the wings, you have a zone in the middle of the field where none of the French are at risk!

Sources say the dismounted van was 5,000 strong. Curry concures. Others say the van was 20-30 ranks deep. Take the lower number divide it in the 5,000 and you get 250 files or the equivalent. This equates to a battle approximately 250 yards wide. If archers can fire 150 yards and the are archers on either side of the battle, then the archers can quite comfortably cover the whole French battle. Of course we're dealing with approximates.

Now take your 1,000 English men-at-arms. Divide them into 4 ranks, as the sources say. The resulting number of files is 250. Fortuitively this is the same number of files that the French battalion had. It looks as though they matched very well with no room for archers

Rocky, " That the army advanced with its wedges in front who planted their stakes and answered your third problem of exposure during the moving. With stakes in hand, in wedges, there is no real exposure."

The problem is that is not consistent with the sources. The archers did not advance as wedges but rather was taken from their position in the battle line and reformed into a battle split into two wings. To get them back into wedges they would have to be reorganized into the original wedges. There is no evidence that they did so.

Rocky, "And there is no issue in the difficulty of moving "mob left and mob right" when using troops with no real drill mechanism."

I don't know why you insist on calling them a mob. They had a formal structure with chain of command.

Rich

"A thin archer screen changes me to agree with Rich. If that was the deployment, they should have had losses because SOME would have been caught and killed."

Archers 2 ranks deep ONLY directly in front of the MAA. 6 ranks everywhere else (between the MAA bodies and on the flanks)

"So, the French were stupid to not attack the vulnerable archer."

The archers in 2 ranks weren't vulnerable because there were 4 ranks of MAA nehind them.

"And history is replete with units passing through each other and being caught and the disruption destroying both units."

Really?

"As for "since roman times". That is a formal checkerboard drill and something documented for romans"

Not referring to the "checkerboard" formation (which only applied to the Republican manipular legion), but the simple drill manoeuvre of moving one rank through the inter-file gaps in another.

Besides there is some doubt as to whether the Republican legion actually deployed in this "checkerboard" formation or whether the maniples behind simply advanced THROUGH the raqnks in front …

Actually it's more likely that the MAA advanced through the ranks of archers rather than the archers falling back through the ranks of MAA. Avoids having to move backwards!

For you information, the first position was the initial setup.

I think your own words have confused yourself: you just confirmed that the (dated) quotes I gave of your own words are at conflict with each other: you cannot have Monstrelet's "wings of archers and men at arms" apply to BOTH the first and second positions: not unless you decide to agree with me and toss out entirely your arguments for the archers being "pulled out" by Erpingham.

Doug, " Proximity, AND direct association: the French battle plan"

What direct association?

I quoted it, twice, above: read it: "The missile-men [gens de trait] of the whole company will stand in front of the two wings of foot, where the knights and squires shall arrange them, each to his own side." (bold my emphasis)

If archers can fire 150 yards and the are archers on either side of the battle, then the archers can quite comfortably cover the whole French battle. Of course we're dealing with approximates.

You are illustrating exactly what Rocky is saying, and not seeing it: try this: the field is 1,000 yards wide (most historians like 900 to 1,000 yards because that's c. how it is today, oh well, so we go with that): 250 yards in the middle, where the English and French men at arms meet: plus 300 yards of total flanking archery that can reach the French upon the point of contact: that's 550 yards from 1,000 yards, which leaves the English with 450 yards of bowmen standing around as spectators with their drawing fingers up their noses. Do you really believe Hal V and his veteran commanders were that STUPID?

I don't know why you insist on calling them a mob. They had a formal structure with chain of command.

Which you have failed to prove what that formal structure and chain of command could possibly have been, since you do not accept that archers were commanded by the men who commanded the battles of men at arms.

Yet the French plan clearly does place oversight and deployement, i.e. COMMAND, of the ignoble troops of the first battle in the hands of the knights and squires; and the earlier sources cited for Crecy give the prince of Wales, Northhampton (et al) and king Ed III command over not only men at arms, but also archers and spearmen.

Wouldn't a formal structure and chain of command make the archers at Agincourt part of the "regular army"?

No? Why not, Rich?

Because your theory that you've put together (tried to imbue with "life" as this thread has evolved) would wind up still born.

Mike:

Actually it's more likely that the MAA advanced through the ranks of archers rather than the archers falling back through the ranks of MAA. Avoids having to move backwards!

That would require the men at arms to be refused to the rear, and move up into the gaps left between the wedges: and the archer screen in front of the battles of men at arms would be further back than the wedges. Any of this could work, but the chances of a screwup are enhanced greatly, imho.

"Simple is best", must apply to battles before anything else: don't do "trick" unless you absolutely have to.

I think that advancing with stakes, setting stakes, advancing beyond stakes and retreating back behind them, all the while shooting as often as possible, is quite enough "trick"! and gets the job done. (and all of that involves only simple, straight ahead and back again movement, no sideways crap to form rear ranks or "wings")

"That would require the men at arms to be refused to the rear, and move up into the gaps left between the wedges:"

Eh?
No, the MAA are not "refused to the rear", they are immediately behind the 2 ranks of archers.

"and the archer screen in front of the battles of men at arms would be further back than the wedges."

No further back than the front rank of MAA if there were no archers immediately to their front.

""Simple is best", must apply to battles before anything else: don't do "trick" unless you absolutely have to."

I quite agree, which is exactly why personally I do not go along with "wedges". To get archers into a wedge formation you have to wheel their line. That's a lot more difficult to do than simply interpenetrating by ranks.

…the MAA are not "refused to the rear", they are immediately behind the 2 ranks of archers.

The archers are, where, exactly? If they are in the gaps between the "wedges" of archers, then for the men at arms to move forward through the two ranks of screening archers would place them forward of the back ranks of the wedges (reducing the number who can target the flanks of the approaching French). If the two ranks of screening archers leave enough room for the men at arms to move through them into position at the base of the gaps, then the screen is even further away from the approaching French, and the men at arms are refused to the rear of the gaps. It all seems too "trick" to me.

To get archers into a wedge formation you have to wheel their line. That's a lot more difficult to do than simply interpenetrating by ranks.

You line them up that way in the first place, they advance facing directly forward in that staggered line, and they stay that way until their job is done. That appears to be what occurred at Agincourt.

I think some of Hal V's trepidation as he contemplated moving his battleline, was the possibility that it might fall apart enough to require time enough to set it back up again: and that would have invited complete disaster if the French attacked before he could redress the line.

Froissart
"The English, who were drawn up in their three divisions and sitting quietly on the ground, got up with perfect discipline and formed their ranks, with the archers in harrow formation and the men-at-arms behind."

It's not that clear at all. What is says is that there were divisions (battles) and there were archers. The archers were supporting the divisions but that is quite another thing from saying that they operated as a single combined formation. This implies command and I don't see that in the quote.

No, it does not say that there were three divisions and there were archers. It says that there were three divisions, deployed with the archers in the front and the men at arms behind.

As is said in The Battle of Crecy (Ayton et al), "The organizational ideal was for archers and men at arms to be closely integrated at retinue, even company, level."

Hi

time and distance. First, the open order not checkerboard deployment is not mentioned anywhere, but in other discussions you both demand we not make asumptions but stick to the material.

Lets do some sums, 5000 men being interpenetrated by 1000. OK, two models, the interpenetration OR, the "body left/body right" scenario in front. In either case the problem is time and distance. 200 yard volley and THEN, the center of the archers must either interpenetrate then sweep left and right OR scatter left and right in front to reach the firing of the wings. In either case, they are moving 2.5 times as fast as the french! Actually, assuming they shot from the wings, then they would be moving at at least 5 times that of the french.

Then, when deployed at the wings anchored on the woods 1000 yards wide, you have most of the archers out of range!

250 yards from the left, 250 from the right the center half a klick is out of range of either archer.

Your source might be a historian and archer, but so am I, and with a background in Drill…your proposal and his is not likely.

The time and distance doesn't add up. Make the field 500 yards, and it is slightly possible. But it would require a complexity in drill never seen before or after.

Sorry.

Rocky

"The organizational ideal was for archers and men at arms to be closely integrated at retinue, even company, level."

Is this author claiming that the entire English battleline was a mixture of men at arms and archers on company levels?

That would certainly blow both Rich's, Rocky's and my concepts out of the water!

I guess if that were literally true, it wouldn't substantially change anything: you would have to interpret the Gesta to mean that mixed "battles" of men at arms and archers in integrated companies were separated by "wedges" of archers only. (the disporportion of archers to men at arms -- 5/6 to 1/6 respectively -- would certainly allow for this)

If the mixed companies of archers and men at arms had the archers in front initially, with their stakes planted, then each company would be covered by stakes, i.e. the entire English battleline: the "wedges" of archers would join in the melee on the flanks after their arrows were spent (as described, no change there). But would the men at arms in the mixed companies be in the rear ranks when the melee started, or penetrate to the front just before contact?

Monstrelet, Waurin and LeFevre describe how the archers came out from behind their stakes and exploited gaps and breaches in the French battle, penetrating through to the second battle: then Henry followed them in with his men at arms.

This could either mean that the archers were still in the front line initially, and exploited the breachs themselves that their arrow fire had made; or, it could mean that the "wedges" attacked hand to hand even before the French reached the English men at arms.

Nothing in the Gesta's wording demands that men at arms be in discrete units: "where the standards were", and "hurled themselves against our men" could imply archers and men at arms in the same companies meeting the French attack.

Combining these sources, it seems that archers also began the melee, being more fleet-footed, and penetrated deeply into the confused French battle where the breachs were; then the men at arms attacked, backing the archers up. Maybe the archers in intermixed companies were always in the front ranks when the melee started?

Other HYW battle descriptions would need to be researched to either bolster this concept or discredit it. But intermixed companies are not without precedent elsewhere and do work: archers are not per se a weak link: not if immediately supported (reinforced) by heavy men at arms.

Both Auray and Crecy show archers in hand to hand combat before the men at arms further back get involved.

"First, the open order not checkerboard deployment is not mentioned anywhere, but in other discussions you both demand we not make asumptions but stick to the material."

Like some other things we have discussed here, perhaps it is not mentioned because it is obvious and thus not worthy of note. How close would archers or MAA normally form up? We have used 3ft per file as a rule of thuimb here (and noone has disagreed with it). Troops drawn up at 3ft file intervals leaves plenty of room for interpentration by rank (what is known in the ECW as "order" as opposed to "open order" which is 6ft per file).

However you are right. I cannot prove the deployment of 2 ranks of archers directly in front of the MAA (although the Froissart quote above does seem to support it). Any more than you can prove that they WEREN'T there. I merely suggested it as a possibility.

"Lets do some sums, 5000 men being interpenetrated by 1000."

No. Each body of MAA is ~83 files (of 4 ranks). Thus I am talking about ~350 men advancing through 166 archers (albeit 3 times over)

Doug, "The missile-men [gens de trait] of the whole company will stand in front of the two wings of foot, where the knights and squires shall arrange them, each to his own side."

I don't know where your translation is from. Here is the one in Curry's book"

"Item all the archers (gens de trait) of the whole company will be put in front of the two wings of foot, under the command of knights and esquires whom the leaders of the wings appoint, each on his own wing." [Probably Curry's translation from the original French]

As I read it, the archers will be put in front of the foot. This would probably be done under the command of the Marshal of the Crossbowmen. That was one of his jobs. Once they were on the wings of the foot, the leaders of the foot assigned knights and esquires to command them. I see nowhere that makes this a unified command.

LarryDunn, "The organizational ideal was for archers and men at arms to be closely integrated at retinue, even company, level."

Men-at-arms and archers were raised together at the retinue level. However, as Curry points out, they were separated on the field of battle.

LarryDunn, "No, it does not say that there were three divisions and there were archers. It says that there were three divisions, deployed with the archers in the front and the men at arms behind."

Yes, you are correct. I was wrong. Here is what Froissart wrote:

Froissart
Then he ordained three battles: in the first was the young prince of Wales … : they were an eight hundred men of arms and two thousand archers, and a thousand of other with the Welshmen: … In the second battle was the earl of Northampton, … about an eight hundred men of arms and twelve hundred archers. The third battle had the king: he had seven hundred men of arms and two thousand archers.

The army was divided into three groups. Each had around 800 men-at-arms and 1,200-2,000 archers.

Rocky, "Then, when deployed at the wings anchored on the woods 1000 yards wide, you have most of the archers out of range!"

And you can guarantee that what we see today is how the fields looked 600 years ago? By the way, not a single sources says the field was 1,000 yards wide.

Rocky, " Your source might be a historian and archer, but so am I, and with a background in Drill…your proposal and his is not likely."

I'm sure you are very knowledgeable. However, he is an expert in medieval military history and teaches at the UK military school at Sandhurst. Nothing personal but I'm still going to side with him.

Rich

The passage I quoted is Bennett's, from the Osprey Campaign book on Agincourt.

As I read it, the archers will be put in front of the foot. This would probably be done under the command of the Marshal of the Crossbowmen. That was one of his jobs. Once they were on the wings of the foot, the leaders of the foot assigned knights and esquires to command them. I see nowhere that makes this a unified command.

Then offer SOMETHING, besides your continued objections, to indicate that it wasn't a single battle command with subcommanders over the elements. You just keep on pounding this without any evidence or proof to back it up. Your chosen interpretation -- that men at arms WERE the battles referred to, and the other troops were some kind of separated command structure not part of "the regular army" (and thus not mentioned/included in Livus or P. Elmham) -- has nothing to support it from the original sources.

And you can guarantee that what we see today is how the fields looked 600 years ago? By the way, not a single sources says the field was 1,000 yards wide.

The folks you "side with" all go for the wider field, I am guessing. That's why I stick with it when talking about probable frontage to be covered by Hal V's single battleline.

But to my way of thinking, the field could have been considerably narrower. A narrower frontage, and you have deeper archers to account for the numbers given. Taking the most accepted, c. 1,000 men at arms and 5,000 archers, in four ranks, you have 4,000 archers still to place, if the field was 500 yards wide; this would make them c. 20 ranks deep, or too deep by a bunch; so it seems therefore that wider rather than narrower is the most likely. The wider the field, the more yards of archers are not shooting at all, if all the archers are massed into two wings.

In order to keep the archers no deeper than 16 ranks, the field would have to be c. 700 yards wide or more: considerably more if Curry's "7,000" archers is correct (iirc, she also goes for 1,500 men at arms too, and not 900 to 1,000). The more archers there were, the bigger the problem of archers only in two huge wings becomes, i.e. the more archers just stand around and watch outside of range….

Doug, "Then offer SOMETHING, besides your continued objections, to indicate that it wasn't a single battle command with subcommanders over the elements."

You've got it backward. One cannot prove a negative. However, one can rebut a positive. Which is what I've done.

Doug, "Your chosen interpretation -- that men at arms WERE the battles referred to, and the other troops were some kind of separated command structure not part of "the regular army"

I've said nothing about "the regular army." I said they were not part of the order of battle[s].

Doug, "The more archers there were, the bigger the problem of archers only in two huge wings becomes, i.e. the more archers just stand around and watch outside of range…."

The French were constrained by the forests. It seems the French battle was 250 yards wide and so was the English. Split 6,000 archers in half and place them 10 deep this calculates that the wings were 300 yards long along the wood line.

Rich

The ten ranks is just a guess. They could have been deeper. The battle lasted about three hours. Not all of that was action. However, this does indicate that the archers would need to fire for extended periods. If I were commander, facing this need, I would split the archers on either side into two groups. If 10 archers can fire simultaneously, I would have the archers form into ranks 20. The first 10 ranks fire until no arrows, then the next 10 ranks step forward to take up the firing. This extends the firing time. But, that is just a guess. There is nothing in the sources to support such a guess.

Rich

You've got it backward. One cannot prove a negative. However, one can rebut a positive. Which is what I've done.

Anyone can do that! What's your point? To claim a successful rebuttal? Okay, you win. Now what?

You have NOTHING to provide as evidence for a separate command structure for ignoble troops. The sources clearly, often, mention the troops together when referencing the strengths of battles: we've been quoting examples of those sources. And all you can say is, "One cannot prove a negative?"

Rich, nothing at all can ever be PROVEN. You talk of probabilities: the probability here is that the noble commanders over ignoble troops answered to the commanders of the battles directly. The archers stand up in front of the men at arms: the archers do not go wandering off because their commanders have a better idea: they answer to the prince of Wales, or the king, or Northampton at Crecy; or to York, the king or Camoys at Agincourt. If they don't, then who gives them their places in the battleline? Your theory holds forth TWO armies within the English army, each operating on its own. And if not that, then a single chain of command to reach the archer units: which makes the archers part of the battles.

I've said nothing about "the regular army." I said they were not part of the order of battle[s].

Excuse my confusion: "normal" or "regular". Is there a difference here?:

"Titus doesn't mention the archers. Evidently the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army. The order of the army was would seem to be established by the heavy infantry. This would fit with the aristocratic approach to viewing an army." (Rich Knapton 29 Sep 2008 6:33 p.m. PST)

This is a bad habit of yours, Rich: forgetting the things you have already said. Here's where you started to really argue in favor of only men at arms being considered by chroniclers as "battles", i.e. the usual/normal order of the army: the archers can stay out of it, they don't measure up and don't get mentioned. Except that the French battle plan clearly disproves your assertion; so do the descriptions of the English battles of mixed arms at Crecy, etc.

It seems the French battle was 250 yards wide and so was the English. Split 6,000 archers in half and place them 10 deep this calculates that the wings were 300 yards long along the wood line.

A bad guess, if this is meant to be some kind of solution to the archers being out of range: in your example, we would still see 150 yards of archers closest to the woods not able to hit anything in the middle of the field.

If 10 archers can fire simultaneously, I would have the archers form into ranks 20. The first 10 ranks fire until no arrows, then the next 10 ranks step forward to take up the firing.

So your idea is that archers would stack deep, so that half of them in the rear would wait for their turn to shoot? when the front ranks ran out of arrows?? and waste time exchanging places (instead of simply passing the quivers forward)???

Hi

rich, actually, I was replying to your 1000 yard statment. Like doug says, you seem to forget your own points.

MY point is that forests usually get smaller because of agrictulure in the green zone of the planet. Therefore, if the field is 1200 today, I would support half that in the day.

I said, above "700 or your choice of number"(gist of).

If credentials are all that matter in this discussion, arguably, your PHd trumps my esperiments. Bennet's 1000 yard and deployment, as dough and I keep pointing out, means a saftty zone in the middle 600 yard wide where no frenchman can be hit.

Your screen deployment doesn't addres the time/distance issue. In this case, it doesn't matter for the point if it is "my" 600, "proposed" 700, or a thousand. At some point, the archers must scamper to the side and replant the stakes. Now, if they dont shoot while in screen and redeploy while the french are out of range, you hve most of the archers unable to hit most of the MAA. Not plausable.

If they fire and fire until the french are close, you have them scampering "body left" such that they run 300, 400 or more yards when the french are at 100 or 200. This doesn't work for the reason that it only changes the dead zone slightly, and needs a mechanism for the brits to run out of the way and plant stakes while the french advance less than half the "scamper" with no archers getting caught.

The time/distance doesn't work.

The multiple wedges with bodies of MAA is the one that is plausable. There is no need to drill much, just deploy as told, advance straight forward….shooting at the french all the way in. No evasion, no complex drill, nothing. Simple.

Rich, you are semi correct that in the musket period 24" is common, and with training 36" allows penetration. But sword and spear fight in pore-gun period(or for that matter as long as there is pike and shot) at 36 and don't penetrate except for some actions involving spanish tercios. and THOSE only happen with combined well drilled units that actually trained for this.

Rocky

Me, Evidently the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army.

Doug, "This is a bad habit of yours, Rich: forgetting the things you have already said."

‘Normal' is an adjective modifying order. It is not modifying army. If it had been intended to modify army it would have read "the archers were not considered part of the normal army." However, since it was written "the archers were not considered part of the normal order of the army". This leaves the archers to be part of the army as non-ordered troops.

This is a bad habit of yours of not thinking before you make accusations.

Doug, "and waste time exchanging places (instead of simply passing the quivers forward)???

Fatigue: "a reduction in the efficiency of a muscle or organ after prolonged activity."

Rich

Rocky, rich, actually, I was replying to your 1000 yard statment. Like doug says, you seem to forget your own points."

It would help Rocky if you would provide my statement so I could know what the hell you're talking about.

Rich

‘Normal' is an adjective modifying order. It is not modifying army. If it had been intended to modify army it would have read "the archers were not considered part of the normal army." However, since it was written "the archers were not considered part of the normal order of the army". This leaves the archers to be part of the army as non-ordered troops.

Blather! Order of what? Now you are going to claim that "order" can be separated to mean something other than the "order of the army." Go argue with yourself. You seem able to do that rather effectively.

This has become pointless. I am through.

I will naturally check this thread if it comes to the top in the future. But unless someone asks pertinent questions that have not been thrashed to bloody rags here (and elsewhere), I will not be responding anymore to the topic of AGINCOURT!

In the future, if I notice anyone bringing up archery questions, or Agincourt-specific questions, I will point them to here: and to make it as comprehensive as possible, here are the other threads that I know of where these subjects have already been argued to death:

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

Doug, as I explained to you at least twice and probably more, the English army was composed of ordered troops, the battles, and the non-ordered troops, the archers. The problem is, you don't pay attention.

Rich

Perhaps I should add that when sources speak of "the normal order of the army" they are talking about the order of the battles. That is the van battle is on the right and the rear battle is on the left of the main battle. This is "the normal order of the army".

Rich

Hi

Rich, lay the figs on the table. Just a simple time motion study of the layout would suggest that the screen, splitting the screen into wings doesn't work. Either the archers don't shoot until in the wings which leaves most of the field empty of risk for the french, or your original point, the archers are toast.

If we assume the french weren't stupid, and the archers would have been toast if caught in open order in the flank while moving to the new position, we might suggest it didn't happen.

The thing with the advance in wedges is the language. Essentially we have words that suggest wedges or not, and "infront" being intrepreted in several mutually exclusive ways.

IF we start with the assumption that the French weren't too stupid to kill the vulnerable archers on the flank, we have to come up with a model on why not.

Easiest is to not accept Bennet, and accept, Oman and his predicessors who were also historians and archers, and have them advance in the ininialt wedges…IN FRONT. One can then intrepret the vague terms.

If you look at that old 3 or 4 wedge behind stakes, and treat the stakes as a screen for the archers, everything falls in place. There is no vulnerable flank to sweep. There is no part of the field the french can safely advance in, and funneling into the british MAA makes sense.

Deploy the troops, and draw that 200yd shooting distance, and model the "body of archers" splitting like the sea before the israelis, and the current fashion just doesn't work.

Rocky

IF we start with the assumption that the French weren't too stupid to kill the vulnerable archers on the flank, we have to come up with a model on why not.

Two models: English men at arms all lumped in the center, archers extended out hundreds of yards as huge "wings": or, three discrete battles of men at arms each with its own "wings" of forward-angled archers (the "old school" of Oman, Burne, et al. the 19th century consensus).

Let's assume that this is always going to be the case.

You and I have argued the "dead/safe space" problem to give greater credence to the "old school" version: I will always believe it suits the sources, in total, better than "the current fashion" as graphically shown in Bennett's Osprey Campaign Series book on Agincourt.

But we are just as prone to be guilty of looking at Agincourt as a finished story, that we are examining to make it make sense. The French watching the English approaching down the muddy grain fields had no such advantage.

Here's how the "current fashion" (new model) could work, and not make Henry out to be an utter fool in the bargain:

He would see an unwritten story on that field, and placing all his men at arms in the center, with archers too far away to be involved in any way with the center, could still be tactically viable. Read on, if you have the patience and interest:

A French man at arms in the vanguard will know what is expected of him: his marching orders have been in his head for days, refreshed/confirmed the night before: he is to advance with his fellow nobles and attack the English men at arms. More than likely, he sees English archers directly in front of his place in the vanguard, which reaches to the edges of the woods on either flank: but he knows that he is to attack only the English men at arms.

A look behind himself will show another battle, the mainguard, ready to move out and answer all eventualities: either press on to the archers, or reinforce the attack on the English center, or both: there are plenty of troops to do this job.

When the English arrive, and set up their battleline behind stakes driven into the ground, there is a pause while the chief commanders on both sides meet in the middle ground and go through a useless show of parleying. This breaks off, and there is another pause.

The English wings of archers send out several ranks, who advance and commence an extreme range peppering of the "wings" of French mounted men at arms: who soon are seen to advance at a trot, while the English archers turn and head back to their own battleline. In very short order, both bodies of mounted troops are streaming back in utter rout: many horses are riderless, all of them bear wounds and protruding arrows.

Our hypothetical man at arms in the French vanguard will feel the effects of the horses which crash back through his formation: the "ripples" that move through the packed ranks of footmen, knocking many of them down in the mud: some are injured: the battleline is suddenly no longer ordered, ready to advance, but broken in many places, men on the ground; others have staggered upright again but are angry and no longer hale.

The orders to advance are given. Our man at arms starts off with those who surround him. Very soon, the first clattering vollies of arrows beat down on the bent shoulders, backs and heads of the French: our man at arms keeps his face to the earth, watching to the sides with a swiveling of his helmet, to keep his own feet in line with those of his companions.

If we are to imagine this man at arms is one of those who actually reaches the English lines, the odds say that if he was lined up in front of archers to begin with he will join in with all the other men at arms facing the "wings" of English archers and move steadily toward the center: his orders direct him there, not toward the enemies most accessible to himself: that task is for the mainguard behind. He finds himself many ranks back from the front and incapable, now, of seeing anything except the backs, shoulders, helmets and held weapons of his companions.

He keeps his feet with extreme difficulty: the numerous ranks ahead of himself have turned the mud of the grain field into a quagmire: all around himself are angry men, frightened men: our man at arms would be personally concerned only to stay on his feet and not upset the formation by lagging: he would be worried that his pace and mounting exhaustion are inadequate, that he's about to let "the team" down, badly: so he puts all his concentration into staying up and moving as swiftly as he can. He's in the midst of a jostling mass of iron and steel, and frequent cacophany as vollies of arrows strike down from high above, shattering on the glancing armored surfaces, flying splinters of wood threatening his eyes through his visor. Maybe our man at arms is slightly wounded through his armor during this relentless slogging advance through the mud toward the English line: it seems interminable: certainly it takes long minutes to get there.

A new sound errupts from somewhere ahead: the clash of arms and the screams and shouts of men now in mortal hand to hand combat. The forward movement continues from the rear: the man at arms is part of it, pressing forward to get to within sight of physical enemies, to get to hand strokes. The forward movement slows, but the pressure from behind and from the sides mounts: the man at arms comes to a stop and the pressure holds him in place. His sword arm is mashed between his own body and the press to his right. He knows with a ludicrous feeling that if he lifted his feet that he would not fall to the ground, so held up by the press of armored bodies is he.

The arrows had continued to fall from straight overhead, then they stopped without the man at arms realizing it at first. Through his visor he gets only sporadic glimpses of what is happening ahead and to the sides. Perhaps he is a few feet inside the packed mass of 5,000 and more men at arms, more off to the right of center and somewhat toward the rear of center: in the right rear quadrant of the French column, from a crow's-eye view.

What he cannot see, yet, is that archers have dropped their bows, seized hand weapons of an incredible variety, and run out from behind their staked line, and have started to attack and kill the French men at arms closest to them. The yeomen kill off the stragglers: the unhorsed, stunned individuals from the failed cavalry charge earlier, and the first French footmen who, on the edges of the compacted column, can see the mortal danger of staying where they are, and have broken away and tried to make for the rear. Most of them are wounded already from the countless thousands of arrows that have been launched into them, exposed as they are on the facing edges of the vanguard. The almost naked yeomen come up to them swiftly, knock them down and administer coups de grace with long daggers through visors, or into armpits, or they smash their steel-clad bodies with heavy mallets where they struggle, supine or prone in the mud.

Then the archers envelop the flanks of the French column and start their butcher's work on the almost defenseless mass of compressed men at arms. Only the outer-most ranks can raise their weapons properly, and they are outnumbered at least two to one by the English yeomen: the French naturally flinch back, trying to find maneuvering room that isn't there: the press of bodies from the interior pushes the exposed men at arms into the weapons of the yeomen, who begin a rapid, extended slaughter of the outer ranks, "peeling" them down and away, exposing the inner canned meat, the men at arms who hardly know until it is their turn, that they are surrounded and being murdered where they stand.

Our man at arms first sees what is happening when his companions to his right exclaim in anger and horror at the fate of those to their own right: he gets his sword aloft and manages to twist to the right enough to face the crowd of sweating, bloody, yelling English yeomen. Dimmly, the man at arms wonders where the mainguard is: their task was to guard the flanks of the vanguard, and engage any yeomen who might threaten it: yet there is no sign of the mainguard that the man at arms can perceive: all he sees is exhausted fellow noblemen moving in slow motion while English villeins avoid their weapon strokes, leap in and knock them down and finish them off. The man at arms hears his own sobbing breath above any other noise: he is probably reciting endlessly a litany of beseeching prayers: his arm is lead, his sword a dead weight.

If the pressure eases on him from the rear, as men abandon the vanguard and stagger away toward the slowly advancing mainguard, the man at arms will in all likelihood take the offered egress from the murderous press and also make for the rear as quickly as his adrenalin-laced muscles can carry him. If he is one of the lucky few, he will not be marked by the English and fastened upon.

The mainguard meets the dregs of the vanguard: but more than this, it is equally exhausted by its slogging progress over a field even more churned and deeper in mud than it was during the advance of the vanguard.

The archers on the extreme flanks of the English army, near the trees, still have their bows and arrows. After dispatching the cavalry charges, they spend the next few minutes of the battle watching the French vanguard pull away from in front of them, forming the attack column that makes for their own men at arms in the center. These yeomen, as yet hardly involved, can see the French mainguard start to move toward them. For long minutes that formidable-looking body of enemy men at arms will be hundreds of yards away. The nearest yeomen to the vanguard will have thrown down their bows and attacked them hand to hand: by that time, the extreme ends of the English "wings" will have advanced as well, moving to archery range and commenced to shoot into the French mainguard.

A much shorter repeat of the first melee is played out: made worse by the severe moral degeneration of the mainguard, caused by seeing the utter defeat of their army's elite battle, and dealing with those survivors of it as they fall back into their faces: the arrow storm completes the horrid conditions, precipitating a rout amongst the members of the mainguard even as the English archers shoot off the last of their arrows and rush forward to attack the French hand to hand: the English men at arms have all the while continued to press forward, slaying and capturing their social equals, until they too arrive within hand strokes of the shaken mainguard which is now breaking up.

The battle, the fighting part of it at any rate, is over soon after this. The English halt slightly beyond the place where the French mainguard was contacted. They watch the French rout away: some of the routers stop where the mounted gross varlets are sitting with the horses, behind the shattered army of their masters.

Hardly believing that they have won thus far, the English form a semblance of restored battleline where they stand, and wait. Nothing happens. So they take their prisoners in hand and slowly, carefully, retreat back to their original line of abandoned, deranged stakes.

Guards are assigned for their numerous prisoners, back near the baggage park behind the battleline. The stakes are redriven into the ground where they have fallen, sharpened again, and the archers take their stations behind them: resupplies of arrows are brought up from the waggons.

Some hours pass, during which fresh French troops have arrived on the field behind their surviving line of battle. They look to be forming up to make another attack.

King Henry has the French prisoners ordered killed, to free all of his battered, weary men for service in the battleline. He sends heralds to the French, telling them that he is killing his prisoners, and will not stop unless they leave the field at once.

Many hundreds, even thousands, of noble prisoners are dispatched before it is well known that the French rearguard is quitting the field of Agincourt. The slaying of the prisoners is halted.

The English can hardly believe that they are alive, and victorious as well: it seems beyond conceivability. It is miraculous, and it remains "the will of God" forever after that day in English lore. They spend the night on the field of the dead, keeping a strong watch on the open fields in front of and behind their camp; and on the woods, through which enemies in vengeance might approach in the witching hour. But no French warriors are to be seen.

In the morning, the English break camp, and comb the field of fallen bodies one last time, mercy killing any wounded who are discovered so close to the point of death that their fate is certain.

-----------------------

Rocky, "rich, actually, I was replying to your 1000 yard statment. Like doug says, you seem to forget your own points."

Rocky, you took what I consider a cheap shot at me. So, it would help if you would provide my statement so I could know what the hell you're talking about.

Rich

Well written Doug. You'll have to wait for my reply in the form of an article I've written for the Journal of Medieval Military History (if it gets accepted).

Rich

Good luck on that! If not, you can always publish it to the Web, for friends, for free? Hmm? Yes?

Ease up on Rocky. He's just conflating the many statements made above and elsewhere, over a period of many months (exceding a year!): I thought you had perhaps made some statement to that effect, too: and went looking for it, fecklessly or at least fruitlessly. I did find a couple of statements from you on the topic of battlefield width; each one responding more or less that we cannot possibly know how wide the 1415 field was (which is true enough).

Hi

Actually, it was mike immediatly above in response to my 700, but no correction from you, and previous statements. I wasn't making a cheap shot. Don't do that with friends.

I think there are a lot of physical problems even with doug's colorful explanation. I was doing my SCW crap 35, 40 years ago, doug came to is rencently. I am amused that he limited view of "the guy" has sunk in. It explains a lot of the movement limits I insist on.

Grin.

But I still have the problem with, not the putative MAA frenchman, but what is happening elsehwere.

The crux of the matter is the "infront" part, and the time and distance of the second position deployment and planting of the stakes in response to the french advance. And the funneling as a mob. This has the french less disiplined and drilled than the english. It has half the brits standing along the sides cheering. It has the second battle standing still without any impetuosity as shown in the first battle with people strikning out on the flamk archers.

R

The crux of the matter is the "infront" part, and the time and distance of the second position deployment and planting of the stakes in response to the french advance.

Ah, but I am not buying into Rich's archer screen: my little reconstruction said nothing about how the English approached. I assume that IF the "new view" was how it all happened (there really were huge wings of archers, and all the men at arms in the center, a la Bennett's Osprey), that the English army advanced that way. Setting stakes would be just as easy and quick as if the archers were divided into six units attacked as wings to the battles: nobody is out in front as some screening line.

And the French, if the Gesta is correct, advanced at the same time as the English: so the English advance would have stopped in time to set stakes and wait. (I didn't put this into my little reconstruction.)

And the funneling as a mob.

Not sure what you mean here.

This has the french less disiplined and drilled than the english.

No it doesn't: they planned to attack the English men at arms with the vanguard: finding the English center considerably narrower than themselves, the French van advanced and brought their men on the ends, in front of the archers, into a column: doing that while crossing a muddy field under arrow shot the whole way shows how disciplined they were: most troops would have fallen back and routed under that combined stress: instead, the French actually made it to the English line and fought a stiff hand to hand combat. I'd say they made about three morale checks before they finally failed!

It has half the brits standing along the sides cheering.

No they aren't: they are the first English troops attacked: and by the time they have seen off the cavalry charges, they are watching the vanguard moving up and contracting toward the center. Before the extended English wings can even contemplate leaving their stakes to close in around the vanguard, they see the mainguard revealed, already moving toward the battle. So the extended wings of archers don't move out until it is evident that their side is winning and the vanguard is breaking back upon the mainguard. I think that this would have been a very obvious mass movement.

It has the second battle standing still without any impetuosity as shown in the first battle with people strikning out on the flamk archers.

No, I have the mainguard moving forward not long after the vanguard moves out, but they aren't stuck in close behind the vanguard, they are quite a few yards to the rear (but less than 100, I reckon): the mud slows them down: and then the vanguard is defeated before the mainguard can come up.

I'm not getting what you mean by, "striking out on the flank archers."

*attached as wings to the battles:

Rocky, "If we assume the french weren't stupid, and the archers would have been toast if caught in open order in the flank while moving to the new position, we might suggest it didn't happen."

On the other hand, the records show that the French were stupid. Instead of preparing to attack the English, they were bickering about who should and should not be allowed to participate in the dismounted van. This bickering allowed Henry to steal that march on them.

Rocky, IF we start with the assumption that the French weren't too stupid to kill the vulnerable archers on the flank, we have to come up with a model on why not."

Or, we assume that the width of the battlefield, at the second battle line, was much narrower than the battlefield looks today. Then everything falls into place.

Rich

Hi

I don't see how it falls into place. We still have the model, archers advance, harass at long range, say 200-220 yards, the french attack. AND, this is the hard part, the screen of archers part left and right, the middle archers travel 500 yards and Plant their stakes while the french march only 200. AND as they are running and planting, are not shooting until AFTER the french magically funnel into the brit MAA.

Even better, as half the archers are STILL more than 250 yards from any frenchman, they don't participate.

Rocky

On the other hand, the records show that the French were stupid. Instead of preparing to attack the English, they were bickering about who should and should not be allowed to participate in the dismounted van. This bickering allowed Henry to steal that march on them.

Doug, "I don't buy the "stupid French chivalry", "social blindness", etc., theory."

Neither do I. Rich Knapton 10 Sep 2008 11:30 a.m. PST

(You keep doing this.)

I told Rocky several days ago, that I was expecting you to finally argue yourself into the obvious conclusion that the French were too "stupid" at Agincourt to attack the archers: and here we have it.

In order for you to sweep aside Rocky's time-motion objections to your archer screen, and allow them the needed time to scamper aside to form enormous wings, the French have to stand around arguing while the English advance.

I'd be interested to see how you back that one up from the sources….

Doug, "(You keep doing this.)"

In your dreams. Each time you think you've got me I point out how you screwed up perfectly good English. This is no different. You would think you would stop trying.

Doug, "I told Rocky several days ago, that I was expecting you to finally argue yourself into the obvious conclusion that the French were too "stupid" at Agincourt to attack the archers: and here we have it."

Oh I hate to do this. No I don't. I get a perverse pleasure out of me showing you how you screwed up. OK, here is your most recent screw up. Here is Doug's full thought on the matter he referenced. The highlights are mine.

We'll never know for sure which, or if both factors were at work in forming the psychological dynamic that caused the French to avoid the archers.
But I don't believe that this battlefield snobbery is what occurred: I take the effect of the arrow fire -- and the disuadance factor of the stakes -- to be the cause of the columns and the French avoidance of the archers: i.e. I don't buy the "stupid French chivalry", "social blindness", etc., theory."

The issue here is why didn't the French attack the archers. Both Doug and I agreed that the French chivalry were not operating out of snobbery or social blindness. Here is my current comment Doug is reacting to,

"On the other hand, the records show that the French were stupid. Instead of preparing to attack the English, they were bickering about who should and should not be allowed to participate in the dismounted van. This bickering allowed Henry to steal that march on them."

The second issue is about the French bickering instead of preparing to attack the English. The subjects are not even close! And you do this all the time.

Doug, "I'd be interested to see how you back that one up from the sources….

You should know by now that I never make any claims I can't back up. There are a number of sources which discuss how the nobles prevented those not noble status from participation in the dismounted van. Here is one of several that I use in the article.

The Religieux (Monk) of Saint-Denis
"When it came to putting the army into battle formation (as is always the usage before coming to blows) each of the leaders claimed for himself the honour of leading the vanguard. This led to considerable debate and so that there could be some agreement, they came to the rather unfortunate conclusion that they should all place themselves in the front line."

There were nobles constantly arriving in the morning. With each arrival the debate would begin again. In fact, the Pseudo Elmham said the French didn't even begin to organize themselves until they say the English advance on them. In addition, every French writer begins the battle story with the English in their second position. None of them indicate that the English had been waiting several hours for the battle to begin. The reason the French didn't attack the first position was they were all arguing about who be in the van and who should have the prominent places in the van. It was this arguing that allowed Henry to get away with moving his army to the second position; with the archers screening the advance of Henry's three battles.

Rich

The second issue is about the French bickering instead of preparing to attack the English. The subjects are not even close! And you do this all the time.

So in essence, you ARE claiming that the French were being stupid because of their social wrangling. By wrangling, they did not move: by not moving they allowed Henry to sneak in an advance on them: by Henry sneaking in an advance, he could tell that placing 5/6ths of his entire army (the "vulnerable" part too, you say) out in front was not any kind of risk: he KNEW that the French were going to allow him complete freedom to move his archers right up to their optimum range, separate into wings, plant stakes, and sit and wait for the French to stop their social bickering and come attack them. Right.

In addition, every French writer begins the battle story with the English in their second position. None of them indicate that the English had been waiting several hours for the battle to begin.

Which means that the waiting did not occur?

You do remember the French "blame culture" that sprang out of the defeat at Agincourt? Curry, et al. caution us to not take everything the French writers say literally: they had reasons for making "the other side" to blame for that defeat.

I see that my reference to the Gesta went under without a whimper, as far as you are concerned. So he was a liar: he didn't really see the French advancing toward the English.

(Oh, I suppose, that you suppose, he mentioned the French advance in conjunction with the English advance mistakenly: he really meant the French attack, but placed it in the same sentence as the English advance, because he was a writer who couldn't keep his chronology straight. Right. Actually, "our cleric" writes the best of them all, withal more lucidly, providing more details with the fewest words, and keeping to a linear unfolding of his narrative better than any of the other sources. He said he and the other clerics "were watching". He said the French advanced toward the English as they advanced. Toss it if you like. I won't.)

The reason the French didn't attack the first position was they were all arguing about who be in the van and who should have the prominent places in the van.

So toss all references to the French waiting because many of them knew that they didn't have to attack at all to defeat the English.

It was this arguing that allowed Henry to get away with moving his army to the second position; with the archers screening the advance of Henry's three battles.

Yes. "The French were STUPID".

You said that you agreed, that they were not guilty of, "stupid French chivalry", and "social blindness", where the actual attack was concerned. But you are saying that very stupidity was what allowed Henry to march up at will, in a very STUPID formation (unless he could see the future). Geez, I guess all that French body language (arguing) was really visible from 1,000 yards away!

And once the English are in position, and the French attack only the men at arms, what is the cause of that? Their chivalric stupidity suddenly went away?

I already said that their attack on the men at arms was the effect of the arrows. But I allow that it could also have been a deliberate adherence to the battle plan: which isn't stupid, but was tactically feckless, as things turned out (which no one could have known beforehand: mistaken notions are how battles get lost and won, after all).

In either case, the French did not attack the archers.

We still have the impossibility of the English being able to form wings and have time to shoot up the French attack: the time-motion simulation that Rocky invited you to set up and test yourself.

But you already knew it wouldn't work. So to keep your 5/6ths-of-the-army-screen alive, you bring up "those stupid French nobles and their social bickering": damn, they just let the English walk right up to them without noticing till it was too late.

And now you have to explain why Henry was being stupid: because if the only reason why the English plan (according to Rich) worked at all, is because the French did not move, then how could the English possibly know that was the case? Talk about reading the known outcome back into the motivations of the commanders!

If the English screen was workable only if the French did the stupidest thing, then that makes the English (according to Rich) at least equally stupid. And if Agincourt is just a battle of "the Stupids Step Out", then that makes US STUPID for spending any time at all studying (arguing) about it!

Sorry Doug I'm not going to wrangle about it. You wanted my sources and I gave it to you.

Rich

Hi

I understand Rich's distinctions about the wrangling.

YOU are more agressive than the Marshall of France, or not, and might have just swept in on first postion or not.

I think that it is irrelevent!

History is replete with similar instances of people not being as agressive as most wargamers. Most wargamers underrate the limits to internal problems of just attacking. I was about to digress into a game design thing. Sorry. Look, the actual attack on the line WHEN the french move is over in a few minutes. Too often we get trapped in vague descriptions and writer hyperbole.

This is an issue. Agincourt took "all day" but the actual fighting took a few minutes. The rest is set up, arranging, minutes of scrum, and running or standing exhausted.

And the crux I am trying to address is the few minutes of combat that starts in second position and the long range fire at the french to spur them into precipitous action.

Can we all agree that all the sources agree here?

The french advance at a walk, say 4mph on clear ground, 3 here from excuse about mud? There is NO TIME for an open screen to fire volleys, scamper 500yards to the side, replant stakes, keep firing while the french attack a mere 200 yards.

Plausable to me, and simpler, is the first position advances straight ahead, in first position and second, the wedges are in front of the MAA, which satisfies the vague descriptions. Advancing a few yards further, the bow shoot, and move back a mere 30 to 50 yards back to their stakes and resume shooting while the french advance, plodding, that last 200 yardd. In this case, all the vague terms are satisfied, and the time. Advance 50, shoot, french move, retreat 50 while the MAA advance 50, in shelter resume shooting.

I believe that is why the 19th century guys all accepted the wedges and such. It makes sense.

rocky

Can we all agree that all the sources agree here?

Nope. Not without interpretation and outside knowledge about how long battles (active fighting) can last. The Gesta, my personal favorite narrative, says the battle lasted two or three hours. Other sources who knew better how to distinguish standing with real intent and facing and maneuvering, from actual fighting time, said it lasted about a half hour, which as we both know is right: they were talking about the fighting time.

The french advance at a walk, say 4mph on clear ground, 3 here from excuse about mud?

I go for c. 2 mph; when you factor in the probable slowing due to crowding and maneuvering that mass of 5K+ men into a column (or I prefer three columns). The most clearly historical outcome I achieved in my few refights of Agincourt was the time I reduced the French advance to 2" instead of 4" per turn.

….

I believe that is why the 19th century guys all accepted the wedges and such. It makes sense.

Absolutely.

Rich's version doesn't make any sense, in so many ways. But good luck getting your version published anyway, Rich. I think that would be way cool….

"I believe that is why the 19th century guys all accepted the wedges and such. It makes sense."

Except that it seems that 19th century historians had a habit of getting things wrong and then perpetuating their mistakes as they copied from each other.

One guy said "cuneos" meant "wedges" and they all copied the idea. Similar things happen in other battle accounts too, particularly in relation to the location of a battlefield.

One guy said "cuneos" meant "wedges" and they all copied the idea. Similar things happen in other battle accounts too, particularly in relation to the location of a battlefield.

And scholars today are immune from the same penchant to copy each other?

E.g., R. H. C. Davis "destroyed" the validity of the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio as an early source for the battle of Hastings, claiming that certain "anachronisms" placed it clearly as an early 12th century work, and not that of the late 1060's or early 1070's (he based his theory mainly on his own deep scholarship regarding the dating and evolution of the Song of Roland, which figures briefly in the Carmen). Most "authorities" on Anglo-Norman history (including the Anglo-Norman doyen, R. Allen Brown) got aboard Davis' theory: but Frank Barlow has more recently argued for early provenance of the Carmen and has subsequently "destroyed" Davis' almost-consensus for later authorship.

It isn't that cuneos means one of several mutually exclusive uses, that causes the problem: modern scholars doubt the separated men at arms, having bought into the theory that the archers, being unarmored and not formally trained in hand to hand fighting, were some kind of "weak link" in the English battleline: by disregarding the Gesta author's so-specific details (because he was "1,000 yards to the rear of the battle"), that archers were placed between the battles of men at arms, the other specific detail he provided, of helmets being pierced in the sides, was also discredited/discarded. In fact, any specific details the priest offered that did not precisely dovetail with the other eyewitnesses were deemed to be mistaken: and this despite his most undeniable claim that he and the other clerics "were watching" what he had just described about the French vanguard's attack.

If you accept that "our cleric" was in fact close enough to see the details he described, then it is the other, less clearly delineated eyewitness sources which need to be compared to his earlier narrative, and not the other way around.

And if there were archers between the battles of men at arms, and there were arrows piercing the sides of helmets, the only way that could be accomplished is if the French vanguard presented its flanks to archery: the most likely probability is therefore that the archers were advanced at a projecting angle out in front of their own men at arms as "wings": which, where their ends meet, form "wedges" of archers. Taking all the written details together, this is the formation which makes most sense of cuneos; and makes the most sense to modern archers attempting to recreate the battle conditions through experimentation.