"Battle-line at Agincourt" Topic

If you knew about the sources you would understand that Henry is the hero of this chronicle.

You keep the understanding and dole it out to me as I become worthy, please.

However, it does not mean nor does it say to Henry's immediate right. It can't because the Van is to Henry's immediate right. Everything to Henry's right, including the archers, is on Henry's right.

I would find your logic convincing enough in this instance if only the other sources agreed with you. Since you do not agree with them, I must assume that your "understanding" is off here.

We know from the getgo that P. Elmham is talking ONLY about troops to Henry's right, the right of center. "On his right, at a very little distance, he placed the vanguard, and joined to it the wing stationed on his right". But since both Monstrelet and the Gesta insist on "wings" of men at arms and archers your simplistic interpretation complicates things: you can, of course, as you already have, "toss" Monstrelet and the Gesta entirely.

The problem is you don't understand the mentality of the period.

Rich, I read the same sources you do. How can you be tied to the mentality of the period through centuries of seminal discourse?

And I read, "…he raised 200 lances and an equal number of archers" (that's Froissart. So I guess Froissart wasn't in touch with the mentality of his period either.

You side-stepped my point and I am calling you on it. The archers were 5/6ths of the whole damn army, not some ignored segment; they are always mentioned, ALWAYS, even in the French sources which hated them. They were the regular army, not some segment that didn't apply to Livius and P. Elmham when they said Henry moved his army in the usual order they were standing in.

The king was there. It was he who ordered the tactical position. The Gesta is quite clear about that.

You are falling for your criticism of me: the Gesta gives Henry credit for EVERYTHING.

"…He made the archers go first from the right and also from the left."

Bingo! From your quote we have a perfect example of how moving out first means "first", which would place the archers in front as well.

The only way these statements can be reconciled with the initial setup is if someone had taken the archers from their position in the battle line and placed them in front of the rest of the army….This all agrees with the chronicle records.

Except that in all your quoting you do not address Livius or P. Elmham even once. Tossing them as well, now, are you? Oh yes, they were only talking about 1/6th of the army, the "regulars", not the archers -- says only Rich.

I notice that only the Ruisseauville says "in front", the rest say "archers first". And this account is of doubtful provenance.

Your theory does not reflect what was SOP for the period.

My theory reconciles the original and eyewitness sources on Agincourt.

The one thing that can be said about an English army is that it did not follow medieval SOP! It broke the "rules". It was an affront to French notions of chivalry.

You've departed far from your OP post premise and question.

"For all your effort to explain the positioning, you've still not reconciled how the Gesta can be right for the first position, and something so different can be possible for the second position, and Livius and P. Elmham not be completely up in the night with their insistence that Henry's army maintained their same and usual order."

Actually I think I did a pretty good job. You don't want to recognize it. You still want to insert your own meanings into the text in order to twist them to try to get them to say what you need them to say.

You've answered NOTHING. To whit: Livius and P. Elmham specifically state that the original/usual array was kept as the army advanced to the second position. You toss that with a glib, "Evidently the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army." Evidently? Based on WHAT evidence? Your criticism of my connection with "the mentality of the period"? Says you.

Address one thing at a time, then. How can you uphold, with EVIDENCE, your claim that, "the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army"? What does that mean, anyway? After that, answer how the archers can recieve as much or more mention in the accounts of the battle, and also be 5/6ths that Livius and P. Elmham ignore in their insistence that the army stuck to their original O.B.?

All most touching could easily mean a file width's away. In other words, about 3-4 feet away.

Shoot, that's nothing. A person watching the battle wouldn't even see a space at all (it would get no mention whatsoever in a chronicle).

But I agree, anything much wider than that would be a hole big enough to drive a charge into and make wider yet!

Your contention that, "no one battle was very distant from the others", and, "the three battles were nearly joined", and, "at a very little distance", means 3 or 4 FEET is absurd.

Any Frenchman entering that empty file would be attacked on HIS flanks by the English in the rear ranks. It would have been suicide for anyone to enter that empty file.

Rich (the wargamer), medieval armies did not have files! They were good troops if they could close up shoulder to shoulder in as many ranks as they had and stick it out in combat. Besides, even a theoretical file system (with opener and closer officers) would be the ideal not the reality in a protracted melee. Your neat, tidy picture of occupied files and empty files -- for command control purposes, no less -- is not realistic, imho.

The reason Henry assigned York and Camoys to command the vanguard and rearguard was so they could command the men in these battles. If you have one big line then Henry ends up commanding everything and doesn't need York and Camoys.

I thought that the banners were used for that. There were three places "where the standards were": the French DIVIDED into three columns in order to charge those places. A file A YARD WIDE would not produce three places to attack, but one continuous line with banners located along each third of the whole. The French would just hit the whole thing in one mass.

And how do you reconcile "in about four ranks" along the entire hypothetical center of men at arms, with "our strongest points"? What would make any part of a continuous four ranks deep line into three "strongest points"?

The Gesta: "But the French nobility, who had previously advanced in line abreast and had all but come to grips with us, either from fear of the missiles which by their very force pierced the sides and visors of their helmets, or in order the sooner to break through our strongest points and reach the standards (emphasis is mine), divided into three columns, attacking our line of battale at the three places where the standards were. And in the melee of spears which then followed, they hurled themselves against our men in such a fierce charge as to force them to fall back almost a spear's length. And then we who have been assigned to the clerical militia and were watching (ditto) fell upon our faces in prayer…" etc.

We see clearly from this eyewitness (doubt not, Rich, but be believing), that the English banners were in three distinct places ("our strongest points"), requiring the French to form columns which attacked only them and only there.

The "one battle of English men at arms in the center" theory is untenable unless we are willing to discard this eyewitness entirely; because Livius and P. Elmham insist that the whole army entered battle in the very same O.B. that it had adopted during the entire campaign. BUT, if we accept that the Gesta cleric was an eyewitness ("we [clerics]…were watching"), then his details dovetail nicely with everyone else's narratives.

Bennett: "Unfortunately, this plan was entirely Burne's invention." (Osprey Campaign Series 9, page 66)

Uh, not quite, really lads. He was going by the Gesta and backing that up with the other sources.

"The situation has not been made easier by the Chaplain's assertion that the archers were formed up in "wedges" in the English line. There are two problems here. One is that the Chaplain was certainly mistaken. He spent the entire battle with the baggage, a thousand yards behind the main line." (ibid page 66, 67)

Invalidating his own assertion that Burne completely made up the formation that I am arguing for here. Oman and other 19th century writers had gone with it long years before Burne took it up.

In lengthy discussion on other threads, with Rich, et al., I have defended the eyewitness positioning of "our cleric." His insistance that he and the other clerics "were watching" makes him out to be a complete fabricator if he was "a thousand yards" to the rear. If he was a complete fabricator, then his details are completely harmonious with the rest of the narrators, and very convincing as well.

Bennett's assertion that heavily armored knights ought to have been able to disperse unarmored bowmen rather quickly is only an assertion (defending himself with Bradbury, who, by asserting that bowmen only on the flanks makes sense, is revealing that he is either no archer himself or has not thought out the physics of this very well): Froissart in his description of Auray shows us archers who fought very effectively indeed, on the offensive (as at Agincourt later), and after shooting off their arrows at an approaching French column of dismounted men at arms (as at Agincourt). Rich has bought into the "archers as weak spots in the line" theory. But the weak spot in the theory of no archers between the battles of men at arms is that the sources have to be picked over to support it: some of our narrators have to be either ignored or taken partially.

I take them all literally. And the O.B. for the English that Oman, Burne, Keegan, et al., and Rocky, Mike and I believe is correct, harmonizes with everything the narratives give us.

Even allowing for the question of whether or not "wedges" were in fact a pointy joining of archer "wings" to the battles of men at arms: there is no question that the archer bodies were there causing the separation of the men at arms into three "strong points" where the standards were.

But the evidence from Froissart (Auray and other 14th century battles) and the narratives of Agincourt does not support the assertion that archers were some sort of "weak link": especially not in a loose (mobile) order to the rear, behind stakes, facing a crammed, plodding mass of exhausted enemy men at arms, with the archers themselves being twice as deep or more than their own men at arms were!

(Man, that graphing thingie is harder than I thought: I tried it vertically and still screwed it up twice)

Do it this way, lads: turn this on its ear 90 degrees, and do as Rocky says, each letter is 500 men:

A
A
A

M

A
A

M

A
A

M

A
A
A

We have 1,500 men at arms and 5,000 archers. Men at arms are four men deep, archers are eight men deep. Each battle of men at arms has two wings of 500 archers; and to suit the sources which specifically mention "wings of archers", we have an additional 500 archers attached to the extreme ends of the line. This is the exact O.B. I used the last time I played Agincourt, lo many years ago.

Doug, "Rich, I read the same sources you do."

Forget about the 70 battle accounts I've read and you haven't. Medieval History was one of the four areas I had to be tested on in my written and oral exams for the PhD program. You haven't even come close to reading the same sources I have. And it is with this background that I state you don't understand the mentality of the period.

Pseudo-Elmham
"On his right, at a very little distance, he placed the vanguard, and joined to it the wing stationed on his right"

Doug, "But since both Monstrelet and the Gesta insist on "wings" of men at arms and archers your simplistic interpretation complicates things.

Bingo! I now know how you are approaching the sources. I should have discovered it earlier. You are taking the Gesta's description as fixed reality. As a consequence all other sources must also reflect that reality. When they don't seem to, as in the case of Titus and Pseudo-Elmham, you interpret their words in such a way as they reflect this reality. Therefore, I'm being simplistic when I take the Titus and Pseudo-Elmham at face value. They must be interpreted in such a way as they agree with the Gesta's account. After all, the Gesta account is reality. So, you interpret Titus and Pseudo-Elmham in such a way that they agree with the Gesta account.

There are several problems with this approach. For one, it is not at all how historical interpretation is done. Because of the nature of sources, historian work with probabilites not ridged fixed ‘realities'. For example, the Gesta said when Henry first met the French, he formed his battle line with wedges of archers. Taken literally, this would mean the battle line the Gesta describes formed on Thursday when Henry first met the French. The next day when Henry formed his battle line he cold well have changed it to the way Titus and Pseudo-Elmham described. For some reason, this may not have been picked up by the Gesta. This may account for why the Gesta says one thing and the other two say something different. Henry may have formed his line one way on Thursday and changed it on Friday. We cannot simply take it on face value that the Gesta's account reflected the battle formation on Friday. I believe it was but it cannot be absolutely proven. Again, we're dealing with probabilites.

Second, while cuneus can mean wedge, it can also mean other things. Matthew Bennett writes

"…, it also means ‘troop', ‘unit, ‘body of men', or even ‘a mob'! The word is used just a few lines earlier in the Gesta where its translator render it as ‘platoons' to describe a unit in the mounted, rear ‘battle' of the French. So the Latin phrase could be rendered as ‘and he mixed troops of archers in his battle lines'. Not the same thing at all."

Wedges of archers is not a fixed reality. It is only a possibility among other possibilities. So Titus's and Pseudo-Elmham's account of the archers on the flanks may reflect that the troops of archers between the battles were simply too small to mention. This then would agree with the Gesta who took the effort to mention them. In both cases there were groups of archers but not enough to make much difference. This is what Bennett meant when he criticized Burne. Burne accepted as true only one possible interpretation of the term ‘cuneus'.

We are left not knowing if the Gesta description only applied to Thursday or Thursday and Friday or just Friday. We don't know whether the archers were placed in wedges or just distributed by groups of unknown size. If this were just small groups then the overwhelming majority of the archers were on the extreme flanks of the battle line.

The end result is that we can't say the other accounts must agree with the Gesta because we don't know what exactly the Gesta is describing. All we can say is it is likely that what the Gesta meant was wedges between the battles. And it is likely that this was the battle setup for Friday but can't know for sure. We certainly can't use the Gesta's account to invalidate other accounts or make the other accounts seem to read so they match the Gesta's account; which is what you are doing.

Therefore, with Titus and Pseudo-Elmham accounts we don't have to insert paces 30 feet to 100 feet wide for archers. It also means we don't have to insert archers in places they are not mentioned.

Another aspect to consider is the accounts may not be as linear as the writer makes out. Example Titus and Pseudo- Elmham. We don't know what the shape of the information was when participants related to them what went on. Huntington may have told Pseudo-Elmham that "the army marched up in order and set up with the battles next to each other and the archers on the flanks." This gets written up as the initial battle order was battles in line and archers on the flanks even though that may not be what Huntington said.

All this is what I mean by you don't know how to read the sources.

By the way, while Monstrelet and the Gesta are talking about "wings" of men at arms, the Gesta is talking about the initial setup. Monstrelet is talking about the Erpingham affair. I already showed the Erpingham affair happened after the initial setup and after the emissaries met (did you forget about that). So I don't know what Monstrelet has to do with what Pseudo-Elmham is talking about.

Doug, "You are falling for your criticism of me: the Gesta gives Henry credit for EVERYTHING.

In this case he happens to be correct. Only the king could command such mighty nobles as Duke of York and Lord Camoys. They would not stand for a lesser noble to order them. This is a mentality thing so you'll have to take my word for it. Besides, Erpingham didn't order the archers until after the meeting with the emissaries. At this point, the army was already in its battle formation.

Me, "Evidently the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army."

Doug, "Evidently? Based on WHAT evidence? Your criticism of my connection with "the mentality of the period"? Says you."

No, says Titus. He mentioned the battles and not the archers.

Doug, "Address one thing at a time, then. How can you uphold, with EVIDENCE, your claim that, "the archers were not considered part of the normal order the army"? What does that mean, anyway?"

It was not a claim but an explanation for why Titus left out the archers in his description of the army advancing in echelon order. Look at it this way. The battles consisted of heavy infantry. The archers were light infantry. Only the heavy infantry was ordered. Not the light infantry. They could be placed anywhere in or around the heavy infantry. They had no particular order. The heavy infantry battles, on the other hand, had a particular order: van, main, and rear. The van lead on the march and the rear took up the rear. When swung into battle, the van was on the right of the main. The rear was on the left of the main. This was the order of the army. When the sources say the English advanced in order this is the order they mean.

Doug, "Your contention that, "no one battle was very distant from the others", and, "the three battles were nearly joined", and, "at a very little distance", means 3 or 4 FEET is absurd."

I'll tell you what is absurd. It is you, who have no knowledge of late medieval battles and no concept of the need for command and control, telling me, who has studied both, what is absurd. You might get a little knowledge before you start casting aspersions on someone.

Doug, " Rich (the wargamer), medieval armies did not have files!"

Doug (the non-observant) I never said medieval battles had files. I only described the space as a file (of three to four feet) in order to describe the space between the battles. You are more interested in trying to catching me in a mistake than you are in readying what I have to say.

Doug, "And how do you reconcile "in about four ranks" along the entire hypothetical center of men at arms, with "our strongest points"? What would make any part of a continuous four ranks deep line into three "strongest points"?

Had you known anything about late medieval battle, you would have know the armies had the tightest grouping of picked men around their banners.

Doug, "Bennett's assertion that heavily armored knights ought to have been able to disperse unarmored bowmen rather quickly is only an assertion (defending himself with Bradbury, who, by asserting that bowmen only on the flanks makes sense, is revealing that he is either no archer himself or has not thought out the physics of this very well)"

Now you are showing your ignorance. Bennett is an archer. He is a member of a company of archers. And, they have shoots all over England. This makes Bennett a professional historian and an experienced archers. I would ease up on the superciliousness.

The reason Bennett rejects the wedge theory is that it cannot be proven that wedges actually existed. And, other chroniclers such as Titus and Pseudo-Elmham, state the archers were on the extreme flanks on the army. I know that view is simplistic but hey what can you do.

Rich

We cannot simply take it on face value that the Gesta's account reflected the battle formation on Friday. I believe it was but it cannot be absolutely proven. Again, we're dealing with probabilites.

We cannot simply take it face value either, that the battle was in fact fought remotely like the narratives tell us. Any amount of postulating what-if's can be entered into.

If you read the context of the Gesta's chronological layout, there is no possible way "our cleric" could have been talking about any other time than the day of battle. I don't know why you are flogging this.

So the Latin phrase could be rendered as ‘and he mixed troops of archers in his battle lines'. Not the same thing at all."

We, you and I, have not been arguing the SHAPE of the archer formation, but rather their very existence in the English line.

I have offered why I believe the wings of archers attached to each battle angled forward to form a "wedge" shape where they connected (or nearly connected). But other than practical considerations making this the (arguably) best formation, I am not prepared to defend "wedge" as literal: as you so ably point out, we have ONE Latin term for several/many possible applications, and trying to tell only from "our cleric" which one applied to the archers is impossible.

So Titus's and Pseudo-Elmham's account of the archers on the flanks may reflect that the troops of archers between the battles were simply too small to mention. This then would agree with the Gesta who took the effort to mention them. In both cases there were groups of archers but not enough to make much difference.

I agree with that possibility. Above, I said that in my mind I see much smaller bodies of archers between the three battles.

When I have played out Agincourt, I have selected the "Bow 4" elites and placed them there: that is c. 20% of the total longbow, or 1,000 men total, 250 between each battle.

I have no trouble believing that Henry knew who his best archers were and selected them to form one or more special units with their more powerful bows, and specially detailed carts to carry their heavier spined arrows. What these hypothetical "wedges" of the cream of the archer crop could do is make up for lack of sheer numbers with excellence in marksmanship and penetrating power! As the French directly in front of their two narrow formations came within pointblank range, their rapid, deadly shooting drove those men at arms back on the ranks behind: at the same time, the massive flanking bodies of archers were driving the French men at arms inward: and as the French came almost within weapon stroke (as the Gesta so clearly states), the French mass split along its forward edge into three bodies and contacted the English battles. The wedge shape of the two interposed archer units would have targetted the inner flanks of the forming columns, encouraging their formation even more.

Bingo! I now know how you are approaching the sources. I should have discovered it earlier. You are taking the Gesta's description as fixed reality. As a consequence all other sources must also reflect that reality.

Not quite. I accept that each eyewitness and our best narrators (whose sources were participants of the battle) were describing the same thing for the most part. Therefore, allowing for the differing perspectives of each source, we must be able to come up with a largely reconciled comparison/compilation of the details.

I know perfectly well of Curry's warning not to try and harmonize all their details into a homogenous, non conflicting whole. I am not saying such is possible. But on this subject -- the English order before the first position, during the first position and advancing to the second position and combat -- the combination of details and specific statements IS reconcilable: but only as long as we read the Gesta as truth: and when "our cleric" states that he and his fellow clerics "were watching", right after he has given some of our most graphic details (and that right after taking the trouble to specify where he was during the battle and his vantage point on horseback), I will take the man at his word -- because his details are reconcilable with the other sources -- and I will not relegate him to a position "a thousand yards" to the rear as do Bennett, et al.

We certainly can't use the Gesta's account to invalidate other accounts or make the other accounts seem to read so they match the Gesta's account; which is what you are doing.

I am not. The only assumption I have made regarding any of the accounts is that they are describing the same thing, ergo, not mentioning something that another narrator does, doesn't mean it didn't happen or exist: it simply means that if the lesser account (as to details given) does not out and out say something contradictory, I can reconcile it with the other accounts. That is not reading into them what I want, because I don't WANT anything but the truth. I have no pet theories, or romantic view of this battle or the "period" it occupies. I do not come to this subject with any other motivation but to know what happened.

Therefore, with Titus and Pseudo-Elmham accounts we don't have to insert paces 30 feet to 100 feet wide for archers. It also means we don't have to insert archers in places they are not mentioned.

Yes, you do, if you read "our cleric" as an honest, accurate writer. "We were watching" means what it says, or he was a liar. If he was a liar, then show it. If you believe he was a liar, but cannot argue convincingly for that, then interpreting original sources is not your vocation and, imho, you wasted your time on your PhD.

All this is what I mean by you don't know how to read the sources.

Imagination has its uses. But imagining "Huntington" saying one thing and the P. Elmhamm getting it wrong, at the very least, only shows to what lengths you are willing to go to reduce all enquiry to a nullity.

There is a very good reason why the Gesta has remainded over the gnerations the most quoted and best referred to original source: internal consistency, agreement in the main with the other sources, and, most importantly, the combined advantages of proximity to the events and NO MIDDLE MAN providing the information.

By the way, while Monstrelet and the Gesta are talking about "wings" of men at arms, the Gesta is talking about the initial setup. Monstrelet is talking about the Erpingham affair. I already showed the Erpingham affair happened after the initial setup and after the emissaries met (did you forget about that). So I don't know what Monstrelet has to do with what Pseudo-Elmham is talking about.

Well, I do: P. Elmham (especially, but also Livius) insists that the English army moved forward in the same order as the usual O.B. that it had adopted since leaving Harfleuer; the same as the first position on the day of battle; the same as the evening before. Therefore, the details of Monstrelet must agree (or we discount any literal meaning to Livius and P. Elmham on this matter).

No, says Titus. He mentioned the battles and not the archers.

Yes, battles of combined men at arms and archers.

For what you say to be true, you would have to show that the archers were in discrete units. (As Erpingham does not command the archers in battle, he cannot be shown to be in even over-all command of them: he's with the men at arms of the king.)

Our hypothesis, as I have said many times, is that the typical medieval battle (SOP) was to mingle troops into one over-all command: in this case, York, the king, Camoys. Depending on whether or not we believe there were discrete extreme flanking archer units to tackle covering the woods, and the "200" in the meadow near Tramecourt, we therefore have at the least three commands, and up to six all told. Where the men at arms went, so too went their attached "wings" of longbowmen.

Look at it this way. The battles consisted of heavy infantry. The archers were light infantry. Only the heavy infantry was ordered. Not the light infantry. They could be placed anywhere in or around the heavy infantry. They had no particular order. The heavy infantry battles, on the other hand, had a particular order: van, main, and rear. The van lead on the march and the rear took up the rear. When swung into battle, the van was on the right of the main. The rear was on the left of the main. This was the order of the army. When the sources say the English advanced in order this is the order they mean.

I accept that you believe this. I don't buy it.

How to explain the hypothetical ignoring of the yeoman chain of command? Was that not part of the army's over-all chain of command? You say the archers could be arranged anywhere any old way and so that fact made including them in the description of "marched forward in the same order" irrelevant? How would Henry have issued orders to the units of archers then? If he was able to issue orders to the archers to take up station on both sides of the three battles of men at arms, he could just as easily have kept some back to insert between the battles; and each time there would have been a change in that over-all order, it would have required transmition of orders. But no such change occurred, because the battle line established on the evening of the 24th was the same as the battle line that engaged in combat a day later.

I'll tell you what is absurd. It is you, who have no knowledge of late medieval battles and no concept of the need for command and control, telling me, who has studied both, what is absurd. You might get a little knowledge before you start casting aspersions on someone.

Testy, there, Doc. As I said you don't know how much I have under MY belt. I can only guess at how much of those "70 battles" you remember thoroughly: judging by this discussion I have my doubts about that too.

Shall it be longbows or crossbows at fifty paces, then?

Doug (the non-observant) I never said medieval battles had files. I only described the space as a file (of three to four feet) in order to describe the space between the battles. You are more interested in trying to catching me in a mistake than you are in readying what I have to say.

Not true, Rich, Doc, whatever. I am interested in pointing out absurdity. As a member of the human race, you must allow yourself to be caught when being absurd. And in this "3 to 4 FEET" thingie, you are, imho, being absurd. Your saying, that leaving deliberate space in what modern authorities contend was a single formation of men at arms, is first of all not supportable by any other authority I have read. Secondly, leaving spaces was completely NOT NECESSARY (and you have not shown a shred of evidence that this was SOP, because you can't, it wasn't), and in fact a stupid thing to do, if the intent was ever to form a cohesive line without a break: clearly what each battle of the English army was doing, and what the French battles were also doing (right up to the point where flinching away from the unexpected viciousness of the bodkin storm caused them to divide apart).

To assume that the English command structure would have become confused if the battles TOUCHED is what's absurd.

As I said, command control was centered on the standards. EACH MAN knew which standards he was grouped with. He kept his eye on them as often as possible, and stayed in the same relationship to his own standards as much as possible. Battles, being chaos perfected, result, of course, in confusion. Your neat, narrow "3 to 4 feet" of essential separation would have vanished within seconds of the first contact, never to be restored till the battle had a breather.

Had you known anything about late medieval battle, you would have know the armies had the tightest grouping of picked men around their banners.

Aside from your continued resorting to personal aspersions about things you do not know (my level of knowledge), what you say is a good answer. But the point I was making is also true: men at arms ARE stronger points in the English line than any number of archers. The Gesta has three separated battles of men at arms as the stronger points, and no reading into the text of hypothetical "Brewster Beefcakes" banner guards is required.

Now you are showing your ignorance. Bennett is an archer.

Now you are showing your lack of reading for comprehension: I was talking about Bradbury, whom Bennett referenced.

But if either is an archer, and nevertheless believes that Hal V would have deliberately drawn up half or more of his archers where they could not possibly have any effect (or even reach) the French with their arrows, he is asking me to believe the king and his commanders were stupid.

The reason Bennett rejects the wedge theory is that it cannot be proven that wedges actually existed. And, other chroniclers such as Titus and Pseudo-Elmham, state the archers were on the extreme flanks on the army. I know that view is simplistic but hey what can you do.

(again) It isn't the wedge theory I take exception to in this protracted exchange, it is your denial of the very existence of archers between the English battles of men at arms. You've conceded above that possibly small enough bodies of archers could have been there and not received specific mention by anyone other than "our cleric." I consider that a HUGE concession on your part.

To toss out the other possible meanings of "cuneus", and discount "the Chaplain's" eyewitness details entirely in this matter, is, imho, a highly unjustified and foolish thing to do.

PhD

Since I have not spoken (much) of what I have read, how could you possibly know, bucko?

"Mentality of the period" betrays two things: a false notion that the middle ages WAS a "period"; and a conflation, that some medieval "mentality" translates into the military sphere of things in some especially "medieval" way. What is the constant here is war and especially battle.

In the context of your criticism of me, you applied my deficiency specifically to understanding how and why the narratives were written, and how and why Hal V waged Agincourt the way he did. In neither case does your criticism show anything about me; but it does show a degree of priggish superiority coming from you. Your investment in your documented education should get you at least that much enjoyment I suppose.

(Ach! "…that is c. 20% of the total longbow, or 1,000 men total, [500] between each battle.")

(I would take back the snipishness of the above, if I could, alas it is too late. Sorry for the snipishness.)

Rich, we are poking each other to no avail.

As you said, "probabilities."

Despite my claim to have reconciled the sources on the matter of the English order of battle, the sources themselves are not 100% internally consistent, so that claim of mine is only partly true. E.g. the way Monstrelet, Waurin and LeFevre deliver the battle narrative does not work with the Gesta formation AT ALL: so my "reconciling" the O.B. becomes pointless as soon as you start to compare the various eyewitness narrators and the best of the informed narrators such as Livius and P. Elmham, regarding the fighting: their battle details don't jive particularly well, to say the least.

It is at this point (battle details) that I fall back on the notion that each source was describing different parts of a wide field and over a period of several hours. Because there is no chronological or systematic discipline to these narratives, it is impossible to piece them together and say, "this happened first over here, and this happened next over there."

From what you've lately said, there were no gaps in a hypothetical English line of all men at arms in the center: my quibbling over your "3 to 4 feet" between battles, for whatever reason, was just too silly and absurd: I admit it. I effectively argued myself into a corner by showing how the spaces would vanish, i.e. were effectively not there in the first place, even if some chroniclers mentioned them for whatever reason: once the fighting started, poof, no more spaces; count on THAT. And if there were archers between the battles of men at arms (I say there were, so what), they were obviously not the weak points you posited in the OP.

Unless you have something significant to add to your original OP premise, I consider myself done with this, really, really, I am.

Unless you want to discuss stakes now, as I said, this is pretty much hashed out to bloody rags, imho….

I must hasten to add to the topic of "absurd" (better to point it out myself than to have Rich or someone else do it, even though the chances of this are small, since this absurdity is almost lost back there): I said, hypothetically, that Waurin and LeFevre might have used Monstrelet as the basis of their "dictated" narrative of Agincourt, many years later, because as warriors of the nobility the chances are that they were illiterate. Hoo boy, now that was a stupid/absurd thing to even say, and doesn't last long enough to even be entered as hypothetical (too bad that you didn't remember better, Rich, you could have laughed me to scorn). Rereading Curry this morning, I (re)discover that both of them wrote their own chronicles, collaborated, and both had the ambition to continue Froissart's type of history where he had left off. There is no possibility of either man being illiterate (any more than there is any possibility of the Gesta's description of the English O.B. applying to Thursday instead of Friday).

Hi

Why, as an archer, I like the 3 wedges versus the wings.

The battlefield is too wide. Remember how rich started with the assumption that the french were either too stupid to attack the vulnerable archers or there was some unstated factor? The tradtional 3 wedges as outlined up till modern times has one overwhelming advantage:

Overlapping fields of fire.

Or for the armor fan bows, the french, as bennet discribes not only flinch awas from being shot in the face, also would be getting shot from the side and sometimes, cowards, in the back!

As for bennet not haveing wedges as "no proof", seems that Nicolle and others have wedges earlier at Poitiers.

So, back to the 70 battles rich….Stakes and wedges or not?

Rocky

One things has always puzzled me about the idea of the wedges. Assuming they existed and each face of a wedge consisted of 500 archers in 8 ranks (as Doug suggests above) then, even if the faces of each wedge are angled forward at 45 degrees then they would only extend 44 yards ahead of the line of MAA. In other words, the archers in the wedges could only deliver effective enfilading fire over the last 44 yards of the French advance. In that case, why did they bother?

44 yards is a lot of ground at pointblank range. And to shoot in from the side is maximized penetration. The worst disruption would therefore be delivered right at the last moment before contact: as c. 1,500 arrows every five seconds smack into fewer than 600 men (lining the outer-facing ranks). Think of that! The projecting area is only that far out in front of the battles of men at arms, but the angled shots into the flanks begin further out than that: you are talking only about the optimum where the full 90 degree side-on shots begin. The wings of archers would get more flanking shots in than the "wedges" between the battles (assuming more archers on the extreme wings than those immediately flanking the battles of men at arms).

Doug, "Unless you want to discuss stakes now, as I said, this is pretty much hashed out to bloody rags, imho….

No way. I haven't given up on you yet. I'm bound and determined to teach you something about late medieval battle.

Part of your problem in understanding battle in this period is that you bring way too many anachronisms to this study.

Doug, "Yes, battles of combined men at arms and archers." … "Where the men at arms went, so too went their attached "wings" of longbowmen."

My little red dictionary defines combined as unite; merge. You might merge different groups of men-at-arms or different groups of archers but you would never combine men-at-arms with archers. Social stratification simply wouldn't allow it. There is no way the nobility, even the minor nobility, would acquiesces to joining with peasants. Longbowmen were great fighters and bowmen but they were still non-noble, peasants (farmers). Men-at-arms may well appreciate the fighting qualities of bowmen but they would never accept them as equals. To accept them into the unit, in whatever capacity, would be to recognize them as equals with others in the unit. Again, a mentality thing. The French wouldn't even let their crossbowmen on the same battlefield as them.

Besides, there is no evidence that the archers were combined or attached to the men-at-arms. All the Gesta says is that Henry placed the archers between the battles. In preparation for the advance, Henry told Erpingham to "unplace" them and put them in two wings in front of the men-at-arms. In this position they became a separate battle composed of two wings. In other words, Henry initially placed them in the battle line. Later he took them out of the battle line and placed them in front of the men-at-arms. No combining, no attaching.

This brings us to the command structure.

Doug, "Depending on whether or not we believe there were discrete extreme flanking archer units to tackle covering the woods, and the "200" in the meadow near Tramecourt, we therefore have at the least three commands, and up to six all told."

On the late medieval battlefield there were generally four commands. The men-at-arms would be broken up into three battles: the van, the main, the rear. The fourth command would be the Master of the Bowmen. There are a number of historians who believe Erpingham was the Master of the Bowmen. He certainly had the battle experience for it. Their job was to place the bowmen where the king, or commander, wanted them placed. Erpingham was certainly performing the function of Master of Bowmen. Whether or not he was, the records don't say. But in this preparation for the move, he was certainly acting as Master of the Bowmen. As Master, it would be his job to reorganize the archers into positions whereby they could screen the advance. He would lead them forward, and would place them in their new dispositions. We are told Erpingham, once the archers were positioned for the advance, rode to the head of the archers.

LeFevre and Wauren,
"He rode with an escort in front of the battle of archers after he had carried out the deployment and threw in the air a baton which he had been holding in his hand. Then he dismounted and put himself in the battle of the king of England who was also on foot between his men and with his banner in front of him, Then the English began suddenly to advance uttering a great cry which much amazed the French."

Now if we take this literally Erpingham rode to the front of the archer battle after he had deployed them. Then threw his baton in the a, dismounted, joined the king and everyone marched over his baton. This doesn't make a lot of sense. Not 15th century sense. Some say that he threw the baton as a signal for the advance. But why throw the baton? He's at the head of the archers, all he has to do is start moving toward the enemy. This is the signal to march and everyone gets under way. Change one word and you have a completely different picture.

"He rode with an escort in front of the battle of archers after[WARDS] he had carried out the deployment and threw in the air a baton which he had been holding in his hand."

Now we get a picture of Erpingham riding at the head of the archers, then seeing them to their new deployment. Once they were deployed he threw his baton in the air. Then he went back to join Henry. We know the archers arrived there first because LeFevre and Wauren write: "Straightway the English approached the French; first the archers," Once the archers were in their new deployment, Erpingham rejoined the king. This is all consistent with Erpingham functioning as Master of the Bowmen.

I find this picture internally consistent and consistent at every turn with the sources. What do you think?

Rich

Hi

A screen again. M for MAA, A for Archer, O for open spaces trying to beat the formatting.

*OAOAOAOAOAO* asterisks atree line.
*AOAOAOAOAOA*

OOOOMMMOOOOOO

Archers die because open order, the french advance means density, and killing archers. Thus proving Rich's point except it didn't happen.

Back to me that your "screen" alone has a problem.

Mike, the concept behind the wedges is that as the french advance, from 225 to 250 yards down to the stakes, the are doing standard mass volley fire. As the stakes and point blank fire funnel the surviviors into the MAA, you get the 44 yard overlapping fields of fire, which might be anacronistic to Rich, but makes sense to me. Doesn't require leap as we have other battles, the other pair of the "big three" where the same is asserted.

I think, Rich, you are arguing with Doug to a misunderstanding. You are correctly asserting that archers and bow are NOT mixed. But this leads to other Command and Control problems, and the usual statmeents about the command being 3 or 4 battles. If the archers are the one big battle, and either deployed in a screen in front, or two wings, or 3 or 4 wedges, with Epingham standing with the king, at best his actual command and control is non existant! Which I think is medieval in that the chroniclers aren't mentioning who is actually running those peasant yeoman. When the french are 200 yard away, someone is calling the range and the loose of the volley.

In other more literate armies, we have some indication of mixed units, say byzantine and the daughter states of the byzantines. But indeed the archers are with archers and the screen is scutati with the overall command as the commander of the scutati. I think you take his "mixed" too literally.

Rocky

My little red dictionary defines combined as unite; merge. You might merge different groups of men-at-arms or different groups of archers but you would never combine men-at-arms with archers.

Isn't it obvious that I mean, units of both in a single battle or as a single command? I have never suggested that archers intermingled with men at arms in the same "unit."

On the late medieval battlefield there were generally four commands. The men-at-arms would be broken up into three battles: the van, the main, the rear.

Another common command was a reserve: you would have van, center and rear (with attached archer units on the flanks where wanted), and a reserve. Not at Agincourt, because there were not enough troops to form a reserve: everyone was in line.

The French wouldn't even let their crossbowmen on the same battlefield as them.

You ought to restate that: because as it reads it simply is not true. The O.B. that the French commanders drew up for facing the English in the Agincourt campaign included dismounted men at arms with "wings" of archers and crossbowmen to face the "wings" of English archers. But when the field for battle manifested, it was too narrow to allow for that deployment and also make room for the anticipated flanking bodies of cavalry: the missile troops were shoved to the rear lines and told to stay out of the way. That is not the same thing as, "wouldn't let their crossbowmen on the same battlefield."

We are told Erpingham, once the archers were positioned for the advance, rode to the head of the archers.

….

find this picture internally consistent and consistent at every turn with the sources. What do you think?

I don't have any trouble imagining Erpingham riding in front of the army until they reached the second position. His command, "Now strike!", wouldn't make sense if they still had several hundred yards to go to even reach the second position; but it would make sense if they had already reset their stakes, and he was commanding them to advance beyond the stakes and start shooting; at which point he would have joined the king's battle on foot.

My little red dictionary defines combined as unite; merge. You might merge different groups of men-at-arms or different groups of archers but you would never combine men-at-arms with archers. Social stratification simply wouldn't allow it. There is no way the nobility, even the minor nobility, would acquiesces to joining with peasants. Longbowmen were great fighters and bowmen but they were still non-noble, peasants (farmers). Men-at-arms may well appreciate the fighting qualities of bowmen but they would never accept them as equals. To accept them into the unit, in whatever capacity, would be to recognize them as equals with others in the unit. Again, a mentality thing. The French wouldn't even let their crossbowmen on the same battlefield as them.

The primary sources tell us something different.

For instance, Froissart says of Crecy that:

"The English, who were drawn up in their three divisions and sitting quietly on the ground, got up with perfect discipline and formed their ranks, with the archers in harrow formation and the men-at-arms behind. The Prince of Wales' division was in front. The second, commanded by the earls of Northampton and Arundel, was on the wing, ready to support the Prince if the need arose."

It is manifestly clear that the English longbowmen were in the same divisions as the men at arms, and in fact it also seems fairly clear that each of these operated as a single combined formation.

By the way, Matthew Bennett probably has it right when he interprets the herce ("harrow") to be archers deployed intersperced, the men in one rank diagonally offset from the men in the rank behind, so that they could, if necessary, fire other than completely overhead yet in multiple ranks.

Larry: that quote adds further evidence to the meaning of "behind" and "in front." The prince's men at arms were no more screened by their own archers by being "behind" them, than Northampton's and Arundel's battle was screened by the prince's battle which was "in front." The second battle was refused off to the left "wing" position. I don't know if Rich has a different battle map for Crecy too: where the archers are screening the men at arms: but consensus (among scholars of my familiarity) always shows the archers organized in bodies on either flank of each battle of men at arms, and "in front of them" by being angled forward.

I don't agree, I think the archers were actually in front. It doesn't matter what modern restorations show, what is actually said is that the men-at-arms were behind so that is presumably what is meant.

The 19-20th century concept of a blunt bottomed V with the MAA in the bottom of the V is not, to the best of my recollection, supported by any evidence from primary descriptions of HYW battle. Bennett's article on the English longbowman is a very refreshing curative when it comes to some of those extrapolations.

The other thing that is noticeable is how Matthews shows the archers on both wings of the Black Princes battle and more or less the same with Northampton's battle. (See battle map pages 167 & 174 chapters XII & XIII. The Battle of Crecy ‘A Campaign in context') This battle again makes a strong case for the MAA in the centre and the archers on the wings, as do many other historians on other engagements of the period.

The book mentioned is a good read & goes a long way in explaining the way that the army of Edward III operated, how the mounted & dismounted units were drawn up and tactically used, all in easy to follow illustrations. (Though the individual soldier type illustrations are a bit rudimentary)And good sequetial battle maps are used which are easy to follow.

Paul

Just to clarify, I am commenting on Rupert Matthew's book.

Paul

I don't agree, I think the archers were actually in front.

Using the same language: how can the prince's battle be in front of Northampton's, and the latter battle be also "on the wing?"

Here's an annoying discrepency too: in my version of Froissart (H. P. Dunster's condensation of the Thomas Johnes translation), it gives the passage you quoted like this: "The English, who, as I have said, were drawn up in three divisions, and seated on the ground, on seeing their enemies advance, rose up undauntedly and fell into their ranks. The prince's battalion, whose archers were formed in the manner of a portcullis, and the men-at-arms in the rear, was the first to do so. The Earls of Northampton and Arundel, who commanded the second division, posted themselves in good order on the prince's wing to assist him if necessary."

Now, here we have a Latin/Old French term that obviously can be rendered either as "in front", or "first to do so".(?) And who here can confidently assure the rest of us that one or the other is the more correct rendering of the original text?

I agree, actually, that the way Froissart reads, the archers of the prince's battle (at least) were drawn up screening the men at arms and Welsh and Cornish auxiliaries behind. So three lines of units to the prince's battle. The men at arms and archers "made way for them" and these knifemen went out and slew a large number of French cavalry who were by then discomfitted by the arrows, and their passage through their own routing (Genoese) crossbowmen.

Interestingly (as per this discussion of men at arms versus archers), at one point French units of cavalry "coasting, as it were, the archers" (drifting around them, apparently), engaged the prince and his men at arms behind and had a lengthy melee.

Now that is a strange image: out in front of the archers you have knifemen cutting up discomfitted French horses and riders; behind the archers you have a melee with their own men at arms going on against two units of French mounted knights; and what were the archers doing all this time? No word at all on that: but the text allows that the archers saw off small parties of French as they arrived and attacked piecemeal. So I guess they were busy enough.

The second division comes to the aid of the prince, and the French (including some Germans and Savoyards) who "had broken through the archers of the prince's battalion and engaged with the men at arms", restored the situation.

So we have a very lengthy, broken, confused fight mostly involving only the prince's battle.

The bit about cavalry breaking through the archers is an interesting comparison to Verneuil much later: where Milanese cavalry ride right through the longbowmen and continue on to attack the baggage. Evidently archers could be ridden through without being ridden down. Pretty nimble guys! Or rather loose and feckless cavalry: impossible to say which is more true.

In any case, on the topic: there doesn't appear to be anything particularly "weak" about the archer units: and it does also appear in this case that the French chivalry could deliberately ignore the archers by "coasting" around their flanks to attack men at arms instead. (Earlier evidence of the assumed battlefield snobbery at Agincourt?)

This battle again makes a strong case for the MAA in the centre and the archers on the wings, as do many other historians on other engagements of the period.

And I can swing back and agree with you: the meaning of "in front" or "behind" or "went first" can be the flat-bottomed "V", or two lines with screening archers in the first line and men at arms in a second, like Rich prefers.

The detail about how the French knights, "had broken through the archers…and engaged with the men at arms", though, is rather telling in favor of the two lines at Crecy.

Securing my Oman for a refresher: he quotes Baker of Swinbrook directly, who says of the prince's O.B. at Crecy: "[the archers] had their post given them not in front of the men-at-arms, but on each flank of them, as wings, so that they should not get in their way, nor have to face the central charge of the French, but might shoot them down from the side." Baker also describes the "pottes" the archers dug in front of themselves while they awaited the French. And says that the Welsh "spearmen" were placed behind the archers. (It appears that they used their long knives instead of spears when they got in amongst the all but routed French knights.)

So that sounds pretty conclusive to me: typically, archers on the flanks "as wings". "Behind" in these cases means refused. "In front" means advanced to engage first. "Went first" can mean, started moving first, or reached the enemy first, or both.

Doug, Isn't it obvious that I mean, units of both in a single battle or as a single command? I have never suggested that archers intermingled with men at arms in the same "unit."

As I pointed out the Gesta does not say they were units of a single battle. All he said was they were placed next to the battles. LeFevre and Waurin then commented that they were taken from this position and placed in front of the men-at-arms. Read the quote above.

Doug, "Another common command was a reserve: you would have van, center and rear (with attached archer units on the flanks where wanted), and a reserve."

Can you mention a battle from the late medieval period in which a reserve existed? Certainly none of the big three had a reserve.

Doug, "You ought to restate that: because as it reads it simply is not true."

The Religieux
"Four thousand of their best crossbowmen who aught to have marched in the front and begun the attack were not found to be at their post and it seems that they had been given permission to depart by the lords of the lords of the army on the pretext that they had no need of their help."

Pierre Coshon
"The French thought that they would carry the day given their great numbers, and in their arrogance had proclaimed that only those who were noble should go into battle. So all the men of lower ranks, who were enough to have beaten the English, were pushed to the rear."

Le Fevre and Waurin
"They had plenty of archers and crossbowmen but nobody wanted to let them fire. The reason for this was that the site was so narrow that there was only enough room for the men-at-arms."

The Religieux and Coshon clearly are saying the nobles didn't want the archers there because they didn't want "men of lower rank" on the battlefield. Le Fevre and Waurin are saying the reason was the shortness of the battlefield. You know the size of the battlefield. If the French had wanted bowmen to their front, their was amble room for them to be there.

Larry, "It is manifestly clear that the English longbowmen were in the same divisions as the men at arms, and in fact it also seems fairly clear that each of these operated as a single combined formation.

Froissart
"The English, who were drawn up in their three divisions and sitting quietly on the ground, got up with perfect discipline and formed their ranks, with the archers in harrow formation and the men-at-arms behind."

It's not that clear at all. What is says is that there were divisions (battles) and there were archers. The archers were supporting the divisions but that is quite another thing from saying that they operated as a single combined formation. This implies command and I don't see that in the quote.

Doug, "The prince's men at arms were no more screened by their own archers by being "behind" them, than Northampton's and Arundel's battle was screened by the prince's battle which was "in front."

FYI, Clifford Rogers, a well known medieval military historian, has presented just such a thesis. He suggests that the three battles were formed one behind the other with the prince's battle in the front. He does this to account for why the Princes battle was so much more battered than were the other two. So, don't be so quick to make assertions.

Doug, "but consensus (among scholars of my familiarity) always shows the archers organized in bodies on either flank of each battle of men at arms, and "in front of them" by being angled forward."

I will readily agree that ‘in front' can mean projected toward the front as in the case of archers in wedges. However, ‘in front' can also mean in front. Comparing a set battle line with a battle line preparing to advance towards the enemy is comparing apples to oranges.

So that's it. We're pretty much agreed that when Henry was ready to advance he told Erpingham to take the archers out of their position in the battle line, form them into two wings in front of the men-at-arms, led them to their new position had them form up in two flanks on the far side of the battlefield, had them replace their spikes, throw his baton and ride back to join Henry.

Rich

Rocky, "If the archers are the one big battle, and either deployed in a screen in front, or two wings, or 3 or 4 wedges, with Erpingham standing with the king, at best his actual command and control is non existent!"

I think that is one of the major problems with Agincourt and the number of archers. If we have two wings on either side of the battle with the width of the battlefield to contend with, how do we get the archers to fire at about the same time and in the same area? You can't do it by voice; too many men, too far apart. You could try it with a single arrow. It could also mark where the other arrows were to be aimed. But there is a time lag for the arrow to finish it's course and if the arrow isn't fired at the exact time the enemy could ride past. There is a better way. Place a marker in the field. When the enemy hits the marker let fly the arrows. The marker will also indicate the area of the target. No commands need be given. Just watch the enemy and when they hit the mark let fly. This seems to be the perfect solution of instructing the archers when to fire and where to fire when voice won't do. I think Erpingham's baton was the marker and the yell "Now fire" meant fire on the enemy when they hit this mark. This way he doesn't have to be there to indicate where and when to fire. In a sense, he still has command and control while standing next to Henry.

Now, what is your objection with screening?

Rich

Now, what is your objection with screening?

My objection is based solely on your claim that the archers are exempt from Livius and P. Elmham's clear statements about the English army advancing in the same O.B. that it had been in the first position.

Nothing you've said to argue that point has made any practical sense to me.

Archer units were part of the commander's battle: in this case, York's, Henry's and Camoy's battles each had archer units attached to them as functionally part of the whole.

Above, the numbers clearly given for each of the battles at Crecy is proof that the various arms were considered part of the prince's, Northampton's and the king's battles, and are so stated to be under each of their commands in their given numerical strengths.

Agincourt would be no different. Nothing had changed in the intervening half century.

If we have two wings on either side of the battle with the width of the battlefield to contend with, how do we get the archers to fire at about the same time and in the same area?

Your fanciful methodology of getting the archers to shoot all at once and all at the same place can be answered easier and more practically.

For one thing, a baton tossed into the grass isn't going to be visible at all from ten feet away; for another, even if it were visible, that would only work for the archers more or less directly in line with the baton; all others further up and down the line would need their own range markers.

Archers practiced shooting at the clout in vollies. We can assume that the most veteran and skilled archers were the officers of companies, and with the other most veteran and skilled men stood in the front rank: vintenars commanded 20 men, and centenars commanded 100 men, or five vintenars and their "squads".

I do not imagine a whole unit of 500 or 1,000 archers shooting all at the same time, much less the whole English army's 5,000! Each company commander and each vintenar knew his job; once the commander of the battle said to start shooting, the rest would have been up to the company officers to get the arrows on target ("on the clout").

Each centenar, or even on a vintenar level, called the shots, literally, by voice and body language: i.e. how he held his weapon, matched by all the front rank men in his company, and mimickied right back to the 8th or even the 16th rank. Behind the first two to four ranks, no archer would be able to see a dammed thing except raised bow limbs in front of himself: he would angle and raise to copy the trajectory of the bows in front, and the instant they all heard "loose!", they all endeavored to loose as close to the same time as possible.

Thus, a panoramic view of an English army engaged in volley shooting would show small "clouds" of arrows arcing out from the whole battleline, here and there, each 20 to 100 men loosing their arrows together every c. 10 seconds.

There would be no need to have the entire army's arrows going out in vollies at the same time: what would be needed is target saturation, and it would matter not a whit if 1,000 arrows arrived all at the same moment, or in batches of 20 to 100 arrows here or there along the targetted enemy unit every few seconds.

"Can you mention a battle from the late medieval period in which a reserve existed? Certainly none of the big three had a reserve."

Lancastrians at the Battle of Barnet, 1471.

"Each centenar, or even on a vintenar level, called the shots, literally, by voice and body language: i.e. how he held his weapon, matched by all the front rank men in his company, and mimicked right back to the 8th or even the 16th rank. Behind the first two to four ranks, no archer would be able to see a dammed thing except raised bow limbs in front of himself: he would angle and raise to copy the trajectory of the bows in front, and the instant they all heard "loose!", they all endeavored to loose as close to the same time as possible."

Fascinating, Doug. You describe exactly the process that I implied when we were discussing rate of fire on the other thread. At that time I didn't think you agreed with me …

Doug, "My objection is based solely on your claim that the archers are exempt from Livius and P. Elmham's clear statements about the English army advancing in the same O.B. that it had been in the first position. Nothing you've said to argue that point has made any practical sense to me."

Regardless of what Titus and Pseudo-Elmham say this is what the eyewitnesses say: Archers were placed next to the three battles. Later the archers were pulled out of those positions and placed into a single battle composed of a left wing and a right wing. This left the three battles with no archers on their wings.

What Titus says is that the battles advanced in echelon. There is no mention of archers with the battles. That's because the eyewitnesses said the archers were taken from their positon on the wings of the battles.

Is everyone on the same page?

Rich

Is everyone on the same page?

Rich

It's odd: I read Livius, P. Elmham, Monstrelet, Waurin and LeFevre, and I don't GET what you are saying from it at all. I don't see, "archers taken from their position on the wings of the battles." If I read only one narrative at a time, and pretend that this source is the ONLY story of Agincourt that exists, then yes, I can interpret it that way. But I can't forget the composite picture of all the sources taken together. I try not to ascribe a weightier importance to any one source above another, unless there is a good reason for doing so: I hold the Gesta above all the rest for the reasons I have given: proximity, internal consistency, reconcilability to the other sources, valuable graphic details, and "no middle man", i.e. a perfectly clear eyewitness narrative.

I think the continued disagreement we have on this is based solely on the veracity, or lack of it, we give to "our cleric."

The next step is to understand Titus and Pseudo-Elmham in terms of the eyewitnesses. Not the other way around as Doug has done.

Both Titus and Pseudo-Elmham state the English army set off on the advance in their normal order of battle. Here is how Titus puts it, "The usual order of the English, established by the king, was maintained." Now Doug would have you believe that ‘usual order' meant battles combined with archers. But that is not what Titus says. When he describes the ‘usual order' he only mentions the battles. He doesn't mention the archers: "the first battle line proceeded, then second and the third followed straight after;" Just in case you might think a ‘battle line' includes archers, he uses this term to describe the French battle which we know didn't have archers: [the French] coming thirty-one deep in their battle line.

Titus doesn't mention the archers when he is talking about the usual English order because archers do not have a specific order in the battle line. They can be placed anywhere the king wants them to be. When Titus and Pseudo-Elmham talk about the army being in the same order, they are talking about the battles not the archers. Now this may not make much sense to Doug's 21st century mind, but it did make a lot of sense to Titus' and Pseudo-Elmham's 15th century minds.

When Henry took the archers out of the battle line, this did not alter the order of the English army. The van was still to the right of the main and the rear was still to the left of the main. Once you realize that the order of the army meant the order of the battles, there is no conflict between what the eyewitnesses said and what Titus and Pseudo-Elmham said.

Rich

When looking at the sources we need to keep in mind that no one source tells the whole picture. But they all seem to provide part of the picture.

The Gesta: tells us how the original battle line was formed. Despite what Bennet says I think the archers were placed into wedges. The Gesta does not tell us much about the advance to the second position. He simple say the two armies marched toward each other.

LeFevre & Waurin: they tell us how the army was organized in preparation for the advance and the advance.

Titus: tells us how the advance was performed with the battles in eschelon formation.

Both Titus and Pseudo-Elmham tell us the description of, what I believe to be, the second line. But here we're dealing with information they were told. They did not see it. We don't know how the information was conveyed to them. They said the battle line was three battles almost touching with archers on the extreme flanks. We know that is incorrect. Not knowing what information was relayed to them, we can't tell exactly how they got this detail wrong. And we may never know.

Since we are dealing with probabilities, I think there is a high probability that the two wings of archers, leading the advance each swung out onto the wings of the what would become the second battle line. This makes sense because they were alread organized into two wings for the advance. The three battles march up to the wings and link up with them. This would be the natural result of the battles following the archer wings. The end result would be battles in the middle, archers on the wings. This agrees with Titus' and Pseudo-Elmham's description of the English battle line. What I think they did was to inadvertently invert the second line for the first line. As I said, we will never know for sure. However, it is a rational explanation for why Titus and Pseudo-Elmham battle position differs from the Gesta's.

Rich

Now Doug would have you believe that ‘usual order' meant battles combined with archers. But that is not what Titus says.

Because archers as part of each battle were obvious? How often do we mention the obvious? Usually we don't even think of the obvious, because it is a given.

When he describes the ‘usual order' he only mentions the battles. He doesn't mention the archers: "the first battle line proceeded, then second and the third followed straight after;"

How do you imagine a single battle of screening archers lined up in front of an echelon of battles of men at arms? Did this enormous (5/6ths of the whole army) battle sort of angle itself back to run parallel with the echelon? Or did it advance more or less down the field at right angles to it, with the van right behind the right end of the archer battle, and the rearguard quite a distance trailing behind it?

I only ask these questions to invite your reconciliation of advancing in echelon, which Livius clearly -- and only -- describes: of what purpose would advancing screened battles of men at arms in echelon serve?

The only logical conclusion, imho, is that each battle of men at arms with its "wings" of archers advanced in echelon to the other two.

Just in case you might think a ‘battle line' includes archers, he uses this term to describe the French battle which we know didn't have archers: [the French] coming thirty-one deep in their battle line.

So to be properly referred to as a "battle", they must be composed of the same troops? How can the battalions at Crecy then follow that "rule"? Not even all three English battles had the same composition: some had Welsh or Cornish troops, Northampton's evidently did not.

Besides, the French vanguard at Agincourt did include missile troops, stuffed behind it instead of out in front on the flanks, as the constable's and marshal's original battle plan had established: a sudden relegating of the ignoble element to the rear, not an excising of them from the vanguard. (that the crossbowmen skedaddled in rout does not change their initial status as part of the vanguard)

You might expect the French to be even more class snobbish than the English, i.e. even more inclined to keep noble battles separated from any "gens de trait" and such like ignoble troops. But in the French battle plan it reads:

"The missile-men [gens de trait] of the whole company will stand in front of the two wings of foot, where the knights and squires shall arrange them, each to his own side."

The point being: specific mentioning of these ignoble units being arranged by the knights and squires to take station beside them. These are not unnoticed/unmentioned troops, operating in their own homogenous units, without command control exercised by the nobles commanding the men at arms in the battalion(s).

Once you realize that the order of the army meant the order of the battles, there is no conflict between what the eyewitnesses said and what Titus and Pseudo-Elmham said.

What you say is true, IF the archers were never assigned to the van, center and rear in the first place.

But the evidence does not support that: Monstrelet's "wings of men at arms and archers" implicitly shows both together under the commanders of said-wings.

It hardly seems logical (and isn't supported by any evidence) that the Gesta's mentioning of archers between the battles of men at arms meant separated units that could go wherever they were needed without being assigned to serve under the commanders of the battles.

If Livius and P. Elmham had seen Henry "pull out the archers" and form an entirely separated unit "screening" the men at arms, where before they had been assigned to the three battles; and after that the archers further split into two wings to either side of the three battles of men at arms (now joined in the center), I doubt that so simple statements of theirs would have served the reality of the situation.

Rich, you have changed the Gesta's (and Monstrelet's) O.B. not once, but twice: archers pulled out to screen the advance, then split into wings. 5/6ths of the army is maneuvering extremely at variance with the first position they had occupied.

The Crecy command structure specifically mentions men at arms, archers and infantry in each battle.

Livius and P. Elmham not specifically mentioning them does not mean they were not there; especially since our other sources specifically do mention them.

I still don't know what your agenda for this argument is, that the archers were not there to be attacked in the first place.

It seems that you have decided that archers were well known to be a weakness in a battleline. You have cited four battles, unsuccessfully, as examples of cases where the dismounted French men at arms beat archers then turned on the exposed English men at arms.

Then you have concluded that the real reason why the French van at Agincourt did not punch through the archers and flank the English men at arms is because the archers were not interposed between the English battles at all.

You have moved all the archers off to the wings, as some kind of answer to your own question, "Why didn't the French attack the archers and threaten the English rear?"

But all your lengthy buttressing of your argement has accomplished is to reduce the number of places in the English line where archers were, not your inherent "weakness of archers" assertion. Because, as all the sources agree, the battlefield was far too narrow for the French army, and the vanguard was many ranks deep and extended to the trees. Ergo, we have the remaining phenomenon of the French vanguard moving to the center (in your scenario) to attack only the men at arms, and they "ignore" the archers entirely.

Your question remains. Your conclusion above, that the French did not attack the archers because "they were not there", is impossible, since 5/6ths of the English army were archers on the wings (even allowing that your premise argued for at length is literally true): if the archers were facing 3/4ths of the French van, by your assertion (the archers were weak) the French should have swept through the stakes (stakes only inhibit cavalry, never infantry, so you also claim), cleaned the archers' clocks, and taken the English center in the flanks and rear.

But the archers were never attacked; rather, they came out and attacked the flanks of the French instead.

Four pages into this discussion/debate/argument, and you have not gotten one whit closer to answering your own question.

You could always admit that my theory is probably right: that the unprecedented conditions of the field at Agincourt, the superior ratio of archers to targets, made it virtually impossible for the men at arms, heads down, crushing together to flinch away from the bodkin storm, to even approach the archers where they were.

Archers were not a weak link, but far from that were in their own way as capable of holding the battleline as heavier armored men.

Hi

This blather is confusing me! Even better, now Mike says we were agreeing about the 10 second volleys, but I thought we didn't we might be having too much verbage!

Course we are, it is the nature of gamers, historians and geeks!

OK. The defination of screen.

I agree the archers were "in front" but that doesn't mean a "screen" as used by skirmishers in the 18th century. I think that leads to a retroprojection.

Back to "two wings, and in front" WE assume the wings mean some thrust forward projection on the flanks. I would offer that as each battle is 1700 bow and 500 MAA, this doesn't work UNLESS the wings are in front but "refused" in effect producing the 3 wedges when the 3 battles are along side each other, or even slightly refused. A wedge of wedges.

This makes sense. IF they are on the extreme "wings" in the modern use, you end up with an open zone in the center where the french cannot take effective fire on the way in, and it wouldn't explain the idea that the king's battle took the hard hits. IF you have the effect of 3 sets of refused wings on 3 battles of ca 500 maa, you have the center battle being attacked because the bow fire funnels the french that way.

R

When looking at the sources we need to keep in mind that no one source tells the whole picture. But they all seem to provide part of the picture.

Well, yeah, I've been saying that the whole time.

Both Titus and Pseudo-Elmham tell us the description of, what I believe to be, the second line. But here we're dealing with information they were told. They did not see it. We don't know how the information was conveyed to them.

On the other hand, the Gesta says that he and the other clerics "were watching", immediately after what he describes that they saw: the French forming three attack columns and striking "where the standards were." As this precisely matches his description of the first position, it means that, "advanced in the same order", means exactly what Livius and P. Elmham meant: the whole army.

That's how you can use all the sources to come to that conclusion: and the other three don't contradict that in detail, because the fewer details they offer us are consistent with the Gesta's more clear picture of the French attack, and the English formation standing to receive that attack.

The picture of the battle itself that Waurin and LeFevre give us, with the archers attacking first, then the men at arms joining in, is almost certainly describing the attack reaching to the second French battle. In other words, each eyewitness is describing what he saw: different parts of the battle, not the whole thing. The Gesta is good for the first attack phase; Waurin and LeFevre are good for showing how the battle continued to include the French second line. It's a good theory, anyway.

They said the battle line was three battles almost touching with archers on the extreme flanks. We know that is incorrect. Not knowing what information was relayed to them, we can't tell exactly how they got this detail wrong. And we may never know.

You claim that is incorrect: I don't know how you can discount Monstrelet AND the Gesta both, which remark that archers were "wings" or were where the "wings" of French mounted men attacked (forming defacto wings in the English army).

The way you are talking now, it reads like you are saying the archers in the second formation only changed to wings once they arrived in the second position; attempting to reconcile the different ways Monstrelet, Waurin and LeFevre described the advance.

As I said, we will never know for sure. However, it is a rational explanation for why Titus and Pseudo-Elmham battle position differs from the Gesta's.

But they don't "differ." If you assume "battles" to mean men at arms between attached "wings" of archers, then there is no problem at all. There's plenty of evidence for assuming such.

IF you have the effect of 3 sets of refused wings on 3 battles of ca 500 maa, you have the center battle being attacked because the bow fire funnels the french that way.

The sources do say, clearly, that Henry lined up his center battle to invite attack from the French center battle, i.e. the French dismounted battle between the two bodies of mounted troops: also, by putting his center c. in the center of the field, even before seeing the final French array as it fell out, he was doing a SOP to meet the most important battle on the French side.

As the French WERE "funneled" toward the center, it is no wonder that Henry's part of the line had some of the heaviest fighting. But not all the heavy fighting. York, with the van on the right, was killed: and it seems that his part of the line was actually attacked first: supporting the Livius description of the English battles advancing in echelon.

Doug, On the other hand, the Gesta says that he and the other clerics "were watching", immediately after what he describes that they saw: the French forming three attack columns and striking "where the standards were." As this precisely matches his description of the first position, it means that, "advanced in the same order", means exactly what Livius and P. Elmham meant: the whole army."

Doug, it means nothing. That discription would perfectly match Titus' and Pseudo-Elmham's description of three battles with archers on the two wings.

Doug, "That's how you can use all the sources to come to that conclusion: and the other three don't contradict that in detail, because the fewer details they offer us are consistent with the Gesta's more clear picture of the French attack, and the English formation standing to receive that attack."

Nonsense. Titus' and Pseudo-Elmaham's description of three battles with archers on the flanks doesn't match what the Gesta said. I don't know where you are coming from.

Doug, "The picture of the battle itself that Waurin and LeFevre give us, with the archers attacking first, then the men at arms joining in, is almost certainly describing the attack reaching to the second French battle.

You certainly have a different picture of the battle than does everyone else. Show me step by step how what you claim can be true. Include complete quotes.

Doug, "I don't know how you can discount Monstrelet AND the Gesta both.

You know exactly what I think about your statement. So I think you are being a bit disingenuous. Now you show how Monstrelet and the Gesta are talking about the same thing.

Doug, "But they don't "differ." If you assume "battles" to mean men at arms between attached "wings" of archers, then there is no problem at all. There's plenty of evidence for assuming such."

Prove from the sources that both formations had archers flanking all the battles. You can't use the Titus and Peudo-Elmham quotes because their claim that the English advanced in the same order only includes the battles. They don't mention the archers, as I have already proved. Besides what they outlined as the initial order does not match that of the Gesta.

Rich

Nonsense. Titus' and Pseudo-Elmaham's description of three battles with archers on the flanks doesn't match what the Gesta said. I don't know where you are coming from.

Your problem, Rich, is that unless a source specifically says such and such was the case, you think what it does say can't jive with a source that specifically says such and such was the case. The P Elmham and Livius don't contradict anything said about the O.B. in the Gesta: there are three battles with archers on the wings, and all three say things about the O.B. that show that they are talking about the same thing.

TMP is about to close down for the night, and so am I….

You certainly have a different picture of the battle than does everyone else. Show me step by step how what you claim can be true. Include complete quotes.

You've, got, to, be, kidding.

You said you are going to teach ME about late medieval battle. Anything I have to say on this topic (esp. archers as part of battles, and on the wings in the first and second positions at Agincourt) has already been hashed above. Go read it again.

Doug, "Your problem, Rich, is that unless a source specifically says such and such was the case, you think what it does say can't jive with a source that specifically says such and such was the case."

Yes working with historical sources mean you're stuck with what they say. That's why they call it history. As apposed to making things up which is call fiction.

Doug, "You said you are going to teach ME about late medieval battle."

I did. I taught you how the battle line at Agincourt went from archers in wedges between the battles, in the first position, to archers on the extreme flanks in the second position. I stepped through segment by segment and tied each segment to what the sources said. It has internal integrity and agreement with the sources. What more can a teacher do. While I promised to teach you, I never promised you would learn. :)

I presented the lesson very clearly. And how did you reply?

1. The French forming three attack columns to strike at the banners of the three battles is consistent with the Gesta's description showing the second position was the same as the first.

Reply: Nonsense. It matches Titus' and Pseudo-Elmham's description battles in the center and archers on the flanks.

2. You talk about the battle description by Waurin and LeFevre having the archer begin the fight then the men-at-arms joining in.

Reply: I asked you to step me through what you're talking about and you refuse. So, I'm left with unsubstantiated musings. With no proof, I'm left with no choice but to discount it.

3. You write that if you assume that battles had attached wings of archers then all three accounts agree.

Reply, why not assume that aliens teleported the English army from position one to position two in the exact same tactical structure. Assume? There are no grounds for this assumption and you have not provided any. When I ask you to provide some sort of grounding for the assumption, you reply no. OK, but this makes your assumption groundless and useless.

And that's it. In reply to my lesson on how the English got from the Gesta's description in position one to Titus' and Pseudo-Elmham' description in position two, I get one comment that was nonsense, one comment you refuse to support, and one comment asking me to accept unfounded assumptions.

This was not a serious challenge to my lesson. Or, at least, not a challenge one could take seriously. So, unless you can come up with a serious challenge to my lesson, I'm moving on. I've taught you. You have my lesson. It's up to you whether you learn or not.

Rich

Your OP premise remains unanswered. So intent have you been on talking me into agreeing with your mishmash of myopical "logic" (i.e. focusing on ONE source at a time and trying to make it give the whole picture, and calling that approach "history"), that you've completely lost track of, and ignored, all statements that I made just above to that end.

Our archers are laid out in front of 3/4ths of the French first battle, yet never get contacted: so your premise, "the archers were not attacked because they were not there", is unsupportable.

I maintain that the archers were not attacked because the French could not attack them with their heads down, getting shot through their armor and "flinching" backward and inward to attempt to avoid the bodkin storm: the archers were never threatened by the French for this reason alone, and went to the offensive themselves (just as they had done a generation earlier at Auray).

As for the rest of your facile dismissal, it is starting to make my brain implode and I won't go there with you anymore.

The non sequiture (vis-a-vis the OP) that I raised -- over the discrepencies of the sources' descriptions of the chronology of the battle itself -- I will drop entirely, for the reason that I also gave: different parts of the field, over a period of several hours, were being focused on by the different eyewitnesses.

Hi

Actually, Rich, even historians come to conclusions based on real world experiences.

Taking a step back, for instance, we are all familiar with, say, Delbruk "proving" points because his beloved prussians couldn't do something, therefore, the sources were wrong or leaving something out, or misunderstanding the realities of the world.

Your screen in front, if I have understood it, makes no sense as an example. There are forlorns who exist to soak up attacks, but that isn't in evidence here. And there are screens that are used to limit visibilty of maneuvers to the rear, or to draw missile fire, but again, that isn't the issue here.

In other periods we have evidence of not only the drill, but how it worked, but again, except for column of march, we have no original source indicating drill for archers, but your premise about going from wedges to wings is based on supposition and intrepretatin. And I suggest that advancing forward in the original wedges would merely be a variant on the "column" of march, meets the critiera if twist the meaning my way instead of yours. And, the trump card for me is that it maximizes the effectiveness of the archers.

The sources can be intrepreted as supporting various solutions, but the wedges are evinced elsewhere and make sense tactically. For me, the others do not.

Rocky

Rich, I can tell from the complete lack of response from you, that you missed this post: I am curious if any response from you will invite any further response from me (besides, I hate to see my efforts go unnoticed and wasted):

Doug Larsen 04 Oct 2008 12:30 p.m. PST

Now Doug would have you believe that ‘usual order' meant battles combined with archers. But that is not what Titus says.

Because archers as part of each battle were obvious? How often do we mention the obvious? Usually we don't even think of the obvious, because it is a given.

When he describes the ‘usual order' he only mentions the battles. He doesn't mention the archers: "the first battle line proceeded, then second and the third followed straight after;"

How do you imagine a single battle of screening archers lined up in front of an echelon of battles of men at arms? Did this enormous (5/6ths of the whole army) battle sort of angle itself back to run parallel with the echelon? Or did it advance more or less down the field at right angles to it, with the van right behind the right end of the archer battle, and the rearguard quite a distance trailing behind it?

I only ask these questions to invite your reconciliation of advancing in echelon, which Livius clearly -- and only -- describes: of what purpose would advancing screened battles of men at arms in echelon serve?

The only logical conclusion, imho, is that each battle of men at arms with its "wings" of archers advanced in echelon to the other two.

Just in case you might think a ‘battle line' includes archers, he uses this term to describe the French battle which we know didn't have archers: [the French] coming thirty-one deep in their battle line.

So to be properly referred to as a "battle", they must be composed of the same troops? How can the battalions at Crecy then follow that "rule"? Not even all three English battles had the same composition: some had Welsh or Cornish troops, Northampton's evidently did not.

Besides, the French vanguard at Agincourt did include missile troops, stuffed behind it instead of out in front on the flanks, as the constable's and marshal's original battle plan had established: a sudden relegating of the ignoble element to the rear, not an excising of them from the vanguard. (that the crossbowmen skedaddled in rout does not change their initial status as part of the vanguard)

You might expect the French to be even more class snobbish than the English, i.e. even more inclined to keep noble battles separated from any "gens de trait" and such like ignoble troops. But in the French battle plan it reads:

"The missile-men [gens de trait] of the whole company will stand in front of the two wings of foot, where the knights and squires shall arrange them, each to his own side."

The point being: specific mentioning of these ignoble units being arranged by the knights and squires to take station beside them. These are not unnoticed/unmentioned troops, operating in their own homogenous units, without command control exercised by the nobles commanding the men at arms in the battalion(s).

Once you realize that the order of the army meant the order of the battles, there is no conflict between what the eyewitnesses said and what Titus and Pseudo-Elmham said.

What you say [could be] true, IF the archers were never assigned to the van, center and rear in the first place.

But the evidence does not support that: Monstrelet's "wings of men at arms and archers" implicitly shows both together under the commanders of said-wings.

It hardly seems logical (and isn't supported by any evidence) that the Gesta's mentioning of archers between the battles of men at arms meant separated units that could go wherever they were needed without being assigned to serve under the commanders of the battles.

If Livius and P. Elmham had seen Henry "pull out the archers" and form an entirely separated unit "screening" the men at arms, where before they had been assigned to the three battles; and after that the archers further split into two wings to either side of the three battles of men at arms (now joined in the center), I doubt that so simple statements of theirs would have served the reality of the situation.

Rich, you have changed the Gesta's (and Monstrelet's) O.B. not once, but twice: archers pulled out to screen the advance, then split into wings. 5/6ths of the army is maneuvering extremely at variance with the first position they had occupied.

The Crecy command structure specifically mentions men at arms, archers and infantry in each battle.

Livius and P. Elmham not specifically mentioning them does not mean they were not there; especially since our other sources specifically do mention them.

I still don't know what your agenda for this argument is, that the archers were not there to be attacked in the first place.

It seems that you have decided that archers were well known to be a weakness in a battleline. You have cited four battles, unsuccessfully, as examples of cases where the dismounted French men at arms beat archers then turned on the exposed English men at arms.

Then you have concluded that the real reason why the French van at Agincourt did not punch through the archers and flank the English men at arms is because the archers were not interposed between the English battles at all.

You have moved all the archers off to the wings, as some kind of answer to your own question, "Why didn't the French attack the archers and threaten the English rear?"

But all your lengthy buttressing of your argement has accomplished is to reduce the number of places in the English line where archers were, not your inherent "weakness of archers" assertion. Because, as all the sources agree, the battlefield was far too narrow for the French army, and the vanguard was many ranks deep and extended to the trees. Ergo, we have the remaining phenomenon of the French vanguard moving to the center (in your scenario) to attack only the men at arms, and they "ignore" the archers entirely.

Your question remains. Your conclusion above, that the French did not attack the archers because "they were not there", is impossible, since 5/6ths of the English army were archers on the wings (even allowing that your premise argued for at length is literally true): if the archers were facing 3/4ths of the French van, by your assertion (the archers were weak) the French should have swept through the stakes (stakes only inhibit cavalry, never infantry, so you also claim), cleaned the archers' clocks, and taken the English center in the flanks and rear.

But the archers were never attacked; rather, they came out and attacked the flanks of the French instead.

Four pages into this discussion/debate/argument, and you have not gotten one whit closer to answering your own question.

You could always admit that my theory is probably right: that the unprecedented conditions of the field at Agincourt, the superior ratio of archers to targets, made it virtually impossible for the men at arms, heads down, crushing together to flinch away from the bodkin storm, to even approach the archers where they were.

Archers were not a weak link, but far from that were in their own way as capable of holding the battleline as heavier armored men.

Doug, "So intent have you been on talking me into agreeing, ….[the rest of the sentence is emotional blather]"

See, you even misread me. I'm not trying to talk you into anything. I pointed out what the sources said and how you misinterpreted them. If you agree or not, it is you affair.

Doug, "Our archers are laid out in front of 3/4ths of the French first battle, yet never get contacted: so your premise, "the archers were not attacked because they were not there", is unsupportable."

Perhaps you don't understand what supportable and unsupportable is in a historical context. I buttressed all my positions with original sources. Ergo, it is supported.

Doug, "I maintain that the archers were not attacked because the French could not attack them …"

Yes I know that‘s your opinion. But to be taken seriously it must be supported by some kind of evidence from the period. For example, can you show in another battle where archers were able to do this? If you wish to assert that the stakes would have slowed the French assault, then some attempt must be made to determine how far apart the stakes were and show the result would materially hinder the men-at-arms. This could be done by estimating the amount of room an archer needs. Then estimate the diameter of the stakes. Place the stake in front of the archer then calculate, roughly, the distance of one stake to another to establish how much room there is from stake to stake. The same needs to be done with the rank in front and the rank in the rear as these are offset from the center ranks of stakes. This will give you some foundation as to the obstruction of the stakes with regards to the oncoming men-at-arms.

Doug, As for the rest of your facile dismissal, it is starting to make my brain implode and I won't go there with you anymore."

What was dismissed was your facile responses to what I laid out. If you have a serious comment [grounded in the sources as written] in response to what I laid out then present it. If not, I wish to move on.

P.S. (just to think about)

1. The baton: one does not have to see it to know where it was dropped. The position works as a trip-wire. When the enemy hits that spot everyone fires.
2. High-angle fire: I learned from Michael Bennett that archers would lay out a cloth on an open field and attempt to hit it using high-angle fire. It was known as "clout-shooting" and was a standard tactic for longbows and practiced often.
3. I gained new insight into the term ‘order of battle'. I discovered it meant the order of the three battles of the men-at-arms It excludes the archers as the commander can place the archers anywhere. There was no standard order of battle for them. I'll bet if we followed the etiology of the term back far enough the term probably originated as the ‘order of [the] battle[s]' with an ‘s'. Meaning the order of the battles of the men-at-arms. The archers were not divided into battles [van, main, rear]. They were placed in the battle line wherever the commander wanted. Eventually, over time, the ‘s' was dropped and the term became ‘order of battle'. Now how would I look that up? Does anyone know of a book on the etiology of terms?

Rocky I'm not ignoring you.

Rich

Er …
"etiology" the study of causation
"etymology" the study of the history of words

I think you mean the latter …

Hi

I didn't think you were ignoring me! All friends.

i am wondering, though if the only readers are now "the gang of four".

I actually did the clout shooting some decades ago down in texas when i was in my "make and test" phase with weapons. The really short version is that you don't need it! To digress again, in the 19th century, rifle were trained to shoot at various ranges coming in, say 200yds. This, oddly, was mostly to limit ammo wastage. So, at Islanduana the martinis were using a round and had a capability of being a 500plus yard killer. But the troops were trained to limit to under 200 because of wastage. In the US usuing a similar weapon and round, the americans commonly engaged and "wasted" ammo at 500. Different tactical doctrine.

With bow, and the "rainbow like" trajectory, in some cases the problem of an individual shooting becomes more difficult. Placing a clout at 100 and 200 doesn't do what you think. Rather it teaches the archer in the field to have a better idea of how far things are. After a while it isn't necessary. A sergent can call 150 and get a volley at that point. The problem is the archers 3 or more ranks back who cannot see the target, but do know the clout!

I was about to digress again, but decided not to.

I get you point about the stakes, but to my mind, the practicality of the system require my deployment, not your screen.

R

Mike, thank you.

Rich

Rocky, "Rather it teaches the archer in the field to have a better idea of how far things are. After a while it isn't necessary. A sergeant can call 150 and get a volley at that point. The problem is the archers 3 or more ranks back who cannot see the target, but do know the clout!"

I understand what you are saying. However, it seems to me that one of the functions of clout shooting (correct me if I'm wrong) is to train groups of archers to hit an particular spot on the battlefield without the sergeant's call. With 6,000 archers, 3,000 to a side, the sergeant's call is impractical. What you need is an approximate location on the battlefield to "aim" for (thus the toss of the baton in the air so all could see the proximate location of where to fire) and a trip-wire to indicate when to fire. The archers that can see when the enemy hits the trip-wire fire which is the key for all to fire at a specific location on the battlefield.

Rocky, "I get your point about the stakes, but to my mind, the practicality of the system require my deployment, not your screen."

Nevertheless, the screen was a reality. The archers were pulled from the battle line. They were gathered together as a single battle composed of two wings. The archers preceded the men-at-arms and then redeployed into two wings on either side of the three battles of men-at-arms. The only things I'm saying is that this use of archers screening the men-at-arms is consistent with how armies, at this time, advanced when done with the enemy in near proximity. The idea is that should the enemy suddenly attack, the archers were to slow up the attack long enough for the men-at-arms, who had been marching, to set up in battle formation to receive the attack.

Henry was taking an awful chance moving his men-at-arms with the French in such close proximity. So, placing the archers in front had two purposes. One would be to slow up any surprise attack by the French. The second was to get the archers in position and ready for the arrival of the men-at-arms. This way, the stakes were already planted by the time the men-at-arms arrived. If all arrived at the same time, the men-at-arms would have to stand unsupported while the archers drove in their stakes. This meant the French could attack before the archers were ready to receive them. Remember, we are looking at the battle from hindsight. Henry could not be sure of when the French would attack.

So, if you are going to move your battle line and you need the archers enstaked by the time the men-at-arms arrive. For all practicable purposes this meant the archers had to go on the extreme flanks. They didn't have engineers laying out how wide the battles were so they could know where to set up their wedges between the battles. That meant the battlefield would have to be stepped off prior to assigning where the wedges should be placed prior to the arrival of the men-at-arms, a total impracticality. The idea is to minimize your risk. Setting the archers on the extreme flanks was the fastest way to get the archers in place and enstaked (is that a word?). So, for all practical purposes, this was the best way to proceed.

Rich

Doug, wow, you have a whole list of assertions you demand I answer but when I asked you to supply sources for two or three of your assertions you told me, in essence, up yours. I have no problem with ‘no' but then to turn around and demand I answer all these unsupported assertion (many of which I've already answered) is a bit unreasonable.

I've already discussed you claims about combined arms.

With Monstrelet, I already showed where his account is superseded by eyewitnesses.

My imaginings are irrelevant to the issue.

Order of battle, I presented my view (with sources) on that issue.

Doug, What you say [could be] true, IF the archers were never assigned to the van, center and rear in the first place."

You are assuming what must be proven.

The vast majority of your post is unsubstantiated opinions. I do not feel obligated to dance to your tune. If you have something substantial (with sources) bring it on.

Rich

i am wondering, though if the only readers are now "the gang of four".

Nope Rocky, still here. I think Rich has set this out nicely as a cogent reading of the sources.

Heh. Rich, still ignoring my challenge of the OP premise, entirely.

Well into this thread, Rich, you claimed the archers were not there to be attacked. That's why, you claimed, they were not exploited and "brushed aside" as in the earlier battles that you cited (which, still, you have not shown a shred of evidence for any of them being an example of brushing archers aside, because they were "weak").

Explain how 3/4ths of the French van could be opposed by archers, and the French not attack them.

Earlier you said:

"The only reason I can think of is that the archers were not attacked because they were not there." (Rich Knapton 10 Sep 2008 11:30 a.m. PST)

"Why didn't the French attack the archers in the battle-line. The implication here, which is part of the assertion, is that archers cannot stop a determined attack" 17 Sep 2008 1:10 p.m. PST

"What I said was because we could not come up with a reasonable explanation why the French didn't attack the archers within the English battle-line, the only other explanation for why they weren't attacked was that they were not there as they had been in the first setup." 23 Sep 2008 2:27 p.m. PST

There we have it: the archers "were not there."

Okay, if Rich is right, the archers are not between the battles of men at arms: but they sure as hell still ARE in front of well over half of the French vanguard: and we have ZERO French attacks going for the archers.

Rich cannot claim they weren't there to be attacked, because the French are lined up to attack the "wings" of archers, sure enough. The French only attacked the men at arms. And Rich has avoided entirely examining the true cause of this phenomenon: even claiming early on that archers could not stop a determined attack by men at arms: to which I AGREED, they only shoot it up as badly as they can, then finish it off in melee.

Rich cannot explain the lack of an attack on the archers, but that's because he doesn't believe longbows could effect plate armor. He doesn't even believe that arrows were shot directly into the enemy, but only lobbed high to fall more or less vertically, to cause "disruption".

So why didn't 3/4ths of the French van attack the men (archers) in front of themselves? Rich won't tell you, but Rocky and I have done so.

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Perhaps you don't understand what supportable and unsupportable is in a historical context. I buttressed all my positions with original sources. Ergo, it is supported.

Not by half. Contextual consistency is required.

Proceed.

Rich, you keep making it sound as though I don't refer to the sources to back up what I say.

The truth is, I am THROUGH quoting the same ol' same ol' passages with you: it does no good at all.

Especially since you don't even use the sources consistently to prove what you say. Example, quoting you (emphasis is all mine):

"Your assertion that the phrase" [from Monstrelet] ""He made two wings of men-at-arms and archers" describes the second position is totally wrong…..

"Monstrelet isn't describing the second position at all. He's describing the formation the English formed prior to their advance. You totally misread Monstrelet." 25 Sep 2008 8:53 a.m. PST

"[Erpingham] only drew out the archers and put them into two wings. Monstrelet's account is wrong." 28 Sep 2008 10:41 a.m. PST

"By the way, while Monstrelet and the Gesta are talking about "wings" of men at arms, the Gesta is talking about the initial setup. Monstrelet is talking about the Erpingham affair. I already showed the Erpingham affair happened after the initial setup and after the emissaries met (did you forget about that). So I don't know what Monstrelet has to do with what Pseudo-Elmham is talking about." 01 Oct 2008 12:10 p.m. PST

It appears to me, during this lengthy exchange, that you have been learning/formulating your position/theory, as you go, on this topic that you started. In your mind at the beginning was no fixed meaning to the sources for Agincourt at all: you pieced this together as we responded to each other.

Which is okay.

But you really shouldn't come across as "Doc the expert", putting me and my so-called lack of emmotional connection to the period down to some anachronistic application problem: not when you make such obvious contradictory statements as you have done. And not when you ignore counters to your arguments entirely (whole posts, even, posted TWICE, even).

I admit that what was unclear to my mind at the opening of this thread, and which our exchanges have brought focus upon for me, is: the exact differences/nuances in the wording of our best sources, and their much greater value compared to the rest; and just how well they do fit together to give us a clear picture of the English array.

I have grown to appreciate also just how easy it is to draw fallacious conclusions when we don't reread and reread carefully (even the "pros" do this and get it published!).

And my debating abilities, such as they are, have been honed by this "discussion" with you. It has been engrossing, to me at least.

I appreciate more than ever just how important it is to define facile terms like "disrupted" and "disordered" and "effective range", etc. And to know what our terms of reference are when we even use commonly assumed terms such as "battle(s)" and "regular army".

I appreciate even more just how strong the belief in effective archery position really is. You have not advanced any reason that can be verified by the sources to explain why the French did not attack the archers: while my position (I am not sure how much Rocky actually shares this), that the arrows were feared, injurious and deadly, and caused crowding such that the French could not even approach the massed longbowmen, is at least a theory which is supported by what the sources describe.

Lame attempts by others (Battlefield Detectives, et al. the "arrows don't kill," crowd), to explain the French incapacity to attack the archers, don't hold up to scrutiny: the ground alone does not answer it: the assumed battlefield "snobbery" making the French nobles ignore the archers, ditto: and yet we have 3/4ths of the French lined up opposite the archers as they start their attack, and failing to attack the archers anywhere: this discussion has made me appreciate that fact more clearly than ever.

----------------------

And, btw, it was I who first brought up clout shooting as SOP drill.

Battles include other troops, as the sources quoted "at" you have proven. (You did not address my use of the sources to disprove your premise: that ignoble troops were not considered part of "battles" of men at arm.)

If your "work" is done here, by all means, move on….

Doug, "Okay, if Rich is right, the archers are not between the battles of men at arms: but they sure as hell still ARE in front of well over half of the French vanguard: and we have ZERO French attacks going for the archers."

How did you arrive at the idea that ¾ of the French faced the archers?

Doug, Rich cannot claim they weren't there to be attacked, because the French are lined up to attack the "wings" of archers, sure enough."

Where did you get that info?

Doug, "Rich cannot explain the lack of an attack on the archers, but that's because he doesn't believe longbows could effect plate armor."

There you go again. Telling me what I think. That's a losing proposition.

Doug, "The truth is, I am THROUGH quoting the same ol' same ol' passages with you: it does no good at all."

I am not going to agree with interpretations that are clearly wrong. In fact I have clearly explained why they are wrong. And yet you simply present them without addressing my comments on why they are wrong.

Doug, "Especially since you don't even use the sources consistently to prove what you say. Example, quoting you (emphasis is all mine):"

I see no inconsistencies at all.

1. Monstratet was not talking about the second position
2. Monstrelet was describing the formation prior to the advance
3. Monstrelet was wrong in claiming the men-at-arms and the archers were drawn up in two wings. [He was corrected by Wauren and LeFevre]
4. Monstrelet was talking about the Erpingham affair.

I don't know what you are complaining about.

Doug, "But you really shouldn't come across as "Doc the expert", putting me and my so-called lack of emotional connection to the period … "

Telling you you're wrong and explaining why is not a put down. I never mentioned emotional connection. What I said is you need to learn to think like those in the 15th century (mentality). As to writing as though I know more than you, I do know more than you about medieval culture and medieval battle tactics. I've spent years studying these things. When you said I don't know what you've read you were right. I don't. But I do know what you haven't read by your comments and assertions.

As to your idea that the archers were not attacked because of the power of the longbow, that needs to supported sources. Your saying it doesn't make it so no matter what you believe

Doug: " … that the arrows were feared, injurious and deadly, and caused crowding such that the French could not even approach the massed longbowmen, is at least a theory which is supported by what the sources describe..

Now this I heartily agree with. They were feared; they were injurious; they were deadly and they did cause crowding (disruption). They did this through (I like Rocky's term) rainbow fire. That's the only kind of fire mentioned in the sources (not withstanding your interpretation of the Gesta's quote).

Doug, "Battles include other troops, as the sources quoted "at" you have proven. (You did not address my use of the sources to disprove your premise: that ignoble troops were not considered part of "battles" of men at arm.)"

Proximity does not prove attachment. That the archers were placed next to the battles does not prove attachment. Especially when they were later removed.

Rich