"Why did the Saxons lose at Hastings?" Topic

Mike Snorbens 06 Sep 2008 11:50 a.m. PST
"You had to bring this up! Doug is OBSESSED with the battle."

Really? You surprise me. See the exchange below:

Quebecnordiques said:
"I bet you wouldn't start a thread on why the Saxons lost at Hastings? ;-)"
To which Doug replied:
"I would, if I thought anyone was interested in discussing it."

!!!

Obsessed, I confess, yes it's true. And also wise to the boredom most others evince whenever I bring this up. That's why I never started my own thread. Frankly, Mike, I am pleasantly surprised at the level of interest this thread has already received.

Here's another factor against William that hasn't been mentioned. Any mini campaign would have to include FIFTY PERCENT of the invader army being prostrated for the best part of a month with disentery, including William himself (at one point his life was feared of): apparently this danger was well appreciated: his fleet had carried copious amounts of wine, but in the two weeks after the battle it ran out and they had to start drinking the local water, bang!

The composition of the Stamford Bridge Saxon army and the Hastings Saxon army were slightly different as the local Fyrd would not have been at both battles (local being the clue). It is possible that the northern army had contained more Saxon archers.

The battle of Hastings raged all day, not the usual couple of hours affair. So the battle must have been hard fought with a successful outcome being absoloutely critical to both sides – this was not a battle that could be fought again on another day.

William had to break out of the peninsular, otherwise he would become trapped. Harold had to bar the way to London.

The Saxon casualties fell amongst the houscarls who occupied the front rank, they were the shieldlwall – and their army simply could not sustain their losses and remain cohesive. The battle raged for hours and increasing numbers of Theign and Fyrd started to replace the fallen houscarl.

This became a 'do or die' battle and large numbers of the Saxon nobility died (making Williams conquest all the more complete).

The integral defence of the saxon shieldwall (line) began to break down, with the Saxons increasingly operating as large isolated groups with the Normans pushed further into the position.

Even at the late hour that Harold died, it must have still been a 'go either way' situation, with neither side willing to cede.

William's ultimate success came not only from the loss of so many Saxon nobles at Hastings, but the castle / catherderal building program that locked down the landscape.

The real problem, of course, was Harold's reliance on his anti-ballistic missile defense system. Foolishly he thought that the mutually assured destruction factor was sufficient to keep the Normans from attacking.

This, of course, lead him to neglect his conventional defenses, such as his submarine fleet that could have destroyed the Normans in the channel, as well as his surface missiles.

The Sussex fyrd had been called out in the summer but William chose to wait as long as he could before crossing. DId he or did he not know of the exact timing of the Norwegian arrival we do not know. By the time Harold was back down south the fyrd and fleet was disbanded – many ships being lost in bad weather – and also cowed by the Norman depredations in the area. The Godwineson's estates were over in Wessex so there was no tradition of local support for HArold. William had built forts and had a plan of conquest. Harold's army was smaller and probably could not fight mounted against the Normans who were better at it. The Normans could have had twice as many men or even more.William even knew where Harold would turn up – the road crossing the Weald.
Ergo Harold was in a trap and was bound to lose. No local troops were available to Harold so he had the rump of an army with poorer mobility than the enemy.
Stamford Bridge was a basic slogging match but at Hastings Harold was facing a real military commander with a plan and an organised army. Not just a king with a bunch of hard case mates. I do not think Harold could have escaped either, William was too ruthless for that. Some of his best knights even swore that they would be the ones to kill Harold in the battle and the tapestry even suggests they did just that. William would not tolerate any competition because he needed to be a legitiimate king. Knud was just as ruthless in playing for the same stakes a generation before. The interesting question is really ..'Was there any way in which the English could have won at Hastings ?'

The Sussex fyrd had been called out in the summer but William chose to wait as long as he could before crossing.

Not just the Sussex fyrd, but the entire core army was on standby throughout the late summer, expecting a French invasion just as soon as the wind might change. William was held back by the wind, not by design.

Did he or did he not know of the exact timing of the Norwegian arrival we do not know.

Did he even know of it at all? We do not know. But it is likely that he did. Tostig visited the Norman court earlier that year, probably recruiting fecklessly (William needed all his troops for his own invasion), and it is likely that Tostig discussed other possibilities to pull down Harold, which would have included the Norse interests in Hardrada's inherited "claim" on the English crown. Other than that, imho, nothing was known to William until rumor came much later that Hardrada and Tostig had been killed by Harold in battle: this of course would have only been after William was in England.

By the time Harold was back down south the fyrd and fleet was disbanded – many ships being lost in bad weather – and also cowed by the Norman depredations in the area.

Actually, the fyrd had been disbanded on 8th September, to go home and get in the harvest. When word reached London of the Norse invasion Harold recalled the fyrd from the south and the Midlands, then rode in five days to York (Tadcaster to be specific). There hadn't been any troops guarding the Sussex coast since early in September, when William arrived on the 28th.

The Godwineson's estates were over in Wessex so there was no tradition of local support for HArold.

The family patrimony was in Wessex, but extended family holdings included Harold's lands in Sussex. Domesday Book says: "King William holds BOSHAM in lordship. Earl Godwin held it." And as his heir, Harold counted Bosham (Boseham) as his family home. William's invasion came to the heart of the king's own family lands.

Harold's army was smaller …. The Normans could have had twice as many men or even more.

This is simply not true. If either side had a numerical advantage, it was the English. At c. 70,000 hides (carucates and sulungs), the English fyrd was a potential of no less than 14,000 thegns (if we apply the "five hides per warrior" rule; but in fact there were thegns that were thegns by birth and held no land, so their obligation to fight was inherited and not because of being landlords/owners): add in the retinues of the fyrd at a factor of two to one or five to one: and finally c. 4,000 housecarles. We are looking at no less than 60,000 warriors, then you can count several thousand local ceorls in the threatened area within a day's march of their homes. William had maybe c. 700 ships to carry all his wine, provisions, arms, men and horses. If he had 13,000 effectives in total (counting sailors, craftsmen, cooks and maybe even some clergy as soldiers) that would be pushing the upper limit for the invaders.

Ergo Harold was in a trap and was bound to lose.

The map shows William "in a trap." He had exhausted the provisions available by plundering the lands belonging to the abbey of Fecamp in Sussex. He was ranging farther afield to get in enough food for his army. Soon he would have to cut his ties with the coast entirely in order to plunder enough to keep his army healthy. Time was on the side of the English in everything. Harold's move to Caldbec hill was like putting a stopper in the end of a bottle that contained the invaders.

No local troops were available to Harold so he had the rump of an army with poorer mobility than the enemy.

The local troops were already mustered to the royal army weeks before: the only locals left were the barely free ceorls who were not part of the fyrd.

The fyrd was an all-mounted force, so mobility was on the side of the English too.

Stamford Bridge was a basic slogging match…

If you work out the estimates, the Horse had at most 8,000 men at Stamford bridge, divided by the river Ouse and unarmed for the most part. The English army was at least 15,000 men, arriving fresh and mounted, and joined by any number of locals within a day's march or so. The Norse were outnumbered at least two-to-one. As Bradbury says (The Battle of Hastings, page 165), "It is probable that the battle had not been quite so prolonged as later sources said. The nature of it, with the surprise attack resulting in victory, normally would speak of a relatively brief conflict. It had been prolonged by the arrival of reinforcements from the coast, but the English army must have escaped without enormous losses. Had Stamford Bridge been too damaging on Harold's men, he would not have been able to contemplate another battle. The signs are that the victory had been so great that few men were lost."

The interesting question is really ..'Was there any way in which the English could have won at Hastings ?'

Yes: by not losing! :) Fade back into the trees at nightfall, regroup a day or so north, link up with reinforcements already on the road south. Fight another day: against a weakened invader army, while the English army grows stronger daily. William's supply and communication was interrupted by the Channel and a capricious wind, and that line of contact with his supply base was too long. Harold's men and supplies were at hand and bigger to boot.

*Horse = Norse (sheesh)

And let's not forget the English fleet cruising the Channel to cut William off from Normandy.

Ok Doug with all that in Harold's favour what went wrong ? How did he lose with a larger army standing on a hill in his own back yard ?

In 1339 Edward III could only raise 2,500 soldiers from 11 counties in a 75 mile radius of Hastings. Was the population so different in HArold's time ?The ASC even suggests William surprised Harold.

I am in the camp of those who think William was just cleverer than Harold and leading a more efficient force. Harold was overconfident or desperate, or both, and paid the price.

We should also consider that the strategy both leaders followed had different priorities than the simple logic a modern author might consider. Hence William's great efforts to get a Papal blessing.In the longer term Harold could look like an usurper not William. A successful warleader suggesting to his army that they should 'fade back into the trees' might not go down too well when it was personal prowess and charisma that played a great role in keeping an army together.

Just a few notes, drawing mainly on Stallard, on the aftermath of the Conquest and what happenened in England that might be of interest.

By 1086 only two non newcomers were in the Baronage. Both of them had Danish rather than English names. The Church had been completely put under Norman leadership. English had ceased to be the language of the Law and of the Court. It also ceased to develop be a literary language.

The geburs of 1066 became the villeins of 1086. Geburs had been free men, with some access to the public courts. They had the wergilds of free men, even if they were economically subservient. After the conquest, wergilds ceased to be used, and formerly free men with little property and heavy labor obligations found themselves to be
villeins. Villeins -a French word – were considered unfree, and eventually were entirely excluded from the shire and hundred courts, at least when they had disputes with their lords. These ended up in the lord's manor court.
Sokemen and the lesser thegns also found themselves farther down the social scale. Whatever their rights, they were certainly not part of the new ruling class, which was distinguished not only by language, but by a distinctive type of military obligation, knight service, one that few
Englishmen (if any) were capable of fulfilling, and by the military tenure and feudal status that went with that obligation.

William acquired in the course of his reign not only all the royal property, but the family property of all the earls of 1066. Even after granting out much of it, he was fabulously wealthy.
The Knight Service of England post 1066 was 6,000 men. I dont think things got any better for the English until the labour shortages caused by the Black Death allowed some social mobility.

Ok Doug with all that in Harold's favour what went wrong ? How did he lose with a larger army standing on a hill in his own back yard ?

Ah! but at Hastings he DIDN'T have a larger army. He should have waited a bit, then done the battle. It worked against the Norse, superior numbers I mean: he almost didn't LOSE Hastings as it was.

In 1339 Edward III could only raise 2,500 soldiers from 11 counties in a 75 mile radius of Hastings. Was the population so different in HArold's time ?The ASC even suggests William surprised Harold.

Different recruiting methods. The fyrd system did produce good sized defensive armies. War of the Roses produced some massive armies too. Different circumstances again.

The "surprise" was the way William was suddenly on the move when Harold wasn't expecting him. But tactically it was the English who took and held the high ground. There was an initial fight for it and the English got to the ridge firstest with the mostest: William's army was still strung out for miles on the track up from Hastings: the English were massed in the woods less than a mile away.

I am in the camp of those who think William was just cleverer than Harold and leading a more efficient force. Harold was overconfident or desperate, or both, and paid the price.

If over-confidence paid off, then William had more of it than Harold!

Harold wasn't desperate in anything other than to spare his own subjects further harm.

I agree that the Norman force was more efficient, in the area of opperating as a well-trained whole: they had been at their training together for months! and they had more tactical options to try out.

A successful warleader suggesting to his army that they should 'fade back into the trees' might not go down too well when it was personal prowess and charisma that played a great role in keeping an army together.

Only at night, of course, after it was too dark to continue fighting.

I think Harold's whole anticipated result of offering battle was to make William's army bleed out. He did not anticipate a complete defeat of the invaders in one battle. Getting killed was definitely not in the program. But then neither was William getting unhorsed -- that's cutting it far to closely! As someone noted already above: both men were in the thick of mortal danger and the dice could have fallen any old way. Bad "saving throws" by the Godwinsons.

Villeins -a French word – were considered unfree, and eventually were entirely excluded from the shire and hundred courts, at least when they had disputes with their lords. These ended up in the lord's manor court.

I thought villeins were the lowest rung of freemen, comparable to the previous ceorl class. I thought geburs and cottars were a tad above ceorls socially if not always economically.

The only major change to the courts system seems to have been the imposition of the Norman landlords requiring cases be tried in their own courts when they had a personal interest. Otherwise the conquerors let English legalese prevail (it was easier than trying to govern the masses with foreign/imposed institutions: the Normans everywhere they went always let as much of the former infrastructure alone as practical).

Ceorl is a general term for free peasantry, there were 3 classes of ceorl, gebur being the lowest.

It's worth noting that the English weren't I think decisively thrashed at Hastings – they were in good enough order to give the pursuing Normans a mauling later in the evening.

The way I read it is that had the Aethling been older, the Witan might have chosen him and William would have been bled out trying to take over the country.

However, given the circumstances – potential problems with Norsemen, Welsh and Scots, the coutnry couldn't afford to be leaderless.

Williams' claim was probably as good as Harolds, so they chose him.

IIRC, the wholesale replacement of the Saxon nobility came AFTER William tried to govern and found himself constantly beset by Saxon rebellion.

This caused a sense of humour failure and a total change of the social order.

Hi

As for numbers under Edward, wasnt that reflective of the current black plague?

R

I dont think the Whitan had much choice William was hardly going home if they said no. The age of the Aethling probably would'nt have changed that much. The Godwinsons had killed the previous Aethling as a threat to Anglo Danish interests. So I doubt all England would have easily rallied round the boy from Hungary. It is also clear that the Anglo Danes provided most of the resistance so long as it lasted. The Anglo Danish interest was not identical with that of the Aethling.

Once William was king he had the resources to recruit additional troops from the rest of Europe and there was nothing to stop them crossing the channel. There was no chance of attrition making him go home.

Its worth considering why the Normans whose Danish forebears fought in exactly the same way as way as Harald's troops adopted the French system – presumably they thought it more effective. At both Hastings and Dyrrachium it proved so.

Rocky – the Black Death didn't turn up until 1348, so no.

The way I read it is that had the Aethling been older, the Witan might have chosen him and William would have been bled out trying to take over the country.

I don't think William would have even tried if the Witan had chosen Edgar as their king. It was having Harold accept the Witan's choice of himself which pushed William's buttons: everyone already knew that Harold had become William's vassal in Normandy and for his lands in England, and had promised to advance William's claim to the throne.

Since the Witan passed up the only living claimant with royal blood ties, everyone else was equally considered "in the running." William couldn't ignore Harold's public flouting of his vassal status: it would have made everyone think that William/Normandy was weak. Besides, I am sure Harold doing what he did just ed William off no-end.

IIRC, the wholesale replacement of the Saxon nobility came AFTER William tried to govern and found himself constantly beset by Saxon rebellion.

This caused a sense of humour failure and a total change of the social order.

Yep. Willy tried to be respected at first. (The Bayeux Tapestry, made before the rebellions in Northumbria, calls Harold "king Harold": he is nowhere in all of Domesday Book c. 18 years later referred to as "king" but only Harold or earl Harold, illustrating the attitude change.) Then the North rebelled and he had to harry them to virtual extinction: a Danish invasion was threatening, and only a denuded North secured William's position, because then the Danes had no one to link up with. It made sound strategic sense, but it made William hated. He didn't have a choice though: if he had let the North alone, the Danes would have come, and he would have had a full-scale invasion and rebellion his hands. It nearly happened that way: only the Danes were too late getting over the sea and the rebels were all scattered before the Danes arrived and were bought off with a fat payment of (effectively) Danegeld.

To summarise : the 'Saxons' lost at Hastings because their leader attempted guerilla warfare with his entire force (which was not as massive as it could have been a few days later) by standing on a hill in the face of a larger army with cavalry and archers (which he apparently had none of).

Someone &%#"ed up.

How could the English – or should we say the Godwine mafia – have won apart from William dying and Harold surviving ?

Interesting point : both Harold and Custer had long hair and moustaches. I am not certain if George A. got an arrow in the eye though.

Once William was king he had the resources to recruit additional troops from the rest of Europe and there was nothing to stop them crossing the channel. There was no chance of attrition making him go home.

That's true. In 1085 William prepared for another Danish invasion, this time from Cnut Sweynson. William personally brought over to England an army even greater than the one in 1066. Cnut was murdered though and that was the end of that.

Its worth considering why the Normans whose Danish forebears fought in exactly the same way as way as Harald's troops adopted the French system – presumably they thought it more effective. At both Hastings and Dyrrachium it proved so.

I see a difference in capacity at Hastings though. The earliest written narrative of the battle of Hastings (the Carmen of bishop Guy of Amiens) says that the Franco-Flemish right performed a prearranged feigned flight, the only one so-mentioned. The same source also has the Normans of the center routing with their shields covering their backs. In 1066 it was still a novel thing for the Normans to do their main fighting on horseback. In this regard it is worth noting that English warfare from this period remains mainly infantry centered: Anglo-Norman knights usually dismounted part or all of their strength and fought alongside their infantry, e.g. the battle of Tinchberai (1106).

At both Hastings and Dyrrachium, however, the cavalry was not alone what achieved victory. At Hastings archery played an essential role; and at Dyrrachium the Varangian guard took refuge in a church and were forced out when the Normans burned it: iirc it was crossbowmen who shot them down as they emerged. But it was initially Norman cavalry charges which compelled the Varangians to hide in the church. (stirring the grey cells, here, to put together what I remember of Dyyrachium/Durrazo)

plasticviking2 08 Sep 2008 2:02 p.m. PST
To summarise : the 'Saxons' lost at Hastings because their leader attempted guerilla warfare with his entire force (which was not as massive as it could have been a few days later) by standing on a hill in the face of a larger army with cavalry and archers (which he apparently had none of).

How is standing in the open on a hill "guerrilla warfare"?

And how, after what I said, can the Norman army be larger than the English army at Hastings?

In this regard, it is interesting that Wace a century later claims that the Anglo-Norman tradition of Hastings was that the English had had far more men than William: but Wace's sources, eyewitness testimony from close relations (though passed down family tradition only, since none would have been alive at the time Wace wrote his poem), said that was not true: that the English had faced William "man for man."

Someone &%#"ed up.

Yeah, William tricked Harold into taking oaths of fealty on holy relics: Harold flouted William's lordship over him by "stealing" William's crown: William was maneuvered into giving battle on very unfavorable ground: Harold looked up at the wrong time….

How could the English – or should we say the Godwine mafia – have won apart from William dying and Harold surviving ?

Just Harold not dying would have been good enough. Or one of his brothers surviving….

Interesting point : both Harold and Custer had long hair and moustaches. I am not certain if George A. got an arrow in the eye though.

I bet he got more than a few arrows all over his body.

Doug:
'Bleeding out' the enemy and 'fading into the trees' are what I meant by guerilla warfare. And re. army size you said Harold needed to wait to amass his supposed 10s of thousands of men. The Norman force, if we accept a 700 ship fleet as Wace says his father counted,(not Wace's 3000) could be 10,000 with about 3000 cavalry. They had only to cross the Channel, not the North Sea and could even make a few trips ferrying more men over. How many men could Harold have after his sojourn in the north ? The Norwegian fleet was 300 so Stamford Bridge was won against a smaller force than the Normans. The army of the south-east had been on watch all summer and autumn and had gone home.
I cannot see an experienced commander like William choosing to attack a superior force at a tactical disadvantage. He must have thought he had the advantage.
And the point remains – how did Harold expect to win by standing on a hill with an army which could not move in the face of the Norman cavalry ? He must have had no alternative.

They had only to cross the Channel, not the North Sea and could even make a few trips ferrying more men over.

These were not longships with warriors rowing. You cannot row such boats across the Channel in any case except under favorable conditions (note the difficulties Harold's fleet had rowing to arrive at the mouth of the Thames -- against the same wind that was keeping William's fleet from sailing -- and the mentioned losses it sustained).

Christine and Gerald Grainge in a paper read before the Institute of Historical Research, London, on 16 October 1991, said:

"The overriding concern, not to say obsession, of the medieval mariner must have been the lee shore. Even in modern times the lee shore is never far from the thoughts of the professional navigator on his high tech bridge or the amateur yachstman in his high performance yacht capable of clawing to the windward in heavy weather. For the lee shore is the ship breaker." (then follows a paragraph illustrating the effects of the high waves pounding a vessel caught on the lee shore, most unpleasant and deadly) "Such conditions would be lethal for the type of medieval ship available to William." (they describe the infrequency of favorable winds at that time of year) "The meteorological feature which exerts the major influence on the weather and, in particular on the winds, in the English Channel is the Atlantic low. Typically these weather systems consist of a low pressure area round which the winds blow in an anti-clockwise direction; forming in the Atlantic, the lows follow each other eastwards across north-west Europe. The central low pressure area almost invariably passes well to the north of the Channel, with the result that, with the passage of each low, the wind in the Channel veers typically from south-westerly through westerly to north-westerly, backing to south-west again with the approach of the next low. From time to time this pattern of lows is interrupted by a high pressure system, characterised by fine settled weather and winds from other directions, including the south and east." (then they raise the factor of the tides in the Channel) "…first, the direction and speed of the tide will mean that the ship's speed and course over the ground will differ from her speed and course through the water; second, the height of the tide will determine at any particular time whether a ship can leave or enter a shallow or drying harbour; third, if the wind blows in a different direction from the tidal set, the sea will be rougher than when the tide is running in the same direction as the wind."

Modern weather and tidal conditions match the descriptions in William of Poitiers and the Carmen, i.e. have not changed in 900 years.

William's fleet crossed during one of those high pressure periods, and then the wind allowed his ships to return to Normandy, but getting back to England would have been chancy, as the first time was: the Grainge's show how late summer 1066 was a particularly wet one with more than the usual series of Atlantic lows, thus penning William's fleet in their harbors waiting: he took the first chance he thought he had in a break in the wind and ended up losing men and ships on the lee shore till the main part of the fleet made the mouth of the Somme in Ponthieu: from there he dashed across to Pevensey the very next chance he had: there was absolutely no method in the madness of waiting: it was go NOW or not at all.

How many men could Harold have after his sojourn in the north ?

As I quoted from Bradbury, the English win at Stamford bridge couldn't have been too costly or Harold would not have been able to contemplate battle so soon with the Normans. I agree with this, since I have verified to my own satisfaction that the English outclassed the Norse by better than two to one.

The Norwegian fleet was 300 so Stamford Bridge was won against a smaller force than the Normans.

Total effectives was probably about the same. The main difference being that the Normans carried thousands of horses! (reducing the actual number of men thereby)

I cannot see an experienced commander like William choosing to attack a superior force at a tactical disadvantage. He must have thought he had the advantage.

He had the backing of the church (God), he apparantly believed in the justice of his position, and he had the better trained force with more tactical options on the battlefield. He may have been over-confident in his vaunted cavalry. The sources speak of the vastness of the English army and place emphasis on the out-numbered situation faced by William's army. His political situation if he didn't punish Harold must have been too threatening to his ambitions: William had to go to England or lose face.

And the point remains – how did Harold expect to win by standing on a hill with an army which could not move in the face of the Norman cavalry ? He must have had no alternative.

But what a hill! Back then it was steeper and higher at the top (the medieval abbey buildings leveled it off considerably): no way around it except through the marshes of the Brede and Bulverhythe: perfect ground for a stolid infantry army to face down cavalry. All Harold had to do was stand his ground until nightfall and that was a win….

So William was William the Lucky Bastard, actually. He had nothing really going for him and a sneak attack on Harold and the lucky death of his brothers was all that gave the Normans victory ?
A vast army cannot stand, for example, on Senlac hill and the Anglo Saxon Chronicle says Harold fought before all his army came up. I know it is steep I ve been up and down it many times but if it was impassable for cavalry what then ? And it is actually very hard to defend on a steep hill with edged weapons and no hobnail boots.
I dont think a chain of lucky breaks for William makes for a good thesis. William only had to cross the Channel not the North Sea, anything that floated could have brought men across. They even crossed at night according to the Carmen so they knew their onions when it came to navigation.
If you add the meterological, numerical, topographical, logistical, moral, tactical advantages you have cited, Doug where does the win for William come in ? It make the English look like the real gens rusticus that the Carmen calls them derisively. Could Harold have got away with a 'draw' against Hardrada ? If not, then it means he should have tried his hardest to beat William decisively,not just stand on a hill and say 'here we are, come on if you think you're hard enough ? '
Anyway perhaps this discussion has reduced down to 2 and does not merit a thread here any longer ?
If you want to continue on email u r welcome. I am netvike
at hotmail dot com.

So William was William the Lucky Bastard, actually.

That is so true. (I would like to know who first coined that one.)

A vast army cannot stand, for example, on Senlac hill and the Anglo Saxon Chronicle says Harold fought before all his army came up.

And not only that, "but inasmuch as the English were drawn up in a narrow place, many retired from the ranks, and very few remained true to him." (Florence of Worcester, using the ASC in a version not extant, or so some scholars surmise.) So even the men he had on hand would not all stand in the shieldwall for Harold. I think the Florence of Worcester statement is an exaggeration, though: "few" compared to the potential army size, yes, but not few of the army he already had on hand. The rest of the evidence doesn't support the notion that most the army he took south from London deserted him!

I know it is steep I ve been up and down it many times but if it was impassable for cavalry what then ? And it is actually very hard to defend on a steep hill with edged weapons and no hobnail boots.

You think the lower slopes (where the reenactment takes place) are steep? I don't think that any part of the hill would have been impassable to horses. But the ground is rough in many places and probably was rougher back then (the whole area has been under cultivation and care for centuries: but in 1066 it was mostly wilderness).

I dont think a chain of lucky breaks for William makes for a good thesis.

I didn't mean for it to look like only that. William appears to be one of those rarely confident leaders who would rather try and be dead than not try at all. He didn't expect to win as big as he did, of that I am sure. Maneuvering Harold into a negotiating position would have allowed William to save face.

William only had to cross the Channel not the North Sea, anything that floated could have brought men across.

That's probably an optimistic view. I have a different view of the Channel since reading the Grainge's paper. The night crossing wasn't a problem if the invaders knew the tides; and William wouldn't risk another change in the wind by waiting till a morning outgoing tide. The tide changes every six hours or so. It flows north up the Normandy side of the Channel, then reverses and flows south. (I don't recall off hand what the tide does on the English side.)

If you add the meterological, numerical, topographical, logistical, moral, tactical advantages you have cited, Doug where does the win for William come in ?

Confidence and luck, and a better army on the ground for that one battle. The ground goes to the English and evens everything more or less.

But battle is only one option/tool: the threat of an army is more than a threat to give battle. I am sure that with his army as a constant threat, that William's options for a suitable conclusion remained open. He was not out to fight a battle, but to win the prestige game (and with prestige comes power and respect, and concessions in material gains).

I don't think Harold was right in accepting the challenge to battle that soon. That really was William's first lucky break: goading Harold into bringing on a battle. But other than dying, it would have worked out okay for Harold!

The strategic situation was Harold's greatest advantage, and would have weighed ever more heavily against William. But William was so tenacious that Harold would have had to bargain to make William go home. What that parley would have included is an interesting speculation.

If Harold had tried to weaken the Norman army through attrition (and avoid battle) he would have failed; the whole of southern England lay open to William's forces (assuming that Harold allowed them to get over their dysentery!).

Anyway perhaps this discussion has reduced down to 2 and does not merit a thread here any longer ?

Surely the two of us don't account for almost a thousand hits to this page. Lurkers, my friend. Consider yourself as a form of entertainment to the unseen :)

If you have anymore to say on the subject, it IS my favorite bit of history….

Hi

I wonder why this sort of anger creeps into these discussions.

Some of the above makes it sound like "you hate Wm, and love H and therefore…" in essence.

I think we can agree that the battle is close. That is what makes it interesting from a gaming point. Most historical battles, in retrospect, have one side having no chance. The point lost in the above few points is that everyone is assuming some sort of knowledge unknown to either party at the time.

Neither could know precisely what was waiting for him. And no one then or now could assert with certainty that one side or the other HAD to do anything. It requires too much knowledge. For all we know, for instance, Wm might have gotten word about all the dissatisfaction in the Saxon ranks who might turn to him. Or people who would come because they held the legality of his position.

Whoever won, with the limited knowledge they had would have had to be "lucky" in one way or another.

Thus, it is inappropriate for people to get all impassioned about a given position.

SO LIGHTEN UP!

Imagine if Wm could have hired some italian civil militia crossbow!

Rocky

Maybe he did (hire Italian crossbow). The sources say nadda about where the "balistantes" came from: and he did have troops from southern Italy and Sicily (interestingly, their weapons are "iacula" "in swarms"; which could be crossbow bolts).

I am passionate about having NO position: I agree completely that hindsight colors everything we say. Wm and Harold had friends and enemies everywhere. The future mixture was unwritten: thus Wm the lucky bastard was counting on the "justice" of his cause and his luck (being in good with God/Holy Church). It is obvious that enough people felt the same way for him to get an invasion of many thousands together and on the ground in England.

The only point I make about the known factors working against the invasion, is that looking back we really do have to say "William the lucky bastard", because it could have all gone so utterly wrong at a dozen different times….

(Btw, the word in the Carmen I referenced as possibly applying to crossbow bolts, "iacula", is given in Barlow's -- latest -- edition as "incola"; and the meaning of the line taken to show that the Normans were masters of the Calabrians, Appulians and Sicilians: the line is evidently meterically corrupt and has caused scholars continued trouble in trying to make it make historical sense.)