"United States Build T34's Instead of Shermans"" Topic

The lady who posed the original enquirey on this thread didn't really think her question through, either because of lack of correct information, reliance on hindsight or simply because her desire to appear to be posing a smart question outweighed her knowledge of the subject.

"A dozen men armed with sticks managing to clobber one man armed with a revolver, after he shot half their number, doesn't make the stick a great weapons system"

Tell that to the man with the revolver… I thought I was agreeing with you Frans, but that doesn't seem good enough. What is a great weapons system? I'm not sure, I wasn't making that point, and any definition would result in a lot (more) subjective waffle.
I'd be more interested in having a SUCCESSFUL weapons system. The T-34 was undeniably that. You seem to have a bit of a problem with this simple fact. Not pretty, not perfect, not efficient, just extremely effective.

You can have as many shiny revolvers as you like, but seeing as you might only have 3 rounds for it, one of which is a dud, no oil to lubricate it, and a bit of a sticky trigger action, I'll go with my dozen big mates and their clubs.

Which tank is better?:

Whichever one I am using in a game that doesn't get blown up and manages to kill a few of the enemy.

Which tank is crap?:

Whichever one I am using in a game that gets blown up and didn't get to kill any enemies.

That's my criteria. YMMV.

3 pages , wow.
re. the idea that the t34 had no radio … from mid 42 all were fitted with radios.
Also some people have not noticed the fact that the US did have a t34 in 1942 for assessment and familiarisation.

Most Russian tank crews had barely seen a car or tractor never mind a tank and so they were suitably impressd by the t34 which was ably designed for Soviet requirements. Most US tank crews would have driven cars and lived in amuch more mechanised society, they also got MUCH more training.

Similarly, the Soviet truck was a model-T ford in essence. What would US logistics have been using that ? ( The KV1 was junk because its transmission was simply a rejected US truck transmission badly copied).

The Tiger tank was a surprise but both the Russians and the allies in north Africa promptly knocked out some of the first they encountered with weapons to hand. In Italy, a few mortar bombs was often enough to make Tigers retire.

Re. knocking out tanks from the front: most tanks are killed from the side. NOT because they are too tough to kill from the front but because the best time to get the drop on your opponent is when you approach from the side. Tanks in ambush or prepared positions kill enemy tanks which never get a chance to shoot back at them. Russian tank tactics against Tigers specifically require tempting out the Tiger with a sacrifical recce tank – hardball.
vis. the success of the Stug. Why didn't the US make Stugs , you might as well ask ? Actually the US did make a very effective Stug – the M4 tank destroyers, if you equate the M4 with the PzIII – the German workhorse in the first years – you could say American development strategy was similar to German: use a proven hull for a tank destroyer.

Another key is tank engagement distances. Just because some wargames rules publish a curve to show an 88 could cripple a battleship at 5 miles doesnt mean it got the chance to do so. Zaloga published (1998) stats for russian tank losses in 43-44 which show 80 percent of tank losses were from hits at ranges of less than 1200 metres with 69 percent less than 600 metres ! ..from 75mmm hits. Only 17 percent of 88s kills were at ranges over 1000 metres. A Sherman or t34 were able to do away with common opponents at these distances – even on your wargame stats – if t34-85 and long-gun Shermans are included things become even better. The point is it is all about getting THE CHANCE to hit the enemy. In the Ardennes there are several examples of Shermans meeting Panthers and beating them hands down, face to face. The crews of the Shermans were trained, experienced, motivated and GOOD.

Which Allied tank force had the best ideas about training its tank crews ? That is a good question. The much debated Operation Goodwood came about partly because at that time the British-Canadian tank force was insufficiently experience to do anything more sophisticated. Lots of Shermans got knocked out but to blame the Sherman for the failure is missing the point totally.

Did Patton's armour have any special training ?
Rybalko's armour was reputedly more intensively trained than other Soviet units and he commanded from a much more advanced location than most. Do such things count for more than millimetres of steel ?

LONG POST, SORRY, I HEREBY SWEAR NOT TO POST ON THIS THREAD AGAIN..UNTIL NEXT TIME

I'm always surprised that no one mentions the Baldwin M6 tank that was developed by the US as a heavy tank. Compare it to the M4 and you'll see why it was never put in production.

Dan

The much debated Operation Goodwood came about partly because at that time the British-Canadian tank force was insufficiently experience to do anything more sophisticated.

You're suggesting that 7th Armoured Division was inexperienced.

plasticviking2
Good post.
I was also under the impression that T34s had radio compartments (I've seen pics), but the Soviet electronics industry just could not produce the sets or the technicians to maintain them.

From the discussion it almost sounds like the US lost WW2. when it came down to battles on the divisional level, didn't the Germans always lose regardless of their armor or MG42s?

As for the M4, the M4 was extremely reliable which was very reliable and honestly when it came down to it, the Germans didn't have all that many tanks to fight compared to the number of US and British M4s in the war. When the M4 with 76mm gun became available a lot of US tankers wanted their M4s with the 75 back. Their reason? The 75mm had a better HE round than the 76mm gun and most of what they dealt with was German infantry and not German tanks and then when they did most of them were PZIVs. (Of course if they were unlucky enough to run into a Panther ot Tiger I bet they regretted that decision)

quote"Perhaps the reason (stand by for correction) that no nation in the industrial age has copied a weapon system and put it into production with almost zero modification isn't entirely a matter of national pride, but also because it's just unfeasible to do on a mass scale. Concepts have been copied (sloped armour, shaped warhead) but I honestly can't think of a full weapons system."

How about the Russian 120mm mortar – copied direct by the Germans?

"How about the Russian 120mm mortar – copied direct by the Germans?"

You see I knew someone would think of one (or is it three now!). And yes, I should've known that one for goodness sakes…Can I argue that the exception proves the rule?!

How about this one? The Russians goty their hands on some Superfortresses and copied them EXACTLY for use themselves. By exactly, this means that they even copied stamped logos on metal parts. Apparently Stalin said he wanted the plane copied, and no-one dared change ANYTHING on the spec.

imdb.com/title/tt0345961

Oh yes, they made 850 of them:

link

"Blimey Frans, haven't heard from you in a while, and a thread with no uber-cool Zen big cats, is the last place I thought you'd turn up, I thought the above post was rather beneath your usual humour, a nasty little barb, uncalled for, I'm not angry…… just a little disappointed. Now go away to the naughty step, and think about what you've done.
;-)
John"

Hi John,

You haven't heard from me in a while because I've been on vacation.
The lack of humour has much to do with the amount of prejudice encountered on this board lately.
Every time I get a remark like the one that triggered the "uncalled for" response you're so disappointed about I ask myself where the poster in question got the right to counter my arguments by trying to discredit me with al kinds of unfounded insinuations.
I got involved with this board out of an interest in discussing WW2, but there seems to be no room here for people who think differently, you're not half as disappointed as I am.
So instead of going away to the "naughty step" I probably better go away altogether.

Greetings, Frans.

Um, ah, how did the US manage to win the war with such "terrible and shoddy equipment"? Something must have gone right.

===

Top class Alies.. (Wink)..

Panzerfrans

I don't know you, but I've read your replies on the WWII threads for some time now and think it would be shame if you cease participating. Some correspondents are thoughtless and needlessly provocative and some occasionally lose their composure on topics they feel strongly about. I find it hard to be patient myself sometimes, but all in all I think the TMP editor does a good job balancing free discussion with controlling those few who are deliberately and consistently nasty and hateful.

The much debated Operation Goodwood came about partly because at that time the British-Canadian tank force was insufficiently experience to do anything more sophisticated.

You're suggesting that 7th Armoured Division was inexperienced.

Having thought about it a bit more, your statement regarding the British at Goodwood begs the question:

Was there any "British/Canadian" (or even American) "tank force" in Normandy with more experience than 7th Armoured Divison?

Further to Dereks point – the British 11th Armoured Division was regarded as the best performed of the three British divisions involved in NW Europe (GAD, 7AD, 11AD. It was also the least experienced overall.

Why didn't the U.S. make Volkswagens?

@ Matsuru Sami Kaze

Easily answered: They knew they will win the war and wait for the new secret weapon of Dr. Porsche, which will be produced, after Adolf was out of power: Project 911!

Greetings

"The much debated Operation Goodwood came about partly because at that time the British-Canadian tank force was insufficiently experience to do anything more sophisticated."

I'm also not sure what the point is here. Operation Goodwood came about (I presume this refers to the outcome of the operation rather than its origins) because of:

i) the depth of the defences.
ii) poor infantry-armour cooperation between the armoured and infantry brigades in the participating divisions.
iii) the strength of the German response.
iv) what looked like good tank country on the map, wasn't.
v) the heavy rain which shut the whole thing down after two days.

Tank losses were heavy, but replaced immediately from reserves. Crew losses were light, but the PBI suffered heavy casualties (as usual).

Infantry-armour cooperation improved considerably thereafter with both 11th AD and GAD implementing square mixed brigades with combined infantry-tank groups.

I am not aware of any Canadian tank forces taking part in Opeation Goodwood, although obviously the Canadian infantry did.

Experience doesn't seem to have a great deal to do with it.

Point about Goodwood is the strategic necessity overrode some tactical considerations which led to high losses. In the weeks before Goodwood chances had arguably been missed to make inroads into the German positions. Not to get diverted into that other controversial subject, though. Another thread if that is necessary ? The tank in question could have been anything but the battlefield context led to high losses. The losses in themselves, as Martin Rapier so rightly says did not actually mean so much even though they look shocking on paper but again, off the point.

OK thanks.

Your essential point is correct though, the relative effectiveness of armoured vehicles is a lot more to do with how they are organised, trained, supplied, supported and commanded than minor technical difference between vehicles. The Germans won their greatest victories with a pile of junk.

The Sherman was a perfectly adequate medium tank, as was the T34 and the Pz IV – they were all used right until the end of the war and beyond. The Pz IV and T34 had pretty much reached the limit of their upgrade potential, the M4 being a newer design hadn't. No-one had really cracked the problem of effective dual purpose guns in such small calibres – the 17pdr, 76mm and 75L70 all had poor HE performance and had to be supported by lower velocity weapons when taking on entrenched targets. The best compromise was probably the 75L48. It was still essentially a choice between AT or HE performance until you got to the 85mm or larger.

It shouldn't be forgotten that the M4 was hot stuff when it first entered service, and instantly rendered the mainstay of the Panzerjagers (the Pak 38) obsolete, just as the T34 had done with the Pak 36 the year before.

Ont thing that has not been metioned in this thread and may just be hearsay is that the T-34 was designed with crews of Russian stature in mind, not Americans. Having looked inside a T34 it certainly looked cramped, I have not had a similar look inside a Sherman and I am sure that they too were far from roomy but I think that for example the driver of a T34 had to be less than 5'6" tall.

If this is the case then just scaling up the T34 to cope with Western physiques would mean a significant increase in weight if nothing else.

Hi

As for copying things: All 20mm at the beginning of WW2 were, in essence, the same gun. The germans had a minor variant using electronic rather than impact primers. "Arms of Krupp".

And I think the 37s were the same.

Later the US cheerfully copied german automatics for the M3/50 and our 20s were in essence rotary Mausers, not to mention the grunts getting the M60 mg. The "Not invented here" isn't that simple.

R

The answer !

This thread has been very productive in dusting off a few old chestnuts. Ones thought to be solved long ago over a pint or 3.

One of the best sources I have found sounds boring but entirely explains the US situation with the m4. It is a fascinating read. I never knew the US was developing a razor-blade studded collar to stop snipers climbing trees, for example ! It also says the US got its t34 in 1943 and not 1942 !

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
Book by Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, Peter C. Roots; Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955. 542 pgs.

I give two quotes which shows something of the dialectics of this thread's subject:

'A few blind spots notwithstanding, by and large the Ordnance Department met its assigned responsibilities with distinction. In most cases, as General Marshall stated, shortcomings in American fighting equipment in World War II were attributable not to Ordnance Department slow-wittedness, but to War Department and Ground Forces instructions. That public opinion and Congress all through the 1930's so stressed defense as opposed to aggressive warfare that Army planning was willynilly influenced by what amounted to a definite national policy, doubtless largely accounts for delays in evolving tactical doctrine for offense. Those delays in turn retarded Ordnance research and development work.Indeed General Marshall, in discussing Army Intelligence, observed that right up to the time of Pearl Harbor the United States had little more than what its military observers "could learn at a dinner, more or less
over the coffee cups." '

AND

'American authorities determining the characteristics of U.S. armor held different views. "There can be no basis for the T26 [90-mm. gun] tank," Army Ground Forces officially replied to the suggestion of introducing the better armed and armored, and consequently heavier, vehicle than the Sherman, "other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel--which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable numbers and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Antitank guns either must be put out by armored infantry or equivalent means, or avoided by tanks. The primary mission of tanks is the destruction of those hostile elements which are vulnerable to them--not antitank guns." '

There are MANY more angles on this argument in aforesaid book.

p.s. I conflated the Canadian operation near Caćn with Goodwood .- thats where the Candian tanks came from..

Thanks for putting the original post up Mosby.

The T34 was a superb tank for 1940, it wasn't as good by 1944.

The Sherman wasn't lots worse than the T34. It was good enough.

It was as good as or better than the German tanks except for the Panther and Tigers. The Germans only ever produced about 1,500 Tiger 1s and less than 500 Tiger 2s, and under 6,000 Panthers.

The USA were also fighting the Japanese. The Sherman was much better than any Japanese tank.

The Allies also had air power and artillery to make up for tank vs tank power.

Switching production to an entirely new foreign design in the middle of the war would have reduce the number of tanks shipped.

Green Easy Eight crews trounced T-34/85's in Korea, and the N. Koreans were the blood tested veterans on the battlefield

By the time of Normandy & after, the sloped armour of the T-34 was meaningless. The contemporary German guns/ammo would drill it outright

>Disgusted, she replied: "I hope they printed that
>on the telegrams they sent to the thousands of
>American tankmen that probably would not have
>died if they were in T34's.

They would have died altogether if they have
had the kind of engagement doctrines and
support the T34's crews had.

Guess this lady should compare US and Soviet
respective casualty rates by conquered square
miles, tankers included, before making further
comments, or should ask why the soviets didn't
copy more US materials which were vastly superiors
to theirs.

Basically, armies go to war with what they have
in stock, be it in arsenals or on drawing boards.
On the course of war, they make 'improved'
designs which are already obsolete when the
next war is looming ahead.

Of course, national pride, rather than ideology
certainly shows its influence on these matters.
The most certain occurence when armies borrow
other countries armies weapon designs is when
they have none, like tanks for the AEF in WW1.

I'm pretty sure Russian soldiers would
have loved to enjoy the same average material
quality and availability the GI's had, and this
wasn't mentioned too in the telegram their familly
received if they were killed, when they received
any.

For 2008 America and other western countries
'man on the street' POV, things are so simple…

Sherman: Thicker armour (yes, really – and sloped too – go look at it some time!), faster, more reliable, better gun, more comfortable, preferred by those who had a choice

T34: Available 2 years earlier, shorter, wider tracks for Russian snow/mud

diesel engines are neither here nor their – they have soem advantages and disadvantages, and the shermans weer made with both petrol and diesel.

Overall:

Sherman – much maligned, but a better tank over all than the T34 or Pz-IV both of which served until 1945 too.

T34: Much mytholigised. In 1941 sloped armour was a bit of a revelation, and the 76mm gun was well ahead of the pack until 1942, but outclassed by 1943 and kept in production (in /76 form) until 1944 much like the Sherman 75's.

it is interesting to note that both US and Soviet doctrine was that the tanks fight against infantry and not othe tanks. Soviet doctrine also had strong AT forces (SP, towed and infantry) as the answer to armoured attacks – tanks were a last resort!

Oh and T34's did have radios from about mid 1942 onwards….the Soviets were not fools – they understood the need for Radios in tanks – they just didn't have enough of them to go around early on – like everyone else but for a few years longer.

Agree with Aloysius,

Much myths around German armour comes from
the fact they were more often in defense than
attack after 1942.
When they attacked and faced Shermans/M10's,
they often got knocked out in single to single
engagements, since allies massed their tanks
for attack purposes only, like everyone else.
Not sure T34's enjoyed the same kill record
in defense(Koursk)

>it is interesting to note that both US and
>Soviet doctrine was that the tanks fight
>against infantry and not othe tanks

Sure, because both built these tanks around 1930's doctrines, not post-1940 ones.
Their greatest achievement was to design sound
armored welfare ops around older material.

The Germans, after the Soviets had let it down after
1937 purges, were way ahead because they had built
their armor engagement doctrines from sturmtruppen
experiences in later WW1, replacing men (mostly)
with tanks.
Their ideas wasn't to have many of them, but
very good (highly trained, motivated and leaded)
ones.

>Soviet doctrine also had strong AT forces
>(SP, towed and infantry) as the answer to
>armoured attacks – tanks were a last resort!

Because most of their tanks were actually
well protected light infantry guns, with
poor optics and worse, hurriedly trained
'artillerist' crews, mostly capable
of hitting a barn at close range only.
(still 1930's doctrines)
Yet, year after year, they developped
superb armor spearheading doctrines
and eventualy got sound material to go
up with by 1944/1945 (JS2 et 3)

>Oh and T34's did have radios from about mid
>1942 onwards

Including all platoon subordinates, in 1942 ?

Jovian1
''How about the fact that the Soviet Union would not share the technical details with the U.S. …..The Sherman, while inferior to the T-34 in most aspects, armor, speed, maneuverability, and armament – was the most easily repaired vehicle of the war.''

I think you're right:
1) Would the USSR share? The US would need USSR co-operation: you can't just knock out a new turret ring, it needs a lot of engineering.

2) Was the T-34 so much better as to justify the sheer expence and loss of time in tooling up all those US factories with new cutters and production lines? It would been expensive and lead to delays when the British in North Africa were desparate for them to add to their Grants (Lees).

I don't think so. The T-34 was good for three reasons, none of which justifies the US copying it.

a) It was light (because it used sloped armour and was unsophisticated)) and therefore slightly faster. Technology that could have been copied easily.
b) It had better suspension (the Allies already had Christie suspension – it was used on the British Crusader)
c) It was easy to manufacture (yet the number of Shermans produced was enough for Allied needs too: the US produced twice as many Shermans as the Germans produced any tank)

It also had important disadvantages. Aside from those already mentioned, the T-34 was designed for armoured thrusts in flat country to break the German lines and used for blitzkrieg tactics: ploughing long thrusts into the German rear and letting the infantry mop up. But it was also vulnerable to side attack: it could be taken out if it's external fuel tanks were hit. It's maximum armour thickness at the front was 60mm as opposed to the Shermans 80mm.

Eisenhower's tactics were cautious: to maintain the long front and to move forward relatively incrimentally. He needed tanks with better all round armour and the T-34s speed was not needed quite so much in the broken country of northern France.

3) Production disruption

How could you justify the sheer expence and delays in re-tooling and re-equipping all those factories during an on -going war? When the whole point was quantity, not quality?

Perhaps US posters forget, that WW2 began in 1939, not 1941, and Britian was already using the Lee/Grant. The US would still have to continue to manufacture spare parts. For this and other reasons, the US Army decided to minimize production disruption by incorporating elements of these other tank designs into Sherman production in the on-going war. There was no time to delay anything.

Strategic delays
Montgomery needed the Sherman in August 1942. Not December '42 or June '43, but August '42. How could he have got it with US factories re-tooling?

But the biggest reason is here:

4) When did the US know the T-34 was effective? When would they have had the information to make a desision on switching?
Not until the Russians started using the T-34 to win. And that wasn't until '44, well after the Battle of Kursk. Even them it wasn't clear that the T-34 was the reason: the Germans were beaten at Kursk in August '43 by superior defensive positions: by artillery, infantry and engineers, and T-34s suffered more losses than German tanks. Tanks were expected to have many roles on the battlefield, the foremost being infantry support and exploitation. And by 1941, tank-versus-tank combat was already an Allied strong point because Britian had already achieved the air dominance they needed to tip a tank battle.

5) Upgrade momentum
If you are going to make a new tank, then make a generational leap, not switch to one that's similar. When the German Tiger IIs and Panthers came along, the Russians needed the Joseph Stalin IS-2 to match it: the T-34 was outdated. And the US produced the perfectly satisfactory Pershing.

The main reason the US stuck with the Sherman, as opposed to the Pershing was, I believe, the problem of getting them to Europe. I don't recall the exact numbers, but I think it's a pretty close guess to say that they could transport 2 Shermans for every Pershing on any given ship.

There was also the problem of Pershings getting over existing bridges and other "rough terrain." There were Pershings in the 9th Armored Division when it captured the Ludendorf bridge over the Rhine at Remagen, but the division's engineers wouldn't let them use the bridge (which had been damaged) until all the Shermans had made it across.

It's notable that after the war the US abandoned the idea of fighting tanks with tank destroyers and disbanded the Tank Destroyer force -- finally concluding that the best weapon for fighting a tank was another tank (until the helicopter came of age).

donlowry,
……and the aeroplane, of course. Typhoons for example.

''There were Pershings in the 9th Armored Division when it captured the Ludendorf bridge over the Rhine at Remagen, but the division's engineers wouldn't let them use the bridge (which had been damaged) until all the Shermans had made it across.''

Mind you, there were only 3 that got that far. Some reports say Patton was sgainst the Pershiing because he preferred the Sherman.
I put up some photos I took of the Pershing here, if you're interested:
link
link

I have Hunnicut's excellent book on the Pershing. It was a good heavy tank, and had it been shipped to Europe in mid-44 might have been of considerable help in the breakout from Normandy or even in busting thru the Siegfried line. But, all-in-all I think Patton was correct. By the time Pershings arrived at the front mobility was more important than gun/armor quality. Besides, Patton had gone thru the experience of being slowed/halted by lack of fuel once before, so he didn't want gas-guzzlers.

I remember, as a kid in the late '40s or early '50s, seeing a movie about a US tank crew. Two or three times their tank got knocked out and they (or the survivors) were issued a new one, and they were always complaining that the German tanks were better. Finally they got a tank with a 90mm gun and better armor (I assume now it was a Pershing) and were happy at last. I've never seen the movie on TV and wonder if somehow it wasn't "censored" for being critical of the US equipment and those who designed and selected same. Wish I could remember the title or who was in it, but I was just a kid at the time.

>"……and the aeroplane, of course. Typhoons for example."<

Well, that was a Brit plane, of course. But the P38s and P47s didn't do too badly.

why not build bloddy Panthers then….

Probably couldn't get a license to build them til the war was over.