"Help me understand skirmishers et al and their effectiveness" Topic

Thank you Chasseur, that explains a great deal to me of lost information I was seeking. I knew the btlns of Jager were around 400 men early on, thanks to verifying that for me.

For me I am trying to establish the exact "official" strengths of every unit of the Napoleonic wars more so than their actual field strengths. This might sound a waste of time but there is a reason in the madness. We play massive campaigns in my group and as such we need this information. Although the various units of nations might have gone to war under strength there are many instances in which the units did go to war at full establishment on many occasions.

Also, in knowing the Full establishment of a unit a player can determine when to stop as he uses the monthly recruitment points to flesh out these units before sending them off to be decimated. We have a very detailed and intricate unit attrition matrix in my system for unit strengths that coupled with Class and Morale give the players information on the current Morale/Class level of a particular unit so knowing the "official" starting strength is very important for us.

As for the Russian numbers of 728 men per btln I will have to look back into my books tonight when I get home, I remember this number as the official strength from my research years ago but I will verify where I got that from asap.

Regards,
Shane

As a side note, in my system we use Skirmishers in a very similar way that Empire does. We have "SK" – Full Skirmish and SS – Semi Skirmish as part of the system. Both types have their advantages and disadvantages etc which I won't elaborate too much on here. However, the spacing of the figures with SK light troops is twice that almost of SS light troops but SS light troops being closer together are much easier to hit with incoming fire while Close Order Infantry is much easier to hit again…

Basically we say that SK style Light Infantry are purpose trained skirmishers well drilled and trained in the art of skirmishing acting in pairs and knowing exactly how to perform this task by taking into account the lay of the land, every defensive posture is taken advantage of and is understood by the SK skirmisher to stay alive.

The SS skirmisher however, is usually not so well trained and in many cases thrown out there with little understanding of the true art of skirmishing. They do not understand fully how to operate in pairs even if the drill might account for it. They tend to bunch up for protection generally making an easier target than men very well trained as SK infantry. Some of these are Russian Jaegers, Prussian, Austrian 3rd Rankers and most light troops of newly formed or conscripted infantry.

Every soldier type by nation in my system has a Rating which is either, SK, SS or N/A. This indicates their ability as Light Infantry and the order (spacing per figure) they would have. We say that all French Infantry are capable of performing as Light Infantry including Ligne Infantry; however, Ligne Infantry can only form SS style skirmish order and suffer a negative -20% Morale when doing so. Line Infantry with an N/A cannot extend into any form of skirmish order and must rely on their supporting Fusiliers or Jaeger to do so.

Later on in the later campaigns as we all know the Allies can place their 3rd rankers into skirmish order and this is also set into the rules easily. They can send out up to one third their number as skirmishers but only in SS order as they too are deemed not that well trained in the art of skirmishing.

Empire allows the player to sometimes switch Light infantry between SK and SS, we don't as we think that the ability to form SK order is ingrained from experience and training where the men are so skilled at it as to be very Adept at it. While others with less training and experience are not so well able to perform the task…

Regards,
Shane

Shane,

Neat system. I like its structure very much, for those who will tolerate the detail and not complain.
:-)

Comments on your ratings (differences of opinion are normal here, so imagine we are at the bar/pub/etc. ….)

I have trouble seeing Russian jägers as anything different from French légère in a general or fundamental way, especially by 1812. The regs were about the same, the lack of new regs about the same, the description in memoires about the same, and so on. A clear quality-of-training difference early on I would agree with through 1807. Actually, I could think of the early Russian jägers as more of the hybrid between the French légère and sharpshooter unit type (see below for Prussians and British). As a compromise, they may have been second rate at both methods.

By 1812, the Russian rifles are nominally gone, the numbers are way up (ratio and absolute) and the whole system just screams "copying the French here, but with more guys".

The Prussians have a neat combo : fusiliers that should have acted like French légère and 3 battalions of real sharpshooters. Oddly, the fact that the Prussians did not in fact so use the fusiliers until the 1812 era I think lies far more under the heading of ossified generals than a failure to have the right troop type or doctrine. How you model that (if I am correct) is the usual challenge : replicating historical stupidity without hamstringing modern players.

The sharpshooter method may have influenced the British. The numbers are small (absolute and ratio) and the idea is to have strongpoints, broken terrain, buildings, etc. occupied by high-accuracy shooters. There are too few of them to really cover much space, but enough for the very small British forces one supposes.

No comments on Austrians – sorry.

Anyway, this whole question poses very interesting rules-writing questions.

G'day mate,

Aye, this is a very strong pet topic of mine and something I do pay particular attention towards in the rules.

Yes, I agree with you, in my system the French in 1805-07 have a very distinct and strong advantage in training and experience over the allies, including the Russian Jaegers. However, as the years tick on by there is a definate switch, I marked 1812 as a year where there is a cross-over or matching of capability. Once 1813-14 come around the French have declined and their ability at skirmishing has definately been surpassed by the Allies, including the Russian Jaegers.

The general and broad picture of this for me is a bell arc of experience and training that is totally different for each nation in regards to capability, training and experience that come together as abilities in my system, tweeking it and getting the time line correct is a tricky thing to do.

Interesting comment about the Prussian fusiliers, are you saying they fought as Line troops in 1806 ? I was under the impression they were actually used in their proper role as lights ?

Regards,
Shane

Shane,

I am NOT NOT NOT a "specialist" for early Prussians. But, I think if you check Jena and Auerstadt carefully, you will find fusiliers forming on the flanks of infantry lines, at least some of the time.

Sorry, I play 1812-1814 Russians (and occasionally have a Prussian unit or two loaned to me for 1813-1814) and 1815 French.
:-)

Understood, that army still confuses me sometimes, is at first appears so simple on paper but when you delve into its make-up you open a hornests nest of sub casses, sub-units and troop types and that is not accounting for the Guard.

still working on the Prussians but I feel I have got them figured out to about 95% accurately now. with what you have stated about the Fusiliers does open up a few questions for me again. I tend to agree that those old Prussian generals were reluctant to use the Fusliers for the role they were intended to be used for. I am suspecting that when they peared across the field and saw the size of the French line they might have placed them in ranks with the line fearing that if they did not they might not have been able to counter the French line length.

I am probably incorrect though.

Shane

I remain concerned about the idea of the early French skirmisher being allowed his head as a reason for an overall advantage in skirmishing.

I though I might find some material that would help clarify this in "Primary Source Material Vol I No 3 Nosworthy's Tactical Study Series Writings on the French Napoleonic Art of War" published by AdSigna.

This includes material by Marshal Ney, Bugeaud (Lt Colonel in Spain) and Baron Jomini and I was surprised to find only a little regarding skirmishing. Perhaps this is due to the selection of material by the author and editor of this condensed work which is something I will need to check if I can get to the originals at some point.

I was rather surprised by the comments by Bugeaud in the notes to the fiftysixth regiment.

The document quotes p152 – I quote " Skirmishers necessarily lack the moral strength which results from the touch of the elbows and the unit of the command. Each skirmisher is his own commandant, and only consults his individual strength. He sees a large group coming down on him. He is too weak to resist it. He falls back. His neighbors on the right and on the left do the same, and lead away their neighbors, who run because others do, and fear to be cut off. They go and rally further off, there to recommence firing."

P153 – "Our company will not return that fire. It will retire at the run, or screen itself behind some accident of the ground. Nothing is so stupid or injurious than those wranglings and skirmishing that lead to nothing."

aye, very interesting point about skirmishers running off, we have a section of rules devoted to "Evasion" where the commander (player) of a threatened skirmish line can call out, "Evade" if the screen is in trouble. They immediately about turn and flee directly away from the threat with no Morale check needed to be made. However, if contacted by the enemy if they are chargers are considered Routed and suffer accordingly.

Regards,
Shane

Guys,

At the risk of insinuating into a 200 post discussion with no intention to take the time to provide sources…

Skirmish lines were 15% to 25% of a unit. They were used to keep opposing skirmishers from harassing friendly units and were thus usually deployed to protect their division/brigade.

Control was important. Skirmishing was very formal and was tightly controlled by officers with whistles and hornists. Skirmishers were paired, a foreman and backman, and the width of a skirmish file was about 44" or double close order. The foreman, did not fire till the backman was loaded and so forth. Skirmish lines had a certain percentage kept in rally platoons scattered across the front where the deployed skirmishers could rush for santuary from a sudden cavalry charge.

Skirmishers rarely got closer than 100 yards, nor did most have anything other than a standard issue musket. Thus, the chance to hit was somewhere in the vicinity of .005%. The skirmish line was most often doubled, firing by introduction or extroduction and the officers paid attention not to block supporting artillery which did the real damage.

A great representation is in the Russian War and Peace movie, the Battle of Schoengraben. The French grenadiers advancing through the vinyard are in skirmish order and when the Russian battalion attacks they fire by extroduction and flee directly to the rear.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Something to add to the contribution of Captain Snort on 13th August about the 71st and Adam's Brigade.

From the published unpublished letters (Gareth Glover) number 128 by Capt. George Miller 2/95th this appears to be an action starting around 3pm. Adam's brigade first forms square near the road to Nivelles. The enemy attacks the guns on the ridge. The brigade advances to the base of the ridge and forms squares. French cavalry take the guns. British cavalry drive the French cavalry away then the ground clears.

French skirmishers (Miller uses the very word) were close behind the cavalry so Adam's brigade formed line and met the French as the rose the hill. The brigade then charged and form square on the forward slope.

Eeles (no 129 in Siborne's published letters) mentions the successful deployment of the 71st under fire from these French in their grey great coats. Eeles company of 3/95th formed line with the 71st and fired on the French who "retired almost unobserved in the smoke". The 71st and 3/95th were still suffering losses so Eeles company moved forwards to find a body of French in a hollow who Eeles attached driving the French back up the hill.

Sounds like a skirmisher fight to me.

Prussians used skrimishers on a regular basis from 1792 on wards, at Valmy the battle line was screened by skirmishers.

Discard Paret and read instead Colin in case you want to find a bit more about French skirmishing.

also – in some armies is was called skirmish order – which meant that there was order to it and not just an unformed mass of infantry burning powder.

Shane, are you still looking for Russian jager battalion strengths? If so, I can offer the following from Russian returns (and hope the columns come out right):

7 Sep/26 Aug 1805

6th jager

Establishment

Shane – are you still looking for jager strengths? If so, I can offer the following from Russian returns (and hopefully the formatting will work this time):

7 Sept/25 Aug 1805
(numbers indicate establishment/on the rolls/present and accounted for, establishment being indicated as the number "lacking" from the number on the rolls)

6th jager, 1805
officers 155/155/153
jager 1200/1150/1102
musicians 32/32/32
non-combatants 125/125/112
total 1512/1462/1399

Effective strength 92.5% of establishment at start of campaign

8th jager, 1805
officers 154/153/149
jager 1200/1127/1078
musicians 32/32/30
non-combatants 126/125/114
total 1512/1437/1371

Effective strength 90.7% of establishment at start of campaign

The variations in stated establishment from regiment to regiment are straight from the document

Returns of 25/13 Nov 1805:
numbers are establishment and on rolls:

5th jager, 1805
officers 155/146
jager 1200/1075
musicians 32/32
non-combatants 125/118
total 1512/1371

7th jager, 1805
officers 155/151
jager 1200/1125
musicians 32/32
non-combatants 125/124
total 1512/1432

Ulyanov's Regulyarnaya Pekhota 1801-1805, part of the Istoriya Rossiiskikh Voick series, confirms 1200 jager per regiment, 400 per battalion, established 1802. Ulyanov shows 8 fewer under-officers than the establishment indicated in the returns though.

There seems to have been an increase in jager establishment between 1805 and 1808 to bring their strength in line with the other infantry regiments, but I don't have an exact date for this. But from a March 1808 return, 7th jager has the following (establishment/on rolls/present):

27/15 March 1808

7th jager, 1808
officers 169/116/93
jager 1692?/2165/1579
musicians 32/21/20
non-combatants 126/112/88
total 1512/1432/1780

This return is hard to interpret, most of the men absent are either in the infirmary, detached, out of the country or in hospitals – the injured and maybe even some prisoners from the 1807 campaign presumably still on the rolls. So the number of jager lacking is 0 while the number on the rolls is plainly over establishment. But the establishment officers is shown as in line with the other infantry regiments, suggesting the number of men are as well and the overage is the result of the large number recovering from wounds or illness. Assuming 1692 to be the establishment strength, this shows an 88.2% effective strength up joining the army of Moldavia.

Overall, it seems at start of campaign the regiments were maybe 10% below establishment on average. Maybe Steve can pinpoint a date for the increase in jager establishment. I'm either overlooking it or it isn't in any of the sources I have at hand.

Hope this helps.

Oh and regarding the 728 battalion strength, I would expect this to be the case in 1799 when the battalions were 5 companies (5 companies at roughly 150 per company = 750 establishment). I don't have volume 1 of the Istoriya Rossiiskikh Voick series, but Nafziger shows an establishment of 23 officers (he seems to have missed non-coms/under officers) and 750 jager in the 1796 jager battalions and 118 officers and 1260 men in the 1798 establishment. I am not certain of his figures, though, since his figures for the 1802 establishment deviate from Ulyanov and the actual returns. He shows 1120 jager instead of 1200 for the 1802 establishment, which could be a peacetime/wartime variation, I suppose.

Carney,

Page 260 of vol 1,[I]Istoriya Rossiiskikh Voick[/I] give a eger battalion 735 souls per PCZPI No. 18308 dated 5.i.1798(os).

Steve

That's PSZRI. <;^}

Well, either i missed something in Ulyanov, Ulyanov is presenting peacetime establishment, or there was an adjustment between 1802 and 1805. The musketeer regiments in 1805 and 1808 returns show 1980 men as the establishment, not 1672 as shown in Ulyanov.

Some more info on jager establishment: From Istoriya 96-go Omskago Polka by Kapitan V. V. Rantsov (The Omsk Infantry Regiment was formed from what began as the 2nd eger battalion)

1796 establishment (battalion)
23 officers
50 unter officers
750 soldiers
60 soldiers "extra complement"
32 non-combatants
33 orderlies/servants
948 total
(855 without "extra complement" and orderlies/servants)

Unfortunately the 5 Jan 1798 establishment isn't included.

1802 establishment:

4 shtab officers
42 ober officers
1340 lower ranks (non-coms/unter officers, soldiers and musicians)
[the 1340 breaks down to 108 non-coms, 1200 soldiers, and 32 musicians]
126 non-combatants
73 orderlies/servants* (dentschikov)
1585 total
(1512 w/o orderlies/servants)

1806 changes:

Decree of 4 July 1806 adds 12 praportchiks to the officers of the regiment; decree of 16 August 1806 brings establishment even with musketeer regiments.

1806 establishment:

7 shtab officers
54 ober officers
120 unter officers
1980 soldiers
56 musicians
148 non-combatants
94 orderlies/servants* (dentschikov)
2459 total
(2365 w/o orderlies/servants)

*These are not enumerated in the returns I have for 1805 and 1808

So from August 1806 on, the jager and musketeer establishments are the same.

Carnot,

I owe you a debt of gratitude; this is exactly what I have been looking for, conformation of the strengths. I knew they were weaker for 1805, I remember reading it so thank you very much.

I also remember reading that most of the non-combatants were actually servants or (slaves)? Can't remember which, but probably means the same really.

This goes along with my system for attrition during a campaign. In my system I start every Battalion at FULL paper strength (unless I have data that states otherwise) and let attrition take its toll. Usually strategic consumption is between 10-20% before the unit even sees combat, this accounts for the sick, lame, disaffected and deserters. So the average 10% losses seem pretty spot on from your data.

Again, thank you very much.

Shane

Thank you !! Robert and Steven – great "stuff".

I have this for 1812 non-combattants, but it is just old (and unverified) notes, so the counts may be off. Anyway, none of these are servant, far less serfs and certainly not slaves. There were many of them likely to have been born into serf families (others from the petit bourgeois and soldiers' sons), but they would all be soldier class as soon as they were inducted.

The "servants" listed above I have never seen ennumerated. Are tehy listed for the purpose of drawing forage or ratios/allowances ? IF they are actually civilians, not inducted, then they could be state serfs. But most of them are not likely to have the officers' own serfs, as the vast majority of the officers owned only a few serfs (even counting their families' serfs) or none at all.

1812
НЕСТРОЕВЫХ / NESTROBYKH / NON-COMBATTANT
Батальонный лекарь / batalonnyi lekar / battalion doctor / 3
Надзиратель больных унтер-офицер чина / nadziratel bolnykh unter-ofitser china / hospital under-officer supervisor / 1
Цирюльник ротный / tsiryulnik rotnyi / company barber / 12
Лазаретный служитель ./ lazaretnyi sluzhitel / hospital attendant / 12
Вагенмейстер / vagenmeister / baggage master / 1
Писарь / pisar / clerk / 6
Ложенной мастер / lozhennoi master / master gunsmith / 1
Ему учеников / emu uchenikov / his apprentices / 12
Оружейный мастер / oruzheinyi master / master vetrinairian / 1
Ему учеников / emu uchenikov / his apprentices / 6
Коновал konoval / armorer/ 1
Кузнец / kuznets / blacksmith / 6
Плотник / plotnik / carpenter / 12
Фурлейт / furleit / drivers / 41*
Профос / profos / provost / 3

* Since 1802, the regimental convoy had the following composition: 5 regimental vehicles (for medical supplies, for records and written matters, for the Church, for tools, for the treasury), the vehicles for the patients (one per company), ammunition supply (one per company), tents (one per company) – in order to move all this 169 draft horses were required. In March 1812, a new order to the army was sent out effecting (at least) mew;y raised regiments. Tents were not to be taken into the field ; the convoy was reduced to : 12 ammunition wagons, 12 provision wagons, 3 medical vehicles, 3 regimental vehicles (for records and written matters, for the treasury, for tools).

Five more, pre-1812, but still not a perfect match for the establishments given above :
Аудитор auditor / auditor / 1
Священник / svyashchennik / priest /1
Церковник / tserkovnik / assistants to the priest / 2
Штаб-лекарь / shtab-lekar / staff-doctor / 1

Shane – The non-combatants were mostly professionals/tradesman except for the teamsters (as you can see above).

For the status of the Russian soldier: Conscription in the Russian army was for life, so once conscripted they became their own class, as already noted. If you are interested enough, I would recommend tracking down a copy of Elise Wirtschafter's From Serf to Russian Soldier. I have seen used copies available at a low price in the states, not sure how accessible it would be in oz. It's basically a social history of the Russian soldier class. The situation of the Russian soldier is unique among European armies and subject to quite a bit of myth and misconception. It seems to me a lot of the misconceptions come from the worst examples of bahavior among the Russian elites (some of whom were plainly sociopaths) rather than from a study of the actual situation of the soldiers, which makes Wirtschafter particularly valuable.

Evan, this is the first time I've seen the "dentschikov" too. I had to look up the translation so there may be a better term for them than my dictionary gave me. Rantsov presents them rather blandly in the list of the establishment of the battalion/regiment. They don't seem to have gone on campaign, though. Maybe something related to children enlisted with the regiment? Soldiers' children were considered to be in military service from birth to age 15 (Mikaberidze, Russian Officer Corps and there were also military orphans, but the specific number in the establishment strength seems odd if this was the case.

Might have to ask Alex. The last time I needed input from Alex, I just typed his name twice in a forum posting and he appeared (sort of like Doctor Bombay in Bewitched). Let's see if it works on this forum too. Alex Mikaberidze … Alex Mikaberidze … emergency emergency, come right away!

денщик денщика / денщики денщиков : I would have translated as "orderly / orderlies".

Officers servants. Here is the repartition for a kirasir polk of 1812 :
генерал-майор / шеф / 8
полковник / командир / 6
подполковник / зам.командира / 4
майор / ком. дивизиона или эскадрона / 3
ротмистр или штабс-ротмистр / командир эскадрона / 2

Later in the 19th century they were taken from the recruits that were inducted, but starting when I do not know. If not soldier class, they would have to be state peasants as they are noted as being "given by the tsar" to the officer.

I thought that in our era that they were like French palfreniers and domestic servants, but more of them per regiment, assumedly to avoid the French practice of pressing soldiers to do this work (in spite of the regulations). I also thought that they did take the field. Thus I would have expected to see them in ration/forage allowances, but not enummerated with the regiment.

If your magic summons does not work, I will try to look around a bit over the weekend and see if I can find more information.

P.S.

I thought the children and military orphans were carried on the rolls of specific units in the garrison "arm of service", school companies or commands and similar, not on the lists for the active regiments of the "army" arms of service. The structure of this is described in some detail in the Viskovatov.

But the "orderlies" might easily have been taken from among the older children anyway.

OK, here is some enlightening info from Wirtschafter. Very brief, but enlightening. I was thinking of the children, but maybe should have been thinking of the elders.

Acc. to Wirtschafter (pp 41-2), the regimental non-combatants were "Men physically unsuitable for combat." Non-combatant lower ranks could rank as privates or non-coms depending on the position "and availability of manpower." She provides examples of these non-combatants including the list above and also … orderlies. "Availability of manpower" seems to indicate that the positions were not filled by seeking people for the jobs but rather choosing the most suitable from some pool of less physically capable men.

So from this it seems that the orderlies and non-combatants might be drawn from the class known as invalides in the French army, except maybe the specialists – like doctor, vet, priest and the artisans (gunsmith, carpenter etc) that would seem to need some specialized skills. So those with skills get the specialized positions, the best physical specimens (or younger ones) might land gigs as drivers, hospital staff, etc. and the orderlies might be the rest, sort of a catchall labor pool of older or mildly disabled veterans. Makes sense.

BTW, Wirtschafter defines the Ïðîôîñ as "barrack and camp cleaners" which is a bit more lowly that I would associate with "provost".

OK, so why does the forum software like YOUR cyrillic and not MINE?

"barrack and camp cleaners" – that's not right, as well as not nice. It is "provost" – military police-ish. Similar to the original meaning of "prévôt"/ "prévost" in French, from which the Russian term might have arisen.
I suppose that the error lies in thinking of "faire la police" as a faux ami for our current usage of "police the area" = "clean up the barracks and camp".

For Cyrillic ….
1. If you don't have one, get a working computer and operating system …. you know, the ones made by Apple
:-)
2. On your Apple, set everything that you can for the default "utf-8" character encoding.
3. choose "Cyrillic Russian" as an alternate language in "System Preferences". A (modern) Russian flag will join your Stars&Stripes, Tricolor, etc, in a little drop-down menu of flags in the right corner of your menu bar.
4. Select Russian flag … the keyboard and several other functions are now Cyrillic.

I shudder to think how many little flags are in the little drop-down menu for our Mr. Smith.

My wife is (very) Russian, so Russian-enabling the computers is required in our family, despite her fluency in English and French.
:-)

found this :

link

and this…

link

interesting.

also this :

link

These are worth a look as well

link

In particular this one –
link

It describes a unit using extended order to look more numerous and the non-decisive use of enemy skirmishers