"Help me understand skirmishers et al and their effectiveness" Topic

>"Such sharpshooters, all of which being expert and skilled men, are each armed with a small blunderbufs ( arquebuse ), and [ are ] allways sure to hit their mark, at a distance of one hundred and fifty paces ( 2 )."<

I find it hard to believe that anyone could hit anything at 150 paces with a blunderbuss! It'd be hard enough with a decent smoothbore musket. Certainly, they would not hit their mark "allways".

Nor am I convinced that a German officer would know so much about how French formations operated.

If this much is in doubt, how reliable is the rest?

to donlowry,

Responding to the just previous post (12 aug 5:14 PM)- maybe look at it this way.

Not everything that everyone says is accurate, although most people will try to explain thing as well as they understand them. I think what you have is a German officer who can not understand how the unformed units that he knows about (empressed conscripts who might operate as skirmishers very poorly and who would run away and hide if asked to approach a formed enemy unit!) could cause the casulties that he has experienced from the French. He doesn't know what the French can and are doing so he comes up with the best explaination that he can. He doesn't seem to know squat about firearms. (Hunting deer with buckshot (blunderbluss-liek) is okay in buildup areas because 0.30" type shot falls to the ground after about 75 yards). But he knows that the enemy fire is murderous and offers his best explination. Stagecoach drivers used blunderbusses against robbers and the fire from them was unbeliveably effective. Right, he doesn't know much about French formations operate nor about ballistics. But he is an acccurate observer and recorder that his side has been shot to ribbons by a bunch of unformed Frenchies.

Shane,

The quoted document of 1807 says :
"The Corps Elite of the French Land Forces, tho' well known actually to exist, has ever since its establishment been made an object of jealous secrecy by the French, …. In any cases, when the whole army is concentrating for a general battle, the several bodies of sharpshooters, belonging to the Corps of each Marshall, are formed into ONE separate Corps by itself, consisting together in sixteen thousand men ( Corps d'Elite )."

To which I commented :
"Does this not strike you as a description of Oudinot's combined elite formation ?"
I did not "conclude that it has to be Oudinot's Elite Corps", I merely raised this as a possibility. Do you know of other groupings of French forces in about the year 1807 in the 10,000+ men size drawn for special skill or capability from many corps ? I don't know of any others, but maybe you or someone else does. Hence I asked a question.

I might also note that our Herr Anonymous, who does not claim to an officer, also does not claim to be an "eyewitness". He actually says :
"The same is the result of an unintermitted Investigation, and also of occasional conversation, with some eminent, and most instructed French Officers."

------------------

Bills' Fan,

"I think what you have is a German officer who can not understand how the unformed units that he knows about …. could cause the casulties that he has experienced …. shot to ribbons by a bunch of unformed Frenchies."

Did I miss something ? (I often do.)
Does the author (who does not claim to be an officer, nor an eye-witness) say he is talking about unformed units in his letter ?

When this anonymous officer speaks about a corps dÉlite I think he might be referencing that term subject to his own idea of a corps dÉlite. What I mean is, Jaegers in the German armies where known as Corps d'Elite because of their specialized role. I don't think he is referring to an actual "Corps" but using the term in the context of "group" of Elite…

I could be wrong but as with an interpretation of ones words unless that person is alive and available for comment on his actual meaning it is open to conjecture and misinterpretation by anyone.

Regards,
Shane

The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789 – 1802 Paddy Griffith
Page 208 – Skirmishing

Overall, there was simply not enough time to give proper training to the large numbers of new soldiers who kept arriving in the armies during he hectic crisis year of 1793, and although it is clear that many of them did receive a full grounding in one version or another of the drill manual, it is equally clear that few of the formed units could be considered truly reliable in combat, either for fire or shock action. Since the generals were only too painfully aware of that fact, the remained reluctant to venture out into open country where solidity in the Old Regime's drills would be at a premium. By sticking to rough or broken ground they would not only limit the risk to their own men, but would also deprive the enemy of one of its main advantages. This point was also well understood by the enemy himself, and the Prussian aide to General Knobelsdorf said of the French in May 1793 were :

"still badly trained; but they were not only our equals but our superiors in the woods where the soldier doesn't keep in his ranks, executes none of the evolutions of the drill manual and, covered by the trees, needs do nothing apart from fire his musket. Our men, accustomed to fight in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy" (ibid, vol, 10 p.96).

This little snippet is an incite into he mind of the men of he time and how the enemy found themselves frustrated by an enemy apparently not playing fair…Not used to this kind of seemingly non accustomed style of warfare the Prussians, and probably every enemy force were frustrated at facing an enemy who they expected to come out and fight the same way they were trained. Once they found out the hard way that the French were not going to play the same game they had no choice but to follow suite…with disastrous results at first. This also tells me that on this occasion the aide is probably relating to us, albeit unbeknown to him at the time that his men and the command were, in having to adapt to this style of combat were at the same time learning from it and planting the seeds to their own revolution in combat style…

Shane

sorry, insight I should have said.

Same book, same page, further down :

"The émigré journalist Mallet du Pan was more pungent, when he said that "Tactical plans are a pure waste of time against a vast scum of floating irregular troops whose true force consists of their impetuous torrent" (ibid, vol. 10,p.96).

I strongly recommend this book to those wanting to understand the Revolutionary French army and how it fought.

link

Regards,
Shane

Again: Same book, next page 209 :

"A few champions of Light Infantry, such as General Duhesme (b. 1766, and very active in the wars of the 1790's), nevertheless did see dispersed skirmishing as the ‘scientific' warfare of the future and his book, published in 1814, was to remain influential long after he had been killed at Waterloo. Even Duhesme, however, was careful to distinguish between his ideal of properly trained elite light infantry which did need new drill manuals, and the sort of untrained formless mobs (‘grandes bandes") that he had sometimes seen in the aRmy of the North in 1792-94. He did not think the later had a great deal of value until special training courses were organized for them at the Tongres camp after Fleurus; and he cited occasions in 1794 when the Austrians had ambushed them, played with them, and generally worn them down, rather than vice versa (pp. 72-73).

Regards,
Shane

here is a link to Duhemse's book :

link

Shane,

I would jump to agree wiht oyu about the use of "corps d'élite", except that the writer called it out as large (16,000 men he says) and collected from the commands of all the maréchaux.

"This little snippet is an insight into he mind of the men of the time"
But the time is 1793, not the Empire. And we are not even talking about "grand bands" or "swarms" or anything other than fighting in broken terrain.

I would NEVER (emphasis, not insult mate) have written on this thread if it were about "swarms" and "mobs" and what not in 1793. I just don't see a Davout, for example, doing it as a innovation, a special tactic, or a special advantage in 1805-1815. In fact, I dont see it all under the Empire except in very unusual and typically unfortunate circumstances (such as Ney at LHS).

I think this is his, not sure, can't speak French myself…

actually, a great deal of this thread is about grand bands which started in the revolutionary period…

I am trying to put forward the proof that during the Revolution the French army used such massive skirmisher screens, swarms, clouds of entire Line infantry formations as skirmishers simply because they did not know "yet" any other way to fight due to ill training or no training. I think you should read Paddy Griffiths book, it will enlighten you to what I am talking about.

I am sure the same heavy skirmisher formations were equally used during the Empire period as previous posters have said but by the time of Davout etc and the Empire the scientific art in this had been refined and honed. Each French Division of the Empire had a Legre Regiment posted to the first brigade of these divisions who were used many times in the same manor, namely as grandes bandes…Simply because their job was to cover and screen an entire division.

Shane

"still badly trained; but they were not only our equals but our superiors in the woods where the soldier doesn't keep in his ranks, executes none of the evolutions of the drill manual and, covered by the trees, needs do nothing apart from fire his musket. Our men, accustomed to fight in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy" (ibid, vol, 10 p.96).

"Ibid" is, of course, neither the author nor the title of the source. A bit of detective work suggests that:

This appears to be an English translation, from the French, from page 96 of the work:

Valenciennes (1793) by Arthur Chuquet. Published by Léopold Cerf in 1894:

link

Which lists "Dohna II, p 88-92; Uber den Feldzug, p. 296" as sources. I assume that the Dohna work cited is
Dohna, Albrecht Leopold Wilhelm Graf von. Der Feldzug der Preußen gegen die Franzosen in den Niederlanden im Jahre 1793. 4 vols. 1798-1807.

Graf Dohna was in 1793 the aide-de-camp of Knobelsdorf.

It is also used in the 2000 essay:

Theorists, Instructors, and Practitioners: The Evolution of French Doctrine in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815 by Kevin Kiley

link

thx Steve,

I knew you would come up with the goods on this

Regards,
Shane

Let's re-focus to the period of the Empire and the following ideas, quoting Kevin :

"First, the French used skirmishers in very large numbers. …. Second, many French commanders would deploy their first line as a heavy skirmish line instead of in three ranks. They would feed that line in the firefight with troops from the second line who were still in ranks."
"I'm talking about deploying and fighting in grandes bandes and/or skirmisher swarms. The French were deploying entire regiments in open order as late as 1813-1814. And I do not agree with you that 'skirmishing is skirmishing' when the French did it differently and much more proficiently than did the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians."
"I would submit that the French infantryman was adept at skirmishing because he was given his head and probably because there was a natural aptitude for it."
"The French did not conduct fighting in open order 'by the numbers.' …. It was instinctive, fluid, and was employed for a variety of missions …. I even doubt that the usual French skirmisher tactics recommended skirmishers always fighting in pairs."

This is giving the impression that, under the Empire :
(i) the French used more skirmishers than their opponents, indeed "very large numbers"
(ii) the French used skirmishers in swarms or "grandes bandes", not guided "by the numbers" or regulations, but instead by "instinct"
(iii) these swarms, made of whole battalions and regiments, formed a firing line and were continually fed replacement men from other units in a "second line" of battalions and regiments, who were waiting while formed "in ranks"
(iii) for the French, each man is "given his head", for which the French uniquely have a "natural aptitude"
(iv) the French did this routinely and by choice
(v) thus, the French "did it differently" from their opponents and thereby enjoyed an advantage over their opponents

We are not talking about the Revolution. We are not talking about skirmishing per open order regulations (such as Davout's or the many listed by Oliver), which are essentially similar to all the other nations' methods. Instead, we are talking about some special French capability, based on greater freedom of individual action and much larger numbers of skirmishers, for which the French have a speical "natural aptitude". We are told that this was an advantage for the French.

Now, look at the threead again. Is it me, or is there NOTHING in the thead and the materials provided as links which substantiates these concepts ?

Monsieur Chasseur:

I agree with your conclusion: "Now, look at the thread again. Is it me, or is there NOTHING in the thead and the materials provided as links which substantiates these concepts?

There was a long discussion on NS in January, 2005 about skirmishing (many of the same questions/points as in this thread) that I reviewed in detail. John Cook concluded that some modern authors refer to grande bandes as if they were the norm. Bressonet, based on Marbot's [Colonel] distinction, identified but one example of a grande bande in 1806 – at Auerstedt. John noted "that speculating on the basis of third hand material is no substitute for primary material and secondary material which has a high degree of substance, such as Bressonet and Foucart."

The discussion also noted, as I also mentioned, that there is no agreed upon "definition" for certain word useages ("grande bande", "swarm", "cloud").

Looking at the sources offered in notional support of the French advantage in skirmishing ….

OK, I don't have the work this was taken from, but it was writtten in French, not English, so whatever Duhesme wrote, somebody translated it. In any case, a quick source-check follows below.

"The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their front or flanks did not know how to spread out or to maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol."
-Duhesme on Russian jagers

Philibert-Guillaume Duhesme (1766-1815)
- studied at the college of Dijon
- raised his own free company in 1791, joined to Dumouriez' command as a capitaine
- promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1792
- wounded at Villeneuve in July 1793, where he stopped his troops from running away, for which he was promoted to général de brigade
- commanded the avant-garde in the invasion of Flanders in 1794, distinguished at Maastricht and promoted général de division
- under Moreau with l'armée du Rhin in 1797, then l'armée d'Italie
- under Championnet in Naples in 1798
- court-martialed along with Championnet in early 1799, but acquitted and made governor of Apulia, then to the army of the Alps, where his division guarded the passes
- to the army of the Reserve in May 1800, army of Italy in July and army of Batavia in September
- from 1801 to 1805 he commanded the 19e division militaire (territorial reserve in the Lyon region)

It was at this time that the wrote his
"Précis historique de l'infanterie légère et de son influence dans la tactique des différents siécles."
This was published at Lyon in 1806.
This was reprinted in Paris in 1814 under the title
"Essai historique sur l'infanterie légère … "

So, we can note :
(i) the "quote" was about the Russians during the reign of Tsar Paul, before 1801
(ii) Duhesme had not, as far as I can tell, ever faced the Russians in combat

The value of this "quote", whatever Duhesme himself actually wrote, for the comparison of the French to the Russians in skirmishing under the Empire (1804-1815) is thus …. ???. I dont see this as applicable at all, but maybe I am wrong somehow ?

Nice DUHESME Bio:

link

Interesting to remark on the passage quoted by chasseur-

"The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their front or flanks did not know how to spread out or to maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol."
-Duhesme on Russian jagers

I take from this that for a mass of skirmishers to be effective there needs to be control by both officers and NCOs. The mass or swarm requires more than "instinct" to be effective.

Working through the whole period from revolution to 1815 perhaps the interpretation could be as follows:-

Revolutionary armies learn to fight in more broken terrain and large scale irregular combat gives sucess. (aside – a form of asymetric warfare of its time)

French continue to evolve and formalise skirmishing whilst becoming more competant in open ground.

1805-1809 Prussians, Austrians and Russians outclassed by French skirmishing methods. Even when these use skirmisher they lack the expertise and experience in the officers and NCOs.

1810-1814 Prussians, Austrians and Russians develop their skirmishing capabilities becoming in some cases a match for the French especially after the loss of experienced NCOs and officers in 1812.

Following a separate course we have the British who gained light infantry and skirmish experience in the American independence war and kept this through Moore and others so were the equals of the French from the early stages in the peninsular. (and I accept the fact that the early peninsular French were not the veterans of 1800-1805 before anyone raises that point!!)

nice information chasseur,

however :

<<<<We are not talking about the Revolution. We are not talking about skirmishing per open order regulations (such as Davout's or the many listed by Oliver),>>>>

Sorry chasseur but although the conversation has centered on Davout and the Empire at not stage was this conversation limited to nothing but the Empire. Many people were bringing up the words, "grande bandes", I am only trying to remind or educate TMP readers of the significance of where grande bandes originated during the revolution, I feel this is important to know and understand. I don't think advising as such is a cause for dismissal.

Shane

I do not think we are limiting the period in this discussion. For me, we are past the stage of establishing the "existance theorum" for the French using a loose but well-populated formation to attack formed troops and should be trying to quanify the extent and qualities thereof. It's sort of like medieval Europeons doubting the existance of the rhinoceros. You only have to have one of them corralled and examimed to establish they exist. Although some people will quote a lot of sources that deny they exist or describe elephants and hippos and horses. I'm not trying to be a wise-, I'm trying to frame where the arguments and discussion is going.

"For me, we are past the stage of establishing the "existance theorum" for the French using a loose but well-populated formation to attack formed troops"

I agree.

I was trying to get at :
(i) did the Frech prefer an open regulated formation (as per Davout's instructions) or some "swarm" where each skirmisher was "given his head" and acted by "instinct" because of some "natural aptitude" unique to Frenchmen ?
(ii) was the French practice different from their opponents?
(iii) was the French use of a "swarm" method, in instances such as Ney at La Haye Sainte, preferred by them or occasionally forced upon them by circumstances ?
(iv) did the French use more skirmishers than their opponents ? did the French use skirmishers differently from their opponents ?
(v) did the French have an advantage in skirmishing vs. their opponents ?

I think the answers to the above may be different between 1793 and 1815. I was trying to focus on the Empire (not limit discussion to this period alone) because (i) I think more of use have Empire-era armies and (ii) it appears that none of the contemporary sources offered so far support a view of the French as in any way unique in this era compared to their opponents.

IF fighting in "swarms" and "clouds" of skirmishers was so effective during the wars of the Revolution, why did the French revert to formed ranks as the rule during the Empire?

Horse chaser,

I agree. I got a lot of studying to do. This is the sort of thing that makes nappies fun. I have a new project. Part of it is to see how to take different national characteristics (on the game table) from the "die-roll-table" to rules that reflect how they operated. A second is to work specificily on the French "formation" under discussion, understand it, reduce it to wargame rules and also understand how other nations countered it and implemented, within their own limitations, methods that has a similiar impact (or chose not to).

Saisir la balle au bond

Alex

Hi Chasseur et al,

Thank you all for your very interesting contributions to this thread. Chasseur wanted to re-focus the thread by writing:

"This is giving the impression (from Kevin Kiley's comments) that, under the Empire:

(i) the French used more skirmishers than their opponents, indeed "very large numbers"

(ii) the French used skirmishers in swarms or "grandes bandes", not guided "by the numbers" or regulations, but instead by "instinct"

(iii) these swarms, made of whole battalions and regiments, formed a firing line and were continually fed replacement men from other units in a "second line" of battalions and regiments, who were waiting while formed "in ranks"

(iv) for the French, each man is "given his head", for which the French uniquely have a "natural aptitude"

(v) the French did this routinely and by choice

(vi) thus, the French "did it differently" from their opponents and thereby enjoyed an advantage over their opponents

…we are talking about some special French capability, based on greater freedom of individual action and much larger numbers of skirmishers, for which the French have a special "natural aptitude". We are told that this was an advantage for the French.

Now, look at the thread again. Is it me, or is there NOTHING in the thread and the materials provided as links which substantiates these concepts?"

I'm not an historian, even at the most amateur level, but:

(i) There are a couple of battles where the large-scale use of French skirmishers to telling effect at the grand tactical level has been recounted in English secondary sources (i.e. Jena-Auerstadt, Thann (both Petre) and Waterloo (Siborne) and, maybe, Gamonal and Somosierra (Oman). I cannot think of any similar claims made on behalf of any Allied troops in any English secondary source (although I am certainly unable to claim that I have read them all, or can remember all of those that I have read).

(ii) Siborne uses the term ‘grandes bandes' explicitly to differentiate from skirmishers and skirmishing and clearly expects it to mean something. I think the ‘instinct' ties in more with point (iv).

(iii) Petre makes this claim about Friant's troops for the April 1809 campaign, at least the first half of this point. I don't know at all where the second part comes from.

(iv) I think the criticism of the lack of formal documentation on this point is a bit unfair if the claim is that the French used this technique in an ‘instinctive' way. I understand the point of this claim not to be that the French were ‘racially' better skirmishers or more intelligent, but that the French Revolutionary soldiers discovered, almost accidentally, that it was more effective to use unregulated leadership with untrained skirmishers than to try and learn it in manuals and thus did so, whilst the Allied armies never made, or had to make, this discovery.

(v) From what I have read, not so in the Imperial period. Siborne has Ney do this AFTER the fall of La Haye Sainte because he is short of men and the ground is favourable (woods and wheatfields to hide in). Petre also indicates that the wooded terrain dictated Friant's actions at Thann and Laichling and one can infer that the ground played a large part against Grawert at Jena. From these two sources, it is as much a weapon of circumstance as a weapon of choice. It is perhaps worthy of note that Oman and Gates IIRC criticize the French in the Peninsular for not using sufficient skirmishers.

(vi) I think that the claim is more that the French sometimes did it differently and it sometimes paid off. From Siborne and Petre, it isn't clear that the French Infantry's attack was more potent than, say, infantry in line (at both Waterloo and Jena, the opposing infantry put up with this for sometimes over two hours, far longer than a close-range close-order musketry duel) but that it reduced their losses. Petre does credit it with helping to defeat the Austrians at the beginning of 1809 – and contrasts the much better Austrian performance in the later battles as partly a function of the more open terrain.

It is clear that these two sources may well be mistaken. But to show that they were mistaken, one of the historians who write about this will have to show that Petre and Siborne were inaccurate or that their summaries were in error. Capt S wrote that he thought that Siborne was summarizing a much more complex series of events when he talked about ‘Tirailleurs en grande bande' – perhaps he could signpost us to those primary sources, and maybe others could do so for 1806 and 1809.

I would like to make it clear that I certainly don't claim to know the truth of the matter or even have a best guess – I just thought that perhaps clarifying why a Napoleonic history enthusiast or gamer may have picked up some of these ideas might be helpful. I certainly don't consider myself a partizan for one side or another, but since Siborne and Petre can't defend themselves, the onus is probably on those wishing us all to take a different view to refute them.

Regards

Whirlwind,

For Waterloo, you need to seek out 2 books:

The Waterloo Letters, edited by H.T Siborne (W. Siborne's son)

and

Letters from the Battle of Waterloo (previously unpublished correspondence with Siborne), edited by Gareth Glover.

With these 2 volumes you will have access to the vast majority of Siborne's sources for the Anglo-allies at Waterloo.

Whirlwind,

Just to illustrate how Siborne saw swarms of skirmishers everywhere, whilst those who were there sometimes thought they saw something quite different, the advance of Adam's brigade against what was perhaps Foy and Bachelu is a good example.

Siborne's account of Adam's attack can be found on p301-302. It is clearly based on the accounts of Adam himself and Captain Eeles. Adam simply states that the attack was directed on a body of French infantry, but Eeles is far more specific:

"The brigade continued to advance through the smoke until it passed beyond the crest of the British position; on the smoke clearing away, the 71st Regiment, with whom my company was acting, found itself in column very close to and in front of a large body of the enemy's infantry, formed in line and dressed in grey greatcoats. The 71st immediately formed line, and I placed my company of rifles on the right of that regiment. I can only observe here that the French and 71st were closer than I ever before saw any regular formed adverse bodies, and much closer than troops normally engage. The French opened a heavy fire on the 71st, who, neverthless, completed their formation in the most regular and gallant style."

Siborne junior notes in the margin: "Most probably a dense line of skirmishers".

I'll leave you to make up your own mind here.

Thanks Capt S

I'll have a look for those letters when I get the chance. I'm still trying to find Siborne's account of the fighting you mention above – the page numbering of the edition on Google books is different.

link

Regards

Regards

…..actually I was at several of these battles and am rummaging around in the basement for the videos that I took that prove the point.

Whirlwind,

Siborne's account is on pages 470 and 471 in the link you provided.

Thanks Capt S, I've got it now.

Regards

Taken from Harry Smith's autobiography, Chapter 11, discussing the battle of Vittoria, 21 Jun 1813:

"…and the 52nd Regiment deployed into line as if at Shorncliffe, while our Riflemen were sent out in every direction, five or six deep, keeping up a fire nothing could resist."

Note: "five or six deep", IMHO a fairly thick skirmish line! OK, it's not conclusive evidence of widespread practice, but although remarked upon, it is not observed as an unusual occurrence.

Regards

A note to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (and maybe Georgia soon): Please keep copious notes on how things are done so you can write your memoirs when you get home for the sake of future historians. You wouldn't want us to give you the wrong facing colors, would you?

I though that keeping copious notes was considered a security risk and memoirs give away too much operational information. In another 200 years the TMP will still rely on conjecture and interpretation of training manuals.

True: we wouldn't want the enemy to discover our true facing colors!

I found the instructions:
"The Use of the Third Rank and Brigade Formations According to the Prussian Regulations of 1812" at link

This shows that the Prussians had learned much from their French enemies after being easily defeated while clinging to Fredrick the Great tactics. The regulations involve generating dense open order Advance Guard formations from either specified, purpose-designed Fusilier Battalions or (when lacking) from their detached organic third rank. The "default" brigade in defense is formed in the following areas: individual skirmishers, 2 dispersed Fusilier battalions (to counter French swarms) , 3 battalions of line infantry in line, and two reserve battalions in column. The "light" or fusilier units are used to hold the French "swarms" off of the formed troops, or to shoot up the enemies formed troops, in line. Some quotes from these regulations and (((my comments)))are given below.

"The two Fusilier Battalions are the Advance Guard before the first Battle Line. The first Battle Line consists of three battalions. Two battalions form the second Battle Line or reserve, namely the Grenadier battalion and the first battalion of the oldest infantry regiment."

"……..It is already mentioned above that arrangement of the Fusiliers depends completely on the circumstances and the terrain. If they should however not be present and are used elsewhere, then the Züge of the third rank take their place."
((the Zuges can also take the place of the missing light troops or serve as a flanking force or reserve))

"If the Fusiliers must depart far from the first Battle Line, in order to take available favourable posts into possession, then a half Horse battery is given to them, whereby then a whole Light Cavalry regiment or nevertheless at least some squadrons necessarily for the support of the infantry and artillery are sent along. In each case…."
(((a classic use of light troops)))

"The Fusiliers open combat of the infantry, which for this partly dissolves into a Tirailleurs line. If they are detached, then their place is taken by the third rank of the first Battle Line. If the Fusiliers cannot provide any more resistance against the enemy (((I think a better translation, would be "are unable to overthrow the enemy))), then the first Battle Line does not advance. The Fusiliers form Column, go through the reserve, and take position on the right and left on the wings of the same." (((This is the method ascribed to the French swarm attack, (dense open order unformed close-range firefight)))
"One can thus deviate from the usual battle order very easily in this kind of the attack arrangement, or from these form the normal position. The Fusilier battalions mask the attack Column, and drives out the enemies, who are not strong enough to resist Line light infantry. "
7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777
Section Four – Determination of the Third Rank
Chapter One – Use of the Third Rank Generally
1. – Introduction
"The infantry must be able to battle in the open and in the rough terrain, against dispersed and formed troops. Each separated troop, Battalion, Company etc. therefore has its detachment for the formed and dispersed Engagement; for the former the first and second ranks, for the latter the third rank.
….
4. Dispersed Combat.
Dispersed combat is where the third rank Züge are best used, although this appointment in no way waives the necessity, that all infantrymen individually must also be capable of this kind of fighting.
1) where the nature of the ground puts difficulties in the way of the movements of formed troops
2) to secure a formed line, or Column, against the fire of individual hostile Schutzen at a substantial distance; (((I think "individual hostile Schutzen" means the classical skirmish chain of pairs of skirmishers}}}}
3) a better aimed fire with security and ease than is possible in formed line, where each man pushes the others, and powder smoke prevents using aim, plus the advantages of the ground protect the individually standing Schutzen.
4) to mask another ones attack, and the enemy throws against it a dispersed swarm, and to prevent the enemy being aware of our movements. (((( and the "enemy…dispersed swarm" is something DIFFERENT than the "individual hostile Schutzen )))
From the use of the third rank for dispersed combat arises the advantage, that the battalion is not easily entangled in a combat where it fires its cartridges at long distance without effect, therefore it remains available in the most perfect order, so that at the crucial instant it can attack the enemy (, who are already shaken by the purposeful fire of the Schutzen,) with the Bayonet. (((ideally, the Prussian swarm shoots up and disorganizes the enemy line, and the Prussian formed line and columns are not disorganized and fully fresh)))

Sample Cases set up here for the purpose of providing explanation
1) if the infantry is posted in rough terrain, then the third rank and a part of the Cannon stand before the formed battalions. Both now form the fire line, until the attack of the formed section takes place.
2) the infantry is placed on mountains, or it has at some distance a brook, or hedges, defiles, houses and such before it; similarly the third rank is posted forward, which can in an advantageous way stop the enemy without entangling our formed battalions in the fire.
The ravines, hollows and outcrops, which occur on slopes, the bushes, embankments and such, and finally the before mentioned hedges, defiles and such, additionally give an opportunity nearly everywhere.
5. to approach or attack the enemy,.
Marching in rough terrain, changing terrain, or in high crops, briefly anywhere one can meet the enemy unexpectedly, then the division of the third rank marches some hundred steps before the front of the battalion in Züge, and has a small part as individual Schutzen before itself. The division of the third rank here drives out the hostile Skirmisher, Tirailleur, patrols, guards and such by which a formed battalion is held up.
(((notice the differentiation between Skirmishers and Tirailleurs)))

6. If one wants to pin the enemy line for a certain time.
If a battalion, brigade, or line faces the hostile cannon fire of an enemy line, without the two lines coming closer to each other, as so often is the case with a part of the army in all battles, then the third rank with or without cannons advances, and forms the first Battle Line or to a certain extent the fire line; the battalion or the brigade stops in recesses, or dead ground, so it can emerge at the crucial instant to deliver an attack. The third rank division disperses only a 1/3 part to at the most 2/3 of the whole, if the enemy does not press too strongly. If the whole third rank disperses, then it does not have Supports in itself, and will soon use itself up.
7 If the enemy yields, or we withdraw.
If the enemy yields, then the third rank pursues him fast; in this instance one must take some risk. Of each battalion one must always, however, withhold a small part of the third rank, one point is so that, if it becomes necessary, one can again collect the dispersed fighters, never wildly pursue the enemy without supports, when fighting dispersed never depart too far from this support troop. During dispersed fighting this was only too often the case for Germans in the last war, particularly in rough terrain. Thus they were separated and the battalions deprived themselves of their Schutzen.
If we ourselves withdraw, then the third rank must hold back the weaker enemy, so that the battalion is not stopped making its retreat. Züge which are beside each other, can, if the enemy is close, alternately retreat, and fire. If Cavalry in Squadron pursues, then the Schutzen must always stay at least four times more near the battalion than the hostile Cavalry. If troops pursue with individual Skirmishers, then a part of the division of the third rank remains formed with each other, and the remaining part is dispersed. Then the distance from the battalion depends on circumstances. It is a general rule to position a part of the retreating troops in such a fashion as to receive & stop the enemy pursuing the hindmost troops still under fire, and to repeat this maneuver as many times as the opportunity for it arises.
8. To attack or defend fortresses and entrenchment works.
With sieges, Schutzen of the third rank are definitely both in, and before the fortresses, to shoot constantly on the batteries in the embrasures. – in the fortress they occupy the forward post, and cause small losses etc. – with the attack they are appropriate for before the fortress covering and protecting the workers at night. With entrenchments they have the occupation of the available small posts etc.
With a fortress work, an entrenchment is first attacked, then it is surrounded by the third ranks of a whole brigade dispersed. These approach constantly, in the alternating fire, in which they throw themselves in furrows, hollows and such, until both cannon and the infantry open fire; now the Schutzen laying fire steadily on the artillery, kill the artillery men. If the third ranks fire their 60 shots in 1 to 2 hours in such a way, then they are replaced by others, and that fire is repeated. Now when the storm takes place, then it probably succeeds, because in most cases the enemy has been firing itself and does not any longer expect an attack."

((((I think the above regulations do a lot towards showing how the "swarm" and light troops were used and are an integral part of the Napoleonic battlefield. What is going to upset a lot of Nappie players is that their rule sets completely ignore the use of light troops and dispersed formations in doing attacks. If your birds eye view is high enough, say one stand is a brigade, it would be too find a detail although the different national characteristics should be elsewhere reflected in the rules. However, if you have multiple stands per battalion and are ignoring these, you are playing a SYW army 45 years too late. I'm sure everyone agrees with me completely and will have no comments. ))))

>"If your birds eye view is high enough, say one stand is a brigade, it would be too fin[e] a detail…"<

Thank you, Grande Armee, for saving me from all this!

Bills' Fan,

I don't want to seem unfriendly, and I really appreciate the Prussian regs (again an example of a definite open order regulation for skirmishing, like the Russians', like Davout's), but ….

You are using "swarm" alot. The regs mention it once : "einen Schwarm zerstreut fechtender Truppen" – "a swarm of scattered screening troops".

That does not say "infantry troops". It does not say "the great trick thing the French and only only French do – because they are given their heads and have "natural aptitude". It just says "screening troops".

Actually, I am not prefectly fluent in German, but I think it can apply to infantry, mounted troops, larger screening formations, small grenzer-like detachments of local territorials and so on. Look at the various usages in German with a google search.

The passage is talking about using the Prussian skirmishers to gain an advantage in a "petit guerre" of tactical intelligence. It does not talk about some commonly-seen special French battlefield tactic or evolution.

Now, the French may have had such a thing as an elan-based, unregulated swarm of skirmishers. But (I say again, with respect and friendship), I just haven't seen it mentioned in any contemporary source, other than as an un-desirable condition forced upon a commander by some special unfavorable condition, such as with Ney at La Haye Sainte.

For 1815, I play French. I WSIH I had some great trick skirmisher super-morale swarm attack to use on Wellington. :-)
But I dont think I can really ask for a special rule based only on quotes from modern tertiary English sources.
:-(

I got to admit, I agree chasseur. I feel the French learning the hard way how to perfect their skirmisher tactics during the revolutionary period has robbed us of a great tactic to use in the later empire period. I also am looking for eyewitness or doccumented accounts of the swarm, cloud tactic of the later empire and drawn a blank so far. I will keep looking though.

Shane

Evan if I understand what you are saying authors or eyewitness have used this term "swarm" to identify skirmishers who have "really" broken down into an unruly mob and all order and discipline has been lost. This is not a military formation but has only happened by accident not by design. If that is not the case then i guess I am out in left field. LOL

Regards
James

James,

My main point was to try to see what the collected wisdom of the group could produce in terms of specific, contemporary references to anything French that could be thought of as a a "large number" of skirmishers in a "swarm" that was organized not by some type of Réglement or Instruction, but instead relied upon a "natural aptitude" with each Frenchman "given his head". If this was an actual tactical advantage, and if it occurred under the Empire, so much the more interesting.

Your summary is not exactly my thoughts, but close (or included).

I have the impression (awaiting the source information that I have requested) of a good amount of untrained French infantry in the period of 1791-93 or so. I think "mobs" or "swarms" were quite possible. These may even have been problematic for France's opponents on occasion.

But, I think it was even more problematic for the French. It led to an inability to direct/re-direct the troops, recall them, manage casualty rates, maintian reserves, etc. So they trained their skirmishers, in a regulated open order style of fighting. The results are the various instructions that Oliver listed in his links. Under these, "swarming" was done only in broken terrain.

In training to these instructions, I dont see the French as really any different from the Russians (see their jäger instructions of vintage 1786 !) or the Austrians' grenzers and jägers. For Prussians or British, I don't really know. The Prussian instructions of 1812 seem to reprise ideas of about 1809. Maybe they did something different before then, and this really hurt them in 1806 ?

The quotes here on this thread indicate that the British had a roughly similar system, but with fewer troops and more markmenship – and a method that seemed to give the French rather more problems than the converse.

As to numbers, I can see that Russian jäger and French légère are typically about the same ratio to line infantry 1805-1812, after which the Russians actually have more light infantry. But, by 1812/1813, I am thinking any special attributes for the "lights" were tending to disappear in both these armies. Ditto early Austrians and later Prussians. The British seemed to live with a lower body count quite happily. The later Austrians and the early Prussians seem to have had a lower ratio of light troops.

I dont think we have sufficient order of battle data to fully evaluate the ratios 1791-1800, but I have never tried. It is quite conceivable that the French enjoyed a numerical advantage in light infantry in these years. Suvarov had only 2 line jäger regiments, if I recall correctly, which would be a bit "light on lights".

The notion of "natural aptitude" I find, frankly, both offensively close to ethno-centrism and absurd. A Parisian conscript did not have more "natural aptitude" for independent fire than an Austrian/Serbian grenzer border guard, or a Russian forester/game-keeper from Olonetz or the Baltic regions or a Komi-speaking native hunter from Vologda !

If we see French in swarms or mobs under the Empire (other than in broken terrain), I think it is because of unfavorable circumstance : the casualty-ridden battalions of Marmont's naval gunners acting as infantry, Ney's forlon hope with the decimated regiments at La Haye Saint, and so on. It was not an innovation or an advantage, nor even the French army's typical or preferred method.

But, I am really wishing I am wrong – and awaiting actual contemporary evidence to help me change my impressions.

:-)

dear horse chaser,

I think you need help in learning how to count. You accuse me in your 15Aug post of using the term "swarms" a lot. I used it twice in comments on the text and repeated the use in the conclusions. Not really a lot.

What I am seeing is that the Prussians in these regulations have put in a new specific way of fighting and tasks for units which is to use advanced unformed formations (even named differently, Fusiliers rather than Grenidiers or line or Grenzers or jagers) to fight in broken terrain, counteract the other sides (whatever you want to call them- dense skirmishers, unformed loose lines, "swarms" (a discriptive term, probably used because there was not a defined military terminology in Fredrick battle theory for it), pr rifle battalions (an English solution to counter it).

The 1812 regulations also every other situation that could arise including seiges, retreats, skirmishers, reserve companies on the flanks pulled from the 3rd rank etc. But they do mention:

"The two Fusilier Battalions are the Advance Guard before the first Battle Line"

Two battalions, (with a unique classification) in front of 3 battalions in line and 2 in column in reserve, is not a skirmish line. It is not a line of battle.

There are detailed desriptions of how it should use terrain to spread itself out, ("The Fusiliers open combat of the infantry, which for this partly dissolves into a Tirailleurs line."), and the intensions of the desired outcome.

("One can thus deviate from the usual battle order very easily in this kind of the attack arrangement, or from these form the normal position. The Fusilier battalions mask the attack Column, and drives out the enemies, who are not strong enough to resist Line light infantry. " )

one of the purposes of this formation and method:

"4) to mask another ones attack, and the enemy throws against it a dispersed swarm"

I guess you would like to cross this part of the regulations out to fit your ideas.

It is pretty explicit and plain that the Prussians, in these official regulations, intended to operate in this manner and are counteracting a known, USUAL and effective French tactic. They even intend on using it themselves, whenever they can. (take a look at the later Prussian-Austrian war with an open mind to see the evoution of this).

I'm in some confusion as to how to repsond to your comment:

"The passage is talking about using the Prussian skirmishers to gain an advantage in a "petit guerre" of tactical intelligence. It does not talk about some commonly-seen special French battlefield tactic or evolution."

The text pretty clearly talks nowhere about petit guerre
(isn't the title: "The Use of the Third Rank and Brigade Formations According to the Prussian Regulations of 1812"- are you on anothe planet?, but on how to set up basic attack formations, use fusiler (light troops) or 3rd rank in lieu of light troops and maneuvuer in ways more flexible and contempory than rigid Fredrichian (?) formations.

Sorry to be so blunt.

It looks to me that these late regulations are (perhaps like the Russian regulations which I have not researched and the British use of light riflemen troops) an attempt to counter an often-used French innovation, within in the constraints of their human material, national unity and officer corps capability. It is not how most Napoleionic wargames have been displayed on the table for the last 50 years, so I can understand a hostility to it because its "not historical". Historical can have several meanings.

I am reminded of the U.S. GI in the Korean War who asked, "How many hordes in a Chinese platoon?"

So how many swarms constitute a cloud?

"0" There the same thing.

Regards
James

Like I keep saying,

The French in the revolution used the swarm or cloud tactic simply out of necessity, it was neither a form of skirmisher order nor was it a closed order formation. It was a clump of men who did not know how to form either formation because they were improperly trained and most of the time no training at all.

As the years went on the French commanders began to see through the mud and chaos of the revolution and by the mid 90's to 1800 began to devise a proper, if not official skirmish order tactic where entire battalions and even regiments could be used to form skirmish order. By the time the empire came along this was basically perfected into typical doctrine of the French army. The first regiment of the first brigade of every Division had a Legere regiment who's primary function was to act as the skirmish screen for the entire division.

From 1803 til 1807 the French gained great benefit from this but as many of these men were laying dead on battlefields all over Europe after the early empire years (glory years) the skill in this had declined, the strength and higher elan of the Legere regiments had dropped significantly while the skill level of the enemy had begun to increase so much so that by 1812-1813 the French lost their distinct advantage. This advantage was already lost way back in 1809 in the Peninsula.

Every enemy army had learnt from the French and surpassed them by the late empire, especially when in 1813-1814 the French army was full of conscripts of ill trained at best men. Funny thing is, in 1815 many men who had earlier been prisoners etc were back in the French ranks and I feel this accounted for the reintroduction of this heavy skirmish line at Waterloo. These men had bought back something into the French army tactical repertoire that had been missing for many years.

Regards,
Shane

Bills' Fan,

"the Prussians in these regulations have put in a new specific way of fighting"
You will then also provide their prior way of fighting, so we can see that there is a substantive difference, something "new" ?

"unformed formations"
It is a new nomenclalture, an an interesting one.

"counteract the other sides whatever you want to call them – dense skirmishers, unformed loose lines, swarms"
The quoted Prussian instruction does not say that. We have nothing but the opinions of modern tertiary-sourced English language authors to suggest that in 1812 the French or any other potential enemy of the Prussians fought thusly (except when forced to by extreme circumstances or by broken terrain).

"to mask another ones attack, and the enemy throws against it a dispersed swarm" "I guess you would like to cross this part of the regulations out to fit your ideas."
No, I would not. However, please read the original German. The text is not talking about anything other than "screening troops". This German usage is not specific to an infantry enemy, nor is any special capablility of the French mentioned. Furthermore, the German usage is not necessarily or even primerily on the battlefield, but rather in the approach of two opposing forces. It is a "petit guerre" function of operational/tactical counter-reconnaisance that is being referenced.

"a known, USUAL and effective French tactic. They even intend on using it themselves, whenever they can."
If you mean the use of light infantry in substantial numbers according to a regulated open order formation, then I agree with you. If you insist on seeing swarms, guided by instinct, with the men given their heads and relying on some alleged uniquely French natural aptitude, then I continue to disagree – at least until we can find some contemproary references to such a thing.

"are you on anothe planet?"
Kinda rude, ace. Please read the German text and other German texts using the same words. The meaning in quite clear, as described above.

"even named differently, Fusiliers rather than Grenidiers" "fusiler (light troops)"
Not a new troop type or function for the Prussians.
Including the Guard, In 1806 there were 120 musketeer, 27 grenadier, 24 fusilier and 3 jäger or schützen battalions – total 174, about 16% "lights". By 1809, there were 24 musketeer, 6 grenadier, 6 combined grenadier, 12 fusilier, 3 jäger or schützen, and 1 normal (demonstration) battalions – total 52, about 29% "lights".
For comparison, the Russians were actively moving to complete a 33% ratio at this time. It is from this point that the French no longer have a higher ratio of "lights". For raw numbers, the Russians fielded 156 jäger battalions by the end of 1811.

"Sorry to be so blunt."
Blunt is cool. Rude is perhaps un-necessary.

"Russian regulations …. an attempt to counter an often-used French innovation"
Well, 1786 jäger instructions pre-date the French, but I suppose that the 1812-vintage instructions to have the line infantry be prepared to skirmish in the same style might be in reaction to the French …. or in reaction to a decline in training for the rapidly expanded jäger corps …. or because the jägers might be expected to have higher casualties and not be around for a long campaign …. or because there was a need to use the line in broken terrain more often since this might shield them from an increasing amount of artillery fire …. or for some other reason. The problem remains: the French "innovation" is not yet documented with contemporary evidence. You are assuming it existed, not demonstrating that it existed. You are givng us your opinion, for which I am thankful. However, you are not a contemporary source.

You are really entitled to any opinion you want to have, of course. I don't want to try to convince you of anything. If you have some contemporary evidence to support your ideas, you could convince me. If not, that's fine too – and we can drop this.

In the meantime, I'll vote with Shane on this topic.
:-)

haha, thanks mate, I was sweating on being wrong on my assumption on this.

Btw, I read that early Russian Jager btlns were "officially" only about 400 men strong but in the reforms of 1810-11 their btln strength had increased to be the same as that of the Musketeer btlns of around 728 men. Is this correct ?

p.s. Note that I did say, "officially"

Regards,
Shane

RE: """"""a known, USUAL and effective French tactic. They even intend on using it themselves, whenever they can."
If you mean the use of light infantry in substantial numbers according to a regulated open order formation, then I agree with you. If you insist on seeing swarms, guided by instinct, with the men given their heads and relying on some alleged uniquely French natural aptitude, then I continue to disagree – at least until we can find some contemproary references to such a thing.""""""

We are in agreement about an open order, flexible formation, without distinct geometric ranks and files ("unformed"), conforming to terrain, and containing a much higher density (10X?) than a skirmish chain. I speculate that the early French revolutionary armies might have spontaneously formed such things guided by their enthusiasm and with only hints of control by their officers. Most conscript troops would find a nice rock to hide behind and become immovable; hence, those French do get some deserved credit for being different. (Some instructions do not even allow troops to kneel to fire, since they would like to remain a smaller target).

""""""are you on anothe planet?"
Kinda rude, ace. Please read the German text and other German texts using the same words. The meaning in quite clear, as described above."""""""

Sorry, I apologize. I got carried away. I promise to whack myself up the side of the head with my musket barrel before making another such gaffe.

I find Shane's entry of 8-17-08 to be a fair assessment of what I think was. A significant point for wargaming is the application changed (back and forth even) over time but eventually most armies got something like this in their toolkit to use, or counter or both. It would slow up battles and make them take a different form than formed units colliding or firefighting with each other. There might be special circumstances of terrain or lack of enemy horse that might trigger the use of the tactic. I would like to see some discussion of how to add this to wargames and at what level it should be included.

A question I have is why isn't this included more in the history of battles? Some thoughts are: it was done at the division level and didn't make the big time reports, it was such a normal happening that it didn't merit reporting, it was misunderstood when used by only one side and was not described due to lack of terminalogy, or it was rarely used.

Shane,

Excellent question !

Lookng at the Russian line jägers ….

At the start of Tsar Paul's reign, the Russian jäger corps was organized :
9 corps of 4 battalions (plus 3 separate battalions), each battalion of 6 companies of about 150 men – nominally over 35,000 men.

But these corps were likely very understrength. Tsar Paul consolidated these corps into :
First : 20 separate battalions, each battalion of 5 companies of about 150 men – nominally about 15,000 men, likley at or near the number actually in the army.
Second : by doubling, 20 regiments of 2 battalions, each battalion of 5 companies – nominally about 27,000 men
Of these, the 1st Jägers were disbanded after the failure of the Holland expedition of 1799.

Tsar Alexander, near the beginning of his reign, instituted a general re-organization of the infantry, which included regiments of 3 battalions, each battalion of 4 companies, each company of still abbout 150 men.
He also added back the disbanded jäger regiment. Two more regiments were added before Austerlitz, and another 10 before Eylau and Freidland, for a total of 32.

It is pretty clear that the jäger did not fully staff at these levels, and used an interim company organization of slightly over 100 men. Hence the "400" of your question. This was the general size of the battalions at Austerlitz. By Freidland, the companies seem to be aiming more toward the 150 man level, but are all still understrength. Nazfiger, for example, gives 133 men each on average.

By June 1812, there are 18 more regiments for a total of 50. These are still 3 battalions of 4 companies, each company of about 150 men, nominally. The total jäger corps was now established at over 95,000 men – in excess of 6 times the level established by Tsar Paul's 20 battalions of 15 years earlier.

By the way, where did you find the total per battalion at 728 ? I have seen a total all ranks (and including 18 non-combattants) of 646, per the 1802 establishments. By 1812, there appears to have been a reduction in actual fielded non-combatants, and a few more buglers and maybe officers – but a total not in excess of 650 all ranks. It appears that some 1st and 3rd battalions attemtped to draw some extra "spare" men from the 2nd battalion at the start of the campaign, but was there another increase per the statutes ?

>"So how many swarms constitute a cloud?

"0" There the same thing."<

If they're the same, the answer is 1, not 0. Unless you mean both are nonexistent.