"Help me understand skirmishers et al and their effectiveness" Topic

Lots of interesting and intermingled lines of discussion here.

On the British side of things it is worth looking up Cooper's "Practical guide for officers of light infantry" (not sure the title is exact – I will look in my notes when I can get to them). I recall that half the company strength would form the reserve whilst the others formed the skirmish chain.

Not sure I like the idea of the French in the peninsular mistaking the thick skirmish line for the British main line and so deploying too early. I get the impression that oftentimes the French were caught in column which would not be the case if deploying too early.

On delaying the French skirmishers the columns would either have to halt under artillery fire or push on. With a strong British skirmish screen the commanders of the main line would get a better idea of the thrust of the attack and be better able to make minor adjustments in deployment in order to defeat the attacking force. The French commander would conversely be denied the opportunity of picking the best point of attack and therefore be disadvantaged.

Another example I recall (chapter and verse to follow – Southwest France 1814 I think) describes the advance of British skirmishers until faced by increased numbers of French skirmishers at which time the British gave ground (under command of the officers) until themselves reinforced and able to renew the advance. The notion of "ebb and flow" based on the perception of strength is interesting.

The word "cloud" or "swarm" of skirmishers, often used in descriptions, is vague and ill-defined. Is a swarm a "large number" or "abuzz with" groups of . . . ?

In my second reading of Gill's latest work (1809: Thunder on the Danube) I only found one reference to a "swarm" of French skirmishers. Gill uses the word "thick swarms" as in "when thick swarms of skirmishers from St. Hilaire's division suddendly appeared on the ridge . . . Sachsen-Koburg moved quickly to counter this threat, launching his hussars in a charge that scattered the French skirmishers . . ."

If the Austrian hussar regiment was understrength (given the exertions of previous days) and the French skirmishers were scattered--it doesn't appear as though there were large numbers. Does "thick swarms" mean small groups?

Gill doesn't cite the source of the passage either which makes it difficult to determine whether one should seek out the French or Austrian sources (although if the Sachsen-Koburg regimental records have more details in German--I'd love to see them for myself).

Such passages, especially when taken out of context (i.e. out of the original sources without reference) tend to be open to interpretation and can be used to support whatever theory of skirmisher useage one wants.

'Such passages, especially when taken out of context (i.e. out of the original sources without reference) tend to be open to interpretation and can be used to support whatever theory of skirmisher useage one wants.'

Unless the meaning of the original passage has been changed then the material has not been taken out of context. That is the definition of the term 'out of context' not that it has been used and not footnoted. That's called research and using material you have found which is called sourcing.

Sincerely,
Kevin

We have Kevin saying that the French often used large bands of skirmishers under the Empire, as a tactical innovation that was an advantage vs. their opponents. Since he so often tells us to "do our homework", I thought to fact-check what he mentioned. Whether he tried to use this material "out-of-context" or not, at least this way we will all have the context and can decide for ourselves.

Among the "sources" that he mentions is Paret. Here is what Paret wrote :
Yorck and the Era of the Prussian Reform, 1807-1815
Dr. Peter Paret
Princeton University Press, 1966 – page 69
« Once again the organic development rather than revolutionary emergence of the tactics is demonstrated: the editors of the Réglement provisoire [of 1791] took these lines word for word from the Reglement of 1778, the only difference being the substitution of the term infanterie légère for the compagnies de chasseurs.
For a second, and more convincing, explanation for the absence of detailed skirmish rules, Colin called on a veteran of the Imperial light infantry, General Le Couturier, who declared that not much instruction was needed "for a type of warfare that was the most natural of all." Couturier's point was that since the movement of tirailleurs was not orderly, as was that of the columns and lines, but rather resembled a hunt, trying to impose order on skirmishers would spoil their effectiveness: "That which by its nature is irregular submits badly to rules." Colin conclued that "if the Réglement … does not mention tirailleurs, then [this was] simply because it was not considered useful to regualte the deployments of swarms of skirmishers." And it is true that the French infantryman of the 1790's received little training in this function; he was told what to do, but not how to do it. * »
« * [footnote 67] Not all superior officers approved of this approach. Even General Le Couturier, despite his advocacy of laissez-faire, called for better musketry instruction and proposed the establishment of highly trained special units of light troops. »

One sees at once that Paret is (i) NOT talking here about what the French did or did not do under the Empire, but rather about what was or was not in the published Réglement of the revolutionary era, and (ii) the specific information that Kevin mentions is actually Paret quoting (and translating) from Colin, who was giving a summary or judgement about what Le Couturier wrote.

The text from Colin is actually taken from the introduction he wrote to this work about the 1791 Réglement:
La tactique et la discipline dans les armees de la Révolution: correspondence du général Schauenbourg du 4 avril au 2 août 1793
lieutentant-général baron Alexis-Balthazar-Henri-Antoine de Schauenbourg (ou v. Schauenburg)
Paris: Libraire Militaire R. Chapelot et Ce., 1902 – pages lxv et seq.

The général Jean-Lambert-Alphonse Colin (1864-1918, mort pour La Patrie) was a French artillery staff officer and historian, writing a time of great nationalism in France, just before World War One. Here is a nice, short personal and bibliographic summary in English :
link

I do not have "La tactique et la discipline ….", but perhaps another contributor does, so we can see exactly what Colin wrote in 1902 about what Le Couturier wrote. It was re-published by the B.N. de France in 1990.

Which brings us, finally, to "General Le Coututier".
He is le adjudant-commandant François-Gervais-Edouard Le Couturier (1768-1830), maréchal de camp (titre honoraire) en 1822.
As a writer, he is perhaps best known for his then-anonymous critique of Thiébault and the new Corps royale d'état-major in 1820, a similar dispute in 1819 with the editors of "Victoires, conquêtes, …" about the siege of Ancone, and a portable dictionary published in 1825. I do not know where he commented upon skirmishing.

He was born near Falaise, and took Holy Orders as chanoine at l'abbaye de Senlis in 1789. He enetered the garde nationale de Paris in 1790, and later served as a subaltern of light infantry, with promotion to chef de bataillon at the siege of Ancone in the an VIII. He then became a prisoner of war, and later upon release, he passed in the an XI to the 79e demi-brigade of the ligne with which he served it Italy and Dalmatia. An aide de camp to Lauriston in 1806, a sous-inspecteur aux revues in 1808, he later served only in staff and supply positions except for a few months in 1811 when he acted as colonel of the 4e régiment croate during its organization. The end of the Empire found him as sous-chef d'état-major in the 2e corps for the Cent Jours.
There is a nice bio of him in "Fastes de la Légion d'honneur" T. V., pages 583-84. He is also in the Quintins' "Dictionnaire des colonels de Napoléon" at page 515.

How much this experience made him an expert on skirmiishing with large bodies of troops during the Empire might be debated. His own field experience dated from the Révolution, and the comments attributed to him by Colin seem to relate to his reaction to the 1791 Réglement. Perhaps they are actually found in his piece on the siege of Ancone ? In any case, he was NOT "a veteran of the Imperial light infantry".

How much should Kevin's 2008 paraphrasing of Paret's 1966 translation and summary of Colin's 1902 description of what Le Couturier thought in 1819(?) about the Réglement of 1791 inform us as wargamers looking to game Empire battles ? Is he "in" or "out" of context ?

Well this poor fellow, (me), is taking from this discussion the following. The French did at some times break down full battalions and use a method (the grand attack en Tirailleurs?) of sending a very flexible, open order, "super-skirmisher" (but NOT a skirmisher formation) gaggle of troops to shoot the shXX out of formed troops and incidently strip away enemy skirmishers. This also confused the dickens out of the opposition, who didn't know what to call it but thought it was most unfair. It also served as a very very effective screen for bringing up assult columns (division wide and maybe (?) battalion wide?) to within 100 yards of the enemy to perform punch-thu charges with some surprise, a lot of flexibility and few walking-in casulties and disarray. The French didn't use it universaily, probably because it required troops who could act and think for themselves in wrapping around and clinging close to the enemy formed forces. Early revolution forces could do it, sometimes forces could do it when in motivated historical periods, well trained conscripts were not canidates, so more classical methods were the norm then. The British (this is my speculation- fire away!!), having a professional army, did come up with a counter, used it, but "somehow" neglected to publish and propagate the method to other countries (who next year might be on the other side of an alliance). This was to also use a large screen of skirmishers, armed with rifles, organized as seperate battalions in order to keep the the "grand attack en Tirailleurs" at a distance and strip them away. Then the double line of line (maximized firepower, but poorer melee) could beat up on the attack columns, using their strenght (firepower) against the attack column's weakness (lack of firepower). (Seemed to work in Spain.)

One thing I see in the discussion and charge/counter-charge (or maybe I might say, insult/counter-insult) above is that some people who are wargamers since the 1970's (I'm spotty since the late 60's myself) MAYBE have a feeling that successful nappy wargame rules and games ARE the reality of napoleonic times and are unchallengeable. I would like to see more collegiality and some willingness to rework rule basics based upon better ideas.

Just some thoughts from an old-timer. Flame away. I probably have misspelling in here. Nik ware?

In the words of President Ronald Reagan, "Here we go again!"

Re:

La tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la Révolution: correspondance du Général Schauenbourg du 4 avril au 2 août1793 by General Alexis Balthasar Henri Antoine de Schauenbourg (1748-1831); Preface and edited by Jean Lambert Alphonse Colin (1864-1917 ). 1902. CXXXVI, 185 p., 5 croquis dépl.

NOTE: The 1990 BN ‘edition' is in fact a microfiche: Shelf mark MFICHE 8-LH3-348. A copy of the microfiche can be ordered from the BN.

The Le Couturier works I found that are possibly on topic are:

Le Couturier, François-Gervais-Édouard (Général). Dictionnaire portatif et raisonné des connaissances militaires, ou premières notions sur l'organisation, l'administration, la comptabilité, le service, la discipline, l'instruction et le régime intérieur des troupes françaises; à l'usage des jeunes gens qui se destinent à la profession des armes. 1825. In-8vo, VIII-522 p.

Le Couturier, François-Gervais-Édouard (Général). Réflexions sur le corps royal d'état-major général réorganisé par les ordonnances des 6 mai et 22 juillet 1818 et sur l'École d'application de ce corps, par un officier de l'ancien état-major général de l'armée [F.-G.-É. Le Couturier] 1819. 40 p.

Le Couturier, François-Gervais-Édouard (Général). Réfutation (en ce qui concerne le siège d'Ancône) du XIe tome de l'ouvrage ayant pour titre : "Victoires, conquêtes, désastres, revers et guerres civiles des Français, de 1792 à 1815", et récit véridique des opérations de la division aux ordres du général Monnier, en 1799 et 1800, dans la marche et place d'Ancône, par le colonel Le Couturier,… un des défenseurs d'Ancône. 1819. 80 p.

The two 1819 works do not look likely as a source for the quote.

Art,

Thank you for the information.

I came across this:

"Une instruction sur le SERVICE des TIRAILLEURS A PIED a été publiée en 1827 par la commission d'officiers généraux chargée de réviser les ÉVOLUTIONS."

I am trying to obtain more information on this work.

A work of possible interest:

Cours complet d'art et d'histoire militaires, cuvrage dogmatique, littéraire et philosophique à l'usage des élèves de l'Ecole royale spéciale militaire by Jean Thomas Rocquancourt. Vol 4, part 1. 1838:
link

pp24-58 – Infanterie – has a nice discussion re: tirailleurs

One of the works you mention is available on Google:

Essai Sur Le Service Des tirailleurs, par le general baron Desmichel, found in the Journal des sciences militaires, 1828, pp 497-513:

link

I also came across these:

Instruction pour le service et les Manœuvres de l'infanterie Légère en Campagne. 12mo. Paris: 1813.

Formy de la Blanchetee. Essai sur une Ecole de Tirailleurs. 8vo. Metz: 1821.

Beauval, Leopold de. Service des tirailleurs en usage au 10* régiment d'infanterie légère, 1826, 1827, 1828 et 1829; Transmission de signaux, ou, moyen de suppléer à l'insuffisance des commandemens au milieu des combats. Paris: 1829. 72 p., with one plate.

Chambrun, baron de. Manœuvres des Tirailleurs, accompagnées de 15 grandes Planches. 18mo. Paris: 1829. 36 p.

See the Bulletin universel des sciences et de l'industrie, vol 6 (1829), pp 349-352:

link
link

Also, of possible interest:

Ordonnance sur l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 4 mars 1831. Part 2 – Ecole de Bataillon. 1832:

link

Steve

A discussion of the above mentioned "Ordonnance sur l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 4 mars 1831." from the Bulletin des sciences militaires, vol 11 (1831), pp 59-66:

link

Also came across

LeLouterel, François Philippe, b. 1789. Manuel encyclopedique et alphabetique de l'officier d'infanterie: contenant généralement toutes les dispositions en vigueur sur le service, la police, la discipline, la législation et l'administration de l'arme d'infanterie; des notions élémentaires de géométrie et de fortification de campagne; un choix de feux et de manoeuvres non prescrits par l'ordonnance de 1791; une instruction pour les tirailleurs, etc. by Francois Philippe LeLouterel. Paris: F. G. Levrault, 1825. 481 p., 6 fold. leaves of plates: ill.; 21 cm.

LeLouterel: ancien capitaine adjudant-major et trésorier, aujourd'hui major du 46е régiment de ligne.

A practical guide for the light infantry officer: Comprising Valuable Extracts from All the Most Popular Works on the Subject; with Further Original Information: and Illustrated by a Set of Plates, on an Entire New and Intelligible Plan; which Simplify Every Movement and Manoeuvre of Light Infantry by Capt T. H. Cooper. 1806. 100 pages:

link

Kevin:

You are nitpicking (my use of the wording "out of context") instead of focusing on the point I was making. Here is exactly what I meant (and which is a problem when writing history). You are referring to "out of context" when used deliberately to distort (which is not what I am inferring).

The problem is not the removal of a quote from its original context (as all quotes are) per se, but to the quoter's decision to exclude from the excerpt certain nearby phrases or sentences (which become "context" by virtue of the exclusion) that serve to clarify the intentions behind the selected words.

We don't know if the description was from a French or Austrian source and we don't have any cues to the meaning of "swarm" which the "context" of the original might have provided.

So, let us not argue about a definition of "out of context" (which is a waste of time) and just note that the paraphrased description was not cited nor was enough detail provided to cue us in on the meaning of the translated word "swarm."

If you're misusing terms or don't know the defintion of what you're using, that isn't nitpicking. You misused a term and what you've done whether or not you meant to is make an accusation of intellectual dishonesty. It can be considered an ad hominem attack. I wouldn't consider it 'nitpicking' but in being able to know and understand the terms that you're using.

Sincerely,
Kevin

G'Day Vox

Steve…again I must reiterate…that you are most emphatically the "VOX MACHINE"…!!!!

What took me days…weeks…a month…to find in the various journals…took you merely a fleeting moment to find….do you use Time Travel…?

Best Regards!!
Art

Bills' fan ,

"The French did at some times break down full battalions and use a method (the grand attack en Tirailleurs?) of sending a very flexible, open order, "super-skirmisher" (but NOT a skirmisher formation) gaggle of troops to shoot the shXX out of formed troops and incidently strip away enemy skirmishers."

I think we still have more questions than answers here (so far) :
1. There are several known examples of the French breaking down full battalions in to skirmishers other than to occupy broken terrain : during the Révolution, Marmont in 1813, Ney at La Haye Sainte. But was this a usual or preffered tactic or one resorted to in unusual circumstances (poorly trained troops, prior casualties, naval infantry), especially under the Empire ?
2. When the French so operated, what were the command methods, open order formations, troop densities, etc. ? Or was this some form of rather un-ordered "swarm", depending on the "élan" supposedly unique to the "French character" ?
3. Did the French enjoy any actual advantage in the area of skirmishing from the use of such larger formations in this role ? How, for example, did this method (assuming the French did indeed have a different method) confer an advantage over, for example, the 1812-1814 Russian method (which involved using 1/3 of an infantry division, the two jäger regiments, in open order – formed with specific frontages, reserves, etc.)? Or over the dedicated rifle (practiced sharpshooters it would appear) formations of the British ?

For me, at least, only contemporary and detailed evidence really helps me understand these more subtle doctrinal details and differences, as opposed to summaries written by historians one or more centuries later.

Art,

Our Mr. Smith is a "triple threat" :
-- extensive study and academic correspondence over many years in several languages
-- massive personal library (ditto languages) with some degree of "database" access
-- the keyboard and internet skills of a champion 15 year-old video gamer

His "yours in firm research" is a dévise for us all.

By the way, have you ever correspnded with Jakob Samuk ? He is a rather young Czech who has applied himself assiduously to the study of drill and tactics, most especially those of the French. (He is fluent in English and French.)

You think he could be a super computer with and infinite data base on what ever you need to know. Glade he is here.

Regards
James

Mike the Mug 10 Aug 2008 1:33 p.m. PST
''Not sure I like the idea of the French in the peninsular mistaking the thick skirmish line for the British main line and so deploying too early. I get the impression that oftentimes the French were caught in column which would not be the case if deploying too early''

Busaco.

Kevin:

You sure like to play coy games. Mental sleight of hand and more spin however. I guess you like to do this because it relieves boredom and gives you reason to post. Or, you are reacting to my earlier comments and have a grudge to play out.

Your comment insinuating academic dishonesty exists in your mind only. You set yourself up as the authority (my defintion [Kiley's] is the one and only true definition) and then nitpick (which is what you are doing--your spin isn't working). I reply, explaining my useage of the term, which is, contrary to your assertion, legitimate. You counter by making a false, bold assertion that my useage was an accusation of intellectual dishonesty. You then top it off with an insult ("I wouldn't consider it 'nitpicking' but in being able to know and understand the terms that you're using"). You also shift attention away from the point I was trying to make, attempting to focus the attention of readers to your perverse accusations and "give me a hatchet job review."

I do not accept you as an authority on anything (other than you are an expert spin doctor). The other members can read what I posted and they will realize that your accusations are baseless, petty, and nitpicking.

When a translated and paraphrased description is not cited and we cannot thus seek out the original text(s) to attempt to determine the definition of a phrase, then phrase is "out of context." The only person that could insinuate that this is an accusation of academic dishonesty on my part is someone that, may I use your words?, is not "able to know and understand the terms that you're using."

G'Day Chasseur a Cheval…

It has been my privilege to keep up a correspondence with Jakob…as well as with others from a select group who study the Ligne de Science…

Their vast knowledge and endless assistance is beyond any description…for me to even try and explain the indebtedness I owe them.

Best Regards,
Art

Art,

But, one can only add that when you share your expertise it is even more appreciated by a large group of gamers, history enthusiasts and re-enactors. If you have a "debt of knowledge", then do know that you have an even larger "credit".

Thank you !

Chasseur a cheval,

Well there is a lot of homework to do about this. I agree that actual primary sources (record by the actual people who were there) are essential in proving something existed. If you want to prove that there was a forest, you should have definate proof of several individual trees. However, summaries written shortly after the time are also valuable in compiling an overview. Seeing the whole forest as it were and from a time span from the actual times, a lot closer than now.

I'm interested in your quotation:

"confer an advantage over, for example, the 1812-1814 Russian method (which involved using 1/3 of an infantry division, the two jäger regiments, in open order – formed with specific frontages, reserves, etc.)? "

I was not aware of this and thought that the jagers only used close order formations. (although jager divisions were usually brigaded with 2 line divisions). Maybe the Russians were patterning themselves on the French tactics to counteract them. They did mainly fight the French and were the last nation to fight an experienced French army. The Russian tatics might be a starting point. A formalized, written explaination of how more rigid troops could mimic the French practice.

Summary about Russians and skirmishing in English :

link

As the author notes, there is little in the way of "manuals", but the various instructions and memoires give a good general impression.

The instructions for jäger regiments date from 1786, so are not themselves a direct reaction to the French. However, from 1799 to 1813 the number of these regiments increased rather steadily, and the proportion of jäger to line also increased, if not quite as quickly. This might be a "reaction".

The jäger instructions do give the general layout of frontages, separation, reserves, etc. in the formation of a chain of skirmishers from whole battalions and regiments. I have no idea if the exact distances, etc. were still used 30 years later, but the general concept aligns with the various later instructions, the memoires, descriptions of battles, etc.

In any case, I am still very dubious that the French developed an "innovation" of "swarms" of skirmishers that operated without a formal open order. I am even more dubious that when such a thing occurred (if it did), that an advantage was conferred. To me it seems more like this happened under unfavorable special circumstances of troop quality or condition, not very often (especially under the Empire) and not by intention or doctrine.

I read something interesting in a book that stated the French sent large arrays of skirmishers ahead of their columns in very loose fashion but larger than anything seen before in what was called a "swarm" and the enemy referred to it as a "cloud."

Nothing was sent by the opposing forces to counter these large skirmishing formations. They moved up in short distances into musket range and caused the enemy heavy casualties.

They countered charged these French skirmishers which caused there ranks to break down and leave gaps in the lines allowing the French columns to roll throw the gaps.

It was also mentioned that they wasted there ammunition, fouled their guns to little avail as the French skirmishers were in such loose formation and not packed together so they could not deal with the French columns that were now upon them. It even disadvantaged the officers as they could not view the field of battle due to the smoke created. (not able to lead or direct their soldiers)

Quotes were form several sources Elting, Chandler, Esposito and Rthenburg I believe there was much more but these names stood out.

Regards
James

I have read similar passages over the years, I think this was a throw back from the revolutionary period when the French conscripts were not so good at close order drill. The conscript btlns of the demi-brigades acting as skirmishers while the older regular btln acting as the shock troops.

Later on as the years moved along these adhoc formations and tactics were refined and perfected to a point where in 1803-1807 the French could perform the same earlier revolutionary tactics desribed above with much more precision and control. The Continental armies did not have an answer to them and were defeated soundly for a long time. It is only when they finally work up after massive defeats that in their own reforms they expanded their own pittiful skirmisher units and regiments to counter the French. But it took years to do and a lot of shaking out of the old concepts from older generals not happy with these new ways of fighting wars.

The British had the advantage of the war in America and were already ready for the French to a degree as did some of the minor german states which experienced this light warfare in America.

Shane

General Brock 11 Aug 2008 7:17 p.m. PST
''I read something interesting in a book that stated the French sent large arrays of skirmishers ahead of their columns in very loose fashion but larger than anything seen before in what was called a "swarm" and the enemy referred to it as a "cloud."''

An anonymous German wrote this to Viscount Castlereagh about how the French organised their skirmishers:

''Each Marshall of the French Empire has a body of Two Thousand men of sharpshooters ( Elite ) attached to his Corps d'armee. Such sharpshooters, all of which being expert and skilled men, are each armed with a small blunderbufs ( arquebuse ), and [ are ] allways sure to hit their mark, at a distance of one hundred and fifty paces ( 2 ). In any cases, when the whole army is concentrating for a general battle, the several bodies of sharpshooters, belonging to the Corps of each Marshall, are formed into ONE separate Corps by itself, consisting together in sixteen thousand men ( Corps d'Elite ). Now, on whatever point, the Commander in Chief, is of intention, or thinks it best expedient, to break through the opposing army, on such point or spot this select corps of 16,000 men is always sure to be placed and posted, in two lines or Files, and according to the ground where the fight takes place, in one or two divisions. In most cases, the firing, kept up by this corps, thus placed, is but an irregular one, yet each charge or shot never misses its object, and within a few minutes the lines of the opposite side are shot down. Immediately after, when two, three, or four lines of the opponents have thus been disabled or killed in this manner, the Columns of Infantry and Cavalry of the French (previously placed behind and at the wings of the corps of sharpshooters ) instantly prefs and force forward thro' the openings, and speding to the right and left, attack and take the neighbouring lines of the opponents in the back. As it is, this body of sharpshooters of 16,000 men may within a short time destroy double the quantity, say an opposing army of 30 to 40,000 men.

Besides this select corps of sharpshooters, each Marshall commanding a body of Troops, has a certain number of skilled sharpshooters attached to each company of Infantry, composing the Regiments that form such body of Troops. The purport entended by these shooters, consists exclusively to shoot dead the artillery men at the guns, as also such Officers, as stand afront of the lines, but more particularly to aim at the Chief Commander of the opponents, being always sure to hit their mark at a distance of 150 Military paces''

The original letter's at Kew. There's more of it here:
link

Are those skirmishers?

well stated cacadore,

I have read this passage before as well, it, I feel explains alot of what I have said with proof given by an actual enemy officer. The blunderbus point is interesting but who's to say it did not happen if stated by an actual eyewitness…

I put all this down to a simple idea, the allied armies were used to fighting in a traditional old fashioned 18th century style. The French came along and totally upset the mindset of those that opposed them with strange and totally unfamiliar tactics which being unconventional caught the allied armies by total surprise and thus defeated them time after time until one by one they all eventually caught on and adapted to the changes even if reluctantly…

Shane

p.s.

cacadore asked : Are those skirmishers?

I do not think they are skirmishers in the strict sense of the word, they were more so men who were hastily organized conscripts who probably could not fight in formed formations as such at first as they were rushed to the front pretty much untrained.

However, as they learnt their trade, "on the job" so to speak I feel they, after time became excellent skirmishers who became the Legere regiments later on were are more familiar with. Remember also that the Ligne regiments were often expected to form these grande bandes first out of nessessity and then later on out of experience.

Shane

Shane,

"proof given by an actual enemy officer."

It's anonymous. WE dont know it was written by an "enemy officer".

Leaving the bluderbusses and several other "odd" details aside ….

Does this not strike you as a description of Oudinot's combined elite formation ?
Does it that they are firing in any sort of "grand band" or for that matter anything other than a regular closed formation ?

"I put all this down to a simple idea, the allied armies were used to fighting in a traditional old fashioned 18th century style."
Maybe a little too "simple" ?

actually chasseur I don't believe it is describing Oudinot's Elite formations at all. However, as those elite batalions were made up of thousands of very experienced trained skirmishers then maybe it was but you would have to convince me of that one pretty soundly mate.

I still say what I said earlier and feel I am correct, you would have to convince me otherwise…

I see we are collecting more and more direct and indirect descriptions of the French using a unformed large group of infantry to close with the enemy and shoot them up, while formed French in line or column waited to exploit the weakened enemy line. It is something more than a scirmish line or reinforced scirmish line. I would really like to see a French tactical manual which describes how it is organized.

Some comments on stuff above:

Some people have given quotes from French opponents which are warnings not to reinforce scirmish lines. A reason for this might not to be sucked into an unformed line battle that their troops didn't know (and couldn't) fight.

We see a refernce to 1813 Russian tactical doctrine option of using 1/3 of an infantry division in open order. I have to ask for the reason for this. An apparent one is to oppose the French formation.

I am trying to put a spin on these things but there does seem to be something out there.

Chass,

Spot on! My thoughts exactly. If this is not the case, why have these mysterious 'units' not been heard about before?

Shane – keep an open mind. Is Herr Anonymous known to you? <;^}

Yours, etc., etc. and so forth,

Steve

Several people have mentioned Coopers 1806 British light infantry tactics book, which is at:
link

It is interesting that he describes skirmish formations and practice in quite a bit of detail and also refers to close order formation:

" When light infantry companies are in line with their battalions they are to form and act in every respect as a company of the battalion."

BUT besides these he briefly mentions some other formations:

"Loose files
When acting by themselves and not in line, they may loosen their files six inches apart from each other.
Open order is two feet between each file.
Extended order is two paces distance between each file…."

What was the "loose files" and "open order" and "extended order" used for?

Re-reading the entries in this thread and more of the references is convincing me that there was considerable use of open order musket firing attacks. I don't see this reflected in nappie wargame rules and think it should be researched more and put in. I agree its not skirmishing. It is fighting in open order.

Another line of thought is to think back on our reading of the American War of Southern Independence. (a.k.a. "civil war"). I am strongly reminded of the difference between how veteran troops would attack and defend in the last 2 years versus how they would at the start of the war. Also, Union descriptions of many Conferate attacks. What they found out worked better, (e.g. less of them got shot and killed) was NOT to attack in regular lines but in ragged groups and duck around using any bits of cover that they could. This was an evolution from the earlier "Napoleonic(?)" methods of rigid lines. Isn't this exactly what is being described in the "skirisher swarm". Note that there's not a lot of difference (percusion caps only) between a rifled musket and a smoothbore at less than 100 yards. The smoothbore has a higher muzzle velocity and some units even preferred to use them to the end of the war because of easier loading and the extra projectiles (smoothbores used a "buck and a ball" (actually often 2 buckshot) loading.

I have mentioned the instructions Davout issued to his corps in 1811 regarding skirmishing. It shows that the intention was to skirmish in some sort of regular order, not in a mob, swarm or cloud, and that the non-voltigeur companies were not familiar with open order combat. Hopefully it is of some interest:

To the general Morand. Hambourg, 16th October 1811.
I have received, my dear general, your letter of 16th and the five copies of your project to teach the service of the skirmishers [tirailleurs] to all troops. It seems excellent to accomplish this task, and I will send it to all generals commanding a division of infantry, ordering them to use the rest of the season to exercise all companies in this. And, thanking you, my dear general, I ask you to send a copy of this project, of which you surely will have kept an original for yourself, to each of your generals and colonels, directing them to stick to it and exercise the troops in the future.
The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.
I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre.
Hambourg, 16th October 1811.
We recognized that it was generally harmful to take a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers, and that it was preferable to take entire companies.
The companies of voltigeurs who are elite companies, cannot always perform this role without serious inconvenience, it has, therefore, appeared appropriate to me that in the case of the companies who could be used for the role, are trained for it.
As it is important for the sake of uniformity that there is some method to adopt, I send you, my dear General, a summary of the manoeuvres that I invite you to train the regiments under your orders to do, whether of light infantry or of infantry of line. I want us to benefit from the present season for training the troops.
Forward this instruction to each of the colonels of the regiments under your orders and one for each general of brigade; recommend that more copies are not made of it by the rest.
The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.
I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.
(To the general Dessaix) It will be needless, my dear General, that you send a copy of this instruction to the 33e léger, as I send a copy to the general Barbanègre, so that he forwards a copy to it.

Covering the head of a column or the front of a line.

The captain of the company of the tirailleurs, having stopped at the point where the reserve section must stay, will divide his company into three sections and will order:
Sections de droite et de gauche, par le flanc droit et le flanc gauche, à 100 pas sur la droite et la gauche – marche.
[Sections of the right and left, by the right flank and the left flank, to 100 paces [65 m] on the right and the left – march!]
At this command, the lieutenants will fall into march with their sections. The sergeant-major, two sergeants, two corporals, two drums or cornets, (if there are four in the company) will stay with the captain in the center section.
On arriving at points 100 paces [65 m] to right and left the lieutenants will halt their sections and will order, as follows:
The lieutenant, commanding the right section:
1. Premier et second rangs par le flanc gauche – gauche.
2. À 15 pas par file, prenez vos distances – marche.
[1. First and second ranks by the left flank – left.
2. To 15 paces [9,75 m] in file, take your distances – march!]
The sous-lieutenant, commanding the left section:
1. Premier et second rangs par le flanc droit – droit.
2. À 15 pas par file, prenez vos distances – marche.
[1. First and second ranks by the right flank – right.
2. To 15 paces [9,75 m] in file, take your distances – march!]
At this command, the files of the two first ranks of the right and left sections take their distances to 15 paces [9,75 m] and march until they meet.
The 3rd rank, the sergeant, the corporals, a drum or cornet, will stay in reserve with an officier.
Remark.
These reserves must provide replacements to the line, reinforcements to the places attacked strongly, and the officers of the escorts who must never leave them: these escorts are intended to serve as rallying points and retirement points, will be of 6 men at least.
If a non-commissioned officer is detached in order to carry some orders to the skirmishers, he must always be accompanied by a fusilier drawn from the reserves.
The distances being taken, the lieutenants will have le pas ordinaire beaten or sound la marche.
At this signal, the files of skirmishers take 100 paces [65 m] forward.

Remark.
The tirailleurs must always walk in pairs in order to give mutual assistance. They should fire only one after the other, so that one of them always remains loaded.
As much as possible, the line of the riflemen covering the head of a column, will describe the part of circle the head of the column of which would be the center.

Article 2.
Covering the tail of a column or the retirement of a line.
Same dispositions as the First Article.

Remarks.
In the retirement of a line, the cordon of skirmishers must be maintained parallel to the line.

The captain of tirailleurs company should never lose sight of the column or line: in the case where the ground would prevent it being seen, he will place some non-commissioned officers or soldiers, in such a manner manner to keep him aware of all its movements.
The pace of the tirailleurs is regulated to that of the column or the line.

Billsfan,

The sections of Cooper's tactics that you quote are lifted straight from the 1792 Rules and Regulations. The author of the Regulations, Dundas, gave his opinion on when loose files, which wasn't a skirmish formation, may be used:

"The formation in 2 ranks, and at open files, is calculated only for light troops in the attack and pursuit of a timid enemy, but not for making an impression on an opposite regular line. No general could manage a considerable army formed and extended in this manner….A line formed in this manner would never be brought to make or to stand an attack with bayonets, nor would it have any prospect of resisting the charge of a determined cavalry."

1792 Rules and Regulations:

Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces published by the War Office, 1794. 2nd edition (ie printing). 458 pages:

link

Musing upon the matter from another direction (mostly whimsical):

Swarm. Cloud.
Peloton – word for a tactical organization of French soldiers, deriving from the word for a small ball.

Now visualize the clusters of bicylists in the Olympics, in the peloton.

Let's hurl far away the idea that regular troops acting as skirmishers are all evenly spaced out, disciplined, and even highly organized.

Wouldn't troops, in a world where soldiers traditionally bunched up for moral support, tend to clump up when acting as skirmishers…in a peloton? Sure, there'd be some on the fringes that would act more individualistic, but the bulk of the poorly trained skirmishers would hover and buzz near the center of the formation.

We know that this happens when trying to get people to advance in extended lines. The constant refrain is to keep the spacing and spread out (accompanied by cries to keep up) and this is not when there is any threat.

The swarms and clouds of skirmishers might not be trying to describe skirmishers as far as they eye can see but instead, skirmishers operating in uneven clumps.

Billsfan,

Extended order was a different matter, and this was the formation that would have been adopted by skirmishers. I think that Cooper copies the work of Baron De Rottenburg here. The spacing between files could be 2,3,4,5 or 6 paces according to his regulations depending on the situation. It is also interesting to note that Gleig of the 85th mentionsw spacing of 10 paces.

Rottenburg was a great influence on the British light infantry, and apart from commanding the 5/60th Rifles, he personally trained the the 68th, 71st and 85th regiments in light infantry manouevres at camps on the Curragh and at Ashford.

His regulations were still being issued by the War Office in 1814.

One of many editions (and publishers):

Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry: And Instruction for Their Conduct in the Field by Baron de Francis Rottenburg. Adjutant-General's Office, Great Britain. Translated by Sir William Fawcett (1728-1804). Dublin: Printed for M. Neary Mahon and John Watson Stewart, 1803. iv, 70 p., 6 leaves of plates : ill., map ; 22 cm. Notes: Reprint of 1798 ed. Translation of the 1797 German work by Baron de Rottenburg.

Billsfan,

Pages 11-14 of "Principles of Military Movement Chiefly Applied to Infantry" also deal with the subject of loose files and open order. This formation had been used extensively in America by the British army, much to the disgust of Dundas.

I bet Steve can provide a link here.

Correcto, mon capitain,

Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly Applied to Infantry: Illustrated by Manoeuvres of the Prussian Troops, and by an Outline of the British Campaings in Germany, During the War of 1757. Together with an Appendix, Containing a Practcal Abstract of the Whole by David Dundas, Colonel, et al. 1788. 355 pages:

link

Thank you caption snort. You've given me some reading to do and have added some light (for me) to what the British light regiments were doing with the extended formations. I'm also interested to see you quote from Dumas:

"The formation in 2 ranks, and at open files, is calculated only for light troops in the attack and pursuit of a timid enemy, but not for making an impression on an opposite regular line. No general could manage a considerable army formed and extended in this manner….A line formed in this manner would never be brought to make or to stand an attack with bayonets, nor would it have any prospect of resisting the charge of a determined cavalry"

So Dumas has considered (or other people of his time are proponents of) using a sort of extended/loose formation to attack formed units. He doesn't think it works. Maybe it doesn't work for him, or his time or his nationality- but someone out there must be using it- or why gainsay it? (Pardon my ignorance, but who and when and where was this statement made?). He does credit the method for working against a "timid enemy". A non-timid enemy would charge this sort of unit with concentrated bayonets, or sic calvary at it. Both these things are correct; however, there are costs on the other side. Charging these units would disorder your formation and disrupt your ability to do something else. If they ran away and came back- you're worse off. Horse could drive such a unit away, but it means having horse right at hand, exhausting them for this purpose and leaves them vulerable to the enemy's horse and artillery. It is also true that when you send out a unit in this fashion, you lose a lot of control of the unit. Something paper-pushers, theoryticians, rules writers and higher officers don't like. For some nationalities the units would probably dissolve. Many not for some. What an army does for its tactics is not a one-size-fits-all solution for everyone. Grenzers and Cossacks aren't available for everyone. This is part of the interest in the nappie period.

I will disagree with one of the quoted statements above.
"…..but not for making an impression on an opposite regular line". Applying this to regular skirmishers, yes. (and these could be kept at distance by your own regular skirmisher screen). Multiple battalions taking careful unhurried aim at a shoulder-to-shoulder 3 deep line 40 to 70 yards wide. That should be serious casulties.

Billsfan,

If you haven't already done so, I would recommend that you read pages 11-14 from Steve's link above to Principles of Military Movement. This will explain Dundas' standpoint more clearly than I can.

Suffice to say that all British officers did not agree, but Dundas' Rules and Regulations, (apart from the unnofficial adoption of 2 rank lines) became the cornerstone of British success, and his work can be seen in action throughout the Peninsula, and such famous manoeuvres as Pakenham at Salamanca, and Craufurd at Fuentes have their roots in this work.

For those interested, some French instructions on skirmishing or descriptions of it (most translated into English, with the French original text and also German or Polish translations) can be found on our website:

link (Schérer 1795, not in English)

link (signals 1806)

link (improvised in 1807)

link (Morand/Davout 1811)

link (Reille 1815)

link (10e léger 1816, or later)

Art, you are quoting the

****************
I. "Service Des Tirailleurs En Usage Au 10e Regiment D'Infanterie" par Lieutant-Colonel de Beauval (which I have)
****************

Is this by chance the same as the instruction for the 10e régiment d'infanterie légère: link ?

And here another one, by Guyard, published in the year XII:

link

Billsfan,

The quote you atribute to Dumas ( I assume a typo) is from page 77 of Dundas' "Principles of Military Movement".

Steve

Whilst there is some great material emerging about the skirmish chain I do not see much about the role of the reserve and how the skirmish "line" works with the main body.

Interesting to see in the Davout/Morand material (1811) a description of the reserve forming circle to resist cavalry and act as a rally point for the open order skirmishers. Perhaps this corresponds to the descriptions of French skirmishers forming knots of men when faced with cavalry.

We have the French specifying the use of the third rank as the reserve and for the British it is a couple of sections. Some nations used the third rank for skirmishing so how were their reserve formed? Any evidence?

As for the linkage between skirmishers and the main body I would speculate that a senior officer from the battalion staff would be working with the commander of the skirmish company to ensure that the skirmishers were doing their job for the benefit of the main body.

Steve,

I am trying to keep an open mind but I don't see how he can conclude that it has to be Oudinot's Elite Corps, sorry, just don't see it. To me it is a passage from an eyewitness to just about any early empire or revolutionary attack by a corps against an enemy line. I have read in many books this explanation by countless historians and authors describing how French attacks were made, especially pre-empire.

The point I am making is that over a million Frenchmen were conscripted into the French army from 1793-1800 and their training left much to be desired if they received any training at all, my conclusion to this is that these men, devoid of any experience or adequate training attacked the enemy in a clumsy and very unskillful way but because the "tactics" used were so radical by the French generals who had little to work with they succeeded. The experienced and well drilled allied armies had no answer to these huge clouds of ill disciplined and unskilled Frenchmen that they got beaten simply because the French generals worked out how best to work a tactic into their battles based on what they had to work with.

It might sound lame or even stupid but you don't have to look far from warfare to see similar things happening in other facets of life. The meek and inexperienced often pull one out of the hat by working with what they have and gaining the upper hand in some field of endeavour and simply pulling it off so to speak. I think this is what the French did and won battles as often as they lost them for a good period of time before the very men who got thrown a uniform and a musket finally knew what they were about.

The toughest veteran with 20 years experience had to start somewhere as a conscript of volunteer all those years earlier. So to with Generals figuring out how to use the tools they are given, I suspect the Generals of the early French army despaired with what they were given in battle and a good many of them paid the price for failure but in the long run the French army emerged from the late 18th century as a finely honed instrument of war by 1803-1807 along with many of the generals who rose from the chaos of the revolutionary period. Armed with years of experience and understanding of what worked and what did not they were able, both soldier and commander to win great battles and campaigns using the skills and doctrines learnt during that crucial period of apprenticeship of the 1790's.

Shane

I have read through the discussion here and I don't think anyone has mentioned the "classic" case of the French at Jena using large numbers of skirmishers in battle. According to Maude's work on the subject (reprinted by Greenhill) it was the skirmish fire and the Prussian's unfamiliarity with it that led to the breakdown of the attack of their infantry in line. This caused a significant number of casualties and also had a demoralizing effect on the Prussians.

Hope this adds something.

V/R

Joe

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Art