"Help me understand skirmishers et al and their effectiveness" Topic

Shane:

I was referring to 1668Billsfan's comment about the +2 modifier for the French.

It does sound as though you are trying to represent things in a more valid way (i.e. taking into accout experience vs. a mere statistical additive and not scaling infantry based on preconceived statistical ranges).

Many wargamers would not like the system we use because of the loss of control. Even movement is not "calulatable" (i.e. there are random factors based on fatigue, terrain, etc.).

I do love to see wargames where someone was relying on statistical bonuses/ratings of a unit see it backfire!

No digression at all--good points.

No, you're correct. I've already explained this to Bill. I have two computers and have a different ID for each one. When we bought our laptop last year, I couldn't remember my password, so I reregistered with a new ID so I could use the computer. I'm absent-minded and didn't have the sense to write it down, and if I had I would have forgotten where I put it anyways. I apologize for the confusion, but there is not intent at subterfuge here.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kev's quotes are found in the following (mostly Gates' 1987 work):

The British Light Infantry Arm, C. 1790-1815 … (1987) by David Gates, pages 34, 34, Paret p. 77, (the 1st Radetzky quote is not known to me – the 2nd one is from page 27), 19, 19, Paret page 258, 32, 34 and 35.

The 1st page 34 quote comes from Paret's Yorck and the Era of the Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (1966), page 253.

The 2nd page 34 quote also comes from Paret, also page 253.

Page 19 quote is from Paret, page 202.

2nd page 19 is also found in Seymour's On Active Service (1939), page 93.

The page 32 ‘quote' is from Arthur Chuquet's Valenciennes (1894), p 96:

link

which states it is from either Dohna's Der Feldzug der Preussen gegen die Franzosen in den Niederlanden, im Jahr 1793, vol 2, pp 88-92 or Ueber den Feldzug, p 296 [Presumably Ueber den Feldzug der Preussen gegen die Nordarmee der Neufranken im Jahr 1793 (1795)].

No worries Lest, I try very hard to shy away from giving plus or minus factors for national characteristics and place them towards other factors such as experience, training, morale, command control, terrain considerations etc. The players who play my system had a tough time becoming accustomed to my rules but once they mastered it they would not play anything else. These are players who have played systems such as Empire, WRG, Nap's Battles, GdB and so on… I am very proud of what I have accomplished and the recommendations I have received by some who have played them.

My biggest success of later (the last three years) is coming here to TMP and speaking to you all and gaining much needed knowledge and on many occasions even turning my own idea or point of view over a particular topic of contention. But more importantly, gaining data and information that I had trouble getting elsewhere.

Regards,
Shane

1. The French send out their skirmishers, their opponent sends out their's and all the skirmishers do is bang away at each other. Skirmishers cancel out skirmishers.

I would say that answers your question right there.
Do you want to be the one without them?

Steven,

I didn't use Paret for any quotes, though I have the book, but Rothenerg's Napoleon's Great Adversary and Chuck White's The Enlightened Soldier as well as Gates book on Light Infantry.

Naturally you can find some of them elsewhere, but perhaps before you assume something you might want to ask. Then, again, you might not.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Regarding my comment about skirmishers chasing away forward artillery- I was not making fun. I believe that French and others often sent horse artillery especially well forward in order to soften up formed units for future attack. Sometimes even foot artillery would be quickly used just before and advance. Skirmishers could clear these fellows out by approaching close enough for melee or fire to be effective, while the dispersed formation would reduce the skirmishers casualties to acceptable levels.

A point that I am now trying to make is that the "Grandes Bandes" related manner of attack. 10marines quoted Foy as saying:
'"The action would be opened by a cloud of skirmishers…who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artillery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect. It was rare for any army to have placed its flanks in impregnable positions; in any case every position presents natural loopholes, which favor an attacker. Against such points the sharpshooters would concentrate their efforts, and élan and inspiration were not often lacking at such times amongst such troops. Once the chink in the foe's armor had been revealed, it became the focal point for the main effort. The horse artillery would gallop up and open fire from close range with canister. Meanwhile, the attacking force would be moved up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column (for it had little fire to offer), the cavalry in regiments and squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon shot began to slacken…the soldiers would being to move forward as the drums beat the charge…'
-Foy "
It would seem that it is leg mate to allow this method of attack for those armies that used it. (Probably, the revolutionary period and some other periods for the French). This would give them a more effective method of attack and would be a more realistic approach to war gaming then just giving the "+2" to the French. Other nationalities wouldn't be allowed to use this formation/attack method. I have a limited knowledge of all the nappie rules, but am not aware of this being represented.

I speculate that this method arose spontaneously as a consequence of having a lack of strict officer control and a combination of very eager and very untrained troops. The "swarm" would be self-motivated, out-of-control troops who want to engage the enemy, and the follow-up columns would be ill-trained troops, who could be more effectively sheparded by limited number of officers and non-coms towards the enemy in a column than in a line formation. The column does not require exact position keeping, has a high morale, and is faster moving and more precise in hitting a specific target. You lose firepower but that wouldn't be a negative for untrained troops, who couldn't shoot well anyway. A disadvantage of the method is that once started, it would be almost out of control of the officers. In a war game setting, we might represent things by: once the method of attack is started, the orders can not be changed and go to victory or defeat.

I'll also guess that as discipline improved and the "swarm" soldiers died out, this method of attack also died out and was replaced by disciplined skirmishers and order-mixed.

Kev,

As I am sure you are aware, I did not state where you found the out of context quotes. I did, however, state, "Kev's quotes are found in the following (mostly Gates' 1987 work): …." And, as I state, they can indeed be found, as shown, in Art's, Dave's, Bill's, and Pete's books. Although both Chuck's and Rothie's (I actually call him Doc) books are in my collection, they were not at hand. I do not have Al's "Der Feldzug der Preussen …" in my collection.

I could wax on about the 'tone' of your post, but you do such things much better than I. <;^} "Wax on; wax off."

Steve

The quotations are not out of context.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kev,

As I am sure you are aware,"out of context" means Rothies, Chuck's and Dave's books – the admitted sources of your above quotes – are not the original works from which the quotes arose. The quotes are not in the context of the original work, not unlike a quote found in Bartlett's (or should I say John's <;^}) "Familiar Quotations".

Context is very important. It allows one to determine the facts and circumstances to which the words refer. We can thereby determine its value to a discussion. Without context such things are not possible.

So, it would appear, my stating that the quotes that you provide are "out of context" would be an accurate statement, nicht war?

It would appear that most, if indeed not all, of them apply to the period 1800 or earlier. Is this correct?

Yours, in firm research,

Steve

The primary importance of skirmishers is to keep wargamers busy dealing with minutia -- that and wargamers like to have something "special" for those elite companies to do.

I have read quite a bit on the Napoleonic wars and I cannot recall one significant battle that featured nothing but skirmishers.

For that matter I cannot think of one significant battle where only one side used nothing but skirmishers (unlike the French and Indian War). Terrain and troop densities probably have a great deal to do with this.

Yeah there were the very small conflicts in Spain or Tyrol but these are probably better gamed with skirmish rules.

Delderfield probably said it best when speaking of the Voltigiers in Seven Men of Gascony, "It was out job to find the enemy and then to identify the enemy to the rest of the army. We did this by getting shot at." Skirmishers are definitely scouts and can / should be used for that purpose.

As one of the prior posters pointed out, skirmishers were never the decisive arm and you can certainly make a case for limiting their combat role to something very small.

That said, the British Rifles were definitely something that deserves a little more attention. The accuracy of their weapons / training made them a very effective force where the shooting of officers leading from the front were concerned. I don't think they killed any more troops than any other skirmishers and indeed their rate of fire was probably slower (they could shoot as fast as the musket men but their barrels would foul and the effectiveness of their long range shooting suffered). BUT their ability to disrupt an enemy unit at long range was undoubtedly a good deal better than any other type of unit armed with small arms.

mjc

nicht wahr?

Below are a few comments on skirmishing from soldiers of the time. For a good overview of the principles of open order combat, including the advantages of dispersal, and the benefits of committing smaller numbers of troops to a firefight than the enemy, I would recommend the Guide to Tactics in Clausewitz's On War

Bagration issued the following order to his army in 1812:

"During a firefight, one is to push out as few skirmishers as possible"

Barclay de Tolly cautioned his Jagers prior to Borodino:

"The corps commanders are to put into the heads of the commanders of Jager regiments, that in the beginning of a battle one is to push out as few skirmishers as possible, but to keep small reserves, to refresh the men in the chain (skirmish line) and to keep the rest behind formed in column. Heavy losses cannot be attributed to skilful actions of the enemy, but to excessive numbers of skirmishers deployed in the face of the enemy fire."

Barclay also wrote that if a chain of skirmishers was deployed too densely, the men would present a good target to the enemy, and also their own dense smoke would baffle their aim.

Davout issued instructions in 1811 that all troops were to be trained as skirmishers. These instructions call for the files to be spaced by 15 paces, and the usual formed supports to be provided.

Reille's instructions were very similar, calling for the men to operate in files (pairs) the spacing between files to be 10 or 15 paces, part of each company being retained as formed supports.

George Gleig of the 85th Regiment (Light Infantry) described skirmishing for those who may never have encountered it:

"When I looked to my right and to my left at this moment, I was delighted with the spectacle which that glance presented. For the benefit of my more peaceable readers, I may well mention, that troops sent out to skirmish, advance or retire in files; each file, or pair of men, keeping about 10 yards from the files on both sides of them."

The following 3 passages, written by members of O'Callaghan's brigade describing Vitoria, illustrate that British line infantry could also be called upon to skirmish, but the principals remained the same, as illustrated by Sherer:

Edward MaCarthur 39th Regiment
"The companies of the brigade were ordered to the front, to skirmish with the enemy. The ground on which they stood was open, and exposed to the artillery of the enemy who had lined the opposite coverts with a swarm of light troops. In the short space of 10 minutes my company lost in killed and wounded 2 officers and 29 men. Each company maintained its ground till its ammunition was exhausted, when it was succeeded by another."

Charles Cadell 28th Regiment
"Soon after this (being engaged by 2 French guns) we were sent out by companies and skirmished the whole day."

Moyle Sherer 34th Regiment
"I, with my company, was soon engaged in smart skirmishing among the ravines, and lost about 11 men, killed and wounded, out of 38. The English do not skirmish so well as the Germans or French; and it really is hard work to make them preserve their PROPER EXTENDED ORDER, cover themselves, and not throw away their fire."

James Campbell, serving as a Brigade Major in the 3rd Division, described the action at Vic Biggore in 1814, which was fought in closely intersected country, preventing regular formations from being employed. Again it illustrates that the use of line infantry as skirmishers was not exclusive to the French:

"Besides the 5/60th, a battalion of Cacadores and our light companies, whole regiments (and here we felt the want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps) only retaining a few companies for support, were engaged as sharpshooters. They were, however, constantly pushed forward upon the French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them. The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another, to the fire of our troops."

I hope that the above passages serve to illustrate how skirmishers actually operated, and that skirmishing was not carried out by heavy masses of men, or by disorderly swarms.

Excellent Post Captain Snort.

What a lot of rules miss is the fact that skirmishers did not wander about as some kind of nebulous mob. They were controlled and directed in their activities by their superiors.

The bit about formed supports in the French Army is very true. I have not read anything like this where the Allies (particularly the British) were concerned.

mjc

alex,

Nicht wahr, nez pas?

<;^}

Steve

Imperial Bayonets – Page 111 – The function of skirmishing was the process by which a number of men broke from their rigid formation and deployed into a loose line, positioning themselves between the enemy and their own lines. Once deployed in this manner they would fire on any enemy formation that stood before them. The advantage of a skirmish line over a formed line was that it often did not present a target sufficiently large for a line unit to justify firing a volley at it.

Imperial Bayonets – Page 111 – Skirmishers had two goals. The first was to engage the enemy's formed units and pepper away at them until their morale was so shaken by the continual effect of seeing people falling around them that they would break when attacked by formed infantry. The second was to deliberately kill the officers and non-commissioned officers of the opponent's infantry. Indeed the morale impact of the deaths of the soldiers standing around them was compounded by the deliberate policy of French skirmishers to aim at the officers and NCO's. Though no published French Regulation states that this was official policy, it was obvious from the comments of the Prussians after Jena-Auerstadt that this was how the French skirmishers fought. The Prussians reported taking heavy casualties on the flanks of their companies….(…) By eliminating those individuals in the formed unit charged with maintaining order as well as controlling the maneuvers of the unit, the skirmishers forced replacements to be drawn from the file closer's rank. When these men were drawn forward into the ranks they were unable to perform as File closers, and the ability of the men to break ranks and flee the scene of battle increased. Eventually, the file closers rank would be so depleted that it could not keep the men from breaking ranks and running away. Once the company was no longer able to prevent desertions, and found itself threatened by a charging enemy, it was doomed to break.

That this was deliberately done is confirmed in a memoir of the period by Nadezhda Durova, a Russian cavalry officer. Durova's work, The Cavalry Maiden, contains the following passage:

"I asked the captain permission not to remount; he agreed, and we went on talking. Explain to me, Captain, why so many of our officers are being wounded. There is such a dense mass of soldiers that it would be easier to kill more of them. Are they really aiming on purpose at the officers?"

"Of cource, answered Podjampolsky. "That is the most effective way of disrupting weakening enemy forces"

"Why is that?"

Why? Because one brave, competent officer can do the enemy more harm with his knowledge, sagacity, and skill in using both the advantages of the landscape and the mistakes of the opposing side – particularly when he is an officer endowed with the lofty sense of honour which makes him face death dauntlessly and act coolly no matter how great the danger – such an officer, I repeat, can do more harm to the enemy that a thousand soldiers with nobody to command them".

To me this reveals a very potent secret to the early French success in the Napoleonic wars. They were unofficially trained to fire directly on enemy Officers. This goes a long way to explain such comments as that of Wellington when he took command in Spain. "The continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle began" Yes he is probably eluding to many factors such as Napoleon's strategic advantages over the enemy to produce battles which would have much greater chances of success but from a tactical point of view the idea that the French had dropped the idea of that over used word, "Honour" strikes true for me. The period was still very deeply focused on the concepts of the gentlemen's' battles of the 18th century. The Revolution and what happened there created a psyche in the French army that evolved them away from the so called Honorable way to conduct a battle of the previous wars to that of a total disrespect for authority, especially that of the enemy which stripped away any repletion against committing such battlefield crimes.

Going into battle with no qualms or ill feeling about deliberately shooting enemy officers went along way to explain why the Prussian army of 1806 was so severely defeated and how the other continental armies had no sufficient answer to the French Skirmishers who were deliberately firing on their commanders, officers and NCO's . Take this compulsion of the French to target enemy officers out of the equation in the period from 1800 to say 1810-11 and I feel the French would not have done as well as they had…

Also, later on in the wars the Allies learnt and caught on, eventually they too were shooting up French officers and killing them in droves. This is to me evidence again of another technological advantage (albeit in policy only) that the French had over their enemies which was eventually picked up on clearly in the quotes given above and acted upon and thus the advantage was lost to the innovators.

Regards,
Shane

Seems like teasing, was it not?
Nez pas de charge. Aber Ich trinke Warsteiner Dunkel.

Steve,

No, again you are wrong. Taking something out of context is a logical fallacy where the intent is to distort the original meaning. I didn't do that, nor do I believe that the authors in whose works I found the material did either. Your definition of 'out of context' is inaccurate. If you have information that they did and can prove it, then I suggest you post it. Otherwise, you're incorrect in your assumption and in your definition of the term.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Warfare is not conducted on a gaming table or a den floor. Nor is it conducted by reenactors interpreting history. It is conducted in a very deadly fashion by commanders in deadly earnest and the mud, sweat, blood, and mess is real as the stalking horse Boer used in the movie 'Zulu' stated to Chard and Bromhead 'it's bloody deadly, old boy.'

The French did not conduct fighting in open order 'by the numbers.' Their tactical system was a result of trial and error and started as field maneuvers in the 1770s in Normandy and evolved into what actually was taking place on the battlefields from 1792-1815. Whole battalions and regiments were used to fight in open order and there was no overall French regulation for skirmishing, fighting in open order or whatever you wish to call it. It was instinctive, fluid, and was employed for a variety of missions on both offense and defense. French commanders did many times, and probably more often than not, have their first line in a heavy skirmish line, deploying their battlions in open order and not in three ranks (there were a couple of articles on this in the old Empires, Eagles, and Lions by Jean Lochet and Paddy Griffith which described French tactics at Jena). You won't find French skirmishing tactics codified in regulations, French commanders believing it was not necessary. Local commanders did write instructions, such as Davout's, but these were undoubtedly for new recruits to be trained by. I even doubt that the usual French skirmisher tactics recommended skirmishers always fighting in pairs.

As Scharnhorst stated, the French were able to use individual initiative in this type of fighting, and that was not the norm for other Continental powers who needed the lock-step regulations to train them and why the Austrians and Russians, and to a lesser extent the Prussians, were not as effective fighting in open order as the French were. The tactics were not institutionalized in the other Continental armies as it became in the Grande Armee just as the doctrine of infantry/artillery cooperation was imbued in the French service and was not in others.

At Waterloo after the French cavalry charges failed, for example, French infantry fought in skirmisher swarms against the allied line, coordinated with artillery that was aggressively handled forward and with cuirassier units in support. What these did was operate against allied units in square, driving in the allied skirmisher, and shooting allied squares to pieces. You can find references to this both in Siborne and in Houssaye (where there is also evidence that allied infantry squares were broken during the massive French cavalry charges). You have to look for it, but it's there. Siborne's history is quite large.

Finally, I would highly recommend two chapters to read in an attempt to understand the French tactical system: first, Quimby's last chapter in The Background of Napoleonic Warfare and the chapter on strategy and tactics is Elting's Swords Around A Throne. All skirmishing is not equal and not the same thing. No one else used large numbers of troops in open order either as an offensive maneuver element as did the French and that was a definite decisive element of their tactical system. The French system was very flexible and coordinated and that combined with their organizational superiority and their command and control (ie, their staff system) gave them immense advantages over their opponents for most of the period.

Sincerely,
Kevin

"Warfare is not conducted on a gaming table or a den floor. Nor is it conducted by reenactors interpreting history. It is conducted in a very deadly fashion by commanders in deadly earnest and the mud, sweat, blood, and mess is real…"

Don't you think wargamers understand this? I'm not sure what your point is (other than a thinly disguised statement that we are playing with toys and that playing with "army men" is not real warfare). The thread began (as most on TMP do) with questions about historical practices that relate to representing warfare (i.e. wargaming/simulation). Many wargamers want their "simulation" to reflect historical practices as much as possible. Most wargamers are interested in history (many are quite knowledgeable) and wargaming is a hobby, albeit educational and fun. You seem impelled to enlighten us with (your version of) history. You are not a wargamer. This is a site primarily for "miniature wargamers." I'm sure most of us appreciate that some people with historical knowledge that do not wargame are willing to share their information and answer questions. You sir, strike me as a dilettante that must force your views on us ignorant wargamers that are deluded.

Kev,

You wascally wabbit! You put your spin on the words I used, then try to suggest I said something negative about other, actually honorable, writers using YOUR spin! You are getting Twicky, indeed!

I found out some additional information about the two Radetzky quotes. They are actually two differing translations of the same material! "Rothenberg gives them on p. 111 and p. 184 (first edition). Each is noted back to the "Alte Feldakten 1813 Deutschland" or "Hauptarmee F/10 436b" at Ch 6 n.39 and Ch 9 n.55."

Yours, in firm research,

Steve

Kevin,

But you bring no detailed evidence to back up your claims, you just tell us that's how it was. You need to put some more meat on the bones of your assertions before you convince me that the French used such a system, or more to the point didn't use any system at all. Your descriptions are just too vague, and you shoudn't presume that most people here haven't read the secondary material that you refer to.

For anyone else trying to follow all of this, Kevin wrote:

"At Waterloo after the French cavalry charges failed, for example, French infantry fought in skirmisher swarms against the allied line, coordinated with artillery that was aggressively handled forward and with cuirassier units in support. What these did was operate against allied units in square, driving in the allied skirmisher, and shooting allied squares to pieces. You can find references to this both in Siborne and in Houssaye (where there is also evidence that allied infantry squares were broken during the massive French cavalry charges). You have to look for it, but it's there. Siborne's history is quite large."

I think that the bit relevant to all of this in the Siborne starts here and continues for about the next fifty pages or so.

link

Hoping this helps,

Regards

I'm not assuming anything but am merely using what you've written for reference. From what you've stated, I'm not convinced that you understand what open order and skirmishing is and you surely don't understand, or don't agree with, the French system.

Here's a quote from Roche-Aymon (1808) which may be helpful for an overall impression of the French tactical system:

'At the start of the Revolutionary Wars, the French government decided to introduce new tactics…which would give hidden talents scope for development. Instead of the line it chose the column, since this provided appropriate means to direct an enflamed people; regular fire was exchanged for the tirailleur system, and thus the basic elements of the French victories were formed. Since skirmishing isolated the soldier in combat, left him to his own judgment, and stronly arounsed the ambition of each individual, it necessarily gave the French an advantage over troops drilled to fight only in close formations…The present French emperor improved on this new system of war. The idea, already sensed by the famous Marshal de Saxe, that the art of war lay solely in the legs, was expanded and realized by Napoleon in his audacious marches; his army achieves a speed of movement so far unequaled by others, and since it is solely designed for fighting it knows neither baggage trains nor supply depots, and its operatons are not dependent on the calculation of the quartermaster. But without the organization of French armies into divisions, legions, and corps, the success of these daring marches would nevertheless often be most doubtful. Apart from other factors, this arragement is so advantageous because through it the efficient combination of infantry and artillery, the two fundamental branches of the service, effectively supports the rather inferior French cavalry. Now the corps and divisional commanders no longer recognize the existence of terrain dangerous to them; they only know more or less favorable ground on hwich they are able to fight at any time.'

Despite the errors in who developed the tactical system, the inaccurate comment on French cavalry by 1808 and a few other errors, Roche-Aymon, a French emigre in the Prussian service understood the French tactical system somewhat especially the employment of infantry in open and skirmish order and the French emphasis on infantry/artillery cooperation. This excerpt is from Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform.

Here is an interesting comment by General Roguet contained in the last chapter of Quimby's book:

'Drills cannot resemble the actions of the battlefield…In peace time, one devotes oneself to regularity, to precision and the uniformity of movements, to the strict and constant observation of all the principles, but new elements intervene in action. The morale of the two forces, the character of the nations and of the commanders, and above all, the influence of the battlefield on these latter complicate the question.'

Roguet stated that both Frederick and Napoleon understood this.

Here is a comment on French skirmishing tactics from the same chapter:

'[They] frankly abandoned any attempt at orderly movement, took refuge behind cover of all sorts, but were so numerous that they could always drive in the very think skirmishing line of the enemy and get closely engaged with his whole front.' This is definite evidence that skirmishing tactics and employment were different.

General Le Coutrier didn't believe that written regulations for skirmishing were needed 'for a type of warfare that was the most natural of all.'

Colin stated in his tactical study 'That w3hich by its nature is irregular submits badly to rules…if the Reglement…does not mention tirailleurs, then [this was] simply because it was not considered useful to regulate the deployment of swarms of skirmishers.'

These last two are in Paret.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Thank you all for this information. It seems that people at the time had knowledge of this uniquely French tatical method, but it seems poorly recorded, particuarily by the English language sources. Its not the first time that one side did not realize that a fundamental different tactic was being used against them and just labled it by familiar terms. Therefore it might be useful to make a distinction between skirmishing and the "swarm of skirmishers", which is really not a type of skirmishing (of just greater density) but a different formation. Lets follow and call it what Siborne called it "the grand attack en Tirailleurs". If in our wargames we have rules that allow Austrian battalion masses and English 2 deep lines- why not.

Kevin,

You have still not provided any detail to explain the point in question. I ask again: how did a French division commander break his front line entirely into skirmish order in the manner that you originally inferred? You tell me that it happened, but you don't seem to know anything about the mechanics of the operation.

I provided some specific evidence above to show that commanders of the time believed that less is more when it came to skirmishing, and that it was a bad idea to cram the line full of men, a point that was obviously understood by Davout and Reille at least within the French army. This is tactical level detail, of interest and use to wargamers, but perhaps beneath the grain of most historian's needs.

Now look at your quote from Roche-Amon. If I was wanting to write a general history of tactics this might be useful, but as a wargamer it tells me nothing. How were the companies arranged? How many men would be used in the firing line at once? How would they be relieved by fresh troops? etc, etc.

The Napoleonic battlefield was certainly a confusing and frightening place, and things certainly wouldn't have been done exactly by the book, but on the other hand, the Napoleonic battlefield was not populated by swarms of French Tirailleurs doing whatever they pleased.

If you read, for example, the Siborne text, the allied line at Waterloo after the French cavalry charges certainly was populated by swarms of French skirmishers firing at will.

If there are no drill regulations governing the employment of French tirailleurs and you want to know specifics, then you'll have to go and find them in French texts. I tend to doubt you're going to find them. You might also want to look at the older Empires, Eagles, and Lions to find more examples of what you're looking for as well as some of the references I've provided. I'm not an expert in French drill, though I have taken a look at the 1791 Reglement for familiarity.

And nobody said anything about 'cramming the line full of men.' That isn't what happened. The French companies would have a reserve, of about twelve picked men with the company commander and the drummer or bugle horn for the troops in open order to rally on, but that was also in one of the references that was given to you. If you want specifics such as commands and who put what foot where on what order, I don't have that and the French didn't do that anyway. The Prussians did, and you can find the reference to that in Paret.

And as a reminder, regulations were for the guidance of the commander, at least in the French service, and they were not written in stone. What the 1791 Reglement did was to provide a 'menu' for the commander to choose from in the field. And the French skirmisher tactics did not replace the 1791 Reglement, they supplemented it.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin wrote:

"And nobody said anything about 'cramming the line full of men.' That isn't what happened."

Kevin,

So is it now fair to say that it would not be possible for a skirmish line to be mistaken for a close order line?

Kevin wrote:

"If you read, for example, the Siborne text, the allied line at Waterloo after the French cavalry charges certainly was populated by swarms of French skirmishers firing at will."

Kevin,

It's far better to read the sources that Siborne relied upon for his history (all readily available) before making any judgement here.

Cap'n,

I like the cut of your jib.

Yours, in firm research,

Steve

'So is it now fair to say that it would not be possible for a skirmish line to be mistaken for a close order line?'

That was never said or implied. What I said was that the French had a habit of not using the usual three-deep line as their first line, instead many French commanders would use a thick skirmish line instead and feed it from the second line which was usually held in a line of battalion columns.

Second, what I said about the French against Wellington in the Peninsula was because of their own tendencies to employ a thick skirmish line as their first line on defense, the French may have thought the British were doing the same thing with theirs, thought it was their main defensive line (main line of resistance) and started to deploy too early.

You have misinterpreted what I said which was a little hard since I was quite specific.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'It's far better to read the sources that Siborne relied upon for his history (all readily available) before making any judgement here.'

Have you? The only person that has questioned Siborne has been Hamilton-Williams and apparently he was wrong.

Have you read Siborne's source material?

Sincerely,
Kevin

I simply cannot figure out the rationale for the strange responses of "10th Marines" to Captain Snort's cogent questions. Captain S was not questioning Siborne (that convoluted spin is entirely 10th Marines'). Kiley quotes Siborne. Captain S. asks legitimate question. Kiley infers that Captain S.'s comment (about reading original sources used by Siborne) puts Captain S. on par with Hamilton-Williams (but first Kiley must "spin" Captain S.'s comment into "the only person that has questioned Siborne…").

10th Marines claims Capatin S. "misinterpreted what I said which was a little hard since I was quite specific."

Mon Dieu Monsieur Kiley, if you cannot or will not answer specific, cogent questions--then by Jove sir--come out and say so! Stop putting convoluted spin on what people say and then placing the onus back on them. Mental sleight of hand only proves ONE THING--either you cannot or will not answer the posed, legitimate, specific, cogent questions.

I remember reading in the "Artillery Bitching" thread from January 2008, Nvrsaynvr concluded that Kevin Kiley cannot be gainsayed. Now I see that his conclusion was well-founded.

So, Mr. Kiley: You are not a wargamer. You are not an historian (by which I mean you are neither trained as one nor paid as one). You are working on an M.A. perhaps, but do not have a doctorate). You have written a couple of tracts (that Owen Connelly, who is a professional, noted in MHQ, are written for a "popular" audience). You have written a few articles and have posted some book reviews (several of which have caused rancor). Connelly also notes in his review about your book that [Kiley] "seems oblivious to certain rules of the history profession." I would concur with Dr. Connelly.

So, that brings me to my cogent question. Why do you even post here? What historical facts you possess are lost as a result of the acrimony that develops given your stubbornness and unwillingness to engage in a discussion where both parties can learn. You state assertions as fact, but when questioned you are incorrigible.

Captain S. lucidly explained that he seeks detailed facts that wargame designers can use to develop more valid representations of warfare. You remind us [wargamers] that "Warfare is not conducted on a gaming table or a den floor." Do you want to play historian? Is that what you are about? I reply that history is not conducted on a miniature wargame web site.

This is about the tenth thread that I have some interest in that you have soured because of your refusal to be gainsayed. If you only wish to prove that you are an "expert" or that "you are right" then you are not helping Captain S. or any members apply history to wargame design nor the hobby in general. Therefore what is your contribution?

Does anyone know why Kev USES two "noms de TMP" at the same time? Good Cop; Bad Cop?

Doesn't he even have a third "nom de TMP" account? Middle Cop?

That's a mighty three 'stifel' sword he wields, isn't it? Better watch out, 'Lest'!

Hi,

Capt S wrote:

"It's far better to read the sources that Siborne relied upon for his history (all readily available) before making any judgement here."

Is it possible for anyone to summarize how the information in the actual primary sources might be interpreted differently from that given by Siborne in his History? Or if not, which of the primary sources he uses is most relevant to the current discussion?

Thanks for the "heads up" Steve.

Interesting that I dug up a similar thread about skirmishing in the NS Archive for January 2005. It took some time to read through all the posts. Monsieur Kiley made many of the same basic arguments as he does here, coughing up the same ole same ole. He was refuted by several people. John Cook (I've discovered was a TMP member in the past) noted in a message to Kevin "It is just too bad that you keep peddling this sort of thing when you know it to be so much twaddle." Cook also noted "I will keep a copy of this in case you raise it again in future." Too bad he is not a current member of TMP or he could save us all the time and trouble.

I also found comments dating back to 2003 (NSF) by Geert; "I give you primary / first hand material. You give me opinions of others, tertiary, hear-say, and only those are PROVING your case . . . I am beginning to believe that you are living in your own Imperium, your own 'make-believe' world."

I've found many more examples (over the years) of such useless bandying and argumentation for no purpose (save some egotistical point scoring). I cannot even finish reading the ones between him and Dave Hollins. I have all the information about Kevin's "historical" methodology necessary to understand what he's about.

I find myself longing for the days of EEL again.

Kevin: I wish to send you some army men and a package of rubber bands for Christmas this year. A small, but progressive step, toward enlightening you about wargaming.

Lest,

You might want to take a look at

Kiley, Kevin "Prussian Light Infantry in the Jena Campaign" – A look at why were the Prussians so deficient in their light infantry arm during the 1806 campaign:

link

Some more citations for Kev's quotes:

Peter Paret. Yorck and the Era of the Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (1966): page 143: "… past fifteen years: At the start of the Revolutionary wars, the French government decided to introduce new tactics . . . which would give hidden talents …."

C. W. C. Oman. "Column and Line in the Peninsular War" found in the "Proceedings of the British Academy", see page 326, vol 4 (1909): "… and were so numerous that they could always drive in the very thin skirmishing line of the enemy, and get closely engaged with his whole front. …."

This was separately published as

Column and Line in the Peninsular War (1910) by C. W. C. Oman. See page 6: "… and were so numerous that they could always drive in the very thin skirmishing line of the enemy, and get closely engaged with his whole front. …."

Which was, of course, part of his "Studies in the Napoleonic Wars" (1929) See page 87: "… but were so numerous that they could always drive in the very thin skirmishing line of the enemy, and get closely engaged with his whole front. …."

Peter Paret. Yorck and the Era of the Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (1966): page 69: "… General Le Couturier, who declared that not much instruction was needed "for a type of warfare that was the most natural of all. …."

Same work, same page 69: "… trying to impose order on skirmishers would spoil their effectiveness: "That which by its nature is irregular submits badly to rules. …."

'Kevin: I wish to send you some army men and a package of rubber bands for Christmas this year. A small, but progressive step, toward enlightening you about wargaming.'

That's OK as I have a good moderate size collection of toy and model soliders and equipment of my own and I do wargame in 34mm as I've said before. But thanks for the offer, that is very kind of you.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Does anyone know why Kev USES two "noms de TMP" at the same time?'

That has already been asked and answered and it's in this thread on 7 August at 9:59 PM. You really need to pay more attention.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Why do you even post here?'

Obviously to keep folks like you on the straight and narrow on your information, which you obviously are having trouble with. ;-)

Sincerely,
Kevin

Steve,

I never stifle by the way as (1) I think it's silly and (2) it's a self-serving manner of censorship.

I'd rather take the good and the bad together and form my own opinions on both people and information.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Sorry, I should have said 54mm vice 34 mm. Further, I am interested, thanks to this forum and seeing Shane's excellent figures, of starting an army in wargame figures. I already have about 100 in my collection but definitely plan on getting more of them.

Sincerely,
Kevin

link

Rothenburg on skirmishing

Regards
James

So Kev, you have four (4) accounts on TMP:

1) "Kevin Kiley" Membership Started 4 May 2008
2) "10th Marines" Membership Started 9 July 2008
3) 2007 – "When we bought our laptop last year, I couldn't remember my password, so I reregistered with a new ID so I could use the computer."
4) Prior one – about which you state "I couldn't remember my password", etc.

Yes, I was very much aware of the "7 August at 9:59 PM." post containing your ‘facts'. The ‘facts' just don't make any sense. I guess we will have to agree to disagree. <;^}

I am glad that you do not use this power block of stifeling for nefarious purposes, nicht war?

Yours, in firm research,

Steve

Kevin wrote:

"Have you? The only person that has questioned Siborne has been Hamilton-Williams and apparently he was wrong. Have you read Siborne's source material?"

Kevin,

Actually, I have. I think that Siborne's work is reasonably good, but I think that it is better to look at the first hand accounts and see what the soldiers who were at Waterloo actually witnessed, rather than Siborne's interpretation of them. The attacks in the afternoon by French infantry are very difficult to follow, and it is easy to cover them with a blanket term, "a cloud of skirmishers".

If you read the sources, there is quite a bit of detail, and the French are described in a variety of modes; attacks in columns, engaging the enemy with deployed lines, and, of course, skirmishing. Its all very interesting.

What have you read?

Sincerely,
Kevin

James,

You might want to supplement what Rothenberg says there with what he says about the Austrian army specifically in Napoleon's Great Adversary. It fills out the picture somewhat.

Sincrely,
Kevin

G'Day Gents,

In regards to what is meant by tirailleurs en grande bande:

Marbot says that tirailleurs en grande bande are quite different from tirailleurs de combat in that the grande bande is the main body (not used by it).

"Les tirailleurs de combat sont donc bien des éléments subordonnés à l'action des batallions, dont ils préparent l'attaque, qu'ils éclairent et relient entre eux. Leur action peut jamais aller jusqu'à la decision.

"Les tirailleurs en grande bande, au contraire, forment un corps principale dont le but est enlever ou défendre une position, ou de tourner les flancs de l'ennemi.".

To complete the validation of Marbot's definition, it must be understood that in 1829 the French were examining three Light Infantry Instructions used during or immediately prior the Napoleonic eara:

I. "Service Des Tirailleurs En Usage Au 10e Regiment D'Infanterie" par Lieutant-Colonel de Beauval (which I have)

II. "Manoeuvres Des tirailleurs" par Colonel Chambrum (which I have)

III. "Sur Le Service Des trailleurs" par General Desmichel (which I have)

This was due to the fact that as late as 1829 the French ordonnnance still did not have one universal reglement on the manner of forming and to employ the trailleurs. Because of this, a commission was charged for the revision of the Reglement de 1791, as well as an insertion of instructions for the trailleurs (… 'just like l'ordonnance Autrichienne 1807, l'ordonnance Prussienne 1812, l'ordonnnce Piemontaise 1818, and British Rules and Regulations of 1792' …).

But it was dissolved before the commission was able to put the last hands on its work. This was due to the untimely death of Comte Curial (who was once the Commander of such commands as the 3' division de la vieille garde en Russie, and died on 30 May 1829), who presided over the charged commission.

When the French were comparing the three instructions, it was made clear that Colonel Chambrum's 'Instructions were not to be applied to the manoeuvre des trailleurs aux grandes bandes' … "Son instructions est destinee a un bataillon". For only an entire battalion en tirailleurs or battalions en tirailleurs were given the mission of assaulting or defending a position, or turning the flank of an enemy body of troops.

I have a printed copy of the instructions "Sur Le Service Des trailleurs", dated from 1828, but we have reason to believe that the treatise was written in 1820 or earlier. Because the treatise may or may have been used during the Napoleonic's (or shortly after), it was first necessary to validate whether or not the treatise was applicable to various instructions that were written during the Napoleonic's.

This was done by comparing Desmichel's "Maniere de Disposer Une compagnie en Tiralleurs" with all the various instructions that are known to exist (or properly said – that I own) during the Napoleonic's. With an end result that Desmichel's treatise was quite similar to those actually used during the Napoleonic's. As a result we have no doubt that the treatise is analogous to the general principles and "system" (doctrine) used during the Napoleonic's.

When one or more battalions of light infantry are to be formed as tirailleurs, the general shall warn the colonels, who would in turn inform their officers of his etat major the various needed points to be known on the line, and points d'appui for the line of tirailleurs.

The officers would proceed to form the battalion en tirailleurs as indicated in the instruction: "Maniere de Disposer Une compagnie en Tiralleurs" for the dispersion of a battalion.

The lines of tirailluers are to be formed on one battalion, the colonel will let the chef de bataillon know where the various points and point d'appui are. The chef de bataillon will warn the compagnies of carabiners or voltigeurs that they will have to form two lines of tirailleurs, with the second line is 50 paces in front of the reserve.

Captains will command the first and second line, and the third line is formed as the reserve of the battalion.

To assure that everyone is in their proper position, the chef de bataillon will give the command to open ranks.

The commanders of each battalion shall give the various orders from the adopted signals by means of diverse batteries from l'ordonnance, or calls adopted for the school of tirailleurs. Which are repeated by the clarions/drummers of the chef de bataillon commanding the reserves and by the captains commanding the lignes de tirailleurs. The tirailleurs are expected to know, as well as promptly obey the various signals no matter what sort of terrain the tirailleurs are in.

The Commander will use both a regulating body and guides on both end of the ligne of tirailleurs to execute any change of front and direction. Of course the use of calls are to replace the command of voice, due to the length of the line, and the turmoil of an action.

As for the French operating a grand body of troops entirely in skirmish formation. We have documented after action reports from Marmont…one of his division commanders…and Captaine Barres validating that in 1813, there were brigades that did operate completely en tirailleur….and of course we have accounts of grande bands in 1815.

I hope this helps.
Art

This is exactly the type of material that I was hoping for, but I am not sure that I completely understand.

You write:

"The lines of tirailleurs are to be formed on one battalion, the colonel will let the chef de bataillon know where the various points and point d'appui are. The chef de bataillon will warn the compagnies of carabiners or voltigeurs that they will have to form two lines of tirailleurs, with the second line is 50 paces in front of the reserve."

Is this a "Grande Bande"?

Are you are saying that the flank companies form the first 2 lines of skirmishers, and that the remaining 4 centre companies form the reserve? Presumably the reserve would take their place in the firng line to relieve the Carabiniers and Voltiguers when required?

If this is a Grande Bande, it would seem that the operation is conducted in some sort of regular order, and not just every man for himself en debandade.