"Marengo 1800 - Is it biased?" Topic

HK,
the assumption is not from me but from Mras, my assumption is just that Mras would have noted it if Melas had used Elsnitz forces against the guard.
All this is discussed in the final pages where Mras deals with Berthier.
Elsnitz forces on the field did actually only consist of the Liechtenstein and Erzherzog Johann dragoons.
In itsself it was a small force, no comparision to a napoleonic cavalry reserve.

I Have no problem with the long delay.

first Melas had to realize that the french were finally giving up their position to retreat, this might indeed have required perhaps an hour or so til the shooting had toned down.
Then he had to hand over command to his successor, which must have produced another delay, according to Mras it did.

Then the army had to regroup, a new advance guard for the advance had to be formed, Mras mentions this.

Then the army, still in line of battle had to march off into column again, which must have required some countermarching and maneuvering to keep the ordre de bataille for the eventuality of marching up again if the french did make a stand.

Then the column(the main column indeed in one column) had to advance forward a few kilometers.

according to Mras, Ott did not attack because it was quite late in the day and primarily because the main column was gone, he was more or less alone.

@von Winterfeldt,

I found this book on Google Books.

Good reading.

If anyone want a "French Mras" (a staff study based on th collected reports of the officers at the battle), the second of five versions of the story of Marengo here :

Journal des sciences militaires
link

is the one that was done by the French Dépôt de la Guerre and which was never published (until the late 1820's), and indeed was supposd to have been destroyed per orders of Bonaparte. One copy was saved, by pulling it out of its binding before the binding was consigned to the flames.

As Kevin has stated, the re-write was agianst Monnier, and made the FIrst Consul look more prescient. No difference for the garde à pied.

- Evan

Chasseur à Cheval

Thank you for the link, I will download and read it in due course.

@Philippe Aube

Do you have a link of that Mras translation, I cannot find it, so I can compare the German original versus the French translation.

Salut von Winterfeldt,

The OMZ article by Mras is the 5th relation of Marengo at the link above for the Journal des sciences militaires
(1st = Bulletin, 2= Dépôt original, 3= Dépôt rewrite, 4 = Napoléon "Memoires", 5= Mras)

Here is what de Cugnac has of Mras :
link

- Evan

evan, thanks for the journal de sciences militaires link, great, just start reading.

@ Chasseur à Cheval

Here is the letter from Bonaparte to Berthier :

" Milan 28 prairial an VIII (17 juin 1800)

Je vous envoie, citoyen général, un arrêté dont je vous prie d'envoyer copie au général Masséna et au général Turreau.
Plaisance est rendue : la garnison est prisonnière sur parole ; elle est forte de 1100 hommes. Elle servira à échanger les 1100 hommes qui ont été faits prisonniers à Marengo et qui sont à Alexandrie.

Bonaparte. "

The letter is clear enough. The prisoners are still in Alexandria and there are about 1100 of them.

Good reading.

@ Cptn Iglo

One simple question : which unit(s) did the four Hussars squadrons, led by Frimont to success against the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls, belonged to ?

Best regards.

Philippe,

I think Petit was speaking of the physical return of the prisoners. It follows right after a discussion of some degree of fraternization between the two armies.

Napoléon himself was said to leave the area early that morning.

So, Napoléon may either (i) not have known the prisoners were back among the French, or (ii) may be writing about their "legal" status, not physical location. And also so, Petit may either (i) be speaking other prisoners, from an original total above 1100, and presumably specifically garde prisoners if not even more specifically grenadier à cheval prisoners, or (ii) may be plain wrong.

Bien amicalement,

- Evan

Which Austrians ?? How many ??

"Stutterheim" A
A. "the regiment of Lobkowitz"
B. "the same battalion of Spleny, with a battalion of Frelich [sic]"
C. "a swarm of imperial cavalry, amongst which the Bussy jägers most notably"

"Stutterheim" B
A. "the light dragoon regiment of Lobkowitz"
B. "another battalion of Spleny and a battalion of Frölich"
C. "some squadrons of Nauendorf husars and Bussy jägers"

Mras
A. "the dragoon regiment of Lobkowitz"
B. "the Austrian regiment of Spleny"
C. "four squadrons of husars"

Neipperg
"Ces mêmes chasseurs de Bussy …. se couvirent de gloire en détruisant une grande partie des grenadeirs de la garde consulaire."

Petit
"Les grenadiers à pied revenaient couverts de gloire et menaçant de leurs terribles bayonettes ceux qui d'aguères vendaient d'avance leurs bonnets. (1)
--------------------------------------
(1) Les soldats de la légion de Bussi avaient ramassé les bonnets des grenadiers morts ou blessés, et nous les moutrait, en les faisant tourner sur leurs sabres. "

Geschichte der K.u. K. Uhlanen-Regiments Kaiser Joseph II. Nr. 6, in 1800 Kaisar DR1
"Parts of our regiment, according to the regiment's tradition, took part to the destructive attack against Bonaparte's Consul Guard."

From Mélas' Austrian order of battle, quoted in Hüffer pages 310-311 and stengths per Mras

-- Bussy JR : 2 esc./186 men in the Avantgarde of the Hauptkolonne (Obrist Frimont)
-- Kaisar DR1 : 2[3?] esc./272 men in the Avantgarde of the Hauptkolonne (Obrist Frimont), 4[3?] esc./309 men in the Hauptkolonne (GM Pilati, FML Hadik)

-- Lobkowitz DR10 : 2 esc./248 men in the Avantgarde of the 2. Kolonne (GM Gottesheim), 4 esc./492 men in the 2. Kolonne (GM Sticker, FML Schellenberg)
-- Frölich IR28 : 1 bat./523 men in the Avantgarde of the 2. Kolonne (GM Gottesheim), 2 bat./1046 men in the 2. Kolonne (GM Retz, FML Schellenberg)
-- Spleny IR51 : 2 bat./737 men in the 2. Kolonne (GM Sticker, FML Schellenberg)

-- Nauendorf HR8 : 3-1/2 esc./426 men in the 3. Kolonne (GM Rousseau, FML O'Reilly)
-- The only other hussard regiment on the field, [vacant] HR5 : 2 esc./230 men in the 3. Kolonne (GM Rousseau, FML O'Reilly)

- Evan

evan and Philippe,
why not just see "hussars" as a troop category, Mras might have alternatively used the term "cheveaulegers", which might have been a bit inappropriate to describe the Bussy jägers.

"4 squadrons of Bussy Jägers" might not be very telling for a reader in 1823.

The Bussy Jägers were a short lived phenomen which did exist from 1797 to 1801. "Jäger" was never an established category in the austrian cavalry.

the Bussy jägers were actually bunched together from a number of former freikorps units, among them the emigree Carneville and Rohan freikorps, who did originally name themselfs as hulans or later hussars.

Call them "semiregular light cavalry", if thats to technical and you want to use an established category to get things across, just say " 4 squadrons of hussars".

@ Cptn Iglo

You wrote : "why not just see "hussars" as a troop category, Mras might have alternatively used the term "cheveaulegers", which might have been a bit inappropriate to describe the Bussy jägers."

Frankly do you really believe that ? If so, there is no amount of evidence that can convince you…

First, Mras, an Austrian officer, gives the name of each and every unit involved in the fight. He also gives the name of one LightDragoon regiment. Why would he fail to trace the units under Frimont ? The order of battle was not a secret (surely not to him).

Moreover, Hussars, in an Austrian context, refers to cavalry of Hungarian origin : nothing like the Bussy Jägers nor the Kaizer Dragoons. I am 100% sure that an AUSTRIAN officer would not make such blunder as to label light cavalry of French (émigrés) and "German" origin with an Hungarian term such as hussars. For any other army your assertion would have a low probability to be true, but for an Austro-hungarian army it is simply IMPOSSIBLE ! There is not a fat chance that an Austrian officer would use the Hussar term to categorize the whole of the light cavalry, especially in 1823 !

@ Chasseur à Cheval

It is clear that Bonaparte speaks of prisoners held in Alexandria (he specifies the place), so we can assume safely that this letter refers to prisoners really held there and not to a certain status for some troops.

I have never heard of an exchange of prisoners (beyond some officers) in any primary source so far (before this letter of course).

Best regards.

Philippe,
you may have a point, but I actually do not have a simple answer to defend "my" author.
He did show the Austrian battle order a few pages before, there would have been no problem to write " 2 squadrons of Bussy jägers and 2 from the kaiser dragoons ."
Perhaps he did read conflicting accounts and was not quite shure.
perhaps it was just the sloppiness of an infantry officer, on the field these people did not ask for a special formation for a scouting or screening mission, they did ask for hussars, and if they did get a squadron of cheveau legers or ulans instead, they were happy too.

I know this is not a very convincing explanation for what might indeed be a complete banality.

The overall description of the engagement is very sound.
Perhaps I´m naive, but people can easily convince me with a logic plausible unpretentious explanation of events.

The problem I have with many french versions is that overboarding pathos, these disproportionate exaggerations, the whole violation of logic thinking.
read Melas account of Marengo and the bulletin and you know what I mean.

If the Guard did indeed do more than the Spartans at the thermopylaes, who did at least have a very strong defensive position to make their story plausible, then there should at least someone have given an accurate account.

My impression after getting more access to the Marengo issue, is , that later even Napoleon seems to have been ashamed of the nonsense he had fabricated in his bulletin.
Until the final 1805 Berthier version the propaganda focus shifts more and more to a well organized fully controlled defensive battle and away from tactical martyr actions.

After all, if the tales were true, sending out a small infantry formation into open terrain without any support and against overwhelming numbers is not sound tactics, not at all.

Philippe,

"really held there and not to a certain status"
Well, actually, for the Austrians "la garnison est prisonnière sur parole", so these ones are not held, but walking around. One may not be wrong to think the French prisoners at Alexandria could be also at physical liberty, or perhaps only the wounded were given over to the care of French doctors (either in Alexandria or after being sent to the French encampments or both).

In any case, my point is not that we can NOT be certain, from the quote you were so good as to provide, that Murat spoke of 121 gardes dead and wounded either before or after the return of (wounded) garde prisoners, or whether the number of 121 included prisoners reported wounded but at that moment on 16 juin not yet "returned", either physically or legally.

For me, it seems Murat thought that he knew the total, one way or another, at 121. And these number easily aligns with the figures of Brossier and Lauriston (as previously discussed). But these are only my OPINIONS, and one could take another line of reasoning quite easily from the data so far adduced on the subject.

---------------------------------------------------

Iglo,

In additon to noting that husars are not strictly jäger, as does our colleague Philippe, but that one might (notionally) generalize all light cavalry under that name (as you propose), what is quite sure is that there were not 4 squadrons of Bussy-Jäger at Marengo, but only 2.

Let's assume 4 total squadrons (the number reported by Mras, and within the "descriptive" numeration of the two manuscripts). More would be ratehr useless anyway. Everyone seems to think that the Bussy were there. So we are looking for two more squadrons.

Now we have a real problem.
OPTION 1 – If we lean toward Manuscript B and Mras, we will say these 2 esc. are hussars. But the only husars we have on hand are over on the right in the 3. Kolonne -- how did these get over to the far left under Frimont ??
OPTION 2 – If we lean toward the quoted Regimental History and the Order of Battle, we will say that the 2 additional squadrons were the 2 of Kaisar (leichte) DR 1 under Frimont's command. But to do this we need to ignore the explicit details in Manuscript B and Mras.

If I were to state an OPINION, I would choose OPTION 1. But if that is correct, then we have an example of a mixing/moving cavalry from one location or Austrian command to another, in a packet of likely 2 esc. size. Which is exactly what I think was being sent at the garde à pied in the 3-ish charges valiantly (if not surprisingly) resisted in square or closed column, as reported by so many French sources, but omitted from Mras. And again, this all seems consistent with what I know Austrian cavalry doctrine circa 1800.

A similarly disconcerting lack of agreement about the appearance of the garde :

Manuscript A
"Just before this deciding moment, the garde consulaire came came marching on the road from Sale toward the center. … In open column by divisions they marched over an open field and had skirmishers to the front at about 60 paces, which screened their march."

Manuscript B
" … one discovered in a fold in the terrain the march of a small column, one with big red plumes, the characteristic of the guard, which moved through a field of high-standing crops, to position itself at the right wing of the division of General Lannes, which was taken in the flank by the jägers."

Mras
"At this decisive moment, Bonaparte ordered the Consular Foot Guard to go through Lannes' corps, which was retreating in disorder, and to go forward. …. In open column by divisions the Guard went through an open field to meet FML Ott – they had deployed skirmishers, who screened them at about 60 paces, covering their march."

I think we can stop attributing the two manuscripts to the same "eyewitness" author. Which rasies that terrible question, if these two manuscripts are not both the eyewitness report of Stutterheim, which one (if either) is ?

"If the Guard did indeed do more than the Spartans at the thermopylaes"
No I dont think this was what happened. Taking the puffery and pathos out of the French accounts, all there is really, before the events as related by the so-called "Stutterheim" manuscript(s), is defense against 3-ish charges by un-armoured cavalry received by formed, drilled, mature (old) infantry in closed column or square. This is no great feat of arms, I am thinking.

- Evan

evan,
which accounts?
I did read the key accounts in Cougnac, what I found out is the following:

berthier on the 14th 9pm (he calls the battle still San giuliano) gives a very rough overview and just writes that the guard did support the right wing.

Lannes, the right wing man , writes his report on the 15th.
Virtually nothing on the guard, perhaps I have overseen something.

Monnier, further on the right writes in his report on the 15th nothing on the guard, only that in the evening part of the guard under stabenrath took part in the counterattack, no details.

Murat, the cavalry commander who had three brigades on all parts of the field writes on the 16th an after action report on the cavalry performances, nothing about the guard.
Then he adds a post scriptum and indeed mentions the guard, surviving three charges and suffering 120 casualties.

My impression is the post scriptum refers to the guard cavalry.

But lets just imagine he did mean the guard infantry.
This might imply that Murat was happily writing his cavalry report, did then receive the bulletin written the day before and covering the epic guard performance, and just adds a post scriptum along the lines of "By the way, the guard was great". One of the most epic infantry performances of the napoleonic wars reduced to a post scriptum and a sign of sheer opportunism.
But as said, I´m quite convinced murat did mean the guard cavalry.

Evan,
all three accounts describe the same event, an infantry formation, the guard consulare moving forward.
Mras has used Stutterheim 1.
stutterhem 2 might be something different or perhaps a fine tuned, more colourful version of 1, perhaps aimed for a publication which did never happen.
where is the problem with all this.
Its at least always the same story.

The problem is where is the French accounts that match? If the Guard infantry was destroyed as Mras states, then no hiding the fact on the French side could have been done as there were too many present. It would have come out.

Further, the long list of awards for Guard personnel attest to a hard fight and surviving. Napoleon was not in the habit of giving awards for being destroyed and not if they were not deserved.

And don't forget Dupont's and Brossier's account of the action which supports the idea that the Guard infantry fought its way out and was not destroyed. If they had been destroyed there were enough people, sch as the 9th Legere, that didn't care for the Guard and they would have said something.

Sincerely,
K

Iglo,

"Mras has used Stutterheim 1. stutterhem [sic?] 2 might be something different or perhaps a fine tuned, more colourful version of 1, … where is the problem with all this."
No problem at all that I can see. It is NOT, however, the way Dave Hollins proposes these sources. And the thread was about "bias" in his booklet and version of Marengo.

"Its at least always the same story."
Yes, in general the same, but not the same in all the little "soldierly details" that make us think it is accurate. Actually, I was not looking for concurrence on all these little details, and it is not likely we will find it.
And so, in general, I accept Stutterheim+Mr. X+Mras as accurate and telling the same overall story, which I tend to accept as "accurate" and for which I have no pointed disagreement.

But let us then apply the same rules when we look at the "French" sources. A few say nothing about the garde à pied, althoguh we think that they would have remarked on anything unusual. Some say "valiant resisitance" or some such without detail. Some say "defended against 3(-ish) calvalry charges in square". Some say defended like a rock, were great heros, defended against artillery, cavalry and infantry, etc. All say they eventually moved back with heavy losses.
So, all of the little "soldierly details" differ, but there is a general positive view, with the "average" or "modal" story of a sucessful defense against 3-ish cavalry charges followed by an eventual retreat with heavy losses.

If we add 2-3 cavalry charges replused in square before the events described by Stutterheim, the two "general views" align perfectly. In this context, having a battalion of formed and drilled infantry repulsing 2-3 such charges by unarmoured cavalry is NO GREAT FEAT OF ARMS (and hence could be easily neglected by some observers as being not noteworthy, including the Austrian one(s)) and could later be written up as pretty good work. Think about how very typical it was (i) for British squares to do this to French armoured horse and (ii) for this to be described quite heroicially afterward, despite its being the typical result. Lastly, I see Manuscript A and Mras has the garde à pied on the field for about 2 hours before the events that resulted in thier retreat. Even here, as in the Frenc sources that give any timing, there is plenty of time for 2-3 cavalry charges replused in square.

Overall, I dont see a contradiction here. Take the puffery out and the non-consensus details out of both the "French" and the "Austrian" sources, and you end up with much the same general story with no points of explicit disagreement. Then one can go through the points of detail, which cannot be said to be "proven", but form an OPINION on some of them as being more or less likely.

Of course, this is exactly the opposite of the methodology used by Dave Hollins, which leads me to note extensive "problems" or areas which are "troublesome" with the way he relates the battle, which in the end strikes me as more or less a pro-Austrian fantasy (if I may be so bold), and VERY far away from the balanced treatment in Mras.

-----------------------------

From Murat:
"Les grenadiers à pied des Consuls que vous m'avez envoyés, ont soutenu à la droite plusieurs charges de cavalerie l'arme au bras, et ont arrêté pendant longtemps le succès de l'ennemi. Ce corps a perdu 121 hommes tués ou blessés. Je lui dois des éloges particuliers, et, si j'ai pris quelques soins à l'organiser, je suis bien récompensé de le voir répondre d'une manière si brillante à mon attente. "

There is no question that 121 refers to the grenadeirs à pied.
He had commanded them, along with the cavalerie de la garde and some other cavalry units, in the days leading up to the battle. This is even in Mras, if I recall correctly.
One wonders if Murat "pri[t] quelques soins à l'organiser", this had to do with their organisation into pelotons and formation of the younger or more able troops under the command of Soulès.

- Evan

Re-reading my last post, I ask myself (and thus share the question with the readers) :

Let us assume that the story of the garde à pied was ONLY :
A. dusted off an advance by the Lobkowitz DR10
B. got into a firefight while in ligne with 2-3 battallions of Austrian infantry
C. got taken in flank by Frimont's 4-ish squadrons and were chopped up and retreated.

Would this cause Murat to write (on the 16th of juin, in an internal report) :
"ont soutenu à la droite plusieurs charges de cavalerie l'arme au bras, et ont arrêté pendant longtemps le succès de l'ennemi …. d'une manière si brillante"

It is a very simple little comparison, which can be repeated 12-24 times with the various "French" sources.

It is this simple comparison which leads me to think that Stutterheim/Mr. X/Mras were INCOMPLETE (but NOT INCORRECT) with regard to the garde à pied.

- Evan

@ Cpth Iglo,

My theory about the Stutterheim/Mras accounts is that it is all based on confusion between several episodes of the battle. The recollections being later modified to make room for a rumour that surfaced around 1810..

Hint 1 : Nauendorf hussars were the only unit of that kind that was engaged. And we KNOW that they participated in the "destruction" of a French infantry unit (Dampierre unit), by charging them in the rear. So it is no wonder, if my theory is true, that Hussars are mentionned for the destruction of the Grenadiers.

Hint 2 : We also know that Monnier lost his four guns while retreating. Once again, it is easy to believe that this episode is the source of the confusion. We also know that te guns were lost to cavalry (the Sénarmont report tells us so).

Mras tried, obviously, to patch together conflicting accunts. My theory is that some of those accounts/rumours were not surfacing before 1810. At this moment, the Garde Imériale was a very important feature of the French system (both military and propaganda). So, for the Austrians, it was tempting to link vague and glorious rememberings/rumours of the fight at Marengo with the ancestors of the "Vieilles Moustaches".

There is nothing that contradicts my theory so far.

The only thing that would shake my belief would be the Neipperg report as given in Hüffer, that gives a 1807+ reference to the glorious charge of Frimont. BUT, if the original text is not the Kreigarchive one, but the one in the Litta collection (without reference to Frimont), then my theory is, in fact, almost proven.

Now, I think you make another mistake. You seem to believe that the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls was a tiny unit. It is wrong. There were, technically, two bataillons of Grenadiers, and one compagnie of Chasseurs. But the Grenadiers bataillons were not complete units (some compagnies were left in France). So, tactically, we cannot know how they were really organised. Moreover, the French of the era were rather adept at using "carrés" with combined units, so it is possible that all the infantry of the Garde formed a single carré, or two carrés.

Your mistake is also to think that the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls acted completely alone. In fact, they were engaged along with Monnier. This reserve was engaged on a rather broad front and it may appear that the Garde was isolated, but it is clear that in the mind of Bonaparte, the Garde was engaged as part of the reserve, along with Monnier.

Now if you judge the informations in a document not from its source, but from its style, then I can only label it bad historiographical work.

Best regards.

Philippe,

Very interesting conjectures, very interesting indeed.

I too get an impression of some degree of conflating of Monnier with the garde à pied among the Austrians : you will note in "Stutterheim" A, for example, that the "garde" is said to enter the fighting by marching down the Sale road toward the center (which seems like more possible for a unit of Monnier).

Such conflating becomes only easier 20 years later, as Mras tries to patch together a story from various documents.

However, what do you make of the specific reference (albeit rather anecdotal) to the Bussy-Jäger in Petit (vintage 1801) ?

Also, one mat note that the Neipperg manuscript in Hüffer is titled "Neipperg, major d'Ott-husards". Neipperg was promoted lieutenant-colonel in a different regiment on 1804.
link

--------------------------------------------

For what it is worth ….

In "Marengo" by Dr. Alfred Herrmann (Münster, 1903), he says he looked in the regimental history of the Nauendorf HR 8 (v. Treuenfest, Geschichte d. k. k. Husaren-Regim. Nr. 8., Wien 1880) and found nothing about serving under Frimont, and concludes Stutterheim/Mras were incorrect and that it was the 2 esc. of Kaisar DR 1 already under Frimont's command that attacked the garde à pied with the 2 esc. of Bussy-Jäger.

He goes on to discuss the various questions much as we have just done !
He seems to discount Manuscript B in favor of Stutterheim A and Mras.

link

- Evan

Stutterheim A – is precise about the Conuslar Guard, also he mentions that shortly after the battle officers of the Guard conceeded that after the battle only about 100 were assebmled in Milano which swell later up to 500 by soldiers returning from captivity. Hüffner page 81

It is not just only by idenficiation of uniform (did Monnier have a battailon d'Elite made of Grenadiers in bonnets de poil? but by presenting a whole story, POWs, which seems to be unlikly (my opinion) that he confused the Consular Guard with a usual infantry battalion of a demi brigade.

In case Stutterheim and others confused a batallion of a demi brigade with the guard, then the rocher story has to be attributed to a demi brigade battalion, and the guard just performed as the average line infantry (that is not standing out).

von Winterfeldt wrote : " Stutterheim A – is precise about the Conuslar Guard,[…] "

Don't that seem strange that Stutterheim should be THAT precise and accurate at identifying an enemy unit that never fought before ?

If I am not mistaken he even mentions the "red plume". I am not even sure the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls fought with the plumes on their bonnet…

von Winterfeldt wrote : " […] also he mentions that shortly after the battle officers of the Guard conceeded that after the battle only about 100 were assebmled in Milano which swell later up to 500 by soldiers returning from captivity. Hüffner page 81 "

I have heard of it before. And I'd like to have a date for this meeting. If I recall correctly, the Garde des Consuls was sent quite quickly back to Paris… Should we trust Stutterheim ? He gives no name, jus a place (Milano), pretty unreliable in my opinion.

von Winterfeldt wrote : " It is not just only by idenficiation of uniform (did Monnier have a battailon d'Elite made of Grenadiers in bonnets de poil? but by presenting a whole story, POWs, which seems to be unlikly (my opinion) that he confused the Consular Guard with a usual infantry battalion of a demi brigade. "

If the story is true, then there is nothing to add. The Grenadiers de la Garde des COnsuls were wiped out by the four squadrons led by Frimont. Only 100 escaped and Monnier must be lying about counterattcking with them later. Unless 100 men out of 800/900 were in such fighting disposition as to fight back later in the day : this would be pretty surprising for me…

My point is that the Stutterheim tale is based on false rumours that floated in Austrian military circles around 1810.

von Winterfeldt wrote : " In case Stutterheim and others confused a batallion of a demi brigade with the guard, then the rocher story has to be attributed to a demi brigade battalion, and the guard just performed as the average line infantry (that is not standing out). "

Ahem… If the AUSTRIANS confuse a French unit for another, there is NO REASON for the FRENCH to do the very same confusion. Especially if the confusion is made through recollections of events who are 10 years old ! One would think that the chance of misidentification are better on the Austrian side for French unité, than the French mistaking one of their own unit for another.

Imagine the one writing the first Stutterheim account patching together facts and rumours to give some substance to an event described by someone he trusts and "who have seen the whole thing, I swear it to you, cross my heart". Including the Nauendorf Hussars would be natural if Frimont is supposed to charge with 4 squadrons of "hussars". He could even feel quite confident, because the Nauendorf hussars were involved in the surrender of one French unit (under Dampierre). He could even trace the taking of the Monnier foour guns to a cavalry unit operating in the vicinity. Now let him add some "conversation with unnamed French officer of the Garde" to spice up the tale and… Voilà ! As would say David Hollins : "It all makes sense !" It doesn't require any conpiration by an evil Consul to strip all the glory from the braves to give it to the cowards of his political Garde…

@ Chasseurs à Cheval

I have yet to read the Petit's book in full. I have been unable to find yet, and just read parts of it.

So I have no opinion on this book yet.

Best regards.

"Stutterheim" A – a unit marching down the road from Sale toward the center and then over an open field, formed in open column by divisions with skirmishers in front, no mention of plumes.

"Manuscript" B – a unit, a "small column", observed in a fold in the ground in amongst high-standing crops, tall red plumes noted, taking position on Lannes' right.

Same writer ? Same unit ? I have my OPINION ("No" and "Yes", respectively), but reasonable men may differ.

- Evan

Coutesy of the formidable Steven H Smith :

Marengo, ou campagne d'Italie par l'armée de réserve, commandée par le
general Bonaparte, … by Joseph Petit. An ix (1801):

Title page:
link
Introduction:
link

XXII – Bataille de Marengo:

pp 48-49:
link
pp 50-51:
link
pp 52-53:
link
pp 54-55:
link
pp 56-57:
link
pp 58-59:
link
pp 60-61:
link
pp 62-63:
link
pp 64-65:
link
pp 66-67:
link
pp 68-69:
link

- Evan

@ Chasseur à Cheval

Please thank Steven H Smith for me. Christmas is quite early this year !!!

Thank you to you also…

At least pedants can discuss the Austrian relations, they have so much detail, the variations are minimal.
four squadrons is four squadrons, a crop field may still be an open field. a "small column" is a period term for a bataillon column which can indeed move par division and open as described by Mras.

In case of the french we have indeed nothing with some sort of coherence.
At the beginning we have indeed virtually nothing at all.

The field commanders in their initial after action reports just ignore the guard of consuls.

Officially the guard did support the right, but Lannes, who did command the right, in his after action report has nothing on them, virtually nothing , not a single word.

Wartin who commands on Lannes right flank has again nothing on them, they should have been somewhere close by, but still not a single word.

Some say the guard did actually support Monnier on the far right, but again Monnier in his report has nothing on the consular guard during the epic hours.

All did write their after action reports on the 15th.

All field commanders, who write early have nothing on the guard, except Murat, who is one day late, his after action report is from the 16th.
Still he writes down a lakonic account of the cavalry actions without a single word on the consular guard a pied and is about to sign it.

Then something happens.

Murat has just finished his work, but then he suddenly adds a post scriptum to his report writing down something along the lines of " ahh , forgot the guard!, they fought magnificantly, did survive multiple charges and they were under my command, ha ".

So what has happened ?, Had murat just forgotten one of the most epic infantry performances ever? Or what ?

I think what has happened was just the arrival of Nappy´s bulletin, written the day before.

And from this moment onward lies did grow like cancer into the brains of goodwilling, earnest soldiers.

The only answer for the question, how the field commanders could ignore the guard a pied, which was meant to protect their hard pressed flank, is that their appearance in the front line was a very short episode, the Austrian accounts describe this episode in my opinion.

I feel I cannot add any longer anything reasonable to the issue, I learned a lot, read new books, as for the Guard, I stick with Sutterheim.
I will re – read Hüffer on the Sutterheim source, maybe he gives a time frame of the write up of Stutterheim A.

Cptn Iglo wrote : " At least pedants can discuss the Austrian relations, they have so much detail, the variations are minimal. "

We are not discussing Austrians accounts as a whole, but only three accounts : Stutterheim A, Stutterheim B and Mras.

The two first accounts are not dated, not signed, not sourced.

Professor Hüffer came to the conclusion that tey were from the same hand : Stutterheim. So they are essentially, for him at least, one source with two versions. So, tell us, why two versions are necessary for Stutterheim to state the facts right ? Why so much variations from the same author ? At least from the Berthier text, we KNOW why there are changes… And we KNOW none have to do with the Garde des Consuls Infanterie performance (see de Castres).

The third one is not sourced. Anybody can trace part of the information back to the so-called Stutterheim accounts. So it is no wonder that all those accounts don't contradict each other. Anyway, Mras is simply repeating information : it's secondary, and maybe tertiary (repeating the Stutterheim secondary sources).

Variations are not that minimal anyway, and they do matter… Even to you (unfortunately only for the French sources in this case).

Cptn Iglo wrote : " four squadrons is four squadrons, a crop field may still be an open field. a "small column" is a period term for a bataillon column which can indeed move par division and open as described by Mras."

Should we trust someone that can mistake LightDragoons for Hussars in his own army, to accurately distiguish between infantry units in the enemy troops ?

Cptn Iglo wrote : " In case of the french we have indeed nothing with some sort of coherence. "

On the Garde des Consuls Grenadiers, French sources (pre-1828) are very coherent : they tell the same thing.

Cptn Iglo wrote : " At the beginning we have indeed virtually nothing at all. "

We miss the officer commanding the Garde des Consuls à Pieds after-battle report. But we have Murat (dated two days after the battle), Monnier (dated one day after the battle), Joseph Petit (1801), Brossier "Journal de marche" (a few days after the battle) and even Berthier's reports and bulletins.

All are primary accounts, with a style you dislike…

Now let's compare to what Austrians have to offer… Nothing in the Melas report. I have yet to read ANY other Austrian after-battle report. Where is the Frimont's report ? Ott's report ? Schellenberg's report ? Gottesheim's report ?

That is what I call NOTHING !

Cptn Iglo wrote : " The field commanders in their initial after action reports just ignore the guard of consuls. "

Amazingly they concentrate on the performance of their own troops. Silly French generals that only tell the glory of their own troops… Now I would like to be able to comment on the style of the Austrian generals : where are their reports ?

Cptn Iglo wrote : " Officially the guard did support the right, but Lannes, who did command the right, in his after action report has nothing on them, virtually nothing , not a single word. "

Did he lead them ? Does he tell anything on Monnier ? The Grade des Consuls cavalry ? Those units did support him too. Still not a word. Why would he cite the Grenadiers de la Garde Consulaire ?

Those reports were meant to tell what the unit did, not what their neighbours did.

Cptn Iglo wrote : " Wartin who commands on Lannes right flank has again nothing on them, they should have been somewhere close by, but still not a single word. "

See above. Watrin tells nothing of Monnier too…

Cptn Iglo wrote : " Some say the guard did actually support Monnier on the far right, but again Monnier in his report has nothing on the consular guard during the epic hours. "

He only tells of the Garde des Consuls Grenadiers when they fought WITH him, in the counter-attack.

Cptn Iglo wrote : " All did write their after action reports on the 15th. "

Amazingly, the after-battle reports were written AFTER the battle. The fights ended during the night.

I presume that the Austrian Generals wrote their report during the fight, or even before. This may explain why we never read them…

Cptn Iglo wrote : " All field commanders, who write early have nothing on the guard, except Murat, who is one day late, his after action report is from the 16th. "

Monnier tells that there were enough of them to participate in the counter-attack.

Murat was one day late… I guess he should be blamed for that !

Cptn Iglo wrote : " Still he writes down a lakonic account of the cavalry actions without a single word on the consular guard a pied and is about to sign it.

Then something happens.

Murat has just finished his work, but then he suddenly adds a post scriptum to his report writing down something along the lines of " ahh , forgot the guard!, they fought magnificantly, did survive multiple charges and they were under my command, ha ".

So what has happened ?, Had murat just forgotten one of the most epic infantry performances ever? Or what ?

I think what has happened was just the arrival of Nappy´s bulletin, written the day before.

And from this moment onward lies did grow like cancer into the brains of goodwilling, earnest soldiers. "

Well if all French Generals are liars, then why even read their reports ?

Cptn Iglo wrote : " The only answer for the question, how the field commanders could ignore the guard a pied, which was meant to protect their hard pressed flank, is that their appearance in the front line was a very short episode, the Austrian accounts describe this episode in my opinion. "

The good historian must first, if I am correct, see what the document he reads was meant for. It is obvious that the French after-battle reports were meant to tell how the units placed under the general performed. Nothing more.

Now, I would like to read the Austrian generals after-battle records… It would be a refreshing change after all the lies of the French generals.

Best regards.

Philippe,
in my opinion an after action report usually has something about the neighbour, at least if the neighbours performance did in one way or another affect the performance of the reporting unit.
Therefore Lannes mentions Victor, Victor mentions Lannes.
Monnier who did move against castel ceriolo did obviously have no impact on the performance of Lannes, at least according to Lannes, perhaps he simply didn´t take notice.
The guard was meant to support the right, neither Lannes nor Monnier report something on them.
So the guard performance did have no impact on the performance of the right as far as I see, or perhaps it was just not noticed.
Now compare this to what the bulletin reports about the infantry of the guard.
Napoleon did obviously have the tendency to make these things up, unless you want to take the bulletin´s claims about the guard literally, which as far as I see virtually nobody does any more.
There was a tendency to manipulate and falsificate the events on the side of Napoleon, there can be no doubt about this.
The fact that the first depot version did survive does not indicate that it was the truth, more likely it was just an imperfect version of a propaganda piece .
According to Cugnac the "modifications" following the intentions of the first Consul did start to affect the staff reporting already the evening of the battle.
Even Berthiers report from the 14th was already heavily edited by the first Consul, according to Cugnac.
He says that the original with Pencil corrections by bonaparte has sadly not survived the events of 1871.
There is basically no problem at all with the commanding general participating in a staff after action report.
But we do know Bonaparte´s interest. He was not interested in a accurate description of what happened.
He was not interested in the truth.
It was obviously not the field commanders who did praise the performance of the guard, they did ignore it initially.
Only Murat, who did indeed have no pressing need to report something about the guard a pied in a cavalry report did write something, but it was in a post scriptum at a moment when the bulletin came out.

The direct Austrian after action reports are indeed not available, perhaps their lost, perhaps they´re still in the archives.
But I have no doubt that Mras must have used them, he could not buy a Marengo book in the book store.
Again, I have see no reason to doubt Mras, he was an integer person without any intention to make things up.
In all staff histories all kinds of often conflicting informations have to be put together to create a coherent story.
Mras has produced one as far as I see.
reducing 2 squadrons of Bussy light cavalry and 2 squadrons of light dragoons, all from Frimont, to 4 squadrons of hussars led by Frimmont doesn´t change the overall picture at all.
There would have been no problem if someone had named the grenadiers a pied fusiliers a pied, the problem is we don´t know at all what they did.
According to Stutterheim The Austrans did take prisoners and did know who their opponent was.

So, Iglo, you are saying :

1. Since Lannes and Monnier did not report about a unit not under thier command in their after-action reports, it was because the unit not under their command did nothing.

2. Napoléon wrote untrue propaganda about this unit doing well, when actually it did nothing. Napoléon created a good performance for this unit out of thin air. No French who were at the battle ever reading this completely fabricated story has had occasion to note its falsity (even under the Restauration).

3. When Murat reports well on 16 juin for the same unit, which is under his command, he is copying untrue propaganda, even if it had not yet been published (items written on 16 juin were not immediately printed and/or copied, it took a little while -- was Murat supposed to have a draft verion sent to him, or did he use ESP ?)

4. And a secondary or tertiary summary of the battle written a generation later by an Austrian sitting in an Austrian archiv can be assured to have perfect detail on the perfomance of this unit, lacking nothing. If it is not in Mras, it must not have happened.

5. Lastly, all (dozens of them) other writers who speak well of this unit are copying this untrue propaganda (whether they are simple grenadiers, Italian nationalist historians, maréchaux of France, or enemy regimental histories).

Can you see why few rational people would leap to thier feet shouting agreement with this line of reasoning ? Does it not look at bit tortured to you ?

Iglo, you are just being biased.

J'accuse !

- Evan

@ Cptn Iglo

Let's assume for a second that general Murat is simply doing his duty…

The French after-battle reports seem to concentrate on the troops under the command of the writer of the report.

Murat says that the Grenadiers were "sent to him" by Bonaparte. So they were, at one moment, under the command of Murat. So it makes sense for Murat to add them at the end of his report, as they were only temporaly under his command. He just does his duty…

You find the same thing in the general Lannes report that cites lieutenant Marin (of the artillery of the Garde des consuls).

I think there is not more to say on the topic until the author(s) of the so-called Stitterheim accounts are known, along with the sources used and the date of compisition. It would be useful to trace the sources for Mras. And I would like to know why there are no after-battle records for the Austrian generals.

I shall wait for the second reading of Hüffer by von Winterfeldt. The reading of the Hermann may give more information…

Best regards.

Interesting to read Petit, so the consular guard was alone, no supporting cavalry, but – wasn't Petit a Grenadier à Cheval? Did he say that the infantry of the Garde Consulaire was just 100 paces in front of him, so there was cavalry then.
In case there was French cavalry, why then the Guard infantry sould form a square.

In case there wasn't any cavalry, then how could Petit see the action, there he was a cavalryman?

@von Winterfeldt

The text says "110 pace from our front." It may mean the front of the Grenadiers à Cheval regiment or the whole army front. The context does not help decide between the two options.

Best regards.

Thank you for the links Steven and Evan.

"wasn't Petit a Grenadier à Cheval? Did he say that the infantry of the Garde Consulaire was just 100 paces in front of him, so there was cavalry then."

That's a good point and I think they were 100 paces in front of his unit as Petit duty was to be aware of the lines of his regiment, not the rest of the army and I doubt he would be in a position to be aware of other units at the army front (apologies, Philippe ;^)).

But Petit also claims they were charged several times and under heavy fire, if there were cavalry in support, why did they not acted?. I tend to think nobody gave them the orders to support the guard nor attack so stood there and the guard commanders just seeing the menaces of the cavalry in their flanks (even with cavalry at their back but doing nothing) could order to form square.

@ Palafox,

I never said that my interpretation was the best… In fact, the whole story is quite difficult to portray. It seems that the Garde cavalry was sent to support Lannes. The episode of the charge of Murat secures, in Petit's words, the right flank of Victor. While the Austrians charged were running after Berthier who fled to the Grenadiers ranks…

It seems the whole episode was quite on the left of the Grenadiers à pieds…

I have te feeling that Petit mixes up what he saw, what he heard and what he read.

In fact, I cannot really portay the situation described in the text…

Best regards.

Back to Hüffer and Stutterheim, well this is what I learned

Hüffer die visit the Kriegsarchiv in 1877 and dedected the source B (or newer source, or Stutterheim B), and he was fascinated by the importance of the content.

page 20

In another later visit, in 1894 he dedected a later added source – which he calls Stutterheim A, or A, page 21.

He finds out that A is the older source but B seems to be a refined document based on A intended for publishing.

About the time of writing, due to the regimental names Hüffer concluded that document A must be written between 1801 and 1817, but even between 1801 and 1806 seems to have been a likley option.

For B he concluded about 1822, one citation may be even added later (using a source published in 1829), his reasons are that B used works published at before and just around 1822.

Authors, Stutterheim A, Hüffer thinks that this was written bei Karl Stutterheim, in third person style, on one or two occations, in the original text – the word I is crossed out and replaced by Major Stutterheim.

Now the very interesting point, Karl Stutterheim died in 1811, text B was however written at or about 1822 or later, so the author or B must have been somebody different, Hüffner assumed it was an Austrian Officer.

Some more reflections from my side, Hüffer found Stutterheim A later, as an add on in the Kriegsarchiv, either obtained later than 1877 – or he just did not find it in 1877 – he speaks "denn bei einem erneuten Besuch im Jahre 1894 fand sich den Akten hinzugefügt ein Manuscript …." So from this was was added on later than to his first visit.

So Hüffer thinks it was added later, I would say, still the possibility existed that he did nor find it in his first visit, or that it was wrongly filed.

My reasoning is Mras, who clearly used Sutterheim A, so the document must have been around in 1822 / 23 in the files of the Kriegsarchiv.

According to the style of writing, I believe, my opinion, is that it is very likley that it was written shortly after the battle, maybe one of two years later.

Document B – has lost in my view a lot of value, it seems to be for me a polished version of A with the spicing of some later works.

A, or indeed Stutterheim however is as valuable as ever.

Hüffer, by the way regards the essay of Mras to be very solid and reliable and one of the most important German sources for the campaign.

Otherwise I also agree with Philippe Aube – some after action reports of Austrian officers would be very nice, a good add on, maybe this would be a very rewarding publication for Dave Hollins, definately much more worthwhile than a translation of Krieg 1809.

@ von Winterfeldt,

Thank you for this review of Hüffer's analysis. It is very enlighting.I also think the the A document is the most interesting. I think it is the closest to the event of the three.

Once again thank you.

Now, I don't get why Hüffer uses no after-battle report. Does he discuss other sources ? Or does he concentrate on the A and B reports because they are his own discovery ?

Does he allude to any other author that unearthed Austrian reports ? Or, do you know of any other German text that would point to them ?

Evan talked about the Hermann work, can he tell us if Hermann uses other Austrian sources than A, B and Mras accounts ?

Petit is quite funny.
every little conversation of Nappy on the field is reported, lots of pathetic words naturally, but when he comes to what must have been one of the most thrilling and haunting moments in a soldiers life he just presses a few words through his lips " three charges, fusiladed at 50 paces".
The usually routine, I don´t trust these people.
Real eyewitnesses do indeed have something to tell and they are usually more than willing to share their experience, Stutterheim does, and everything he writes has an inherent logic.

How can people fill pages with endless pathetic babbling about banalities and then in key moments they become even less articulate than a 3 year old.

Its this weird cocktail of sparkling champagne and military cognac which makes most published period french military prosa such an unpleasant read.

And again, those who just say just "three charges" have seen nothing.

Stutterheim is in my opinion the only eyewitness who did write something down.

@Philippe Aube

Herrmann is bringing nothing new, only some slightly different analysation, and there it was published post de Cugnac, he had the benefit of using him as well.

As for the Austrian after action reports, was it a policy to write such after action reports in 1800?

I don't know. I find it extremly strange that seemingly none seem to exist, or in case they do, why it was failed to use them as source.

The only person who could say more would be Dave Hollins, who is in my opinion, one of the very few authors who published recently well researched information about the Austrian Army which surpasses the usual trivial knowledge which gave a wrong impression about this army.

@Cptn Iglo

Its this weird cocktail of sparkling champagne and military cognac which makes most published period french military prosa such an unpleasant read

I disagree absolutly, there are numerous works which are very pleasant reads, examples? Blaze, de Gonneville, Faucher, Girod de l'Ain, …

HK,
Okay I have to row back. I must admit I don´t know to much of french military writing of the period.
but I have just the impression from what I could read in the last years that german/ austrian writers of that period are a bit more toned down, rational and logic while french descriptions of combat -thats what I´m interested in- all to often are micro bulletins, lots of gloire and pathos, thin on facts.
The great man did have a lot of influence, not only as a soldier, but as an author too.
By the way I´m not anti french at all, not even anti Napoleon.
But the person was a politician, who had a talent and will for self mystification.
He was a dictator and the napoleonic era was an epoque of rigid censorship. Its naive to think that the military was completly unaffected by this.
Petit´s writing had to pass the censor and as a military person he did even need Napoleon´s allowance to write a book.
Marengo was a highly sensible topic for the great man.
It should be difficult/impossible to find something completely open or neutral from the french side durign his reign on that issue.
Its like trying to judge the role of Joseph Stalin during the russian civil war and ww II by soviet publications of that era.

I must admit I´m a bit surprised that someone can consider Petit a serius source. For me he´s not serious at all.

Comparing Napoleon to Stalin is just a bit much. And having read Petit on Marengo and Stutterheim on Ulm and both are informative and quite good.

Sincerely,
Kevin

@ Cptn Iglo,

So you dislike Petit's tone. No great news. Now, let's see what you say about him and hs master.

"By the way I´m not anti french at all, not even anti Napoleon.
But the person was a politician, who had a talent and will for self mystification.
He was a dictator and the napoleonic era was an epoque of rigid censorship. Its naive to think that the military was completly unaffected by this.
Petit´s writing had to pass the censor and as a military person he did even need Napoleon´s allowance to write a book.
Marengo was a highly sensible topic for the great man.
It should be difficult/impossible to find something completely open or neutral from the french side durign his reign on that issue."

Now let's play…

"By the way I´m not anti [Austrian] at all, not even anti [Francis Habsburg].
But the person was [an aristocrat], who had a talent and will for self mystification.
He was a [absolute monarch] and the [monarchy] era was an epoque of rigid censorship. Its naive to think that the military was completly unaffected by this.
[Stutterheim]´s writing had to pass the censor and as a military person he did even need [Habsburg]´s allowance to write a book.
Marengo was a highly sensible topic for the [Austrian monarch].
It should be difficult/impossible to find something completely open or neutral from the [Austrian] side durign his reign on that issue.

Napoleon Bonaparte was rather good at propaganda, but don't forget that the Kings of Europe were just like him when it came to censorship… The Austro-hungarian empire was not a free-speech democracy.

Now, it would be nice to come back to the study of the few available sources we have.

I noted that David Hollins said in another thread that he used 8 non-french source for his work. I don't know what he really meant, but anyway, I tried to guess which sources he had in mind. I came with the following list.

1. Melas after-battle report.
2. Stutterheim A account.
3. Stutterheim (very unlikely, but met's keep this label anyway) B account
4. Mras account
5. Neipperg lettre/report (as found in the Hüffer book, I guess)
6. Rauch memoires.
7. Hochenegg souvenirs.
8. Crossard mémoires (in French, by a French émigré in Austrian service)
9. DR1 regimental history
10. HR8 regimental history
11. IR51 Spleniy regimental history

I guess my list is not correct… If someone can add some sources that David Hollins alluded to, that would be nice.

Best regards.

Philippe,
If the Mras piece had been published say in 1802, filled with praises of the great Melas, a flawless army performance, and celebrating the wisdom of Kaiser Franz and the Hofkriegsrat, you may have a point.

Mut Mras is completely free of that stuff and strictly on the job which is a staff history of what happened, he has tough critical passages on his own side.
The whole piece was published 22 years after the events, with Marengo and even Bonaparte being out of the political fire zone.
Stutterheim did put nothing in print, so no need for censorship.

But how about Joe Petit?
According to the introduction of his book in 1801, Petit was just a common soldier, who was urged by his comrades to write a book and "tell it like it was".
This smells already.
The writing itsself actually doesn´t tell it like it was from the soldiers perspective, not at all. 95% of the events, Petit as a common soldier must have been unable to see or analyze, simply because he could not be everywhere. One might still ask from where he did know all these things, did he get a one year leave to interview all the participants? As a common soldier, as a nobody ?

We don´t hear much of Petit and his men. According to Petit he was assigned into a task which brought him very close to the first consul, but he doesn´t tell us what task it was.

Key tactical actions are described in not more than half sentences usung platitudes, so one might assume that Petit as a common soldier might not have been articulate enough to give an in depth description of what happened.
But Petit is actually very articulate and even a somehow talented writer, His sentences always get longer and more pathetic everytime Bonaparte pops up.
Boney indeed pops up regularly and the book is actually about him.
The tactical action of the consular guard is reduced to " three charges and fusiladed at 50 paces", but look how he describes in some depth "le sang froid de Bonaparte" on page 55 of his writing (link to this and other pages was provided by Evan in his post above)

link

My French is not to perfect, but what Petit unleashes on that page sounds like a shameless case of hero-worship.
the whole write up is essentially of that tone, its pure Nappy propaganda.

How can such a first rate example of third rate Nappy propaganda be taken seriously?

About after action reports, sometimes they were specially ordered to so so, like in the Prussian Army after 1807 to explain why such a disaster as 1806 could have happened and to evaluate the actions of the officers.

I don't know if such a policy did exist in the Austrian Army after the campaign of 1800.

Hüffer tried to find documents not just only covering the battle of Marengo but covering aspects of the whole campaign, therefore he selected Hohenzollern, Stutterheim and anonymous writing B, as well as Neipperg.

I don't know if eye witness accounts or after action reports do exist in the Kriegsarchiv.

De Cugnac does a good examen critique with his sources, Petit is – in my view – not that valuable to find out what happened at Marengo.

@ Cptn Iglo

Why don't we simply follow de Cugnac conclusion on the Petit's book ? For de Cugnac, Petit gives interesting details about what he saw, but not so interesting information about what he was told… Now, let's simply try to find out what he really saw.

Anyway, it must have been quite a thrill for a soldier of this era to serve under Bonaparte, don't you think ? Moreover, you can't compare someone who fought on the battle experience with the account from an author that simply scan through archives. Petit was not chosen to write down his account, nor was he educated enough to give a nicely written text : it is quite "raw" French. While, Mras was certainly chosen because he had a certain talent for this task, and it shows.

Now, it doen't change the fact that Mras is 100% secondary and unsourced, while Petit is partly primary…

Best regards.

Philippe,
The problem is I cannot really find out what Petit is telling us about what he did see and what he was told.

He starts to talk in length only when Bonaparte is around, then he gets even creative and tries to bring things across.
so he is somehow talented.
But I cannot see his talents when he writes about the fight, he always uses strong short words and all stays quite pale, thats not how real eyewitnesses of impressive events do act.
Petit on the field was obviously only impressed by Bonaparte.

And remains the question how an average soldier could write such a book at all.
Right or wrong aside, his description is actually packed with a lot of details, mostly not on the soldiers experience,where he might indeed have had access to, by just questioning some of his comrades, but on the grand tactical level.
So did he consult the war ministry or Berthier for support of his book.
did he get 6 months leave to write it, or did he do it in his free time after service.
what did he write before and after this.
A common soldier writing and publishing nothing less than a campaign study while still in service, a few months after the events, is a completly unique event in the history of military publishing.
Its like a drummer boy composing and publishing a whole opera.

There is actually no general censorship for print media needed for Joe petit.
even today active soldiers are not just allowed to write a book about recent events.
The army has usual trained personnal for this, they don´t want Joe Petit´s to write down their view of things, if common soldiers are brought to the front and tell their view its part of an official effort, all is checked in advance.

I have problems to imagine Bonaparte, Berthier, the depot, the topographical bureau working hard for years to bring out an acceptable view of things while fully independent trooper little Joe Petit beats them to the book stores by two years.

My theory is that something was needed to fill the gap until the official publication, this could not be official, so why not let some guy, call him Joe Petit, or even choose a real joe Petit, write a campaign account.
All naturally under close supervision and with perhaps zero input from Petit himself.

Thats just a speculation and my reasoning is not based on this.
And in the final consequence it does not even have something to do with dictatorship and print media censorship.

Someone within the military hierarchy is not allowed to publish things conflicting with official military views, this job is usually left to retired colonels, even in modern liberal societies, in dictatorships it is left to those who leave the country.