"Marengo 1800 - Is it biased?" Topic

Capt I,

Leonidas only had 300 Spartans and he lost because the Persians came in behind him and he wouldn't withdraw.

There were, however, about 7,000 Greeks in the position during most of the fighting. Most of them got away.

Sincerely,
K

Cpt I,

I agree with Philippe on Napoleon and the Frnech general officers. Rapp, Lannes, Berthier, Davout, Savary, et al, spoke bluntly and quite frankly to Napoleon when necessary. Victor and St. Cyr were never particularly friendly with him in the first place.

The Grande Armee was not a place where the only one who spoke was Napoleon and everyone then fumbled over themselves to get things done. Good armies that are successful don't work that way. I can clearly understand where you'd get that impression (especially of you are on the internet forums for awhile), but it is an inaccurate assessment and sells the French general officers quite short. If you read Funck and Odeleben, you might get a different impression. Phipps is also excellent.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Dear All,

Just a note on the official French version of Marengo. Berthier was not the author of the 'official' version. Colonel Vallongue of the Depot de Guerre was the author and he used information from both sides of the action as well as interviewing French officers that had been there. That was the report that Napoleon ordered to be rewritten and ordered the original ones to be destroyed. One copy of it was saved by a clerk in the Ministry of War and was found later.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Très cher Phillippe,

"I don't trust award citations nor regimental histories, as they are agiographical by nature. They tend to give a lot of importance to the individual or unit cited."
I dont think the question is "trust this one" or "dont trust that one". I think the question is more nuanced. The regimental histories were written (i) much later (often with a nationalsst tone and (ii) with access to srchives which since saw two world wars. The award citations, senso strictu, of the era are very short : "for disntiguished conduct at Marengo". What is more useful is Fastes, which typically gets its biographic data from the Légion archives (now partly lost), which typically included a copy of the member's état de service, either as a copy direct from the ministre de la guerre or more likelya copy attached to lettres sent (appealling for this or that benefit) by the member or his family. I have a few of these Légion dosssiers, and they are quite descriptive in some cases.

Overall, I think we can look at all the potential sources "of the era" or places where these can be reflected if they lost. Then taking all the sources together, I try to take an overall impression of the given event, with as much detail as the sources can be said to be providing "reasonably". I think perfection in the details is likely lost to us.

"I don't believe in the two independant bataillons of Grenadiers "
I am not thinking I did posit this. If I even used "bataillon", it was for convenience of the readers.

I note what is SOURCED :
-- there are two chefs de bataillon present: Soulès and Tortel
-- Tortel is not credited with the "valiant resisitance" of the garde à pied on the French right, Soulès is
-- there are two detachments marching from France, one of 300 gardes under Tortel (the word "bataillon" is not used in the Correspondence to refer to either detachment)
-- there are a total of approx. 800-850 gardes, thus the second detachment is about 500-550 gardes (under Soulès)
-- Soulès bio says 500 gardes under his orders on the French right
-- Stutterheim uses the number of 500 as the presumed starting number of gardes on the French right (although the reference is perhaps figurative).
-- Immedaitely after the coup, on 19 brumaire, the garde du directoire à pied and the garde du corps législatif were reformed as two bataillons of grenadiers and one of chasseurs (each of huit compagnies, donc 24 compagnies).
-- At the time of the start of the campaign, the garde à pied was organised by the décret of 7 frimaire an VIII with: 2 bataillons of grenadiers à pied (each of 6 compagnies, each with 96 gardes) and 1 compagnie d'infanterie légère, a total of 13 compagnies. Although a few of the guides à pied returned from Egypt and a few selected officers and sous-officiers form the ligne might have been added, especially to the chasseurs, the vast majority of the garde consulaire à pied at Marengodid clearly come from selections from among the larger ranks of the prior government's guards. One may also note that a full strength bataillon of the garde à pied would have 576 gardes.
-- The état nominatif as of July 1800 for the garde à pied upon the orgianisation of 7 frimaire an VIII is given in the Saint-Hilaire (it is said as to be from before Marengo, but if you look at the ranks of the officiers and then look at their bios, you see it is really an état from July). Of the 7 capitaines there listed whose Légion d'honneur specify the campaign, 4 are listed in the 1er bataillon de grenadiers and 3 are listed in the 2e bataillon de grenadiers. This is after the battle, and may reflect some reorganisation and re-assignment. As a sidenote, 2 of these were from the garde du directoire, 1 from the guides à pied, 3 from the garde du corps législatif and 1 from the ligne.

Now I will give my OPINION :
-- I think that Soulès commanded 500-550 gardes and formed the position on the French right. I think Tortel commanded 300-350 guardes and that these did not paticipate (other than perhaps to hand out cartridges to Coignet) until the counter-attack.
-- I think the two detachments were created based on able-bodiedness and sufficient equipment, ammunition and provisions to leave Paris, with the Soulès command going first.
-- I do not think that either command reflected an actual fixed "bataillon" of the guard. I do not think that the "compagnie d'infanterie légère" did enter the campaifn as an integrated whole (as it is nowhere so mentioned)
-- I think that Soulès formed in 8 pelotons and that Tortel would form in 4 pelotons, as these did exist in the réglement and did more reflect the ligne's drill (less grenadiers, hence 8 compagnies) and the prior organisation of the Parisian guard formations (these of 8 compagnies). I think these all may have re-formed as 8 pelotons for the counter-attack (by which time i estimate Soulès disposed of only 1/2 to perhaps as much as 2/3 of his original strength, or something around 300 gardes), then under the overall command of Stabenrath, a général placed above the two chefs de bataillon.

Reasonable men might easily come to other opinions, based on the same source information.

Bien fort amicalement,

- Evan

Evan,

Have you been able to find anything on Stabenrath? I believe he was detailed to command the Guard infantry from the staff for the French counterattack, but I've seen little on it and the inforamtion I have on Stabenrath is slight.

Any insight or ideas?

Sincerely,
Kevin

Evan,

I do agree with your assessment on the two separate units of the Guard infantry at Marengo. That seems to fit in with the initial action and the handing out of ammunition time-wise.

Further, Tortel isn't mentioned as being in combat and it is worth noting that Soules later became a general. Do you know what happened to Tortel? He did get an award for Marengo.

Sincerely,
K

Gilbert-Joseph Tortel
-- né le 5 août 1747 à Moulins, fils de André Tortel, marchand tanneur
-- marchand tanneur lui-même, marié avec trois enfant sous l'ancien régime
-- 5 pied, 4 pounces de sa taille
-- lieutenant aide-major de la 1ere gardes-nationaux de Moulins en 1790
-- capitaine commandant le 7e compagnie, 1er bataillon de la demi-brigade de voluntaires de l'Allier (armée du Nord) en 1792
-- capitaine dans la garde du corps législatif le journée du 18 fructidor, il se rend sa compagnie en disant «Nous ne sommes pas de Suisses !»
-- chef de bataillon de la garde consulaire après le 18 brumaire
-- promu adjudant-commandant en 1802
-- adjoint près du grand maréchal du palais le géneral Duroc en 1805
-- baron de l'Empire et commander de la Légion d'honneur en 1810
-- sous-gouvournor du palais de Saint-Cloud in 1813
-- à la suite de l'état-major, chevalier Saint-Louis en février 1815
see also the Quintin, page 837

I don´t know who brought up the idea that "eyewitnesses" or "original sources" are automatically telling the truce.
Thats naive thinking.
Its simply necessary, notably when dealing with a proven liar like Napoleon, to see things from different perspectives.
and its naive to think that Napoleon´s strong personality did have no impact on his subordinates.
Even someone of prominence like Berthier did have no problem to risk his soldier honour and reputation by writing down a big piece of lies and halftruths about Marengo in 1805.
And there were all the others who did not yet have a reputation to loose on their way up on the career ladder.

after all there was not much needed, just a half sentence along the lines of " the guard on our right did resist stubbornly half a dozen charges", thats not very much and not even big lies.

some, like petit did obviously go overboard.
according to Petit the single bataillon of guards did march out in the open alone to face a victorious advancing army, all without cavalry ot artillery support, receiving multiple cavalry charges and engaging austrian infantry at 50 paces distance.

For me thats just a big lie and it doesn´t matter for me if Petit was an eyewitness or not.
From where do I know this? Just common sense tells me so.

On the other hand Mras account is very convinving because common sense tells me so again.

Liars and manipulaters do need an agenda, I can´t see one in Mras writing.
And he has all those little details which make things so convincing, liars and manipulaters are usually quite short on these things unless they work on orders.
If it was Mras official mission to boost austrian moral then he came over 20 years to late, then he should have been a little more pathetic on the key events and he shouldn´t have reported so frankly on all Austrian setbacks during the campaign and battle.

Its actually difficult not to believe Mras.

Mras is actually quite resignative in his writing, in one sentence he states that the Napoleon/Berthier view of the battle had prevailed and would prevail in the future, but that it was for him just an act of historical justice to write it down as it was.

Capt I,

Mras did not have an agenda? You're kidding right? The Austrians blew a victory at the last possible moment and lost it badly. And it is a secondary source to boot.
Further, what is decscribed is what happened to a line battalion earlier in the battle and corroborates what Coignet says about that unit.

Napoleon is a proven liar? If that is the case, then all heads of state are.

If you read du Cugnac/Lanza, you'll see accounts by Dupont and Monnier, for example, that clearly state that the Consular Guard infantry was not destroyed and that it participated in the counterattack. But the most important part of the issue to my mind, is that the part of the action that was rewritten by Napoleon's order had nothing to do with the action of the Consular Guard infantry, but with the action and performance of Monnier's division.

Further, du Cugnac clearly states what the issued with the rewrite are, and the Consular Guard is not involved.

Lastly, your assessment of the integrity and character of the French general officers is quite inaccurate and does not provide a realistic picture of what these soldiers were like. There were honorable and dishonorable men among the group, as with any group of general officers in any army. but to lump them all into one group is both unfair and highly inaccurate.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Jean-Marie-Etienne-Eléonore Léopold de Stabenrath
-- né le 13 avril 1770 à Gournay-en-Bray
-- neveu de René-Marie-Maximillien (député à la Legislatif) et Auguste-Marie (secrétaire à Châteauneuf) du Léopold de Stabenrath, guillotinées comme countre-révolutionaires le 21 prairial an II
-- il portait le nom "Léopold Stabenrath" sous la révolution
-- adjudant chef de bataillon dans l'armée d'Italie en 1793
-- armée de Pyrennes Occidentales 1794-1795, promu adjudant-général chef de brigade
-- reformé en 1796, puis 8e division militaire
-- commandant du place à Marsaille en 1797
-- 7e division militaire en 1798 et 1799
-- à la suite de l'état-major de l'armée de réserve en 1800, puis chef d'état-major dans l'armée de Grisons
-- adjudant commandant en 1801, à la departement de Vaucluse
-- chef d'état-major dans la 3e division d'infanterie 1803-1805, puis 1ère division in 1806
-- sous-chef d'état-major au 4e corps en 1807
-- général de brigade, baron de l'Empire, commandant de la Légion d'honneur, blessé à Essling et Znaim
-- fin de service activ, commandant de quelques départements 1810-1815
-- mort en 1853
See also the Six

also, Léopold de Stabenrath he was tall, unlike Tortel, who was (as noted above) of average height.

:-)

- Evan

Salut capitiane Iglo !

"receiving multiple cavalry charges"

As previously noted, if they were British, no one would even question it.

Well-formed and drill infantry, in square or even closed columns, were not vulnerable to cavalry acting alone. Even lots of heavy cavalry. And the Austrians were not heavy, and had no doctrine of massed charges in 1800.

As for facing infantry, we see in Stutterheim that didnt go as well.

I am glad you can tell by your native intuition who is telling the truth and who is not. I do not have this vision and skill.

To me, they are all telling a part of the story, all filtering that part based on what they saw, what they heard and (for later writers like Mras) what the documents in front of them did say, and also filtering that part based on their own sympathies.

But then I am hindered by the lack of the perfect insight with which you are gifted, so I have to use the more pedestrian methods of source analysis.

- Evan

How to delete a message?

Very funny spelling erors, conclusion – cptn iglo etc,

"To me, they are all telling a part of the story, all filtering that part based on what they saw, what they heard and (for later writers like Mras) what the documents in front of them did say, and also filtering that part based on their own sympathies."
Chasseur à Cheval

The discussion is moving again on dangerous grounds, may I suggest that the above paragraph would form the base for all examen critique? Including the French?

Personally, my opinion, I come to the identical conclusions than CPNT IGLO about the assesment of the huge distotion of Napoleon about this battle in special, destroying of documents, re – writing of the story till it fitted his propagande machine.

"S'il fallait pourtant caractériser d'un mot le génie de Napoléon, c'est sont sens de la propgande qui apparaîtrait comme les plus impressionannant. En cela c'est un homme du XXe siècle."

As an amateur historian, with not that special interest in Marengo, my only approach could be – read as many sources possible, examine them and then form a conclusion.

Without interpretation of sources – no good history, even amateur history would be possible.

So yes, when it took Boudet and the timley charge of Kellermann – and the miraculous panic in the Austrian Army – to beat off the Austrian pursuit, the Pelet story seems very unlikley to me.

Without such authors like de Cugnac we all still might admire the great manoeuvre of Castel Ceriolo (for example).
The First Consul said it and therefore it must be right.

"Well-formed and drill infantry, in square or even closed columns, were not vulnerable to cavalry acting alone. Even lots of heavy cavalry. And the Austrians were not heavy, and had no doctrine of massed charges in 1800"

I agree with the first part, but the second part?

Stutterheim clearly states that it was a combined infantry and cavalry action that cleared the Consular Guard off the battle field and into retreat.

Kevin,

I am reminded that among the recompenses for Marengo …

« Tortel, chef de bataillon, le grade d'adjudant supérieur. »

Armes d'honneur decernées a la garde consulaire après Marengo.
Carnet de la Sabretache, 1903:
link

Yours, in firm research,

- Evan

Evan,

Thanks very much.

Sincerely,
K

Gentlemen,

It should be stated that the knowledge that Napoleon had the official account of Marengo rewritten and that it was a put-up job has been available in English from at least the 1920s. This shouldn't be any great revelation and it certainly wasn't 'new' information in 2000.

I first read of it in 1965 and it is in the Esposito and Elting Atlas, so it was being taught to cadets at West Point before that date.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Salut v. Winterfedlt

"may I suggest that the above paragraph would form the base for all examen critique? Including the French?"
I agree completely.

"I come to the identical conclusions than CPNT IGLO about the assesment of the huge distotion of Napoleon about this battle in special" "The First Consul said it and therefore it must be right."
I have not disagreed with CPNT IGLO on this point, and s do not disagree with you either.
But, why are we talking about the words of Napoléon, or documents that he ordered re-written ? I have not once alluded to such among the sources which I have quoted or applied to the question put here. Shall we start a new thread about th porpaganda of politicians and heads-of-state ?

"the Pelet story seems very unlikley to me"
Do you mean Petit, the grenadier ? Or what did Pelet the général of the chasseurs à pied de la garde at Mont-Saint-Jean write about Marengo that seems unlikely to you ?
If you jean Petit, the grenadier, I think I could pick through it word-by-word and evaluate this word as likely puffery, that bit as less likely so, etc. To what end ?
The view of a period of heroic resistance by the garde à pied does not lay only upon a the perfection of the description of the grenadier Petit. But I did list 9 others (none of them Napoléon, none of the pieces re-written by him) who wrote in the same general sense. I stoped listing becasue I was bored. If I checked another group o fcsources, I will likely find more. It is the accumulation of all these sources' views that I find it difficult to just sweep aside.

"And the Austrians were not heavy, and had no doctrine of massed charges in 1800
I agree with the first part, but the second part? Stutterheim clearly states that it was a combined infantry and cavalry action that cleared the Consular Guard off the battle field and into retreat."
Yes. The comparison being made started "As previously noted, if they were British, no one would even question it." The compasrion was intended to be :
(i) The French, using huge formations of many regiments of heavy, mostly armoured, cavalry, could not break well-formed and drill British squares, even after repeated charges
(ii) Therefore, the oft-repeated view of the garde à pied defending succcessfully of some 3-ish charges (before the events related by Stutterheim and thus recounted in Mras), delivered by Austrian non-heavy cavalry seems no great surprise to me.
Is there some glaring defect in this reasoning?

- Evan

<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “I don´t know who brought
up the idea that "eyewitnesses" or "original sources"
are automatically telling the truce.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>Nobody did, as far as I know. I simply said that primary sources
are better that unsourced secondary ones (such as so-called
Stutterheim account, and more so Mras account).</P>

<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “Thats naive thinking.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>It would be… Who did that ?</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “Its simply necessary, notably
when dealing with a proven liar like Napoleon, to see things from
different perspectives.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>What are those different perspectives ? So-called Stutterheim
unsourced secondary (no author name, no date, no source) is hardly a
very good start. Some Austrian after-battle records would be.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “and its naive to think that
Napoleon´s strong personality did have no impact on his
subordinates.<BR>Even someone of prominence like Berthier did have no
problem to risk his soldier honour and reputation by writing down a
big piece of lies and half truths about Marengo in 1805.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>It's no big secret that Berthier was fascinated by Napoleon
Bonaparte. BUT, many other generals were not so impressed. In 1800,
the situation of Bonaparte was not that of an Emperor, but just a
successful general who managed to reach the situation of First
Consul. But, another coup d'état would be enough to throw him
down.</P>

<P>Moreover, after Waterloo there was a very virulent
anti-bonapartist, reactionnary, counter-revolution. The de Castres
text of 1828 is one fine example. It exposes al the lies of Napoleon,
and goes on to say that Napoleon and compares the “dément”
(madman) Bonaparte to the sane Louis XIV.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “And there were all the others
who did not yet have a reputation to loose on their way up on the
career ladder.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>Can you simply name the Generals that lied in their reports in
order to please Bonaparte : Monnier ? Pernety ? Sénarmont ?
Murat ?</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “after all there was not much
needed, just a half sentence along the lines of " the guard on
our right did resist stubbornly half a dozen charges", that's
not very much and not even big lies.”</BLOCKQUOTE>

<P>Lannes did not do that, nor Watrin. Name someone who did please.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “some, like petit did obviously
go overboard.<BR>according to Petit the single bataillon of guards
did march out in the open alone to face a victorious advancing army,
all without cavalry ot artillery support, receiving multiple cavalry
charges and engaging austrian infantry at 50 paces distance. For me
thats just a big lie and it doesn´t matter for me if Petit was
an eyewitness or not. From where do I know this? Just common sense
tells me so.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>So Petit is lying. What are your evidences ? You have the
“feeling” he does. But that does not make your feeling
right. “Common sense” tells us the sun circles around the
earth only evidences tell the truth.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “On the other hand Mras account
is very convincing because common sense tells me so again.”</BLOCKQUOTE>

<P>With such reasoning everything is possible. All you need is
“common sense”. Personally, I would prefer a set of
evidences. And, to begin with, the sources of Mras.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “Liars and manipulators do need
an agenda, I can´t see one in Mras writing.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>You WON'T see it, as you simply WANT to believe this account over
the French ones. In 1823, the Austro-Hungarian army was not the most
glorious of all. One could see the advantage of promoting a story
showing the Austrian being the first to beat the fearsome Garde…
But I don't think Mras lies…</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “And he has all those little
details which make things so convincing, liars and manipulators are
usually quite short on these things unless they work on orders.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>Are you trying to convince yourself there ? I am an amateur
historian myself, but there is one thing that I learnt very early :
it NEVER fits. The more details you get, the less it fits. The most
one gets when trying to make all reports fit, even on one side, is
chaos.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE><BR>Cptn Iglo wrote : “If it was Mras official
mission to boost austrian moral then he came over 20 years to late,
then he should have been a little more pathetic on the key events and
he shouldn´t have reported so frankly on all Austrian setbacks
during the campaign and battle.”</BLOCKQUOTE>

<P>Who told Mras did it on purpose ? Who told Mras was lying ? Who
told he was not sincere ? Once again, I think that every historian,
even the most amateurish such as me, knows that many people tell
things that are false sincerely, really believing they are right. The
further the tale is from the event, the bigger the chance of
distortion.</P>
<P>I can tell you of a very personal experience. My father was a kid
during the May/June 1940 debacle, in France. While on the road he was
straffed. He always swore that it was by Italians… My father is not
lying, but it is simply impossible.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “Its actually difficult not to
believe Mras.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>It seems quite difficult to me. Of course an evidence or two would
make it easier to me. For example, if the primary sources used by
so-called Stutterheim/Mras were discovered by someone who reviewed
many sources in the Kriegarchives and they told the same story, then
it would be easy.</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Cptn Iglo wrote : “Mras is actually quite
resignative in his writing, in one sentence he states that the
Napoleon/Berthier view of the battle had prevailed and would prevail
in the future, but that it was for him just an act of historical
justice to write it down as it was.”</BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>So it seems that Mras was wrong on that… At least.</P>
<P>Best regards.</P>

I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras.
someone who writes around 100 pages on a whole campaign, is not a pamphletist, as a starting point he had in print only the french view, all details on the austrians is his own work.
he claims his sources were from the kriegsarchiv, I see no reason not to believe him.
Mras is a typical self critical modest Austrian like most of the k u k era, k u k Austrians should not be confused with Dave Hollins.
For every french failure he reports at least 2 austrian ones, I would not have employed such a person in the propaganda department and definitly not issued his writing as free print for schools.
The Napoleon/Berthier view might even make the Austrians look better than Mras lakonic write up, at least in the second half of the battle the Austrians look like dumbheads.
Perhaps is hidden agenda was " it was not Nappy, it was our own idiocy".
A whole army failing against a single bataillon might indeed have fitted into the overall picture, Mras would not have lost such an opportunity if it had really happened.

He´s just not the person to make things up.

Cptn Iglo wrote : "I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras."

You summed up very nicely what I was trying to say. I beg to disagree. To me, sources are important.

Best regards.

Cptn Iglo wrote : "I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras."

I'd have thought that sums up the whole ball game right there and could have been the first and last posting on this subject.

Capt I,

If something isn't sourced, how can it begin to be credible unless the author has established himself as a conscientious historian?

We don't know what Mras is basing his material on. He might be doing the same thing Napoleon had done for the same battle, could he not?

Sincerely,
Kevin

If you read 100 pages of a fully detailed report you might be able to judge if an author has certain tendencies, if you can´t find them you can assume that this person might be objective.
If this person is in a position to have access to certain information and writes at a time and under conditions where there is no reason to think of bias or negative influence, then you have every reason to believe this person and no reason not to believe him.

If some claim otherwise, its a test, so far in my opinion Mras has not failed this test.

Kevin,
why should he do this?

I think people do always have reasons for not telling the truth, lies have a background.

Capt I,

So, you are of the opinion that the French are liars and the Austrians are truthful?

Sincerely,
Kevin

Let us not pounce like jackals on CPTN IGLO's "I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras."

In the first place, it is not nice.

In the second place, he makes a good point. Mras was told to sit in the Austrian archivs and write up the story based on what he found there ca. 1820. There is no reason to think he did actively attempt to twist what he wrote to say anything in particular, beyond a natural difference between his writing and others writings that will always arise between two authors.

And it is true, even my primitive understanding of German gives me nothing but an impression of modesty, honesty and genuine expression without more than normal bias.

The archives in which he sat were better prepared ca. 1820 to give him information than they are today. And Mras published near enough to events that some "comment" might have occurred from living persons who were at the battle. So he is "technically" a "very good early secondary source" in my OPINION.

Next, we DO know the the so-called Stutterheim manuscripts were available to Mras. We see of the exact expressions and many of the concepts of these in the resulting Mras text. The supposed provenance of the Stutterheim manuscripts is known, and we have no reason to disbelieve this provenance.

This, incidentally, clearly shows how mistaken was Dave Hollins' chanting of "independent primary sources". Really we have exactly one "very good early secondary source" out of the nexus of 2 "Stutterheim" manuscipts and the Mras text.

None of this makes the Mras text into Holy Writ. But the extent that I believe any similarly situated and provenanced text, "I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras." either.

Now then, for you, IGLO …

First, the whining about Bonapartiste propaganga and lying is really OFF-TOPIC. No one here is proposing that the French view of the battle is best sourced in the Bulletins.

Secondly, Mras' account is 100% dependent on what he found in the archivs. If some Austrian didnt write it up in the intervening years and get it into those cabinets, he didnt see and it is not in his text. Since we have no indication of a detailed and comprehensive effort to collect narratives from the participants (which DID occur on the French side, but led to the Napoleon re-writes), we have to assume that Mras is INCOMPLETE, altough we have no reason to think he is INCORRECT in any fundamental or unusual way with regard to the things he did report.

- Evan

I agree – it is bad style just to pound on Cptn Iglo's statement that he doesn't need sources to believe that Mras wrote a sincere report.
He just wanted to express that the Mras source is not spiced with fantastic incidents – but writen in a down to earth professionalism, like, dare I say – de Cugnac?

I don't need sources to see that de Cugnac is an excellent work, because de Cugnac provides numerous sources from where he derives his conclusions and the reader can see why de Cugnac, based on those sources – came to those conclusions – he is transparent.

I prefer such works to those where you cannot see from where the author did make up his statements.

So let us not discuss Captn Iglo but Mras and in case anybody finds him vague or wrong, then we could discuss this point.

Otherwise I agree of course that also Mras cannot be complete, but what source about a campaing is ever complete?

Bonjour messieurs,

Back in the days when I was discussing the Stutterheim/Mras accounts with David Hollins, I came to the conclusion that the Mras account was a patchwork made up with all Austrians sources that he could gather. Those sources representing the "received wisdom" of Austria military circles of the early 1820's.

It doesn't mean that Mras is a liar. I certainly never used the term. I hate to put such labels on people that died centuries ago. I even stated that I saw him as a sincere man. I have read a little about historiography, and historians always have to find out whether the author is sincere or not, AND if the information he gives is right.

Now, Mras being sincere doesn't mean that he tells the truth. All he seems to do is trying to make some sense from very different accounts he found and that we know nothing of. Mras gives a text that is coherent BECAUSE it is made up. We do know he used Stutterheim accounts, we do know he changed the information they contain. So, he modified this source information, this is what I mean by "making up", nothing more. He does that in order to make something that makes sense. What he used in conjunction with Stutterheim is unknown to us, and that's a shame.

Once again, I have never seen different sources, even on the same side, that fit that perfectly… So I think that Mras did patch up something. In my opinion, he did it sincerely. But he did it anyway. If you look at the only source he used that we know of, Mras removed the extraordinary claims, so technically, he modified the source information.

Can we trust Mras ? I don't think so. I would trust his sources much better. This is where Professor Hermann Hüffer would come handy. He should give us the sources that he believes Mras used (just what de Cugnac did with the French accounts). What are those sources ?

They should be in the Kreigarchives in Vienna. If someone did a thoughtful work there, he should have read them and he should be able to give us, at least, some of the sources Mras used.

Where are the after-battle reports from the Austrian Generals such as Elnitz, Frimont, Pilati, etc ? I have never seen even an allusion to them.

In a nutshell, you cannot compare a set of primary after-battle reports with a secondary unsourced work such as Mras. Nor can you compare Mras to de Cugnac. Because de Cugnac gives all the sources he used and discuss them. The closest thing to the Mras account would be the Vallongue writing of the battle of Marengo : complete, coherent, unsourced, yet filled with inaccuracies.

Best regards.

Well, back to reading, Hüffer and Mras.

OK – I did read the Mras account in OMZ 1823 – 3rd volume, very interesting, especially what he has to say about the effect of a possible Austrian battle victory at Marengo, he still thinks Bonparte would have won the campaign.

The also puts the battle – at least for me – in a new context, it was not that all important victory or defeat.

The net around the Austrians was closed and even an Austrian victory – and there Mras convinced me – would have not changed that much on the perilous situation of Melas.

Anyway, for sure Mras did use Stutterheim /amongst else), like his story about the "destruction" of the Guard.

To make a good examen critique on Mras – one would have to

1st read Mras in full

2nd find out where he was right

3rd find out where he was wrong

Just so we're clear about this 'pounding' of Iglo.

Winterfield wrote "I agree – it is bad style just to pound on Cptn Iglo's statement that he doesn't need sources to believe that Mras wrote a sincere report."

My comments were not, as you say, it was a SINCERE report, but Iglo's statement that he was happy to BELIEVE it without sources.

Cptn Iglo wrote : "I don´t need sources to believe Hauptmann Mras."

very different things – one questions Mras' integrity, the other questions his 100% accuracy DESPITE BEST EFFORTS.

Where´s the problem with Mras?
Did he cover things up, what was his intention?

Mras gives a detail description of the first half of the battle until midday. He describes stiff granite like french resistance and repeated austrian failures to dislodge the french. Add the granite redoubt on the right and nothing changes. After all even the French did admit they had to retreat finally. There is simply no reason to start a manipulation here.
Perhaps he did try to cover up failures of the Austrian cavalry. But a few pages later when he deals with Kellermann´s cavalry charge and descibes in detail how three austrian cavalry regiments did fail miserably, contributing to a massive degree to the rout of three austrian infantry brigades and the surrender of an other one, he´s quite unsentimental. If we follow Mras it was the Liechtenstein dragoons and the Pilati cavalry brigade who bear the main responsibility for the defeat of the main column and the loss of the battle.
In comparision to this a number of failed charges against the consular guard would fade into insignificance.

When looking at the overall picture it is quite obvious that Mras has no intention to play things up or down.
He´s quite critical towards his own forces and doesn´t downplay french successes.

Remains the question if he did make a mistake or has overlooked something.

Both Stutterheim and Mras state that the consular guard was charged once by the Lobkowitz dragoons without establishing contact, a failed charge.
Stutterheim even adds details about the leadership decisions and problems before the attack was launched.
As far as I see it the actions of the Lobkowitz dragoons are very well documented on the austrian side, they did try to charge just once.

It was Berthier did bring Elsnitz cavalry into play to create an adequate enviroment for a granite redoubt scenario, Bonaparte in his bulletin had by the way mentioned 10000 cavalry.
Mras states that the force dealing with the consular guard was Ott´s column. Ott´s only cavalry formation was Lobkowitz dragoons who didn´t do anything constructive.

Elsnitz cavalry was partly absent, what was on the field was deployed as tactical reserve in the rear of Melas main column.
Launching the tactical reserve would have been a key tactical decision.
Mras reports nothing like this.
Mras indeed gives us the ordre de bataille, the battle plan and the key tactical leadership decisions through the battle, he did his job on the grand tactical issues.

He would have mentioned the launching of the tactical cavalry reserve if it had happened, you can´t overlook this.
its like overlooking the charge of the Union brigade at Waterloo, even a lousy researcher would not make this mistake.

So we must conclude that one component of most of the granite redoubt tales, including the bulletin, was lacking.
And thats a sufficient number of charging cavalry.

And this leads us to an important question.

How does the alternative scenario actually look like?
everybody is talking of sources and eyewitnesses, but these do all tell different tales.

Mras/Stutterheim tell a coherent logic story, the other side offers us not one but actually half a dozen different versions, all from "eyewitnesses", these tales have just one thing in common and that´s the picture of a granite redoubt created by the boss one day after the battle in his bulletin.

Those who see things differently should finally start to get their act together.
Which version is the one which should be debated?
Is it 1,2,3,4,5 or more charges?, is infantry involved? is it all square, or line too? how long did they do it?

If the final version contains numerous cavalry one should answer the question where it did come from.

The problem is that it is quite definite that the Consular Guard infantry was not destroyed as it participated in the French counterattack probably commanded by a staff officer sent to command them in the counterattack.

The second problem with Mras is the lack of sourcing. it is a secondary account, written years after the action and cannot be given the same credibility as first hand accounts in after action reports from general officers who were present. Monnier's after action report definitely contradicts Mras in this action of the Guard infantry. And Monnier was there and on the same flank.

Yes, Mras' account is clear and logical. It's also incorrect and cannot be accepted at face value in with the primary contradictory evidence present in du Cugnac/Lanza. So, the bottom line is to support Mras' account with primary evidence drawn from wherever. Melas' after action report does not support Mras in the action of the Consular Guard, for example.

'the other side offers us not one but actually half a dozen different versions, all from "eyewitnesses", these tales have just one thing in common and that´s the picture of a granite redoubt created by the boss one day after the battle in his bulletin.'

Who? I haven't seen the 'granite redoubt' comment anywhere but in the Bulletin. And Col Vallongue certainly didn't use it in his account of the action if I'm not mistaken. Neither Dupont nor Monnier use it and I don't think Berthier does either.

So who did?

Just see the granite redoubt as an inspiration, the master is responsible for the big words, his followeres can fill out the details.

Capt I,

Again, who?

Sincerely,
K

I am starting to wonder who this is, with a few good idea's

TMP link

Cptn Iglo wrote : "Where´s the problem with Mras?"

He doesn't state his sources.

Cptn Iglo wrote : "Did he cover things up, what was his intention?"

We don't know.

Salut CPTN IGLO,

May I say that your line of reasoning, while by no means "impossible", goes much along the lines of the following :

1. Mras was a careful writer and MUST HAVE included any event of the battle in his account if he saw it described in the archival materials available to him when he wrote his account 20 years after the battle.
2. Nobili's 2 regiments of dragoons (the part of Elnitz division present at the battle) MUST HAVE been considered the tactical cavalry reserve during the mid-afternoon at Marengo *
3. Although "a number of failed charges against the consular guard would fade into insignificance," the committment of the tactical cavalry reserve if it occurred, MUST HAVE been among the documents available to Mras.
4. Therefore Mras MUST HAVE "mentioned the launching of the tactical cavalry reserve if it had happened"
5. All other Austrian cavalry units MUST HAVE been otherwise engaged during the period of time after the arrival of the French garde à pied and leading up to events described by Stutterheim.
6. The Bulletin has a description of the garde à pied resisting cavalry on the French right, but Bulletins were documents crafted for propaganda purposes, so this particular passage in this particular Bulletin MUST HAVE been a lie, a part of the propaganda.
7. All other sources mentioning similar events in whatever words that they used MUST HAVE been lying, since "the master is responsible for the big words, his followeres can fill out the details."
8. These "followers [who] fill out the details" of the master's lies MUST HAVE included ALL of: Berthier, Victor, Dupont, Monnier and Murat writing from one day before to about 1 day after the Bulletin; the Italian nationalist Botta, grenadier Petit and Soulès' Légion citation written about 1-3 year later; Soult writing during the Restauration; Coignet's memoires written decades later, the ERZ Ludwig Uhlans regimental history written a century later, etc., etc., etc. -- each and all of these MUST HAVE slavishly followed the "master's" propaganda and thus these sources all MUST HAVE been in error.

It is a long, long, long, long chain of MUST HAVE arguments. I am surprised that you would adopt this line of reasoning, which strikes me as baroque in its complexity and extremely unlikely to be correct. It is this behavior of creating long, tortured MUST HAVE been arguments, as opposed to simply reading the available sources, that I have so-often found deficient in Dave Hollins' approach to the narrative.

- Evan

* Can you point out to me Austrian cavalry doctrine and usage vintage 1800 that actually held masses of (light dragoon) cavalry as a important (battlefield wide) grand tactical reserve to be committed en masse at a critical point ? This does not seem to be the usual procedure for Austrians of this era to my limited understanding. Actually, the contrary – small "packages" of cavalry released here and there about the battlefield to work with the infantry – seems the usual method.

Iglo,

To give you an idea of the logical or analystical strain your line reasoning requires, if we replace "MUST HAVE" in the above summary with "IT IS 90% LIKELY" in each case, but otherwise ACCEPT every single one of the steps in the long chain (including accepting the claim that all the "French sources" are identically copies of one-another), then it is only about 39% likely that the Mras was correct to omit reference to the garde à pied resisting valiantly on the French right.

Please reconsider your analysis. You do seldom (never?) otherwise torture the poor sources in such a fashion in any other post I have seen from you.

- Evan

Open question :

Who did read Mras (apart from Dave Hollins)?

Cptn Iglo
von Winterfeld

who else?

In case we like to discuss Mras, then this is an essential condition to discuss him.
Those who did not read Mras cannot discuss about the writing of Mras.

Otherwise we refute Mras, because he did not state his specific sources and deem his work as useless.
Mras is however in good / bad company then as other cherrished works of more recent authors just are vague in stating specific sources as well.

Also – I won't discuss in this thread Austrian cavalry doctrine, this is too general, certainly according to Mras ;-)) and Stutterheim, one of the reasons to chose the battle field at Marengo was to exploit the cavalry superiority (in numbers) to the French.

I hoped to discuss some really good points here, but I see there is no hope – we are again thrown back at this silly rocher.

I have the excerpt(s) from Mras that are in du Cugnac/Lanza and did mention what he said about the Consular Guard infantry.

And Austrian cavalry doctrine is not a general subject but a quite direct and particular one. The bottom line is that the excellent Austrian cavalry arm did not have a tradition of acting in mass, and that is quite evident from their employment at Marengo. They operated in brigades as the highest tactical level employed. That isn't massing cavalry.

Sincerely,
Kevin

One question for the people that can read Mras account in German.

For the whole fight we have very precise information, except for the Champeaux counter-attack. That is quite understandable because Mras had no access to French sources, and could only guess that the cavalry involved was from Champeaux.

Now there is something I don't get. Why doesn't Mras tell us which unit(s) the four Hussars squadrons led by Frimont came from ? Was this information lost in the French translation ?

Why does Mras gives four squadrons of hussars, when he could check and see that Frimont led the de Bussy Chasseurs and two squadrons from the Kaizer Dragons ?

Stutterheim first account is more vague : "Then suddenly while behind the Guard the whole French army was on the retreat a swarm of Imperial cavalry came galloped from Marengo fell into its rear and let only a few escape."

The second version is more precise, but even less credible : "Near Marengo the rolling musket fire had already decreased and drawn to the Austrian left wing where Gottesheim was still fighting the Guard and Vogelsang Carra Saint-Cyr when a few sqns of Nauendorf HR8 and Bussy JR came gallopped from the main road and fell into the rear of the Guard."

We know that the Nauendorf Hussars were involved in the surrender of part of the 44° Demi-Brigade de ligne, under Dampierre.

Source : letter from Dampierre to Dumas. Revue de Paris (15 juin 1900), p. 803

In every account (Stutterheim/Mras), the Garde des Consuls Grenadiers are supposed to lose four guns.

We know that Monnier that was fighting around the same spot lost four guns. Moreover, they were lost to cavalry. The information is given in the Sénarmont report that sums up all artillery reports for the day.

Source : de Cugnac, La Campagne de l'Armée de Réserve (partie 2) p.383.

We also know that the Garde des Consuls artillery was probably only three guns strong on the battlefield at that moment, and led by lieutenant Marin, under Lannes.

Source : de Cugnac, La Campagne de l'Armée de Réserve (partie 2) p.370.

Some said that the Murat report, about 121 wounded and dead for the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls, was such because when it was written the prisoners taken by the Austrians were already back. It seems very unlikely. In a letter, dated June 17, Bonaparte writes to Berthier that he wants to exchange the prisonners taken in Plaisance with the french held in Alexandria. The number of prisoners given is 1100.

Source : Correspondence de Napoléon Ier (tome 6) an VIII (1800) p.371.

I can't see how the sources I used dcould be made up. They have no direct link with any bulletin thing. They are just "technical" reports from an officer to another. They don't even try to make sense. They just give some information on the matter of things at one point.

Best regards.

Salut von Winterfeldt,

I have read the French translated parts of Mras. I read French as well as English. I have also read the Mras in the Hüffer, but I will admit that my comprehension in German is not as good, may be on the level of an average 12 year old.

I have never once "refuted" a single word of Mras. I did actually agree that we do not need his listed sources, since we do know in general what these were : the documents in the archiv where he did work ca. 1820, therein to include two manuscipts said to be authored by Stutterheim. That, together with his method and style in the narrative, lead me to share CPTN IGLO's positive appreciation of Mras.

The person who brought up Austrian cavalry doctrine was actually CPTN IGLO.
He reasoned as follows (I quote myself) :
-- Nobili's 2 regiments of dragoons (the part of Elnitz division present at the battle) MUST HAVE been considered the tactical cavalry reserve during the mid-afternoon at Marengo
-- Although "a number of failed charges against the consular guard would fade into insignificance," the committment of the tactical cavalry reserve if it occurred, MUST HAVE been included among the documents available to Mras.
-- Therefore Mras MUST HAVE "mentioned the launching of the tactical cavalry reserve if it had happened"

This line of reasoning implicitly requires that such a reserve of 2 light dragoon regiments would be created and so employed, and only in a critical moment that would merit inclusion in the documents available to Mras.
I do not know of such Austrian doctrine nor usage, and so did ask.

"I hoped to discuss some really good points here, but I see there is no hope – we are again thrown back at this silly rocher."

I do not see what there is in my response to CPTN IGLO which could possibly merit such disapprobation.
-- If you did not intend to include my response in this criticism, please so state.
-- If you did so intend to include me, please tell me more explicitly how I have merited your criticism.

= Evan

von Winterfeldt

There is a complete, as far as I know, translation of the Mras account in French in "Journal des sciences militaires" (1828).

It is compared with four French accounts, including the "lost" Vallongue one.

So every poeple still alive in 1828 could read it in France. I am convinced that Kellerman and Victor did read it. And de Cugnac certainly did (he quotes it).

Now, for Stutterheim, it is a completely different matter, it was not available to the French public until 1900…

Best regards

Cher Phillippe,

"Some said that the Murat report, about 121 wounded and dead for the Grenadiers de la Garde des Consuls, was such because when it was written the prisoners taken by the Austrians were already back."

On 16 juin, the Autricheins began to march out of Alexandria. Petit notes explicitly that the local prisoners were all returned on the 16th. Murat wrote on the 16th, speaking of gardes "sent to" him. It is not explicitly stated and thus not guaranteed, and hence appears under my OPINION, that Murat was writing after the return of the prisoniers, but I think it is most likely.

- Evan

points I would have liked to discuss, as already mentioned by Philippe Aube – the statement of Mras that Bonaparte was already informed by the evening befor the battle that the Austrians would attack, by scouts.
Hollins is not mentioninig this in his Marengo book at all.

Also the timing of Mras, or the general timing of the French retreat and the Austrian advance, something sounds very odd, why took it so long for the Austrians to gain the ground till they met Boudet?

Why did Ott fail to counter charge and roll up the advancing French again?

As to the critic of Cptn Iglo – he wrote:

It was Berthier did bring Elsnitz cavalry into play to create an adequate enviroment for a granite redoubt scenario, Bonaparte in his bulletin had by the way mentioned 10000 cavalry.
Mras states that the force dealing with the consular guard was Ott´s column. Ott´s only cavalry formation was Lobkowitz dragoons who didn´t do anything constructive.

Elsnitz cavalry was partly absent, what was on the field was deployed as tactical reserve in the rear of Melas main column.
Launching the tactical reserve would have been a key tactical decision.
Mras reports nothing like this.
Mras indeed gives us the ordre de bataille, the battle plan and the key tactical leadership decisions through the battle, he did his job on the grand tactical issues.

All I say that I have no clue about how Elsnitz cavalry was employed, this is the assumption of Cptn Iglo, one can agree or disagree – it is not vital for me for the action about the Consular Guard.

Journal des sciences militaires 1928

is that available on Gallica?

Hk is naturally a bit brutal.
most people on this forum cannot read german.
But on the other hand Marengo is indeed a battle in which one side did publisize their views in german.
They didn´t publisize very much, the ÖMZ(Streffleurs) did from 1807 to 1910 publish 2 articles with Marengo content, thats Mras in 1822/23 and Pannasch in 1846, plus a book review by Woinowich in 1905(on Cugnac).
There is no problem to overwhelm Mras with french sources on a 100 to 1 rate.
As long as 50 french sources tell 50 different versions of the same story I stick with Mras, who at least seems to have done his homework.
he tells all things which are necessary to describe a military action, and he tells the story in a way a serious soldier should do it, without much pathos or sentimentality, most important he tells the story like someone who doesn´t try to sell his or others glory.

Thats something i cannot say about what I could read so far from the napoleonic french side.

I have no doubt that The French could do this too, but my impression is they didn´t even try on this one , all just so much hollow pathos.

My favorite so far is Petit´s account, If I had been Napoleon I would have given him a solid kick in the butt for his attempt to outbulletin me , but Nappy did very likely promote him.