"Zieten's letter: Do Hofschroer's books bend the facts?" Topic

Von Winterfeldt, excuse me but I dont follow this post of yours.
Youre not a native English speaker are you? Not a problem as not everyone is so blessed.
Could you please rephrase what you wrote as I am interested in what you have to say.

Oliver Schmidt writes:

With which intention Zieten's papers were written is hard to decide.

As to that I agree fully, or this is my opinion as well.

The same could be said about Wellington's intention as well.

To Von Winterfeldt:

"But that is exactly the story, where did Peter Hofschröer bent "facts" then, when Wellingto expressed disbelieve that Napoleon did attack?"
>>>> The remark made by Wellington was not his disbelieve of an attack on 15 June, but his general view since alonger period that the French would not attack, as he (and the Prussians) considered themselves to be too strong in Belgium. So therefore this cannot support any claims to an early letter of Zieten arriving in Brussels.

"Why is Zieten under attack, ok if his memoires were there to entertain, Wellington's were there to cover up."
>>>> What would Wellington have to cover up for????

Why in this discussion is it, that a lot of people think that Zieten sent an early message to Wellington DIRECTLY???

It would be far more reasonable to assume this letter would have been sent to Von Muffling, the Prussian liason-officer in Brussels, whou would then walk over to Wellington.
This seems far better to understand, as Zieten's letter despatched later in the morning (between 8 and 9 a.m.) was indeed adressed to Von Muffling. Gneisenau's letter from 12 a.m. on 15 June was also adressed to Von Muffling.
So if Von Muffling did not mention anything in his recollections (there are three/each a little different), then it probably didn't happen. (I think it never was sent).

It would also make Zieten's argument of having to write the message himself in French less valid, as none on his staff could handle this language sufficiently; the corps commander could easily have written in German to Von Muffling, in the safe knowledge the latter would bring it to the duke.

Pflugk-Harttung's article on this debate can be found in full as a free pdf-file on the website of the magazine First Empire: PDF link

Question: during the campaign did Zieten or Gnesenau ever send a letter pertaining to operational matters direct to Wellington, or did they always communicate through von Muffling? If the latter then it would seem to be game and set….

P

There Zieten wrote in French – it is an indiction that communicated directly with Wellington.
I did read the p-H article but I come to the same conclusion as Oliver, nothing certain.

Zieten himself stated he sent the messenger to Wellington. This seems logical to me. Müffling was just the Prussian liaison officer to Wellington's staff, Wellington was the man to make the decisions and act. Why lose time in informing Müffling first and not second ?

But my personal opinion is no proof. The following facts are:

In a letter of 8.15 a.m. which still did exist 100 years ago, Zieten wrote to Blücher:

"I have informed the Duke of Wellington of the situation, and requested him to concentrate at Nivelles." (This information of the Duke may be the alleged 4 a.m. message or the "9 a.m." message.)

In the Wellington Papers, Hartley Library, University of Southampton, there is at least one letter from Zieten to Welligton, written in French by Zieten's hand. (Peter's Waterloo Campaign, p. 193)

Having re-read the relevant passages of Peter Hofschröer's book, I must confess, I find it quite untwisted. Peter gives quotations for his statements and the letters he quotes, and cites also statements which are opposite to his own.

The intelligent reader can clearly distinguish between "facts" (and check in which sources they are found) and Peter's conclusions, and accept or discard the latter at will.

The only flaw for me is that the German and French documents have been translated into English instead of giving them in the original … but this is what makes out the valor of this book for the English reader: you can access German primary sources on the events without knowing German.

Not to belabor the point, but this debate is not about Zieten lying or Zieten telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but rather about plausibilities and likelyhoods. Of course Peter's account could be true. So could a manuscript produced by a room full of monkeys with typewriters. And we wouldn't know, because it is history and in the past and we can only look at the evidence and judge the possibilities.
The conventional view, found in serious English language texts, is that Wellington was taken by surprise, was – at least in retrospect – too fixated on Mons, and did botch his concentration. So no one is arguing that he was flawless or saintly. No one is arguing that Peter has misquoted his sources or failed to cite them. There is a honking big problem with what he said about JvP-H, and there are some concerns that he confused the Corps journal and Ziethen's autobiographical manuscript. It's all detailed in the Pedlow article. As for citing opposing evidence, here I have to say I'm disappointed. It is clear that the Zieten question was examined in great detail a century ago, and JvP-H's view has been accepted as the conventional view, and nobody trots out all the details. I do not see that Peter did this either, which means I'm right back in the same old boat. I need to learn German…

NSN

To Oliver Schmidt:

"I have informed the Duke of Wellington of the situation, and requested him to concentrate at Nivelles." (This information of the Duke may be the alleged 4 a.m. message or the "9 a.m." message.)"
>>> Based on what Zieten knew and reported to Blucher in his first message on 15 June, I'd say it would be out of the question that he would immediately send a message to Wellington requesting to concentrate at Nivelles, while Zieten had not received any reports from his own divisional commanders at the border, Von Steinmetz and Pirch II, but had only heard some shooting.
Therefore I believe it it logical that when Zieten referred to Wellington in his 8.15 a.m. message to his own commander at Namur, he spoke about a message either just sent to Wellington, or which he was to send immediately after the one now sent to Blucher. That is why I speak of a message sent between 8 and 9 a.m. in my own study.

I must confess, there is no clear evidence or even a primary source to corroborate Zieten was ONLY communicating to Wellinton through Von Muffling.

Oliver,
you state you did read his books and (to summarize) you have the impression of solid reasoning and Peter mentioning opposite statements.

I do know Peters resoning only from third parties.

According to Gregg Pedlow, Hofschroer does indeed explicitly state that Pflugk- Harttung supports his view and even offers a footnote for this.
Thats not an irrelevant little mistake, as far as I see it, Hoffie´s impact on the British market is essentially based on his seeminglingly exclusive access to the german/prussian view of things. How can a british reader check H´s claims if he cannot read german?

Does Hofschroer really discuss the 4.45am and 8.15am messages to Blücher?

how does he deal with the fact that according to the 4.45 message, Zieten did actually have no relevant information which could be sent early enough to reach Wellington until 9am ?

How does he deal with the fact that Zieten in his 8.15 message to Blücher explicitly states that the same informations will be sent to wellington, thats informations he could not have earlier.?
How does he deal with the fact that a message sent around this time would not have reached Brussels at 9am?

Overall how does he deal with Pflugk-Harttungs arguments on that issue?, he must have read them.
He must have known that the person he calls "arguably the the greatest Waterloo historian who has ever lived"
debunks all arguments based on the Feltre letter and Zieten´s confusing memory and concentrates instead on the only available hard facts which are Zietens other messages send on that day.

So does Hofschroer even discuss the other messages Zieten sent on that day?
And whats his reasoning on these key points?

To Captain Iglo (and others!)

"Overall how does he deal with Pflugk-Harttungs arguments on that issue?, he must have read them.
He must have known that the person he calls "arguably the the greatest Waterloo historian who has ever lived"
debunks all arguments based on the Feltre letter and Zieten´s confusing memory and concentrates instead on the only available hard facts which are Zietens other messages send on that day."
>>> You are quite right! This was the reason why I about a week ago mentioned here that Mr. H bends the facts! Yet, this immediately made him respond to me in a private email that I was telling 'blatant lies'about him,and when I responded to that privately was again accused of making 'false statements'about the man.

Now I know he is follwing this discussion as a paranoid at the moment, and will not like me of publishing this here. But at Carcadores started this discussion here, it is important once again to underline, that any one criticising the man from Austria, has no opportunity to discuss withhim, but is immediately accused of telling lies and being a fool or whatever. Obviously Mr. H is incompatent of adult discussion etc. etc. and since more then 10 years unwilling to reconsider his false accusations against Wellington in his pre-set 2 volume work in which the only outcome could be that the 1815 campaign was a 'German victory'.

As I am now a blatant lier and false accusationer I can no longer take this man from Austria any serious and hope he will stay put on his mountain overthere. The more he insults people like me, Mr Hussey, mr. pedlow and others, the more he makes himself the object of sillyness.

Have others here, who are gaainst Mr. H's opinion also received private emails accusing them of being blatant liers or any other insults?

I was enjoying this thread. Unbelievable.

A copy of Von Damitz' book "Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 in den Niederlanden und Frankreich", based partly on Von Grolman's memoirs can be found on Google Books at link

It is in German, but if you're interested!

Erwin, I agree that the early message by Zieten cannot have contained much more than "The French have started to attack us."

But if Zieten outposts were attacked, it was clear the French would head for Charleroi to cross the Sambre. As the Prussians had planned to retreat in order to gain time for concentrating their troops, and the French would follow them, the general movements of both armies on the first day of the campaign were basically predictable.

Captain Iglo, unfortunately, I haven't got the time at the moment to answer your detailed questions about Peter Hofschröer's book. But as it is written in English, it should be easy for you to lend it in a library and read the relevant passages yourself. I stated my personal impression above, it may or may not differ from yours after you have read the passage.

Oliver,
Zieten´s earliest message was not about the beginning of a french attack towards Charleroi or a french attack at all.
It was about hearing the sound of gunshots.
This might have been a friendly fire incident, an outpost skirmish, a feint attack or indeed the major offensive across the borders.
All became clear some hours later when Thuin had to be given up, the french guards had been spotted and informations had come in about Napoleon leading in person.

The "I can hear gunshots" message was definitly worth to be sent to the immediate superior, who was Blücher.
It was not worth sending this to the commander of an allied army controlling a different sector of the borders.

Nobody, not even Zieten or Hofschroer, has ever claimed that Zieten did sent more than 1 message to Wellington.

At 8.15am Zieten had gathered all relevant informations, which he could not have had at 4pm, did sent a message to Blücher and did inform him that the same info´s were sent to Wellington.

Based on these documented facts, not just vague and confused memories decades later, its impossible to come to Hofschroers conclusions as far as I see it.

I have no access to an English language library, Hofschroers book was not published in German.
It still might interesting to know if Hofschroer did inform his readers about these other Zieten messages, he must have known them.

Captain Iglo, the early message from Zieten to Blücher reads (translation stolen from Erwin's article: PDF link – footnote 2)

"Since 4,5 o'clock several gunshots and now also
musketshots have been fired on the right flank. No message has yet arrived. As soon as this will, I will not fail to obediently inform Your Excellency. I will concentrate all in the position of Charleroi, and when necessary, concentrate near Fleurus."

If an early message to Wellington existed, it will have been of a similar kind.

The contents seems quite feeble, but according to Zieten's memories, being informed by spies, all the Allies he did expected the French attack, so for him it was/seemed obvious what was going on.

Zieten's early message to Wellington (if it existed) could have stated – just a guess – that gun fire and musketry indicate the commencement of the French attack and that Wellington is requested to concentrate his forces at Nivelles.

I am not going to write an account of my own of these events,

With inter-library loan, you should be able to get a copy of the Hofschröer book. I don't know where you are living, but there are several copies in German libraries, see:

link

The letter of Zieten to Wellington which arrived at around 3 p.m. is mentioned in the Hofschröer book.

@Oliver Schmidt

IMHO Zieten had to assume the worst case scenario for his own forces (full scale French attack).

When it comes to messages to commander of allied forces (Netherland, British) the problem is not that simple. An early wrong message could do a lot of damage, a too late message too. So Zieten had to find (and did find) a compromise: He sent at around 9:OO a.m. messages to Blücher and Wellington, that contained useful information, i.e. Bonaparte is attacking the Prussian army.

When the message reached the Netherland forces via Blücher and arrived at Wellingtons staff before Zietens direct message to Wellington then this does not change the interpretation of Zieten's actions.

Ulenspiegel

Basileus66, I'd just like to say 'Bravo' to your perceptive comments at the start of this post. I've tried to say much they same thing in the Iron Duke's defence on various posts over the years. How these armchair generals can ascribe motives of dishonesty or even political scheming to the mishandling of messages in a staff headquarters in the opening of a campaign is quite beyond me. Even in a modern BHQ with all mod cons, video conferencing etc things go wrong quite regularly. Anyway, hopefully your eloquence will make some of the Duke's detractors think again!

Perhaps a little bit off, but are there source refrences when Wellington usually was up and awake & working in his Brussels headquarters? Was it as early as sunrise, or around 7 a.m.? Or whatever other time?
I'm trying to get some idea in relation to Dutch accounts.
(The one presented earlier by me in this thread from Van der Capellen wasn't as I mentioned in the afternoon, but written during the morning of 15 June. Apologies for my mistake)