"Zieten's letter: Do Hofschroer's books bend the facts?" Topic

HK,
again, there is only one message in debate.
we do already have one, thats the 8.15 pm message sent to Blücher and Wellington.

to receive a message at 9am it had to be sent at 4 or 5 am.

We do indeed have a Zieten message sent at 4.45 to Blücher.
this message indicates that nothing was sent before and that Zieten at this time did knew essentially nothing except that he could hear some shooting since 4.30.
nothing about the attack on Thuin mentioned in the 8.15 message and the Feltre letter.

And again and again, there is only one message to discuss. We have it. Zieten in his 8.15 message explicitly states that the same info is sent to Wellington.

Hofschroer has made a lot of Zietens claims in his unpublished memoirs, which were written decades later.
They´re unreliable in many cases,not only in context of the Zieten message.

In his memoirs he writes that the message was sent at 4am and even names the courier.

In his 1819 letter to the war ministry he states the message was written at 3.45 and can´t remember the name of the courier.

In his 4.45 am message to blücher on the june 15,1815 he states that he could hear the sound of shooting since 4.30am, no message to Wellington is mentioned(unlike in his 8.15 message.)

The french attack across the borders had officially begun some time after 4am.

Zieten did have no memory, no diary, no record book to rely upon, he didn´t even have a copy of the message.
still at least in 1819 he was under heavy pressure from the war ministry to produce some info to justify the claims about a timely message to Wellington.

There is no justification to overrule the written evidence with vague speculations based on memoirs written decades later.

And there is a difference between having a opinion and religious belief.

I don´t think that anybody who is informed in full can have the "opinion" that Wellington did receive the Zieten message at 9am.

Another interesting question is how Wellington could hide the Prussian courier from others, notably from the Prussian community and and the liaison officer Müffling, from 9 am to at least 3pm.
Normally contacting Müffling should have been step 2 after delivering the message to Wellington.
But until the afternoon Müffling was happily writing a number of letters with strictly peacetime content, no mentioning of a courier or the beginning of hostilities.

OK, I never claimed that I am infomred in full, but still, surly those who are can come up with the letter of Wellington to Feltre in French.

Why did wellington back paddle from an statment that he knew about the attack against the Prussians at the evening and had to wind back the clock to 15:00?

"There is no justification to overrule the written evidence with vague speculations based on memoirs written decades later."

This seemingly Wellington did as well evening – 15:00 time wrap.

While Zieten is under attack and re-viewed criticially, Wellington escapes unnoticed.

Yes yes HK, perhaps Peter Hofschroer is just an agent provocateur hired by the Wellington admiration society.
Trying to pee at a monument will not bring it down

Von Winterfeldt, there are two separate questions: when did Wellington learn the French were attacking the Prussians, and when did Wellington get a full report from Prussian HQ. As Cptn Iglo said, by 3PM Prussian messages to neighboring Allied commands had been forwarded to Brussels. At 6-7pm the size of the attack became apparant from Zieten's 9am message.

It's interesting to note the Prussian investigate the possibility that Zieten sent a dawn message to Wellington, but seemingly did not check why it took 9-10 hours for his 9am message to arrive. I wonder if that's because they knew why… (or perhaps they knew it didn't make much difference…)

NSN

corrected.
Condottiere 28 Feb 2008 6:54 p.m. PST
Re: if Peter Hofschroer just stuck to historical fact from the Prussian view he would have a good credability but he chose not too.
''He did, the rest is a matter of his interpretation''

How is pretending that Dr Pf-Ht agreed with him, when he clearly didn't, sticking to 'historical fact?' Is that not deception?

basileus66 28 Feb 2008 10:02 p.m. PST
''Wellington hadn't even confidence in his own subordinates… How was he to put much faith in a panicky report of an unknown entity -for him- as Ziethen? ''
Good point. Dr Pflugk-Harttung pointed out that even Zeiten had a problem knowing how strong the French were, so how could he tell Wellington?

Oliver Schmidt 29 Feb 2008 2:01 a.m. PST
''Re: "Militärische Rundschau"….There (p. 252) the manuscript of an unpublished autobiography by Zieten is literally quoted.''

Wrong – Peter quotes 3 sources, all written many years apart, one not written by Zieten at all. But he pretends they are all the same source.

''Zieten…..had given orders to the orderly on duty, to wake him up on the first cannon shot heard, which happened on 15th at "2 1/4" = a quarter past 2 a.m., when 3 cannon shots had been heard.''

Yes, but the first cannon wasn't actually fired until 4.30!* So how can we believe anything he says? Actually it's not surprising – he was under investigation by the chiefs of staff for sending the dispatch 'late'. What would you say?

''Zieten states he woke up the other officers of his staff, dictated a German and a French letter''

Yet Zeiten, 3 years earlier, explicitly stated he couldn't 'dictate' them as his staff only understood German, so he wrote the letters himself. Another 'error'.

''So this a factum that Zieten states himself he sent such an early letter.

Zeiten said that 24 years after the event. And his reputation hung on sending an 'early' letter.

''How to bring this in harmony with contradicting facta (Wellinton stating he did not receive such a letter), is basically a matter of taste.''

The way to do it, is the way Hofschroer did it:

1) First, you take 3 accounts written two decades apart, and pretend they were one document.

2) You take a claim made originally under the threat of court marshal, and you pretend it was written objectively as part of a 'journal'.

3) You then fail to point out that your whole thesis depends upon Zeiten being a fortune teller & sending a letter over 2 hours before the battle began! And finally

4) Just as people are starting wise up, you enlist the support of the main authority, Dr Pflugk-Harttung, and pretend he agrees. You then insult anyone who shows this isn't true.

I guess that's how you do it :-)
* 4.30 is also the time Zeiten tells Blucher.

Can anybody of the fully informed provide the Feltre letter in French?

@vWinterfeld

Sorry the sentence from the Feltre letter are in the Berichterstattung p54:

"Die Worte sind:" Je n'ai rieu recu dupuis neuf heures du matin de Charleroi" Das heißt zunächst so, wie wir übersetzen, daß seit 9 Uhr nichts aus Charleroi bei ihm eingetroffen sei. Aber die einzige Erklärung ist es nicht; es könnte auch gemeint sein, seit 9 Uhr ist nichts von Charleroi für mich abgegangen. Damit wäre dann nicht von der Ankuft einer Meldung, sondern von deren Versendung die Rede. es stünde hiemit, wie mit dem Briefe Müfflings an Hofmann, der berichtet: "am 15. morgens 9 Uhr hatte mir Zieten aus Charleroi geschrieben",….."

Ulenspiegel

@Ulenspiegel

Thank you, in case Wellinton would not have reieved anything, he would have xpressed so, like

Je n'ai rien recus or pas de nouvelles, etc, it confirms – my opinion, be it religeous or not – that Wellingto did receive a message before 9 o clock, why otherwise write it?

OK other question:

Let's simply forget the later events. When Zieten heard (about) gun fire at around 4 a.m., he could have expected everything from a mere border incident caused by trigger happy sentries to a full-scale attack of French forces against his I. Korps, which was in a less then optimal situation for a successful defense.

Would it have been SOP to send the fragmentary information to Wellington? Or did the whole affair become much more important later because the whole comapaign was a near run thing?

Ulenspiegel

@Ulenspiegel

Again, I am not in the league to criticise Wellington deliberatly withholding aid to the Prussians (he would be a fool in case he would have been in the position to do so – as also in the otherway round, Blücher put is foot down to help Wellington on the 18th) – but yes – it becomes a political issue.

For me, not fully informed and of relgious believe, it seems that Zieten did sent a report and Wellington did get it before 09:00 at the morning but he was waiting for further news to commit himself.

He did not know what the future would bring. Later on, politically – maybe a bit polishing of his glory and avoiding to show too much prudence.

@CPT IGLO

Zieten did (in my amateurish opinion his job) when all of the Prussian units which could be affected by an French attack were notified at 4:45 a.m. (therefore the message to Blücher) and when he later sent essential news which he gathered afterwards and which would affect the operations of the allied forces to Wellington and Blücher at 9 a.m.

Was Zietens 1819 response to Grolman then a deliberate inaccuracy to avoid any discussion (which he did not have to fear?)or was it a lapsus?

Ulenspiegel

Ulenspegel,
agree completely.At 4,30 am Zieten didn´t have much to report to the commander of an allied army who was responsible for a different part of the border, still he should have informed his direct superior, and thats what he did.

about his letter to the war ministry, the demand from Grolman was quite pressing along the lines of " zieten! we know you sent a message to wellington at daybreak which did reach W at nine, give us details and send a copy".

without a record book, a journal or the copied order, Zieten very likely did just not know.
He did know he sent a message to W at this morning 4 years ago, he did know he did sent a message directly after jumping out of bed.
if the war ministry says the W message was send at daybreak and did reach Brussels at 9 , they must be right.
when was daybreak? Lets just say 3.45.

Sorry to divert you – but if you want to know if Welly might have been less than truthful the Zieten message is an oversmoked herring not worth bothering with.

Try the meeting with Blucher on the 16th for a simpler test.
Even the most ardent Welly hugger has trouble blagging their way round that stupendous failure to inform the Prussians of the truth.

If thats the 'windmill meeting' thats been done before to – and I'm yet to see anything untoward in Wellingtons statements. Probbaly best covered in a seperate thread though.

As Clarke served Napoleon as Minister of War, why would Wellington desire the Duke of Feltre (Clarke) to have fully accurate information ? Might he not dissimulate a matter such as time while being otherwise informative(he wrote separately to the Duc de Artois with no such time reference) ?

If Wellington was "dining" at 3 or 4 PM which repast does this represent ? When would "evening" begin for an Englishman in 1815 ?

Just asking. – R

The whole question of the de Feltre letter is bizarre. The obvious military necessity is what time the letter was sent, and I suspect specifying the post time was standard practise. JvP-H points out that Muffling did that very thing in one of his letters on the subject. Furthermore, interpreting it as arrival time leaves Wellington untruthful about getting news from Charleroi at 6PM while acknowledging something he presumably went on to deny. The letter does not exclude the possibility of an even earlier message, but it really can't set the arrival time at 9AM in any sensible way.

It's not clear what happened between 3PM and 6PM. Maybe gathering the general staff? Perhaps the troops could have been prepared to march, but I'm under the impression that ordinarily marches were started very early in the morning. Starting off at 9-10PM (after destinations could be determined and despatched) might not accomplish much. Had Z.'s message arrived at 9am, it would be embarassing, but it's not clear that it would have changed anything, because the exact nature of the attack was not clear til the 6PM message arrival.

I've enjoyed 1815: The Waterloo Campaign as an amusing polemic, where one had to keep a sharp eye on the author, but accepted his facts. But PH simply asserts that the de Feltre letter specifies a 9AM message arrival when any presentation of the facts and analysis would fail to uphold it, and I've lost trust.

NSN

JeffsaysHi wrote: "…but if you want to know if Welly might have been less than truthful the Zieten message is an oversmoked herring not worth bothering with."

Yes and No. If the Prussian handling of the early Zieten message (taking it as fact) lead to interesting British reactions in the 1840s then it is still worth to discuss.

Which data got Siborne from the Prussians?

"Try the meeting with Blucher on the 16th for a simpler test."

Here my problem is, I have read completely different versions of Wellingtons promise for support and I have no detail knowledge in respect to the origination of these different version, so I support hos' suggestion to start a seperate thread.

Ulenspiegel

Sorry, I've overlooked PH's argument and what people meant when they said only one message is being considered. PH asserts that Zieten only sent the dawn message to Wellington, and that is what Zieten in refering to in the 8:15 message to Bluecher.

NSN

At dawn there was nothing to report, at least not more than what Blücher got in his own dawn (or 4.45) message.
And this was essentially nothing except hearing gunshots.

at 8.15 zieten did finally have enough material.
thuin was taken, a massive attack was underway, the guards were spotted and Napoleon was leading in person.

If zieten didn´t send these essential informations, but just the irrelevant dawn message, PH´s reasoning backfires badly.
The Prussians get now more blame that they actually deserve and there is no reason to blame Wellington for anything.
I don´t think that this is Hofschroers agenda, or perhaps he is indeed an agent provocateur paid by the Wellington fan club.

There is no need for an extra thread about Wellingtons promises of support on the 16th for the simple fact that he appears to have said diddly squat worthwhile mentioning.
Which is quite amazing since he spent about an hour watching everyone else argue about where his army could be best used – all of them in places he knew it was utterly impossible to reach that day.
Since there is no facts to discuss it simply requires one to make own judgement as to why & what this says about him.

@CPTN IGLO

"The Prussians get now more blame that they actually deserve and there is no reason to blame Wellington for anything."

I disagree – even von Pflugk – Harttung, in case you see him as valuable source is critical about Wellingtion, more so about the Prussians, this is true, but where should it backfire?

For the simple reason that if Zieten sent a useless message 'I hear cannons' at dawn and never sent anything explaining that the French were rolling up the outposts and threatening Charleroi, he would be remarkably incompetent.

NSN

Nobody's perfect.

Long time since I've read PH, but both he and Siborne agree that Zieten sent a message to Wellington shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, one that arrived in Brussels around 9 a.m.

Now either Zieten is telling the truth or he is not. Longford, if I remember correctly, seems to think he was not, but rather he was going for glory by taking on Napoleon alone. I don't think an experienced general like Zieten would have been so dumb.

Question – why would Zieten not tell the truth here? Did he deliberately not inform Wellington? A bit strange as he informed Blücher and the Netherlanders, so why leave out Wellington?

The alternative is that Wellington did receive the message at 9 a.m., for what ever reason did not react (the Fouché story sounds credible here), and later did not want to admit his error, viz. the Waterloo Despatch of June 19, 1815, where the 9 a.m. of a letter he did not publish at the time, became "evening" in the official published report, and "evening" just happened to be the time when Wellington ordered his "entire army" to Quatre Bras. Of course, as his orders of 7 p.m. show, he did nothing of the sort.

So if no troops were ordered to Quatre Bras, let alone the "entire army", then why believe what Wellington said about when he first heard from the Prussians?

For the simple reason that if Zieten sent a useless message 'I hear cannons' at dawn and never sent anything explaining that the French were rolling up the outposts and threatening Charleroi, he would be remarkably incompetent.

Yes, "I hear cannons" should certainly have been followed up with "I see dead people".

"Lots of them"

Arthur, it is not as simple as Zieten lying or telling the truth. Four years after the event, Inspector General Grohlman sent him a letter _telling_ him it is said that he sent a messanger to Brussles who arrived at 9AM, and asking who was the messenger, what was the message, what were the times? Zieten may have simply accepted this was true and allowed he couldn't remember the details.

NSN

The French were rolling up cannon and threatening Charleroi at 4.45 am? Remarkable! Which history book is that in?

Please explain why Wellington kept changing his version – 9 am, then evening, then 3 pm.

No, Peter, the French weren't threatening Charleroi at 4:45am. That's why a 5am note would not be terribly helful to the CinC…

NSN

To conclude this discussion: yes, Peter Hofschroer in his 2-volume book bends the facts. Uses sources shown to be wrong anyhow, manipulates fact and quoates serious historians such as Pflugk-Harttung entirely wrong, when this man means either this and Peter distorts the entire arguments to support something entirely opposite.
I very much doubt if Peter has really found all sources he mentions, in archives or then has even read them. Many annotations are from books (2nd hand opinions!) from which he only uses those quotes that within his conspiracy theory back his own opinins, and totally disregard far more stronger historucal primary sources.

But hey! How many others have done the same; simply because writing a book and using other books as 'sources' is far more easy than actually visiting archives and do some boring homework such as transcribing these, thinking them over, combining material into thoughts. Too tedious!
Just copy 20 other opinions into your own………………

If the energy expanded on this minor point had instead been directed into study several people could have published their own books by now.
We look forward to these books that sets the record straight using purely archive sources and does not take a lazy route.

G'day, Erwin.

To conclude this discussion: yes, Peter Hofschröer in his 2-volume book bends the facts.

No, that's just your perspective of what this debate (and others in magazines, etc) has done. And you have an obvious bias on the matter (as do I, of course), so will of course see this debate in those terms.

Therefore, as my post shows, the discussion is still open. Or is there a reason you'd like the discussion to end prematurely? (Erwin, if I was saying those words they'd be in a friendly tone, I'm looking for discussion, not a fight- I can get one of those easily on another thread ).

The debate here really proves nothing more than that people will accept the sources that suit their opinion and question those that do not- just as the other debate on Marengo is doing.

Whether PH did or did not bend the truth about the 9am message is still an open question to me, considering the man responsible for writing the letter said he wrote it (the old "Primary Source" argument) and the ambiguity of Wellington's own words. As for twisting Pflugk–Harttung's conclusions, it looks like PH may have done so. The question is whether he did it deliberately, to attack Wellington, or interpreted it that way (possibly because that interpretation fitted his views of Wellington).

However, even if he's done that, it doesn't mean the book, nor the other two, are now worthless and can be discounted as history. Though that is what people are attempting to achieve- discredit the whole work by concentrating on two more or less provable "errors".

What about the other criticisms of Wellington:

That he lied about his whole army being sent to Quatre Bras, having in fact ordered the troops there to abandon the position?

That he lied about the position of his troops on 16th June (having ridden past them, it's hard for him not to have known where they were- so how can he blame the deceased DeLancey for misinforming him? Did he ride with his eyes shut and ears blocked?)?

That he was mistaken about French intentions at Quatre Bras (discussed here before, with you)?

That his comments about seeing the deployment of the Prussian army, and what's more warning Bluecher about it, was a lie (his own claim, made by himself personally- though it was made years later)?

That he either knew of, or himself applied, the pressure that saw Siborne remove the "extra" Prussian models of the Great Diorama, changing the "history" it represented to his advantage?

The 9am message and PH's interpretations of Pflugk-Harttung are one very small part of the first book. The first book (which generated the whole controversy) itself dealt with far more than examining Wellington's mistakes, though Wellington's supporters would have you believe the whole book was written as an attack on their hero. It was actually written as a campaign study that finally looked at the events around Ligny in detail.

But those two points are used to attack Peter's veracity and to divert people from the other questions, which aren't so easy for Wellington's supporters to dismiss. It's an old ploy- "Look, he got this wrong, so the rest of the book is wrong too!". I even had one discussion where some of the above questions were dismissed as unimportant, because if Peter misrepresented Pflugk-Harttung he must also be wrong about them. Great logical thought process, that.

Wellington was a man, with all the faults men have, not some perfect early 19C Super Hero who never made a mistake. By defending him so hard, as Napoleon's defenders do with their hero, all they do is turn a very talented man into a questionable caricature.

Cheers.

Dal.

Dal.,
Erwin made substantive comments on the other thread "Chronology of messages to Wellington, June 15" which include a link to an extensive set of articles where he goes into great detail on the communications as it affected the Netherlands forces. Suffice to say you and I are mere cup holders at this level. What he posted here is just a summary and in fairness you really ought to read his whole argument before responding.

NSN

Hello Dal, all comment I gave here was about the subject of this topic: the Zieten letters.
Other comments can be found in my study, where I think it is important regarding the Netherlands Mobile Army. So I perfectly understand that judging about one topic certainly doesn't mean disregarding other parts of studies on their value.

G'day.

NSN, Suffice to say you and I are mere cup holders at this level.

True, mate. And probably with plenty of wine stains down our tunics, as well.

I have read about half of the sites (the English bits, I mean). And I agree, they are good, well detailed and well resourced (part of the reason I came to the conclusions I mention above). But are they the definitive answer? Not quite yet, mate, though that opinion may change as I read more. Certainly the evidence is stacking up, but it isn't quite overwhelming as yet. Until the matter of the "9am dispatch" is definitively answered there will always be a question mark.

After all, why is it acceptable that Zeithen lied about his dispatches, but unacceptable that anyone suggests Wellington lied- despite overwhelming evidence he did? My view- they were probably both lying. Or at least "remembering to advantage".

Besides the bits I've read, including the ones on the other site, don't convincingly address the other points I brought up.

Erwin, you've posted some good work, mate. I wish I had the time to read it in one go, instead of "pecking" at it.

As to disregarding one topic on the judgement of another, isn't that what the original poster intended?

Anyway, I'm off to Adelaide tomorrow (bloody 40C there today, so it will be hot!), so I'll step back and let you get on with the discussion. I just wanted to point out that it's still too early to state anything, one way or another. At least for my judgement of the matters.

I'd like to know your thoughts on why Wellington stated the army positions he did, though, despite riding past the units. Any ideas?

Cheers.

Dal.

I still cannot see where Peter Hofschröer should have bent facts, where in fact there is a dispute about the Zieten letters, for me, reading von Pflugk – Hartunng, the book and the article, it seems that Zieten did write the letter.

As for the series of articles – sorry I cannot see again where Peter Hofschröer has bent facts, nor that it is evident that Zieten did lie at all.

For the moment besides the debate here on Wellington receiving Zieten's letter at Brussels at 9 a.m. or if this letter was despatched from Charleroi at 9 a.m., there can be indeed criticism on the Duke of Wellington for waiting (with reason?) to start concentrating his troops on 15 June.
He had already received news from cannonfire heard at the border, by the Prince of Orange, who told him this during dinner around 3 p.m. and between 5 and 6 p.m. Lord March arrived from Braine-le-Comte, carrying messages from Behr, Paravicini, Chasse and Berkely's letter to Fitzroy Somerset.

There is another source that explains that prior to receiving information from Von Muffling, who received a message from Zieten around 6 p.m. (which I believe is the one referred to in this discussion and sent from Charleroi at 9 a.m.) Wellington still believed in general that Napoleon wouldn't attack. Hence the Duke's order to Orange to inform Constant-Rebecque to have all Netherlands troops of Chasse and Collaert to return to their cantonments.

Apparently the Dutch Secretary of State (for the southern provinces)Van der Capellen visited Wellington after Lord March had delivered his messages, but prior to Von Muffling went to inform the duke.
This is what Van der Capellen wrote about that visit to King Willem in a letter of 15 June 1815: "When informing the duke of Wellington about the messages from Mons he told me he already knew the content of these. He hoped that Buonaparte would attack but did not believe it, as [he] was not strong enough. The Duke told to have taken his dispositions in such a way, that he could be from here within 5 or at least 6 hours at all those points where his presence might be neccessary." [Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland, van 1795 tot 1840. Edited by Colenbrander. Vol. 7, p. 774-775.]

Had Wellington been informed as early as 9 a.m. that morning I can't believe he would still have that impression.
Therefore he at least adequatley acted after receiving news through Von Muffling and drafted his set of concentration orders.

There is only one message to Wellington in debate, it was sent sometimes around 8.15 am and could therefore not reach Brussels at 9 am. There is hard evidence for this because Zieten states just this in his letter to Blücher written at the same time.
Any message to reach Wellington at 9am would have had no significant content, because Zieten himself did need a few hours to find out what was going on.

So all is actually a no brainer.

There was never a real debate about the Zieten message.
Some early/mid 18th century german authors had claimed, without deeper reasoning, and based on undocumented claims from the Prussian war ministry, that Wellington was informed early and accuratly about the opening of the 1815 campaign.
The debate, if there ever was one, was definitly finished, at least in Germany, with Pflugk-Harttungs in depth analysis of the issue 100 years ago.

Hofschroer did just pull out a very old worn out hat.

He would never have been able to put some mileage out of this, if he had not turned things upside down.

What made his view so convincing was not his "facts", but the claim he would open the eyes of his british readers with his access to the german archives and the analytic expertise of great historians like Pflugk-Harttung.

He did use his bilingual privilege to sell his own agenda, so to say.

Concerning the early Zieten message, it is not so easy.

Pflugk-Harttung has not proved that Zieten's message did not exist, but based on the 14 sources available to him (and probably no additional evidence has turned up in the last 100 years), he provided a (reasonable, but not exclusively consistent) personal view of what could have happened.

In order to bring the "facts" (statements by the acting people involved) in accord, Pflugk-Harttung had to correct some "errors" or inaccuracies in the timings given, and discard others (e. g. Zieten's own statement).

We will never know for sure what really happened. Pflugk-Harttung's view is one possible version, Peter Hofschröer's view is another possible interpretation of the contradicting information which is reported.

This is what Van der Capellen wrote about that visit to King Willem in a letter of 15 June 1815: "When informing the duke of Wellington about the messages from Mons he told me he already knew the content of these. He hoped that Buonaparte would attack but did not believe it, as [he] was not strong enough. The Duke told to have taken his dispositions in such a way, that he could be from here within 5 or at least 6 hours at all those points where his presence might be neccessary." [Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland, van 1795 tot 1840. Edited by Colenbrander. Vol. 7, p. 774-775.]

Had Wellington been informed as early as 9 a.m. that morning I can't believe he would still have that impression.

But that is exactly the story, where did Peter Hofschröer bent "facts" then, when Wellingto expressed disbelieve that Napoleon did attack? For me it seems that he either ignored the first Zieten report – because he disbelieved that Napoleon did attack or he just waited to get more intelligence.

Question: Why does this support the assumption of an early Zieten message to Wellington?

When Zietens message finally arrived in Brussel Wellington had already received the info on other routes during the afternoon. That is not disputed.

The question still is: Could Zieten know that he was under real attack at about 4 am and sent such info to Wellington at 5 am. For me this is physically not possible.

At 8 am Zieten know that the Prussian army was under attack, but then the message would have arrived in Brussel after 1 pm.

We can argue whether JvPH's assessment of Zieten's conduct is correct (i.e. Zieten is responsible for the delay) but I see no room for a revision of the time the message was sent (8 am or later).

Ulenspiegel

I'm afraid Pedlow & Co have convinced me that Peter Hofschroer is another Hamilton-Williams.

There was an early message, Wellington wrote it in the Feltre letter, Zieten as well, two sources agree.

Zieten is not responsible for the delay, there Wellington, see above did not believe that Napoleon would attack at the 15th – he was as much surprised as the Prussians.

J.v.P-H is very critical about Wellington's cavalier attitude how to assemble his units.

Who is responsible how Wellington did act on the 16th? Wellington himself. He had to make up his mind and to commit himself. Maybe by hindsight it seemed also for him that he was slow – but at least he had to concede 15:00 at being informed in full.

Zieten never said he wrote a message that arrived at 9am. He was told that 4 years later, in an official investigation, and did not quibble. The Prussians were certainly remiss in not sending another message as soon as Charleroi fell (although PH speculates they did), but whether that was Zieten or Bluecher's fault isn't so clear. The elephant in the room is why Zieten's message took so long to get to Brussels, and the lack of an investigation seems somewhat telling.

Hofschroer has the advantage of going into exacting detail to argue his case, while the vast majority of Waterloo books accept the conventional views established a century ago and do not repeat the analysis. PH may have just another view, but it's not a very persuasive one, once you dig up all the old work on the issue.

NSN

Zieten himself stated twice expressively that he had sent this early letter immediately after the commencement of the French attack early in the morning of 15th June:

1) On 21st January 1819 Zieten wrote in a letter to Grolmann that he had sent a letter to Wellington on 15th June early at a quarter to 4 a.m. Obviously, he was wrong at least with the time.

2) In his memoirs (see my posting near to the beginning of this thread), he recollected that he sent this letter quite soon after the beginning of the attack at a quarter past 2 a.m. Again, the time is definitely wrong.

Still, of course, we are free to believe with Pflugk-Harttung that Zieten's memory betrayed him, or, maybe, that he wanted to cover his fault of not having sent this letter.

Or that for some unknown reasons this early letter got lost or arrived only after his message which was despatched around 9 a.m.

Look- to put the record straight once and for all:
Fred Elliot told Wellington- AND he said it twice so there's no excuse.
And the Iron Duke ignored him because he was too busy chatting up Virginia McKenna.
Fact…

Oliver, I assume you meant explicitly…yes that's the point. Zieten did not explicitly testify to this. He was told he sent a message to Brussels that arrived at 9am, and so his answer can be seen as anything from innocently assuming this was true, to understanding that he needed to defend Prussian honor with some plausible fib. His later, unpublished memoires were intended to entertain. This lack of context in PH's book devalues it in my opinion.

NSN

Why is Zieten under attack, ok if his memoires were there to entertain, Wellington's were there to cover up.

This is even more clear by the contribution of Erwin Muilwijk

Apparently the Dutch Secretary of State (for the southern provinces)Van der Capellen visited Wellington after Lord March had delivered his messages, but prior to Von Muffling went to inform the duke.
This is what Van der Capellen wrote about that visit to King Willem in a letter of 15 June 1815: "When informing the duke of Wellington about the messages from Mons he told me he already knew the content of these. He hoped that Buonaparte would attack but did not believe it, as [he] was not strong enough. The Duke told to have taken his dispositions in such a way, that he could be from here within 5 or at least 6 hours at all those points where his presence might be neccessary." [Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland, van 1795 tot 1840. Edited by Colenbrander. Vol. 7, p. 774-775.]

Of course when Zieten is completly ignored and dismissed as source, than we can stop discussing the topic, in my view he is as valuable as Wellington's say about that story.

I don't have to bend facts to see that Wellington was completly surprised and not sufficiently prepared for the 16th June.

NSN, thanks, yes, "explicitely" would have been the better word.

I have re-read Grolman's letter to Zieten of 19th January 1819. It is possible to read it as an implicite request to confirm the "facts" stated in it. But it is equally possible to understand it as an innocent request, stating the already known facts and asking for more details.

At that time, Zieten was General-Lieutenant (since 13th December 1813), and about to receive the overall command in Silesia, and Grolman but a General-Major (30th Mai 1814), head of the 2nd department in the Ministry of War (general staff, dealing with dislocation of the troops and plans for defence or attack).

So, formally, Grolman had no authority over Zieten, and Grolman's work (published by Damitz) was not an "official" publication.

With which intention Zieten's papers were written is hard to decide.

With which intention Zieten's papers were written is hard to decide.

My opinion well and I add

with what intention Wellington't say about this matter was written is hard to decide too.