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SHolmes16 Feb 2008 6:31 a.m. PST

There has to be scapegoats and other reasons for Napoleon's defeat in 1815.

It can't just be that he was out muscled, out hustled and out generaled by the best two generals of the coalition, Blucher and Wellington. And these two with armies made up with large numbers of garrison troops, newly raised troops, militia and landwehr.

At any time Napoleon could have stopped the cavalry charges.

Defiant16 Feb 2008 6:52 a.m. PST

I would dearly love it if people understood that this thread was intended to explain a relationship or lack thereof between Ney and Napoleon.


not to debate the battle of waterloo…

SHolmes16 Feb 2008 7:32 a.m. PST

You're right Ney and Napoleon's relationship had nothing to do with Waterloo :-)

Ney disliked Massena because he was a looter and Ney refused his gift after the sack of Coimbra. None of the Marshals cooperated with each other willingly in Spain except for Marmont. Bessieres screwed up in Spain. Davout was on Napoleon's s-list because he had won a bigger victory in 1806 and was replaced by Ney in 1812. Davout disliked Berthier too. Oudinot wrecked Ney's battle in 1813 because he was angry at being placed under Ney's command.

Few of the Marshals joined Napoleon in 1815.

Ney was one of a crowd.

Defiant16 Feb 2008 7:40 a.m. PST

again here is my evidence Ney was far from one in a crowd,

This is my attempt to show evidence that may or may not prove my point that Ney and Napoleon were on low personal terms with each other which may have began as far back as 1813 at Bautzen with Ney's failed outflanking manoeuvre.

The following are direct quotes from various sources I have which I feel paint a vivid picture as to the deteriorated personal relationship between these two great men. Napoleon was hurt by Ney's actions and words and revenged him with stony silence for 6 weeks before the crucial Waterloo campaign only to recall him once he realized he needed charismatic leaders to lead the easily impressionable men of the army. Napoleon knew Ney's charisma and love from the men and his leadership style bravery was second to none.

Despite his better judgment Napoleon took him back even after his actions and words not knowing what was to unfold. Ney, desired to redeem himself under his old master and show him just as he desired to show the King his loyalty and devotion however, Napoleon still kept the animosity going on the march into Belgium. Napoleon did not give Ney any command and as a result he was nothing more than a mere Aide d camp, Ney found this hard to swallow but honor and respect for himself forced him to bite his tongue. Eventually he was given command and the rest is history.

What I am trying to portray is by no means meant to put Ney in a bad light whatsoever, Ney was a brilliant field commander, it cannot be denied. Ney's problem was his lack of ability to use tact during non war situations, he readily said and did things that offended others and usually spoke before thinking. This is what I feel caused him trouble off the battlefield and created problems for all those around him. Ney simply could not help himself, he said it like it was, he was blunt and at times could be hurtful. Some might see that as a flaw and Ney himself said he had no interest in politics whatsoever which is probably a good idea seeing he had very limited restraint, tact and diplomacy.

I want to make it clear that personally to me Ney is one of my favorite Marshal's his qualities and leadership are second to none, his tactical skill and ability are brilliant and his tenacity on the battlefield are superb, it was his mouth and blunt way of speaking his mind which got him into trouble. This might do him well on the battlefield but in a social setting it leads to trouble and eventually enemies of which in the end it was proven he had many. Some of whom presided over his trial and subsequent death sentence.

Firstly it must be understood my feelings on this stem from the books I have read, the statements by authors of these books and their own opinions and conclusions drawn from the evidence they themselves present. I only add that based on this evidence I conclude that personally the two men at that point in time, 1814-1815 were on low personal terms with each other and this emanated down into the army and the actions, non-actions and decisions that were made in that crucial time.

I do not make excuses for the army's performance against the British or Prussians whatsoever, the battles fought and the decisions made, strategies used and tactics employed were directly as a result and consequence of high command namely Napoleon and Ney. Both men are to blame for what happened along with many other situations and problems which arose.

The following quotes will be punctuated with "……." To show that some test is not needed to be typed simply because it may be long winded and irrelevant to my points throughout the passages shown.

1st Book: Ney, Bravest of the Brave – A.H. Atteridge

Page 93 Authors comments Jena 1806 – "An incident of this day related by De Fezensac, who was then attached to Ney's staff, throws a strange light on his methods of command, and the whole machinery of the Imperial army. As a soldier of the Republic Ney had lived on terms of familiar friendship with those who were associated with him in the work of command. As a Marshal of the Empire he kept aloof from them. According to one account his confidence had been betrayed by an officer, who served with him at the Boulogne camps, and henceforth he protected himself by trusting no one"(Haughty and Aloof)….."Then Ney, eager for the fight, and regardless of the strict letter of his orders from the Emperor, brought his small force into action on the left of Lannes". – (Insubordination)

Page 95 – Jena 1806 – "Ney was anything but pleased at finding himself thus once more associated with Murat and under his orders, for as second on the list of Marshals and an Imperial Prince younger soldier was his senior in rank".

Page 98 – Poland 1807 – "Jomini was carrying a letter to Ney from Napoleon written in a tone of severe censure, and was also charged with a verbal message for the marshal, and during the northward journey he told De Fezensas its purport. The Emperor had been seriously displeased at the news from Ney. "What is the meaning, he had asked, of these movements that I never ordered, which fatigue the troops and may even endanger them? To obtain supplies? To extend the occupation of the country and enter Konigsberg? But it is my business to direct the movements of the army and to provide for its needs. And who authorized Marshal Ney to conclude an armistice – a right that belongs to the Emperor alone as commander-in-chief? Generals have been brought before a court of inquiry for acts like this. Napoleon was angry, and Jomini was to express his displeasure to Ney". (Insubordination)

Pages 107-08 Spain 1808 – "Ney found himself isolated among enemies…..For the first time in his life Ney hesitated to advance, though his orders told him to do so……had he blindly obeyed Napoleon's orders and marched at once to Agreda he probably would have cut off Castanos" ……The Emperor was very disappointed at the news that Ney had failed to carry out his orders. He wrote blaming him for the halt at Soria though at the same time, he admitted that he had some cause for prudent hesitation". (Insubordination)

Page 110 Spain 1809 – "Ney curtly rejected a plan of campaign sent him by Marshal Jourdan. "This order, he wrote to Jourdan, is drawn up by someone who knows nothing of our business. The Emperor has given me an army to conquer with and not to capitulate. You may tell the King (Joseph) that I have not come here to play the part of Dupont". The state of mind manifested in such an utterance , the contempt for the puppet king and his major-general, the independence resulting from the difficulty of communications, all helped to produce a tendency to insubordination towards authority,……Ney's action in the crisis that later on brought to an abrupt end his command in the Peninsula". (Insubordination)

Page 111 Spain – "The Emperor was very angry with Marchand, and ordered Marshal Ney to return post-haste to Slamanca. Ney arrived there in very bad humour. He had a quarrel with Jomini whom he blamed for the mischance that had so abruptly cut short his leave of absence. The Switzer resigned his place as chief of the staff,……" (Anger and Short Temper)


Page 111 Spain – "Then came Ney's first open quarrel with Massena. Massena sent a letter to Ney directing him to assign Junot's engineer officer Lt.-Col. Valaze as head of the siege operations of Cuidad-Rodrigo. Ney was indignant at what he regarded as a plan for giving to a protégé of Junot the credit for taking the fortress, after his own officer had done the hardest part of the work…..Massena was furious, and talked of removing Ney from his command and sending him back to France….Massena – "You will see that this proud fellow will upset all our plans with his stubborn self-will and foolish vanity". (Insubordination)

Valaze was sent back to Massena only two days later with a letter from Ney to Massena – The contents of this letter are long winded but include words like, "your title is of no importance outside the Tuileries" and "I will no more listen to your orders than I fear your threats". The letter goes on and is pretty scathing and insulting to say the least. (Insubordination)

Massena replies to Junot – "You see it is impossible to do anything with that man".

Page 113 Spain – "Ney's resentment of Massena still rankled in his mind"…..Ney, who had had from the first been on the point of a quarrel with Massena, refused to obey, and declared that he would lead 6th corps by Almeida into Spain. Massena's patience was now exhausted….." Ney was sacked. Napoleon sent Ney a strong censure and told him to go home to Coudreaux". (Insubordination)

Page 132-133 – Russia 1812 – "Ney was excited and angry. Davout, he said, should have held on at Krasnoi until the 3rd Corps could reach the place, or if he could not do that he should have sent him a timely warning, instead of allowing him to march into a trap. He continued speaking in this strain during the night march back to Orsza. There he met Davout. The Marshal tried to explain his retirement from Krasnoi and his failure to warn him. Ney gave him an angry look and replied, "As for me, Monsieur Le Marechal, I do not reproach you. God sees us and will judge us". (Anger and Short Temper)

Page 147 – Bauetzen 1813 – "From Ney's failure to carry out Napoleon's plan at Bautzen dates the beginning of the final stage of the Emperor's downfall". (Failure to carry out orders)

Page 148 – 1813 "His mistake at Bautzen was not allowed to count against him, but he did not escape the ill fortune that was now linking with defeat so many names that hitherto had been held to mean unfailing success". (Noticed for his failures now)


Book: – Memoirs of an Aid-de-Camp of Napoleon – General Count Philippe de Segur

Page 175 – Ulm – Marshal Lannes words – "Sire! What are you thinking of" You are sleeping, while Ney, single-handed, is fighting against the whole of the Austrian army? – Why has he engaged them? Answered the Emperor. I told him to wait; but it is just like him; he cannot see the enemy without falling upon them! – That is very well, retorted Lannes, but one of his brigades has been repulsed". (Insubordination)

Page 182 – Ulm – Segur again – "On this General Mack complained of Marshal Ney's rudeness towards the bearer of a flag of truce to whom he would not listen. I took advantage to say that this Marshal was indeed of a most hot-headed and impetuous disposition and incapable of self-restraint". (Anger and Short Temper)


Book: Napoleon's Marshals – David Chandler

Page 362 – Spain 1808 – "….a period of misfortune for the French arms and one that revealed Ney in a bad light: thoroughly insubordinate to any commander but the Emperor himself, besides being unreasonably touchy, quarrelsome, and uncooperative". (Insubordinate and Quarrelsome)

Page 362 – Spain 1808 – A letter from Napoleon to Joseph – "Ney has allowed himself to be imposed upon by the Spaniards, and rested for the 22nd and 23rd at Soria, because he chose to imagine that the enemy had 80,000 men and other follies. If he had reached Agreda on the 23rd, according to my orders not a man would have escaped……" (Insubordinate)

Page 364 – Spain – Authors words – "But if the marshal was a generous foe, he could be the most uncooperative of colleagues. Both Soult and Massena were to discover this to their cost….." (Uncooperative)

Page 368 – 1813 – Ney's own words were that he could not believe that the Emperor could be so mad as to recommence hostilities when he no longer had an army: "the machine no longer has either strength or cohesion: we need peace to reorganize everything…It would be folly to ensconce ourselves in Germany" Ney's views could not be faulted from a strategic point of view". (Critical of Napoleon)

Page 368 – 1813 words of General Van Dedem van der Gelder – "Ney was a man of much courage and energy on the battlefield; otherwise he was was feeble and indecisive, permitting himself to be led by other's councel. Deeply detesting Napoleon, on bad terms with the Prince of Neuchatel, jealous of other Marshals, he was on good terms only with Macdonald. Uncommunicative, reserved, he saw little of the generals who served under him". Gelder goes on to say, "….Ney was tormented with jealousy over his wife and had a poor opinion of the ladies with whom she was intimate, particularly Queen Hortense. In addition, Ney foresaw early on the unfortunate end of the 1813 campaign". (Very damming evidence from one close to him)

Page 369 – Battle of Bautzen – "….All went well at first but one of Napoleon's hastily scribbled pencil notes was misunderstood by Ney, who halted when, by pushing on, he might have cut the allies line of retreat. Once again the Emperor had won, but it was a fruitless victory. Ney had clearly demonstrated that he was not really capable of commanding more than a single corps. There were those who said that Ney had taken a village (Prostitz) – and had lost an empire".

Page 369 – Promotion of Jomini – "Ney chose this moment to recommend Jomini for promotion to general of division, but the jealous Berthier managed to prevent this by arresting the Swiss pundit for not submitting his strength returns on time. On August 15 the wily Swiss went over to the Tzar…." (Ongoing conflict with Berthier – tit for tat between the both of them)

Page 369-370 – Dennewitz saga – "Ney's dislike of Napoleon, which, in view of his changeable nature, should not be exaggerated, dates from the days following the disaster at Dennewitz. The Emperor's Corsican suspicions were aroused when he learned that Bernadotte had corresponded with Murat, Berthier, Ney, Oudinot, and Macdonald. There was a furious row. Ney spoke for them all, but the others came to his support. Napoleon called his brother-in-law a traitor, whereupon Murat laid his hand on the hilt of his saber. Berthier tried to speak of his duty as a French prince, and Napoleon turned on him savagely: You too, old imbecile, what are you meddling in? Be quiet! To such a pass had things come".


Page 370 – Abdication 1814 – "When the last of the corps commanders found that they could no longer hold the allies with the few thousand exhausted men that remained, it was Ney who spoke for the other Marshals at Fontainbleau, demanding the Emperor's abdication".


Okie, as I stated at the very beginning, I am not on a crusade to destroy Ney's reputation. However, I have noticed over many years of reading about the Napoleonic period a constant theme regarding Ney. His apparent habitual habit of fighting against authority from the period of 1804 onwards is very noticeable. Before this time Ney was a hard working tough fighting man who was both loyal to the cause and subservient to those he respected above him in rank. But after his inclusion to the new rank of Marshal of the Empire in 1804 he changed. He no longer bowed to those above him but instead questioned them at every turn. He felt no other man had the right to have any authority over him with the exception of the Emperor and even then he began to show a mind of his own which over the years became more and more prevalent.

On the battlefield and amongst the men he commanded he was as brave as could be, he was at home when the guns began to roar but away from the actual battlefield he was totally insubordinate, haughty, rude, arrogant and totally disrespectful to all those around him. This is plainly obvious. He answered to no one, or so he felt and only one person would he bow to. But even then he showed signs over the years of disliking taking orders from Napoleon so much so that he became blatantly insubordinate to the Emperor himself. It is a wonder Napoleon suffered his tantrums and total lack of respect for his authority for so long and we can see many cases of Napoleon becoming more than a little annoyed with Ney's behavior. Yes they were friends from time to time, yes they had a relationship and yes there were many times of cooperation to get the job done but the occurrence of this insubordination increased as the years progressed especially in the late empire when Ney worked under Napoleon's eye from 1813 onwards.

There were times when Napoleon showered Ney with accolades, there were times when Napoleon embraced Ney and even times when Napoleon exclaimed him the Bravest of the brave. Napoleon once called him a Lion, but these occurrences were but small windows in time and for fortunes of war come and go and with them the attitudes and moods of those involved also change.

When a relationship that starts off great begins to decline it is seldom that it will be retrieved. A person may perform 100 acts of valor or positive actions etc but he will be remembered more so for a single act or deed against those in positions of authority. A single negative act or mistake or misdeed is often what is remembered and becomes a thorn in the side of a relationship especially one involving war and with Ney there were plenty. He showed a consistency for producing negativity for those around him and the only reason he was so tolerated was due to his on field performances. If he was not as brave or charismatic or tactically gifted as he was Napoleon would have long ago gotten rid of him. Even in 1811 when dismissed from Spain Napoleon put him in semi-retirement until he was called back to fight in Russia.

Of all the major leaders and generals of the French army between 1804 to 1815 there is only one who shines out above all others for his negative attitude towards others around him and that is Ney. I feel he was an anti-social type and distained people at first meetings. He, I feel was the kind of person who not give you the time of day and it showed in his personality. His aloofness, haughty attitude was prevalent with his dealing with many of the other Marshals and only Macdonald did he share any great friendship. Even his own staff and subordinate generals under him felt this; Ney often remained distant towards them and took advice or remarks from no one it seemed bar Jomini.

I feel Ney suffered from an inferiority complex and probably had a mental problem dealing with others. He was anti-social and felt insults or slights easily. He tended to over react to others around him and coupled with his short temper made him angry way to quickly to give sound and considered instructions. He often for example sent Aide-de-camps off with messages to other commanders without aid of maps or even instructions as to where the recipient may be. He was once quoted as saying is such an episode, "no remarks, I hate them" to one such aide. He had zero patience and those who pressed him on matters he did not wish to get into felt the fire of his personality severely.

Ney, as I stated had an inferiority complex and a very low respect for others and probably himself also. This is very noticeable in his early career in Germany in the 1790's. He knocked back 5 promotions because he felt he was not up to or worthy of the honor of the promotion. He might have had a kind of self loathing for some reason which coupled with his anger and short temper manifested itself in distain for others around him. He was definitely the kind of person who, at first glance at others felt either nothing or at worst total distain, history proves this. People like this in social settings often are gifted in one way or another as they focus on one aspect of their lives and try to shut down or turn a blind eye to their failings. Ney would have been acutely aware of his personality failings but felt after his baton that he no longer had to hide it or be ashamed of it. He was becoming open about it without admitting it.

He was a jealous man as is clearly recorded and even towards his wife. He did not like his wife's lady companions she consorted with back at home and probably gave her a hard time about it. It is also documented clearly that in the restoration he roared into the royal court and lost his temper at apparent insults which made his wife cry. Ney was a very passionate man I feel towards his wife and was very family orientated. He often raced home for leave every chance he could get. Being passionate he would have shown great love and feelings towards his wife probably because he felt life at home was a sanctuary. No one to judge him or take orders from, he was his own lord at home and desired nothing more than to remain home and do nothing more than inspect troop garrisons from time to time.

Ney loved action and being in the thick of the fighting. To command and fight battles where he was master of all and subordinate to no one. He bucked when placed under other marshals and genuinely felt insulted to be placed under orders of fellow marshals. He longed to be in command as commander-in-chief but failed in those rolls as he was not up to the task. This is proven on several occasions and I think Ney, in the end, knew it. This goes a long way to explain his innate and impulsive style of command on the battlefield but his lack of decision, frustration, lack of focus and focus in semi-independent command.

As for Napoleon, he was supreme leader and in total command, Ney had no choice but to bow to Napoleon like any other Marshal during those long years but it was obvious that while other marshals were following orders from Napoleon to a tee, Ney at times did not and either acted on his own or disregarded blatantly orders given to him from Napoleon at times. He was lucky to remain a marshal at times and napoleon reminded him of that on at least one occasion. Ney was a lose cannon not only in the eyes of most of the other Marshals but to Napoleon as well.

Ney, deep down probably knew his personality faults and how people reacted to his short temper and abrupt manor but eventually thought to himself, "oohh well, if everyone knows my personality faults why continue to hide it? I don't care anymore; they can think of me what they like. I am Marshal Ney!!"

Regards,
Shane

CPTN IGLO16 Feb 2008 9:31 a.m. PST

Shane, thanks for your efforts, but what you describe is essentially for the most part napoleonic normality.
Marshals did quarrel all the time with each other.
Nappy´s correspondence is full of critisizm of his leading generals for disobeying orders and other things, he did often in his written correspondence treat them like dumb little children, not just Ney.
individual initiative was usually not encouraged, but critisized.
there can be no doubt that Nappy and Ney didn´t have the best relations, but who among the napoleonic marshals did have some sort of amicable relation with the great man, or, to get political was a loyal Bonapartist or supporter of the dynasty?
everybody did deffect in 1814 , not a single one of Nappy´s marshals was involved in a plot to bring him back, Nappy came back on his own.
I remember reading somwhere that no one of the surviving marshals d´empire and none of the surviving family members did give a single centime in a collection for his tomb in Paris.
the great man did actually have not many friends, and looking at how he did treat his leading military personnel, its easy to understand why.

David Brown16 Feb 2008 12:01 p.m. PST

S,

Re:
Intrigued by this section of your essay:

"Then came the command given by Wellington to retire his overextended line back over the brow of the ridge and the protection of its brow. This singular apparently insignificant act was going to cause such a response out of all proportion to what should have happened that no one could have foreseen it. Ney either heard of the retirement or was told about it and decided probably on remarks of those around him that the entire British army was in actual fact retreating"

What evidence do you have to support this assertion that the cavalry charges were prompted by Wellington's withdrawal order?

Awfully sorry about this appalling attempt to hi jack this thread!

Perhaps, at your leisure, you'd be kind enough to start another thread to address this question.

Many thanks.

DB

Defiant16 Feb 2008 4:18 p.m. PST

hi mate sure I will post it,

Page 356 – Waterloo Companion – Adkin :

"Marshal Ney ordered them, Marshal Ney led them (losing three horses in the process), but he did so as a result of an error of judgement. At about 3:30pm he had instituted another assault on La Haie Sainte by Infantry which failed, and he rode forward to peer through the swirling smoke at the centre of the enemy position. What he saw, fleetingly and indistinctly, was Wellington pulling several units back into more protected reverse slope locations, wounded wounded and wagons going to the rear, plus numbers of prisoners being escorted away from the line. Ney could not know why these troops were going back, he only saw what seemed substantial numbers of men leaving the ridge. He misinterpreted this rearward movement as the line beginning to crack. An ADC was sent galloping away for the Heavy cavalry – Cuirassiers. This order was to put in motion the largest and most prolonged series of cavalry attacks in so confined a space of the Napoleonic wars".

This is just one of countless other descriptions of this part of the battle by many other authors all describing in similar detail the reasons why Ney ordered the cavalry attacks. It was the greatest single cavalry action of the entire Napoleonic wars to involve numbers of this proportion and sustained for so long, but also the the most dreadful and wasteful of cavalry actions of its time. Not even Eylau comes close, in that attack the horse rode through the Russian lines only to rally and reform and ride back. The Waterloo cavalry attacks were constant and repeated time and time again for between 1 to 2 hours.

Regards,
Shane

Defiant16 Feb 2008 4:39 p.m. PST

Ctpn Iglo,

Yes I agree, there was great animosity and jealousy between the various Marshals under Napoleon and he did encourage it, divide and conquer so to speak. However, although I have read many instances of other Marshals and generals going at it with each other these cases are mostly few and far between, one would also note that they are mostly isolated instances. With Ney it is a constant stream of anger, angst and short temper. He unleashed tirades one after the other at those around him and one after the other these people grew to dislike him for his outbursts of anger and outright rudeness.

It you meet a person and work close with him and notice a constant theme of abuse aimed towards others possibly including yourself then you end up seeing instability of character or worse. Ney I believe was like this and many people noticed it. Down through history we are taught to focus on Ney's achievements and bravery, that's great but what is not focused on is his personality all that well. Same goes for all the other Marshals for that matter. However, many good authors do try to convey through evidence his short comings on personal levels which did affect his relationships with others and ultimately (I believe) his decisions and judgements on the battlefield.

With the cavalry attacks at Waterloo, Ney spotted the enemy retreating, that's how he saw it plain and simple and ordered Milhaud's 5,000 men to charge them. If Ney had instead sent men up the ridge to determine just what was going on "before" sending an ADC to the cavalry and marked time while awaiting the return report he might not have bothered to give the order to charge.

Ney made a snap decision on the spot because of his character make up of boldness, rashness and an inflated idea of his level of power on that day. It cost France greatly in the end even if it was spectacular news to slap in the Times newspaper.

simply put, Ney felt he had the authority to command the cavalry to charge and did so. Basically a, Order the charge and worry about any possible negative consequences later". It probably did not even enter Ney's head that the charges would fail, he 100% felt Wellington had had enough and was retreating from the field. Ney felt his work all that day had paid off and he was going to be the one to order the coupe de gras and receive the glory or at least the accusations from Napoleon for winning the battle!

But what happened in the end was Ney was totally mistaken and destroyed 10,000 fine heavy cavalry on stupid "repeated" charges against a well protected and well maintained enemy covered and protected position.

He cost Napoleon his empire twice, once at Bautzen and secondly at Waterloo through stupid or at least poorly conceived decisions. Funnily enough, at Bautzen it was inactivity while at Waterloo it was over zealous activity. To me Ney might have wanted to make up for all past indiscretions and mistakes and win the battle in one great stroke, what he did was lose the battle instead.

That is my theory….

Regards,
Shane

Defiant16 Feb 2008 4:42 p.m. PST

"accusations"

sigh, should have been, "accolations"

BravoX16 Feb 2008 9:29 p.m. PST

Its a lot of effort your putting into these mammoth posts but I am really now not sure what it is you are saying and what your expecting as a response.

If your "theory" is that Ney was hot headed and didnt have a great relationship with Nappy, then I dont think anybody will disagree with you.

But its all the rest where the problem lies.

He cost Napoleon his empire twice, once at Bautzen

Ney being blamed for Bautzen is at best debatable at worst a complete fiction and that has been made clear once again on the thread you started on Bautzen so I don't know why you raise it again here.


Ney might have wanted to make up for all past indiscretions and mistakes and win the battle in one great stroke
Might but there isn't one shred of evidence to support that, what else do you want people to say?


It probably did not even enter Ney's head that the charges would fail
Whether true or not there is not a shred of evidence to support that either.

an inflated idea of his level of power on that day.

Where do you get that from? If Nappy was running the show and didn't want it to happen then why didnt he say so, these attacks were going on for 2 hours he had plenty of time.

Ney felt his work all that day had paid off and he was going to be the one to order the coupe de gras and receive the glory or at least the accusations from Napoleon for winning the battle!
Sorry but where do you have evidence to support that.


I guesss your reply is going to be once again that you don't have evidence becuase it just speculation, then what are you actually expecting anyone to say, that we agree that your specualtion is, umm, well, speculation?
Then ok I agree your speculation is unsubstantiated speculation.

Defiant16 Feb 2008 10:59 p.m. PST

mate, you don't have to agree, simple as that.

If you noticed earlier on I was going to post my evidence in two parts, I have so far only poasted the first part, it is a big undertaking to do this. Guess your going to have to wait for the rest, you wanted evidence and I am giving it, but I do have other commitments outside of TMP.

Shane

Defiant16 Feb 2008 11:39 p.m. PST

>>>>Ney being blamed for Bautzen is at best debatable at worst a complete fiction and that has been made clear once again on the thread you started on Bautzen so I don't know why you raise it again here.<<<<

Yes, I do believe Ney is responsible for the loss to which might have saved an empire. If you do not agree that is your personal right.


>>>>Might but there isn't one shred of evidence to support that, what else do you want people to say?<<<<

And this is why I posted it, to bring about debate on the point. If you wish to debate it great.

>>>>Where do you get that from? If Nappy was running the show and didn't want it to happen then why didnt he say so, these attacks were going on for 2 hours he had plenty of time.<<<<

That is the point, Napoleon was not running the show as you might think, How else was Ney able to drag first 5,000 away from their reserve positions into making massive charges followed by more formations? Napoleon himself had said Ney is committing the cavalry an hour too soon. This to me tells me Napoleon was allowing Ney a free hand to an extent…

>>>>Sorry but where do you have evidence to support that.<<<<

Like I said, it is my own opinion based on what I have read about Ney and his leadership style. I have already shown you evidence of his personality to which I am basing my evidence from. If you do not agree that is fine, your right.

Shane

BravoX17 Feb 2008 12:41 a.m. PST

This to me tells me Napoleon was allowing Ney a free hand

So you now agree that your statement that Ney had an inflated idea of his level of power on that day was wrong, thanks, were making progress!

malcolmmccallum17 Feb 2008 12:55 a.m. PST

I will exercise my right, state that I disagree, and extend that to clarifying that my belief is that you are wrong.

CPTN IGLO17 Feb 2008 3:47 a.m. PST

Shane,
You might not have made a good napoleonic cavalry commander.
Wasting an hour or so to send an aide de camp forward for checking the situation is not how napoleonic cavalry was used. Cavalry was a weapon of opportunity, cavalry leaders did need a good eye for the situation and quick reactions.

I don´t know if Wellingtons retrograde movement was the inspiration for the attack, lets just assume it was.
whats wrong with this? a large scale repositioning of forces under fire is a tricky move, there are many cases in which regrouping or retreating under fire did result in a rout. Why not launch a cavalry charge into such a movement, thats not madman thinking but more a sharp eye for the tactical situation, why not praise Ney for this?
Wellington´s forces were already for two hours under fire when the line was ordered to retreat a few hundred paces. The reverse slope was in no ways a live insurance, it was no problem to shoot over the ridge, the balls would all go down behind and then bounce off for another 200 paces or so.
Wellington had suffered over 20% casualties at the end of the day, Waterloo was a bloody meatgrinder even for the winners.
Nappy on St. Helena did state that the charge was made 1 hour to early. This comment is along the lines of his famous sentence that " this morning we had a 90% chance, now we still have 60/40 ".
Comments like these create an air of sovereignity and control which Nappy arguably did not have anymore.
Wellington did see it much simpler, he did simply state "the battle is mine" once Bülow joined the fight.
Nappy was obviously running out of time, something had to be done to apply pressure on Wellington.
Other frequently made claims about the charges are that the french did forget to spike the guns or didn´t coordinate the charges with infantry or horse artillery.
Cavalry did usually not spike guns during an ongoing charge, its like tankers dismounting to dislodge infantry from their foxholes, mobile forces are quite unwilling to become infantry or combat engineers in the middle of a heated engagement.
All napoleonic massed cavalry charges were no combined armes efforts, these actions had their own rules.
If a ditch or fence did appear to the right the whole masse had to move to the left, no matter if the supports were planned to engage on the left flank or not. If defenders or terrain made further movemement impossible the force had to turn around quickly to avoid a desaster, no chance to fill an already crowded field with support units to the rear.
These masses were huge, 10000 cavalry did need as much space as 100000 infantry and they had to move all the time to avoid desasters like Pavia in 1525.

The usage of massed cavalry at Mt. St. Jean was along the lines of how it was used in other battles, this includes the timing, and if the standard for success is not wild speculations about decisive action or destroying squares by the dozen, but just the results reached in other battles, then the charges should even be considered succesful.

As said before, shortly after the charges the key position at La Haye Sainte was taken and Wellington was unable to react, blame it on the confusion and chaos of the 2 hours before.

Defiant17 Feb 2008 6:53 a.m. PST

>>>>Wasting an hour or so to send an aide de camp forward for checking the situation is not how Napoleonic cavalry was used. Cavalry was a weapon of opportunity, cavalry leaders did need a good eye for the situation and quick reactions.<<<<

Actually Cptn Iglo you I feel you are incorrect. If you read it again you will notice Ney had ridden forward thru the swirling smoke while an attack on La Hai Stainte was being carried out. So he had to be close to those buildings which are only a couple of hundred mtrs from the crest at best. It is at this point Ney noticed the retrograde movement. To send an ADC forward to the ridge might have taken what? 10-20seconds there and back? So your statement of an hour or two I do not really understand?


>>>>I don´t know if Wellingtons retrograde movement was the inspiration for the attack, lets just assume it was.<<<<

As I stated earlier via the Adkin Waterloo companion the evidence suggests that this is exactly what Ney did….I am not assuming anything here but following printed published evidence.


>>>>whats wrong with this? a large scale repositioning of forces under fire is a tricky move, there are many cases in which regrouping or retreating under fire did result in a rout.<<<<

Mate, I am not disputing that at all, Wellington's men had obviously crested the ridge repulsing Ney's attack, Ney was their himself. Wellington was merely pulling his men back to cover simply because the French attackers were retiring again and the French artillery would have found targets once again. I would do the same if I was Wellington, I do it in Napoleonic war games many times.


>>>>Why not launch a cavalry charge into such a movement, that's not madman thinking but more a sharp eye for the tactical situation, why not praise Ney for this?<<<<

If the enemy line was shaken, wavering or totally disordered yeah, for sure. I would charge with cavalry in a heart beat. However, as clearly stated in Adkin once more and several other publications Ney made a false conclusion as to why the enemy was retiring. He thought they were disordered and retreating, that is why he launched the attack. His consequent onslaught of cavalry attacks wave after wave ended in destroying the entire French Heavy cavalry arm…I do not think Ney should be praised at all, quite the opposite to be honest. At little bit of time spent of better judgement might have persuaded him that launching 10,000 cavalry at an enemy under cover and unbroken was fool hardy at best. What made it worse is that instead of giving it up after the first wave of 5,000 men of Milhaud's formations he goes and drags more cavalry into the assaults until every formation is involved. That is to me pure madness.

>>>>The reverse slope was in no ways a live insurance, it was no problem to shoot over the ridge, the balls would all go down behind and then bounce off for another 200 paces or so.<<<<

Yes this is true, however, direct fire by batteries at clearly visible targets will do much more damage than indirect firing and hoping for the best. Remember, there were clear gaps between each square where many of the balls would have rolled thorough. If the target squares were fully visible the percentage of misses would have been much much lower. The French artillery firing blind at an enemy mostly covered buy an enormous ridge is not ideal firing conditions would you not agree?


>>>>Wellington had suffered over 20% casualties at the end of the day, Waterloo was a bloody meatgrinder even for the winners.<<<<

I agree totally, the battle lasting 10 hours was shear blood and guts from both sides. I know I could not have stood like those soldiers that day, I would have been a nervous wreak by the time I was sabred, shot at or had a ball through my chest.


>>>>Nappy on St. Helena did state that the charge was made 1 hour to early. This comment is along the lines of his famous sentence that " this morning we had a 90% chance, now we still have 60/40 ".<<<<

I am not sure I agree with your conclusions there, I am sure Napoleon was genuinely honest with that statement about the cavalry going forward an hour too early. He did not order them to attack, Ney did and in so doing he sucked over 10,000 fine cavalrymen into a slaughter fest for between 1-2 hours. You only have to look at Napoleon's previous battles to know he was a brilliant judge of time and levels or degrees of destruction his bombardments were causing in the enemy lines. I feel Waterloo was no different here, Napoleon was prepared to launch the Cavalry within the next hour or two himself but Ney's rash move preempted him by over an hour. The enemy line was not yet ripe for it. To me Ney's impetuosity and grave error of judgement was the cause of the loss at Waterloo. I have stated that b4 and stick by it.

Also, with the constant citations by Napoleon about his chances for and against is pretty obvious, Napoleon was a gambler his entire career and looked at the odds very deeply when committing himself to battles and changing tactical situations upon those fields. To some this might seem odd but if you think about it Napoleon was calculating in every thing he did and did nothing without first thinking it through thoroughly. He was the perfect judge of time and space and knew clearly how to judge the enemy morale before ordering attacks. With Waterloo, Napoleon clearly understood the longer the battle went that day the lower the odds were getting for him.


>>>>Other frequently made claims about the charges are that the french did forget to spike the guns or didn´t coordinate the charges with infantry or horse artillery.
Cavalry did usually not spike guns during an ongoing charge, its like tankers dismounting to dislodge infantry from their foxholes, mobile forces are quite unwilling to become infantry or combat engineers in the middle of a heated engagement.<<<<

I agree totally, the attacks were ordered way to suddenly and to rashly to have time to send in artillery and engineers to destroy the British gun line. Pity that.


>>>>Wellington did see it much simpler, he did simply state "the battle is mine" once Bülow joined the fight.<<<<

I agree totally, Wellington knew this from early morning, one single corps of Prussians (30,ooomen) would be all Wellington needed to draw off a large proportion of the French army and seal the day.


>>>>Nappy was obviously running out of time, something had to be done to apply pressure on Wellington.<<<<

I agree, problem is, Ney went about it the wrong way…


>>>>As said before, shortly after the charges the key position at La Haye Sainte was taken and Wellington was unable to react, blame it on the confusion and chaos of the 2 hours before.<<<<

I agree, this is the only good I feel of the entire episode of the cavalry charges. Wellington's line were probably still way back behind the ridge when the Infantry finally tool LHS – Not being able to support the garrison like it had been able too during Ney's previous attack of 3pm.


Cptn Iglo, thank you for the questions, answers and debate, I appreciate it and you did it with commendable restraint. That's all I wanted, to find out how close or far off the mark I was. I will say that I still strongly feel my opinions are correct but I will admit now that probably after talking on this thread I might tone down the depth of my reasoning slightly. It is easy to feel one way until someone else points out another angle or something you might not have thought about, thank you again.

p.s. still think Ney lost the battle

*ducking back behind the cover of my ridge for the time being*…

Regards,
Shane

David Brown17 Feb 2008 10:19 a.m. PST

S,

Many thanks for the answer Shane, (especially as it's not a Waterloo thread) – but quoting Adkins is NOT evidence.

He is a secondary or even further removed source and what does he base his evidence upon?

I also know of numerous other "secondary" sources that assume this is what caused the cavalry charges – but not a single one I have even encountered actually quotes a PRIMARY source or indeed any source at all!

If you can do so I'd be very grateful.

Other than that it's pure guess work.

DB

CPTN IGLO17 Feb 2008 11:44 a.m. PST

Here´s a link to a primary source, Napoleons bulletin after the battle.

link

The claim about the premature charge is part of the bulletin, like other claims.

even superficial reading reveals quickly that the whole bulletin is in typical napoleonic bulletin fashion a conglomerate of half truths and propaganda lies, virtually everything is wrong.
"liar like a bulletin" was a common saying in the napoleonic era.

Bandit17 Feb 2008 6:42 p.m. PST

Shane,

I have been lurking on this thread on and off. I think to gage the accuracy of your conclusion (the relationship of Napy and Ney being on the rocks) on the basis of your long-post evidence (an easy to refer to name ;) one would have to compare Napy's interactions with the other marshals and their assumed stature to see if this is an accurate barometer.

Napy has quite a name for himself in stirring the pot and commanding by offering favors or rebukes not based necessarily on reality but on his motivational intention.

My general notion of Ney is a man who was popular with the men but less excellent in other areas. I understand you are 1. a fan 2. better read than I on Ney so I post the present questions:

Lannes and Ney (in my limited understanding) have always been similar people, though one (Lannes) had Napy's confidence and friendship and the other (Ney), bounced in and out of favor. Ney's rearguard in Russia is amazing, Napy's removal of Davout from the rearguard is curious (to me). Many people form a negative opinion of Ney based on the post-1812 years, feeling he is rash, impatient, and does not see the big picture. On looking at the glory years Ney does not seem all the different from that to me. I think he has incredible value as a field commander and is a terrible liability in independent command. In my mind the problem was that Ney wanted more, after battlefield success a man wants to grow and take on more, my personal feeling is that he never had that skill set so the failing of the Waterloo campaign was that Napy gave Ney an independent field command at Ligne and set him up for failure at Waterloo with the general disposition and troop quality.

I am probably butchering my own point and will be flamed for it (my own fault for writing this while in a bar), but when the odds were long and you had specific strengths (the rearguard in Russia) – Ney shines, when you speak to his strengths he capitalizes on the charisma and the "sudden death, save the world" mentality. Yet in the broad view, the grand tactical and the strategic – Ney commits troops when he should not have. If Napy wanted to win and ego was not an issue I have always thought he should have given Davout an independent command and provided Ney no scenerio or one he was more likely to win out in.

All people have strengths, question is, did you provide them circumstances where they could be used?

I think the relationship was always aloof and at the end, tenuous, both of them needed each other for things they wished the other could provide (Napy needed victory but Ney could not give it to him. Ney needed personal security and Napy could not give it to him). The result being a tragedy for both men.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Defiant17 Feb 2008 7:04 p.m. PST

Bandit, thank you very much, you have explained very well what I could not in my previous posts all that well. Both men needed each other but could not get on together.

Palafox18 Feb 2008 2:44 a.m. PST

This is a very interesting thread, Shane. Thanks for starting it.

Regarding the cavalry charges at Waterloo I heard some time ago an hypothesis about that such a big charge could not have been ordered without Napoleon having a decision in it and that later Napoleon used Ney as a scapegoat for the loss of the battle. Probably this hypothesis is nonsense and has already been debunked but it was an interesting and credible one.

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