"Foot formations in the TYW" Topic

Hi all,

decided to start this topic because it seems to be interesting for some people (see the question about imperial units of foot in the armour topic), and we might just have the right experts to provide some answers!

I would like to start with the "Swedish Brigade" based on the detailed diagram posted by CaptainGars.

If the small units of shot inside the formation would be corporalships, the number of shot would be 576 men at full complement.
If the sizes of the units are matching, the divisions in the pike blocks would roughly contain 60 men, bringing the pike total to 720 men, giving a total of 1296 men (most probably excluding officers!?)

As the diagram says it comprises 16 companies, this would make out at 81 men per company (plus officers).

CaptainGars: am I correct so far? :-)

A question would refer to the units following the "triangular" formation. Are they regular part of the unit?
This would then add another 576 shot and 288 pike, thus bringing the overall total to 2160 rank and file!!
(If my assumption as to the sizes of the units is correct of course.)

These 2160 would then divide into something like 1008 pike and 1152 shot, which would be roughly a 50:50 ratio.

4 companies formed a squadron. There are 4 squadrons in the drawing, 3 in the brigade and a 4th behind it in reserv.

A corporalship of pikes was smaller than those of the shot, only 18 men strong. 6 corporlaships form a divion of pikes, 108 strong. Each squadron has two divisions of pikes for a total of 216 pikes.

A brigade at full strenght would have 576 shot, 648 pikes in the squadrons and an additional 288 commanded shot posted behind the brigade be used as the commander saw fit.
(In the diagram this is the two divisons of 6 corporalships each formed up behind the main brigade.)The brigade was led by 192 officers. So the fighting strenght of the ordinary 3-squadron brigade was 1512 men.

The finaly unit forming the 3rd rank is a single squadron which would add 288 shot and 216 pike to the brigade. However in reality the shortage of pikemen meant that no 4 squadron brigade was ever used in battle.

Based on the Breitenfeld deployment there was enough shot to provide strong detachments for both cavalry wings and still deploy a reserv of 288 shot with each brigade. Infact there was so much suprlus shot that three additonal squadrons of shot were formed and posted as a reserve to the Swedish 1st line.

CaptainGars:

thanks a lot for the extensive and detailed information!

One thing though: the reserve squadron is split in 2 lines, and the total shot would then be the same as for the triangular formation, i.e. 576 (4 x 6 instead of 3 x 8), or are the rear 12 corporalships for the "1st line reserve"??

The rear 12 corporalships are indeed the two reservdivsions I mentioned above :-) First you have the brigade of 3 squadrons then the commanded shot and finaly the 4th squadron.

Thanks for the clarification!!

Cheers

Romain

Next would thus be the imperial foot formations or battalions, early tercio variations up to the "1000 men battalions" at Lützen f.ex.

Are there sizes recorded for actual early imperial tercios (pike centre, 4 shot corners)? Apparently they were quite big.

The later battalions were a lot less sophisticated, being a centre of pikes with 2 sleeves of shot.

It would also be interesting to see why the larger formations were dropped. Lack of training, more aggressive tactics on the protestant side…?

The Swedes seem to have simplified their tactical formations as well over the years.

Obviously all of the later formations would be relevant for the ECW also, as organisations were extensively copied by various commanders on both sides (Montrose's Irish troops f.ex. said to have deployed in the swedish brigade formation).

Dr. Pierre Pic website provides detailed descriptions of the Spanish squadron. (Tercios were administrative units only) link

The Imperial & Catholic Leauge infantry was organisaed in regiments, not tercios, and did not use "spanish squadron", rather they used the German system which was simpler and more suited the German military system with it's lack of standing forces.

CG, again thanks for all the help!

Is there a link for diagrams of the Catholic regimental formation?

As 1J asked, is there any info on the later formations employed by the Catholic and Swedish armies in the late 1630's and 1640's?

I would also be interested in the French system in use in the 1630's-40's.

Hi

Most of the illustrations from the day with the square and sleeves in TYW drawings are anachronistic. Pretty much everyone had been impressed with the mobility in the Dutch versus Spanish earlier. The big tercios derive from earlier italian city state militia(3 coronellas of ca 1200 men grouped in a "tercio"). Hard to kill, but not flexible or fast. But by TYW, no one was doing that. "tercios" were often no more than the earlier coronellas in size and deployed in the "regimental" structure.

It is one of the problems with trying to find a global concept for a period of rapid transition between medieval practices and Napoleonic.

Rocky

Several writers suggest that the French started out old fashioned compared to the other combatants of the TYW. A detialed diagram of the French army at Jülich in 1610 show the Swiss drawn up in square straight out of the Italian wars. Other regiments form up in spanish squadrons complete with mangas at the corners and a final group form up in Dutch style formations. Other than the Swiss all units are forme dup 10 ranks deep.

During the TYW the French used a modfied version of the Dutch battalion, 10 ranks deep but later changed to 8 ranks. Swedish influence by way of Bernhard Saxe-Weimar saw some French commanders reducing the depth to 6 ranks.

The Swedes, the Empire and their German allies had all adopted the simple Protestant German battalion. in theory 1000 men strong. Pikes formed in the middle, shot on the flanks. Swedes still fought 6 ranks deep as did the Saxons, Branderguers Hessians and so on. The Imperial army at first used 10 ranks deep formations but this was reduced to 7 ranks by order of Wallenstein. Following Wallensteins assasination formatiosn show up both 10 and 6 ranks deep thoug the thinner formations previaled in the end.

This formation was simple to use and train and it work quite well most of the time.

As I mentioned in the other posting. The diagram is not correct for the TYW. You should use more accurate information. It exists but I don't remember where I saw it.

Rich

The depth of foot formations and its evolution is interesting in itself!
The question is: why?
Why have formations deeper than 10 f.ex. as was the case in the XVIth and partly into the XVIIth century?
And then:
why reduce them progressively to 6?

Was the "phalanx" meant as a battering ram (forget about the shot, just smash them!)? Why make it deeper than the length of the pike?
Question of morale?
Not so likely in our period, as cannonballs ploughing through could hit more men, and the rear ranks in the pike block are actually "lost" for the fight.
(Reminds me of the discussion "column versus line in the napol period.)
Question of filling the gaps torn in the front ranks?
More likely IMHO, but needs good morale to continuously step over casualties and know that you are going to be next.

Is a block roughly squareshaped easier to control than 600 men strung out over a greater distance?

Does it provide better protection against cavalry? Most probably yes, as the "square" is formed already, no thin flanks to roll up.

What is the use of deeper shot formations, when (at maximum!) 3 ranks can fire at once?
Did fire by ranks (extroduction) require a minimum number of files to give the ranks enough time to reload and so keep up a rolling fire?

Was such fire really effective, or else, why did the Swedes introduce (prefer?) the salvee of all the shot at once?

Was fire by ranks (more) difficult to execute in battle?
(I refer to the blunder of the Westminster TB at basing, where one rank fired before the previous had cleared the way, although the LTB were well drilled in comparison to other ECW troops.

Was the salvee easier to perform? Wasn't it a gamble on one card?

Many questions I know, but nobody said it was going to be easy! :-))

"As I mentioned in the other posting. The diagram is not correct for the TYW. You should use more accurate information. It exists but I don't remember where I saw it.

Rich"
Indeed you made that claim, and provided no factual support to back it up.

Rich's claim and my reply to it can be foudn at TMP link

"The Swedes, the Empire and their German allies had all adopted the simple Protestant German battalion. in theory 1000 men strong. Pikes formed in the middle, shot on the flanks.

This formation was simple to use and train and it work quite well most of the time."

Was the move away from the Gustavian 3 squadron "brigade" a matter of training?

1J, I think the deep formations provided a lot of muscle-power and momentum for the shoving matches which sometime occurred and also served to overawe the opposition.

Was the "phalanx" meant as a battering ram (forget about the shot, just smash them!)? Why make it deeper than the length of the pike? Question of morale?

Prevented penetration or breakthrough by gendarmes charging en haie in the earlier periods.

huevans, if these shoving matches actually occurred in open battle! Would definitely question it, and if it happened, it certainly was rarest and the exception to the rule!
To frighten the enemy, yes, but could they always "see" the real depth?? If so, why would nobody "laugh at" the Swedes in their 6deep? :-))
Seriously, the morale factor was certainly an issue, no doubt!

John, absolutely right! That was the basic idea, but the big block continued to exist when the gendarmes were already gone.
There is a debate however as to the use of lances by cavalry well into the TYW (the polish hussars even used them until the end of the century, to great effect, as the Turcs besieging Vienna found out).

huevans,
Yes, at least partly. The Swedish infantry had been worn down by the Pyrrhic victory at lutzen and even more so by the diaster at Nordlingen. Duke Bernhards defection removed even more trained med from Swedish service. There was a need to raise new but serviceable units as fast as possible. Both the time and the officers needed to train in the use of the 'Swedish brigade' was in short supply.

The 'Swedish brigade' was seen as not worth the trouble. It was in it self not a better formation than the German battalion. It needed comparatively complex manouvers to the fully effective. The brigades main advantages had always been the quality of the men&officers who formed the brigade and it's supporting artillery. You could still get that at a lower cost in time and resources with the battalion.
So the Swedes changed the formation but kept the brigade name. Wittstock was the first large battle fought with the new formation.

Actually, what WAS the advantage of the brigade formation? I guess the fact that 1 of the pike formations was formed ahead of the others would break up cavalry attacks. I can't think of any other advantages.

Prince Rupert is criticized for using the 4-squadron Swedish brigade at Edgehill. The criticism is that the 4th squadron "reserve" was not usable and was just lost manpower. Also that the Royalist foote have been trained in the German battalion formation and had little idea how to deploy from the Swedish brigade. Of course, neither of these criticisms would apply to the 3-squadron Swedish brigade being used by GA.

IIRC that is the description of event put forward in a recent book about Edgehill? My impression is that the authors did not fully understand how the brigade functioned which marred their conclusions. However they do have a point that the comparatively ill-trained royalist foot would have little chance to employ the brigade formation effectively espeically since they had been trained in Dutch(?) tactics. Prince Ruperts choice of the brigade formation is even more surprising given that it had not ben used by the Swedes for 6-7 years.

The formation allowed for flanking fire by the centre squadrons musketeers while the musketeers remained protected behind the pikes. It also allowed the Swedes to fire along the entire front of the brigade.

Since the brigade was made up of 3 sub-units capable of independent action if necessary it could adapt it self to the terrain or outflank an enemy much easier than a German battalion of similar size. A flank attack could be met by one squadron wheeling to face it.

Also it looked good in paintings ;-))

Captain Gars:

you wrote:

"The formation allowed for flanking fire by the centre squadrons musketeers while the musketeers remained protected behind the pikes. It also allowed the Swedes to fire along the entire front of the brigade."

How many or better how few would have been able to provide flanking fire when compared to the deployed musketeer wings?
I would guess only the outer corporalship (i.e. 24 men)

Wouldn't they have advanced in front of the pike to deliver their volley at point blank, and then (maybe) retire through the pike to allow them to "charge" the shattered enemy formation?

Such a manoeuvre would have required disciplined and well trained and led troops, but that was the case with the Swedes until Lützen (at least).

After all, this was the centre of the formation, which should be the point the brigade was aiming at to attack, wasn't it!

"Rich,
Indeed you made that claim, and provided no factual support to back it up."

[I found the diagram I had earlier mentioned] According to you, while your diagram is dated 1628 it actually belongs to 1630. In 1631-32 Gustavus reorganized his army. The diagram I have is dated 1637. Ergo you diagram is out of date. With all your research, I'm surprised you would use an outdated one when more up to date diagrams were available.

The diagram I have presents three battalions (squadrons) of pikes and accompanying shot. Each battalion of pikes was composed of 36 rotts (a rot is a file of 6 men) of pikes. It's accompanying shot was formed into 4 platoons each of 8 rotts. The pikes would represent 216 men. The accompanying shot represents 192 men. This does not count the 6 platoons, each of 6 rotts held in reserve. This would represent an additional 216 shot. A battalion would then have 624 men. The brigade would then have a total of 1,872 men. This is similar to what you have but your information was not derived from you diagram.

Now this is the paper strength of a brigade. Actual numbers on the battlefield probably would not look exactly like this. Besides campaign casualties, it was quite common to strip shot from their parent brigades for fortress duty, holding strong points, holding crossing points, accompanying supply trains etc. In addition, shot used to accompany cavalry in battle would also come from these brigades. So in battle it was not likely that each brigade would have all of it's reserve shot. Reserve shot that did accompany their brigades were used for casualty replacements and to bring water and additional ammunition to the brigade or anything else the battalion commander wanted.

Depending on the seize of the Dutch army, a Dutch brigade could also be composed of three battalions of approximately 500 men each (1:1 shot). The depth of each battalion was dependent upon the amount of terrain required to cover. Generally it was around 10 ranks but could be slimmer if required. However, these battalions would be placed next to each other. What Gustavus did was to formalize the brigade (3 battalions), advance the center battalion and draw the three battalions closer together. With the Dutch brigade, gaps would appear between battalions when the shot was withdrawn. For the Swedes, when the shot of the center battalion was withdrawn the rear two battalions would advance presenting no gaps. I'm assuming this was because of the greater threat cavalry was to the Swedish infantry than was the case with the Dutch.

Another aspect of the Dutch brigade was that another brigade of three battalions was placed in reserve (a second line) in checkerboard fashion. The English would call this a tercio because there were generally three division of two or more brigades making up the Dutch infantry formations. The commander of the front line Dutch brigade could give the command for the front brigade to disband and fallback through the gaps in the rear brigade. Once in the rear, they would reform. Communication between the front and second lines was therefore critical. For this reason each tercio was made up of troops using the same language. Generally the right tercio was composed of English units. The center tercio was composed of Dutch and German units, And, the left tercio was composed of French units. The Swedes did something similar. The gaps between brigades was covered by a rear brigade.

In another posting we can discuss extraduction.

Rich

My impression was that the quality of infantry declined during the war. Better to be a musketeer, than a pikeman, easier to loot. Musketeers wanted horses for the same reason. I think being a cavalryman was prefered.

"Rich Knaptons description of the formation and actions of the Swedish brigade is not incorrect. [I think this is a typing error. CG's sentence is actually saying I'm correct: "not incorrect." What I think he meant to say is my description is not correct.] The shot of the centre squadron (no "battalions" in the Swedish army at this time) formed up behind the pikes, not on the flanks. …. If threatened in front by cavalry the shot of the centre squadron would remain behind the pikes and fire by extraduction. 
An alternate method would have the platoons moving up in front of the divisions of pike and firing a salvo at long range before falling back behind the pikes."

What I had presented was having the platoons of shot from the center battalion on the flanks of the pikes, and not in reserve behind the pikes. Both CG's and my diagrams show the center shot formed up behind the pikes. I believe that the battalion commander would mover his shot from behind his pikes and maneuver them onto either side of the pikes. My information on the Swedish formations comes from Captain William Barriffe's "Military Discipline." This is the same Barriffe which CG references with regards to extraduction. However, the diagrams simply show the initial battlefield setup. From this formation, the battalion commander can make such changes as he will. Barriffe states that this is only one way of forming the brigade.

According to CG the shot of this center battalion either fired flanking fire from behind the pikes on the flanks of charging cavalry, or were placed in front of the pikes firing salvo at long range. I doubt that shot fired from a position behind the pikes as CG suggests occurred. And, placing shot in front of the pikes (other than skirmishers) was done under very restricted circumstances.

But lets talk about facing cavalry and extraduction. As a reminder, firing by extraduction is where after the front rank fires, the rear ranks, in turn, move forward cover the front rank and fires. The next rear rank moves forward covers the rank that had just fired and fires in their turn, etc. This firing is done by platoons. In CG's map, two platoons of shot of the center battalion are placed directly behind the pikes and two more behind those front platoons. The rear platoons of the shot are formed directly on line with the pikes of the two rear brigades.

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If they were to turn to their right or left flank and fire, they kill their own pikes. In my map the 4 platoons are formed on line behind the pikes. If they formed to their left and right flanks and fired the two center platoons of pikes would be firing into the shot of the two outer platoons. In order to avoid these situations, in both cases, only two of the platoons of shot would be allowed to fire. The other two platoons would be killing their own men if they fired. This is a terrible waste of firepower. Thus firing on the flank behind the center battalion of pikes makes no military sense. Of course you can move the center battalion of pikes, in CG's diagram, further forward so that all platoons of shot have an unobstructed fields of fire but then your pikes are uncovered and in a position to be attacked on their flank. Again, this doesn't make much military sense.

Moving shot in front of the pikes only makes sense if there is no room for them to form on the flanks of the pikes. After all, they can perform salvo fire from the flanks of the pikes as easily as firing in front of the pikes. Plus they don't have to fire at long range. And, it is quicker to move behind the pikes if they are on the flanks than if they are in front of the pikes. Barriffe does discusses firing by extraduction where the shot is formed in back of the pikes and are then moved to the front by file by rank. In the case Barriffe discusses, there is no room for the shot to form on the flanks of the pikes, as it is in a narrow confined space: "Having gotten into some strait, there fill the mouth, of the passage with your pikes." In this cased there is no room for your shot. Therefore, the shot is formed behind the pikes. They advance, by file and form on rank to fire. All the shot can be placed in front of the pikes and then fire by extraduction by platoon. To fallback behind the pikes, the pikes open four files to allow the 4 platoons to fallback by file by rank. All this while, the pikes are vulnerable to attack. That's why firing in front of the pikes must be done at long distance. The unit needs time for the shot to move back and for the pikes to recover.

The Swedish center battalion does not meet the requirements for this form of firing by extraduction. The flanks of this battalion are not flanked by some kind of passage. Therefore there is no need to move the shot in front of the pikes. The shot can fire just as effectively, and perhaps more so, on the flanks of the pikes, as I suggested. The fallback is quicker and doesn't disrupt the pikes.

Therefore, I do not believe CG has adequately proven I was wrong. His one alternative, firing behind the pikes, probably never occurred, and the other, in front of the pikes happened only rarely.

Rich

Rich,
The diagram that was used as starting point of this discussion it this one:
picture
Not this one
picture
Which is the one that was previously dated to 1628 but which actually was made in 1630.
I've never mentioned the date of the first diagram at all.

What sources do you base your claim about an army reorganisation in 1631-1632 on? I'd very much like to know since no such thing is mentioned by a major source. Certainly not by "Sveriges krig" nor by Barkman&Lundqvist.So do let us know who tells of this reorganisation and what changes it involved.

I'm familiar with Bariffe's work, "Militarie Discipline, or the Young Artillery-Man" . It was published in six editions: 1635, 1639, 1643, 1648, 1657 and 1661. Can't find mention of a 1637 edition.
So the first edition was printed after the Swedish brigades was no longer used by the Swedish army. " While a usefull source Barriffe is not on the same level as an offical Swedish document commisioned to show how the Swedish brigade was formed up.

The reason I provided a link to the School of the Renassiance soldier's website and their excellent animation of Barriffe is that they describe the manouvers in question far better than me translating Schildknecht or Troupitz old fashioned German into English.

Barriffe does contradict you description of brigade is erronous as he neither shows the organisation you describe nor the numbers you quote. There are no 6 platoons of reserve shot behind each squadron. Instead there is a single formation of 6 platoons, each of 8 "rots" of shot (not 6 as you claim) Each brigade clearly has a single formation of 288 commanded shot, not 3x216.
" Chapter 120 begins with grandiloquent praise of 'Gustavus Adolphus King of Sweden, (who) was found not only able to wage a Warr with the Imperial Austrian bird; but that he soared even to admiration, pluming and tearing the best feathers from his back and wings, none of his Commanders nor Generalisimos being able to stand the torrent of his victories' . This last chapter is somewhat at odds with the preceding ones, which have used as their example a company equal in muskets and pike and adopting the Dutch style of eight rank deep formations, for it describes the method of drawing up three brigades in the Swedish method using six rank deep formations in the proportion 4 musketeers to every 3 pikemen. The total of the three brigades is 4536 rank and file. This total is made up in the following way: six men make a file, three (for pike) or four (for musket) files makes a corporalship, three corporalships each of musket (12 files) and of pike (9 files) makes up a company (126 men), four companies make up a squadron (504 men), three squadrons make up a brigade (1512 men)."
link
picture
picture
(Images taken from "Cromwell's War Machine" pages 151 and 157)

So Barriffe is in agreement with Barkman, the Swedish General Staff, Brzeinski, Junkelmann and Roberts that the Swedish brigade had 1512 rank &file. Not 1872 men as you claim.
Had you actually read Troupitz " Kriegs Kunst, Nach Königlicher Schwedischer Manier" you would have known that the centre corporalships did not simply turn in place and fired when providing flanking fire. Instead the shot reformed it self as shown in formation "A" below picture
The pikes would advance to allow the corporalships the extra space needed to assume firing positions. They only need to advance 10-15 feet to provide the additional space needed by the shot.
The flanks of the centre pikes would be covered by fire from musketeers of the rear squadrons s well as from the regimental cannon posted in front of their pikes.
Do note the formation labled "D", all the shot deployed in front of the pikes. That is how the centre shot was formed when firing at enemy foot.
There is a very simple reason the shot of the centre squadron was not formed on the flanks. While there is ample space to deploy on the flanks doing so will merely ensure that the musketeers either prevent the attached regimental cannon from firing or ensures that the musketers will be moved down by friendly roundshot and cannister.
Of course a colonel whose brigade lacked regimental cannon was free to deploy his centre shot on the flansk of the pikes.
Barriffes fairly crude drawings does not show this as they contain neither the regimental cannon nor are drawn to scale
picture
The much more detailed "Des Hochlöblichsten König zu Schweden Brigaden wie Hr solche Zu lest von 16 Compagnien vndt von Zweÿen Regimentern hat stellen wollen." Show both the cannon and is drawn to scale.
picture
And of course " Des Hochlöblichsten König zu Schweden Brigaden…" was actually used by the Swedish army as is evident from the fact that Col. MacKay made an almost sketch of the brigade. Identical brigades also appear on the deployments praticed prior to and then used during the invasion of Germany which began in 1630.
picture
However there is no evidence that "Militarie Discipline, or the Young Artillery-Man" was used in any way by the Swedish army to form their brigades as it is rather difficult to use a book which was published one year after the brigade formation was abandoned.

Apologies for the massive block of text, some how the formating got lost when I cut and pasted the text from Word.

Yes I multiplied the reserve shot rather than simply adding it to the brigade. And, I mistook the map dated 1630-31 for the map dated 1628/30. If that's all the screw ups I made, I can live with it. :))

Here is the problem I have with you stating I was wrong to place shot on the flanks of the pikes. Let's step through how these formations as they probably unfolded. I'm basing this estimation of how the Swedish would form on my studies of Dutch, English and French tactical documents. Obviously they don't discuss Swedish battle formations and I am not an expert on Swedish documents. So this represents how I believe the Swedes use their brigade tactical formations. The Swedish army would advance to the area where they would form a battle array from road column. The brigade would have to go from road column to battle line. In doing this, first the pikes would form the front of the brigade and then the shot would form behind them. I'm assuming the shot would be formed in square by platoons. [CG talks of corporalships. There are two corporalships to the platoon. I use the platoon because I can show the positions of the shot with fewer little squares.] It could also be that the platoons formed all 4 in line. It wouldn't make much difference to the discussion. Here is how I believe the Swedish brigade would look like just after forming line from road column. I left out the reserve shot in order to simplify things.

link

The command would be given for the shot of the left and right squadrons to form on their respective flanks and the center squadron to advance to the fore of the brigade. This would correspond to CG's Swedish map dated 1630-31. Looking at the diagram of the different Swedish formations CG provided,

picture

the two left and right squadrons are in variations of Formation F and the center squadron is formed up in Formation B.

link

In this formation, the center squadron cannot form an effective A formation and fire from behind their pikes. Only two platoons have an open field of fire. In order to allow all platoons to have open fields of fire the center squadron must advance further and position itself around 20-25 yds/mtrs in front of the flanking squadrons. [this is rough calculation based on individual intervals of 3 feet to the man plus some fudge factor]. Here you are endangering the central squadron by leaving it unsupported and isolated.

This brigade formation would not stop pistoliers from coming into close range of the central squadron, fire and disrupt the pikes and then charge and break it apart as the Dutch cavalry did to the Spanish pikes at Turnout. Also, there is nothing to stop the pistoliers from attacking the central squadron in the flanks.

link

A much more effective formation would be to form the central squadron into the E formation. This is a legitimate Swedish formation; one the Swedish brigades would have practiced.

link

Instead of waiting behind the pikes and not firing, having the shot on the wings allows them to fire on the oncoming cavalry. Keeping the center squadron in advanced of the other two means that this small unit of 36 files, 36 men across the front, must bear the brunt of the attack. And, they do it with out their flanks covered. It makes much more sense to have the shot, of the central squadron, break and reform behind their pikes while the two squadrons, in the rear, move up to form a much stronger brigade.

link

Here the shot, on the flanks, can continue to fire until the cavalry is so close that they too need to break and reform. They reform in a modified B/A formation. The platoons of shot reform behind their pikes however the outer most platoons turn to fire on the flanks of any cavalry swerving around the brigade.

link

Given this scenario, formation E is a better choice for the central squadron than is the A formation. As a consequence, I believe I was correct in describing the shot being on the flanks of the central squadron. If CG has copies of Swedish orders stating that brigades must form up with the central squadron only in formation A or formation D, then I will stand corrected.

Rich

Rich,

I would agree with your description of the brigade and of how it worked (with the exception of a few rather minor details) if you hadn't made a rather major omission. You have left out the brigade artillery.
Using your suggested formations would cause major problems for the brigade.

The position of the artillery is clearly shown in
" Des Hochlöblichsten König zu Schweden Brigaden…"
picture
Monro describes the very same deployment at Breitenfeld when with the minor difference that 4 regimental cannon have been replaced by 'great Cannon' (i.e. 12-pounders and 24-pounders.) in the 4 brigades of 1st line ('the Battaile')
picture
(page 191 in the 1999 edition published by Praeger)

Forming the centre squadron into formation 'E' as you suggest would put the musketeers in the line of fire and prevent the rear regimental cannon from firing.
These 8 regimental cannon represent a far greater source of firepower than the 192 musketeers of the centre squadron.

According to Schildknecht a Swedish regimental cannon fired 3 shots in the same time it took a musketeer to fire 2. The brigade commander has a choice of using the musketeers who can get of 384 shots or the regimental cannon which can 24 "field cartridges" each loaded with 36 musket shot. I.e 864 shot.

The regimental artillery had a much greater range and would begin firing round shot at 600 paces. The musketeers would ordinarily not open fire at ranges above 150 paces.

The regimental cannon attached to the brigade was the reason why the central squadron formed up in formation B when marching and formation A or D when firing. When using formation D the musketeers would arrange themselves so that the position of the regimental cannon matched the gaps between the corporalship which ensured that the musketeers had a clear field of fire.

Your pistoliers would be fired by the regimental artillery posted in front of the centre squadron if approaching from the front. Attacking the flank would have meant exposing themselves to enfilade fire from the artillery posted in front of the flank squadrons pikes.
Not to mention the fact that the musketeers of each squadron could be brought into action as well.

So the central squadron was not "unsupported and isolated".

Gentlemen,

this is getting more fascinating by the day! I thank both of you for the animation of this topic!

Fascinating, but also very difficult to understand, I must admit!

CG: you mentioned the ordnance, regimental guns being replaced by bigger pieces, but this would then mean that the brigades were taking a defensive stance only, would it not!
I always thought the XVIIth did not see mobile artillery on the battlefield yet (except for the light batallion guns of course).

Moreover, how the brigade should advance steadily when the guns are in their way remains a secret. While I agree that a regimental gun was probably as fast to load as a musket (or even maybe a bit faster), I can hardly see it being manhandled and loaded at the same time!

The Swedes were not necessarily noted for fighting battles on the defensive, so the brigade naturally had to advance to "contact".
While doing this, I suppose the reg. guns would advance loaded until the brigade is within striking range, then fire and reload…and wait for orders or for enemies to attack them.

Now, if the brigade is advancing in the formation shown in the "Des höchstlöblichen..", the only sense I can see in it, is to protect the central shot from damage on the way in by putting them behind the pike (where they cannot fire).
And once in musket range, extract the shot to the front and fire a salvee to be followed up by an attack with the pike, as I said earlier!

I cannot see any other way in the offensive, or am I wrong?

1st Jaeger,
The deployment at Breitenfeld was indeed defensive and mirrored Swedish army deployments in Prussia. The frontline brigades didn't move until the end of the battle if at all. It was the 3 brigades of the reserve which wheeled and engaged Tilly's troops. They were not encumbered with heavy artillery.

Gustavus only switched to offensive tactics after Breitenfeld. Before that he was a defensive general when it came to large scale engagemnents. He either avoided battle altogether or assumed a defensive stance.

Swedish regimental cannon used cartridges with powder and shot in the same package. Loading the gun is both simple and fast. The guns themselves were light, two men could do it in a pinch but it was common to attack a file or two of musketeers to help move the regimental cannon and carry the cartridges.

As time went by the Swedish artillery became capable of considerable movement on the battle field if the conditiosn were right. At Jankow even the heavy 24-pounders were kept moving into new positions from which to support army. The heavy guns changed firing positions 3 times during that battle something which had not been done before in the TYW.

"Des höchstlöblichen.." shows the basic formation, it would be adapted to suit the circumstances. At Lutzen the pikemen 'covered' the musketeers according to Imperial eyewitnesses. How the brigades were formed durign the movement to contact at Breitenfeld is not known. If a brigade commander judged it prudent he could advance his centre shot in front of the pikes early on. Unfortunately the only detailed low level accounts of Breitenfeld come from the Scots who formed flank squadrons.

Keep in mind that the Swedish brigade evolved from formations that were both static and defensive in nature.
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So the Swedish brigade was designed more with the defensive in midn than the offensive. That is why you get the 'strange' placement of the central shot. in the end the German battalion adopted from 1635 onward was probably more suited to the offensive tactics used by the Swedes due to being much simpler to use, particularly in the attack.

CG: Thanks to you the fog is beginning to lift!
It would still be hard work to move guns and the ammo around a battlefield.

Would these light guns only fire "canister", i.e. at ranges under 300 yards?

How do you gauge the chances for well trained troops to "interpenetrate", like pike opening up to let shot pass through, or vice versa in a minimum of time.

The statements that swedish brigades marched up to point blank range to deliver their salvee would suppose the pike would then finish off the enemy unit shaken and disorderd by the devastating volley before they could reform, would it not?

This would perhaps explain why one of the brigades was stopped at Lützen, the imperialists firing "first" at point blank and disabling a lot of officers (captains in the front) which prevented the forming of the shot (or the interpenetration of the pike).

Regimental cannon were issued both roundshot and grapeshot. These were then attached to a powder charge with cloth, wire and glue to create a cartridge.

While 3-pound canistershot did exist it seems to have primarily been used a sea or in fortresses.

Yes, that was precisely the idea, disoered the enemy with overwhelming firepower and then finish hte job with a decisive charge with the pikes.

Lutzen was a mess, command and control fell apart in the smoke and fog and several of the brigades had been force to leav their regimental cannon behind as they could not get them across the ditches/trenches at the road.
(Regimental cannon are not mentioned by Imperial eyewitnesses, nor do the Imperials boast of capturing any)

So the at least 2, possibly 3 brigades in the frontline fought without any supporting artillery after they had passed the road. And suffered accordingly.

Still Lutzen was very much a mutual bloodbath for the infantry of both sides. The Osprey downplays Imperial casulties by misquoting Holk. In his orignal letter Holk writes that the army had 3000 "_dead_" not "3000 Imperial dead and wounded".

Yes, if I recollect Pappenheim was hit by one of the wire ammo.

Wasn't the right flank foot fighting the imperial batallions in the vicinity of the ditches? Couldn't have been more than 100 yards, less probably, as they would try to hold that line (or take it back)?

The regimental cannon could still have fired at close range, or were they perhaps caught in the general disorder.

So, you agree that "interpenetration" would have been done by seasoned troops under efficient command?

I was having quite a discussion with some experts that would not buy it, but I see no other way to success for the swedish brigade formation!

and yes, Lützen was a blodbath indeed! It seems natural for the Swedes to have higher immediate casualties, as they were assaulting entrenched troops for most of the line.

It also appears that ordnance did a lot of damage, a rare thing later in the ECW.

You're right. I forgot the artillery. But that's no problem. Simply have the commander of shot yell out "DUCK!"

I liked your description of placing the shot between the artillery pieces in front of the center squadron. It seems to me that same disposition can be used with shot on the flanks of the pikes of the center squadron. Again, the problem I have with placing shot in front of the pikes is it just seems to me it would be more difficult to pull-back the shot prior to contact when the are in front than when they are on the side. In addition, some of the musketeers can help pull the guns out of the way.

As to the pistoleers the artillerist cannot remain in their position once the cavalry gets too close. They need to get out of the way of pikes. Also, while my diagram showed the arrows coming in at sharp angle, they preferred to hit pikes at the corners. So, I don't think the artillerists will be around by the time the pistoleers get to the pikes. This is why I believe that the other two squadrons will advance to cover the flanks of the center squadron. I say this not because I've read it somewhere but because it makes military sense. If we have information to the opposite I would love to hear it.

Rich

Rich:

of course they would try the corners, less of a solid wall of pikes!

it does make sense indeed! In case the horse is battling it out with the flanks of the central pike, the advancing pike sleeves would catch them in the flank!
And we haven't even mentioned the shot firing at them all the time!

If the horse is foolish enough to charge the front, the shot and reg. guns would just repel them, which is what happened to Götz at Lützen.

If the foot engages the brigade in a firefight, and then the horse charge in the flanks in total surprise, the matter is different.

Next we come to the Catholic German formations; older works of history often assume that the Germans were using Spanish formations and tactics. However the German infantry used its own, separate set of formations&tactics.

The ability and performance of the German infantry was in decline during the last half of the 16th Century. The once respected Landsknechts had suffered long series of set back and defeats in the service of Danish, Dutch, Huguenot and Danziger armies. Fellow soldiers such as Roger Williams held the German soldier in low regard. By the start of the 17th Century Catholic and Protestant military thinkers alike realized the need for change and improvement.
In the first years of the 17th Century a German regiment of foot consisted of 10 companies, each of 300 men. Each company was commonly 50% pike and 50% shot (on paper). In battle the regiment formed up 30 ranks deep with the pikes in the middle and shot on the flanks.

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(Drawing in the Kriegsbuch of Johann von Nassau-Siegen, the dots with flags are the pikemen. ) Each company formed two sub-units, one of pikes and one of shot, for a total of 20 sub-units as seen in the drawing. A simple to use but formation since the temporary units on which the German military system relied were ill suited to the more advanced and flexible formations employed first by the Spanish and later on by the Dutch. But it lacked flexibility and did not make efficient use of the manpower that went into it.
Giorgio (Georg) Basta had commanded Imperial army during the last years of the ‘Long Turkish War' 1593-1606 primarily fought in Hungary and Transylvania. He had experienced firsthand the problems inherent in the German formation and proposed a series of changes to improve the performance of the German infantry. These can be found in Il maestro di campo generale, an important but today forgotten work.
Basta recommended that the German regiment be split into 3 battalions each of 1000 men formed 12 ranks deep.
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Basta passed away in 1607 and it fell to his ‘students' to make his ideas reality. Two the more well known men who served with Basta was his 2nd in command, Johann Tserclaes von Tilly and a junior officer Albrecht von Wallenstein.
Basta's ideas were never fully implemented. The regiment, not the remained the basic tactical formation but the depth of the formation was reduced, often to 10 rather than 12 ranks as 10 was the customary depth of the German file. But in Basta's writings you find the seed to the 1000 man battalions used by Wallenstein at Lützen and which became the standard imperial formation for the rest of the war.

By the time of the TYW the ratio of pike to show in the company had changed as well. Rather than 1:1 ration companies were now typical y recruited with a 3:2 or even a 2:1 ratio of shot to pike. The Germans also made used halberds as part of their formations. In the 1620's 1/6-1/5 of the pikemen in Leaguist regiments were to be given halberds rather than pikes.
How many halberdiers saw action is an open question, in most understrenght units the halberds would have been quickly replaced by pikes in order to keep the important pikes up to strength.

So when the German infantry of the Catholic League and the Emperor took to the field in the 1620's they did so in regiments which were 1500-2000 strong and formed 10 deep. Attrition from desertions and sickness ensured that the regiments never were much larger than that during active operations.

Tilly's impressive string of victories seemed to confirm that there was no need to further improve the German system. Breitenfeld changed all that, following Tilly's death and Wallenstein's rise to renewed supreme command the smaller battalion proposed by Basta was finally adopted as the standard tactical formation. At first 10 ranks deep the depth was reduced to 7 ranks in 1633 appears to have then been reduced to 6 ranks after Wallenstein's death.

Rich,
There's no need for the artillery men to get out the way until the very last instant. Neither they nor the regimental cannon prevent the pikemen from charging their pikes for horse properly. The two gunners can remain in place until the last instant in order to fire a final shot at close range and then shelter under the pikes. But in reality no attacks got that far.

In fact there's no record the kind of attck you describe succeding against a Swedish brigade. The overwhelming firepower of Swedish formations made frontal attacks by cavalry almost impossible. At Lützen Götz's cuirassiers made repeated charges against the 'Swedish' brigade led by Kyle all of which failed in the face of the 'tremendous salvoes' fired by that bigade to quote Piccolomini. Even the superb Polish cavalry failed when faced with such firepower. At Gorzno even the vaunted hussars 'bounced' when charging into the Swedish salvoes and at Nowy Dwor Swedish artillery alone prevented the Polish cavalry from closing.

Of course the position of the artillery wasn't fixed. At Lützen there wasn't enough artillery for the kind support described by Monro. So each brigade of the 4 brigades with artillery support only had a single battery of 5 regimental cannon posted in front of the centre squadron.

Positioning the artillery in front of the pikes also required well trained pikemen who were able to swiftly move past the artillery and reform once past it when attacking. Indeed at Breitenfeld some brigades advanced with the regimentalcannon hidden inside/behind the pikes and only revaled them by unmasking and firing at a range of 30 paces.

Post-Nordlingen artillery tactics changed as the Swedish brigade went out of use. The artillery was still deployed in front of the pikes at the start of an egagement but once the action got to closer ranges the guns were moved to the side of the formation. A position also recomended by Schildknecht.

CG: "But in reality no attacks got that far", "In fact there's no record the kind of attack you describe [cavalry] succeeding against a Swedish brigade."

Well except for a few days before Mitawa where Polish hussars broke the Swedish infantry. Or at Mitawa where the Lithuanian hussaria broke the Swedish infantry but were in turn fired on by units in the nearby woods. Then there is Mewe where some of the Swedish infantry had gained a critical small hill and the hussars were chosen to drive them off. The hussars broke the first line but didn't have the support needed to break the second line. Then there was, during the first day of the battle of Warsaw, where hussars broke some units of Swedish infantry. And, of course, the third day, I think it was the third day, when the hussars broke not only the first Swedish infantry line but the second as well. Again they went in unsupported and had to fall back. For the most part, Swedish infantry entrenched in the field rather than face hussar attacks. So, on those occasions when the Swedish infantry is broken, you had better get your artillerymen out of the way. [I had some help. A friend of mine is a Polish historian.]

I envy you the resources you have access to. Where in the world did you get a hold of "Il maestro di campo generale"? And do you have access to "Il governo della cavalleria leggiera"? I would love to have a crack at those books. Basta wrote "Il maestro di campo generale" in 1606 presumably after the Turkish war and he died in 1607. So I assume his ideas on 1000 man battalions were never put into practice. Thus he himself never commanded such units. Do we have any indication that Basta actually formed these kinds of units. If not, then I doubt Tilly used such units. Tilly was pretty much a military conservative. There is no tradition attached to Tilly as a military reformer, at least as far as I know. I could be wrong. So while Tilly fought under the command of Basta, if there is no evidence that Basta used these smaller units in battle, then I doubt that Tilly did. Nor did Wallenstein. As for Wallenstein's changes, I would suspect the Imperial experiences with the smaller Swedish units probably had more impact on Wallenstein. I'm not saying Basta had no influence on Wallenstein. I don't know. But he probably didn't come across those ideas commanding units under Basta. Unless you can show that Wallenstein had read Basta's book and was influenced by it, I don't think you can draw a direct line between the two.

"A simple to use but formation since the temporary units on which the German military system relied were ill suited to the more advanced and flexible formations employed first by the Spanish and later on by the Dutch."

I simply do not know of any "German military system." German troops were raised on the basis of military contractors. There were contractors who raised German troops for whomever could afford their services. Both the Dutch and the Spanish armies hired German troops. The Dutch also hired French troops and English troops. They were formed under the prevailing military structure of the person or state who hired them. There was no Germany at the time only Germans. German was a linguistic identification. The Dutch had a system. The Spanish had a system. Later the Swedes had a system. At the time of the TYW the empire did not have a military system other than that of the Spanish which was brought over by commanders who had served in the Spanish army. So while Parma fought with troops raised and trained in the Spanish system and Maurice fought with troops trained in his system, Imperial contractors like Tilly, formed their armies as they saw fit. And, they formed their armies on the basis of the prevailing military ideas of the day which was Spanish. Tilly, a Burgundian, [Belgium] got his military training in the Spanish army under the command of the Duke of Parma, an Italian. He later fought in the Ottoman wars and brought the knowledge of the Spanish way of war to the Empire. [Of course he wasn't the only one.] Afterwards he was placed in command of the Bavarian army. It is said he brought the Spanish system to Bavaria. Of course he was not the only one with experience in the Spanish army to the serve the Empire. Basta was an Albanian who also learned his soldiering under the tutelage of the Italian Duke of Parma in the Spanish army.

There were many such soldiers who brought their experience fighting for Spain to the service of the Imperial wars. For Protestants and the French the Dutch army was the training ground for future commanders. Viscount Turenne began his career as a musketeer in the Dutch army. This was at the insistence of Maurice who was Turenne's uncle. For Catholics it was the Spanish army.

The prevailing doctrine was that battle units should be drawn up in infantry units of 1,500 men. This is not to say they always had to fight in these large units. Just prior to the battle to Nieuwpoort the Spanish commanders came to the commanding general Albrecht of Austria and asked if they should reform their infantry into smaller units such as the Dutch had. Clearly they had that capability. Albrecht said no. The larger Spanish infantry units steadily pushed back the smaller Dutch units. It was the Dutch cavalry which saved the day. After they had driven off the Spanish cavalry they attacked the weary Spanish pike units and destroyed them.

Thus there was a constant interchange of personal between those in the service of Spain and those in the service of the Empire. Both drew upon the Italians for many of their best commanders. As I mentioned Parma was an Italian, Spinola was an Italian who got his start in the Spanish army. Montecuccoli was Italian. Piccolomini was Italian who started his career as a pikeman in the Spanish army. Papenheim, a Bavarian, began his military service in Poland but later served in the Spanish army also. These were cosmopolitan armies not national armies.

"Tilly's impressive string of victories seemed to confirm that there was no need to further improve the German system."

As I pointed out there was no German system. What Tilly instituted for the Bavarian army was the Spanish system. And, the Imperial armies were led by many officers who brought Spanish military ideas to the Imperial armies by having served in the Spanish army including Basta.

Rich

And do you have access to "Il governo della cavalleria leggiera"? I would love to have a crack at those books.

Rich,

For a mere 1350 euros you can have an original copy:

link

John that's great. Say, I've got a birthday coming up and I know the perfect gift you can send me. :))

Rich

Hi

As an irrelevent side note, a local game shop has one of "those" Pappenheims working there. While he knows about the fact of his family holdings in europe and that some ancient ancestor was "that" one, he has zero interest in the era or what made Pappenhime famous!

R

The cad!