"Ney at Bautzen" Topic

No worries Bill,

Sadly, having a strong opinion here not based on another's version of truth or fact is wrong and not allowed. If you don't back it up with sound historical evidence you get hounded into submission like a dog being hit with a newspaper by its master…I gave up on this a while back.

Regards,
Shane

It is interesting the way opinions are formed.

Had the statement been made that 'I haven't looked deeply into it but I believe X's action at Y was incompetent" I'd never even post in response in all likelyhood. But when the statement is that it was simply incompetent and the analysis consists of 'well others said so', well…

Here we have an excelent thread that works its way through Ney at Bautzen, discussing the pro's and con's of Neys actions and decisions, and showing that a case can certainly be made that Neys decision making was not only NOT the debacle of being out of his depth, but can arguably be considered at least OK, if not excelent under very difficult conditions. What made the thread excellent – people being willing to actually look at the historical situation and analyse actual options available at the time.

After all of this we then go back to an offhanded dismisal of Ney as incompetent, arrived at because a number of authors said so.

Not the first time such a discussion has been had, or the first time an offhanded dismissal stands without any analysis. Which undoubtedly means the next conversation starts at square 1 again.

standing over someonw demanding them to explain why they had formed an opinion and further, demanding evidence only alienates those who form their opinions. Requesting or demanding someone to explain or give evidence for stating what he believes is fact is one thing but demanding the same for ones opinion is totally overbearing. Instead one should instead explain why they think the opinion holder is misinformed or incorrect and let that person form a new opinion based on the evidence you bring forth.

Forcing someone to give evidence for a mere opinion is just plain wrong. If you don't like someones opinion give evidence to make them change their mind instead…simple as that.

Shane

Not just "mere opinion". It was stated as fact. It may have even been correct fact but if there was no analysis then who knows?

I go back to where it started – 9 times out of 10, a statement such as "X was wrong", in all its variations, is made with no analysis, and nothing to back it up, and with 20/20 hinsight armchair generalship of the worst sort, yet when questioned the response is "well show us YOUR analysis".

The whole end-thread occured because rather than say there had been no analysis (we eventualy got to it must be correct because a number of authors said it) I got a VERY defensive push back asking for counter-points.

It could have all be so-easy to just say it was gut feel/based on a few authors say so.

A day out of the dog house, and away we go!

Look, if you have something to say about Ney, about the decisions he made a Bautzen, or about the possible results of those decisions, you have my attention. If you want to loudly state you opinion, well, I can probably ignore you. But if you want start a meta-discussion whining about your opinion of other people's opinions of yet other people's opinions about the subject at hand, well, that's just borish and destructive.

Fortunately there is the Stifle! button…

NSN

yawn…

Yawn exactly. There is nothing to discuss, unfortunately it took a number of postings to establish that.

actually,

there was quite a bit to discuss, the posts on this thread proved that. It's just a pity forming an opinion has to be substanciated with evidence for some people to be satisfied.

I decided to explore a little on the subject of Ney, this despite the tread having covered nicely the aspects of Ney's actions at Bautzen.

I like Ney. He seems to have been hard done by too many writers.

That is my opinion. What follows are my thoughts and opinions.

I believe the question of Ney as strategist does not apply to Bautzen. The Marshal was following orders and did not have an independent command. In a similar manner, the stategist question does not apply to the Waterloo campaign, overall, nor to the Waterloo battle, in particular.

Ney has been misunderstood as a person and a commander. Further, too often, he has been a "easy target" in life – because of his tendency to become excited – and in death – because he held important positions in areas where things went wrong.

At one point (it may not have been this tread), I tried to point out that this may, repeat may, have come from his Franco-German upbringing on the border with a German-speaking mother.

He exhibited a sense of "right and wrong" (let me call it that) at moments causing awkwardness for others (and himself).

When this sense was disturbed he could become quite upset and stubborn at the same time. (The D'Erlon episode strikes me in this way.) At Bautzen, this seems not to have been the case. He (and Jomini)tried to interpert the orders. Yes, he could have shifted more troops to the outside (left) flank. He sent Jomini there to Lauriston. The later Jomini claim was not to do that (send more troops to Lauriston), it was for an earlier advance. So, Ney acted reasonably on this occaison with the information he had available. There is scope to say he could have sent more troops with Lauriston, though much of that view seems to be in hindsight (and seems to skip over when troops were avaiable and what troops were available, such as cavalry). Again, Ney was trying to follow orders.

It is fair enough to ask whether Ney was a good strategist. I think his lack of "flexibility" inhibited him to achieve this. He was a Marshal and a fighter. Napoleon employed him for good reasons, though "good strategist" does not appear among them.

I would note that the person who cites examples against him being a good strategist selects situations where Ney was following orders – operationally or tactically. I believe Napoleon himself acknowledged that the cavalry charge was too early at Waterloo and Ney was carried away by his "reckless courage" (per Bourrienne, Napoleon said "He charged the enemy at the head of Milhaud's cuirassiers and the light cavalry of the guard, and succeeded, amid the applauses of the army, in establishing himself on the heights of Mont St. Jean, till then inaccessible." ), then the Emperor sends Kelleman's cavalry forward.

According the O'Meara, the Emperor thought the cavalry needed more "impetuosity" (how about that? Napoleon tells O'Meara "There wanted but very little, I assure you, to gain the day for me.")

Taking Milhaud's cavalry forward was supposedly against Napoleon's orders. Perhaps.

In my view, it is another example where Ney was trying to follow orders, the situation changed, and Napoleon did not communicate clearly the change to Ney. Apparently expecting him to simply "know" the new situation. In fact, Napoleon seems not to have done so during Ney's lifetime. Instead, the Emperor sends more cavalry forward.

Now, when subordinate receive orders for a mission they are allocated troops to achieve the objective. A superior can change the anything – as is a commander's right. The manner of telling (or not) a subordinate of new events could result in problems.

Here is where Ney's flexibility would fail him, particularly under stress. In the worst times, Ney could act as he did at Quatre Bras with respect to D'Erlon.

This could be taken as a reflection on his ability to be a strategist. It is not a test, however, of him as a strategist, rather of his intentions to exectute a mission. (One could debate whether it would have not been better "strategically" to capture Quatre Bras with D'Erlon and push Wellington's army back rather than having a "bigger" win over Bluecher. If a "bigger" win was necessary over Bluecher, why was Ney allocated D'Erlon in the first place?)

Of the Marshals, I believe, I would have found Ney to be "difficult" (by his comments, Napoleon found him so) as a subordinate. Still, for a clear mission that was not going to change, I would want a fighter like Ney by my side. I doubt, I would want to send Ney into a situation too fludia, where I would need to change his troops or where events would change too rapidly, because I would be concerned Ney would be too "fixed" on the last order or plan and not "accept" the new one.

For what it is worth, my opinion. I shall be traveling again, so may not "dip" in for awhile. – R

I'll say this again, since it seems to have been missed..

"there was quite a bit to discuss, the posts on this thread proved that."

It did – many people discussed the actual options available to the historic commander at the time, not just off hand opnions. Thats exactly what made it such a good thread.

"It's just a pity forming an opinion has to be substanciated with evidence for some people to be satisfied."

No, again, it just took a number of posts to confirm the opinion was based on the fact a few authors said so. Had that been admitted/said first up there would have been no thread because there was nothing to discuss.

Hos writes:

"Not just "mere opinion". It was stated as fact. It may have even been correct fact but if there was no analysis then who knows?"

That's either an outright lie or an inability to read the English language. My first post on this subject began with exactly that – it was stated as my opinion. It was NOT stated as fact. Hos, what is your malfunction?

You dispute my posts without offering anything in return. When pressed, you admit that you don't even disagree with my opinion, so what the hell are you bitching about? You are starting an argument merely for the sake of starting an argument. You have no point. You need a life.

Wow, lots of anger there….

I'll remind you, your VERY FIRST words were "Besides Ney's shortcomings as a master strategist, ….."

Next time a few deep breaths before posting may save lots of time.

As for my point, its already been made. We are talking about an assesment of Neys decision making abaility. Your opinion may or may not be correct, but if it is based on a few authors say so rather than any process on your part then there is nothing to discuss.

Have a look at the thread above you say is so good – it was good because it went into a discussion of the OPTIONS available at the time, and attempted to weigh each.

There are very few (at the time their made) obvioulsy correct/incorrect decisions in tactics/strategy, but merely a number of options, each with advantages and disadvantages. Sometimes, even the obviously 'most advantageous' option isn't the most succesful in practice specificaly because its the obvious one.

Again, if your opinion was formed without looking at those option, and advantages/disadvantages of each, then I again say there is nothing to discuss.

Widowson you'll also please note, that from the very first post you said it was merely your 'opinion' I backed right off asking you for the basis for it (the posts then moved to Shane leaping to your call for assistance) – all my posts asking for how you formed your opinion was after you'd stated a very strong statement about Ney as above, but BEFORE you'd finaly said it was just an opinion.

My opinion is based upon 40+ years of studying and reading the subject. I feel no obligation to satisfy your ignorance on the subject. There is nothing I can do for you, and I'm not about to recap all Napoleonic history for your benefit.

Go read some books.

I say again, you stated your opinion, or we eventualy found it was simply an opinion, not a thought out result of some sort of analysis as had occured earlier in the threads. So there is nothing to discuss.

OK, lets see how far it gets us. Not sure why its the responsibility of someone other than the person with the strong opinion to provide the background analysis, but lets see what we can do.

For discussions sake lets simply take the first opinion on Ney listed by Widowson.

"1. Being lazy on 16 June, without accounting for the urgency of the STRATEGIC situation."

Ok, being lazy on 16th June. Thats a pretty broad brush. Is there a particular decision of Neys that you believe shows he was lazy?

Failing a response, lets look at the 'traditional' view that Ney showed lack of urgency (not sure how we study laziness, but lets come to that later) in that at the point he studied the situation alongside (going from memory here) one of the Corp Commanders (Riley?), who advised him something along the lines that based on past experience Wellington could have quite a force concealed in the terrain ahead, and Ney therefore delayed an assault in order to bring up and deploy more troop.

So, I guess the question comes down to it is of Neys choices at the time (remembering we need to determine that time) did he pick poorly?

Obviously there are lots of options, but for the purposes of the converstaion lets say the options were along the lines of.

A. Go immediately in some sort of Coup de main.
B. Go quickly, by imediately deploying and assaulting with troops at hand.
C. Go later, after bringing up more troops.

Thats from memory so I'll pull out some books and flesh out the situation at that time and try to run through the options.

Hmmm, the conversation with Reille seems to have occured roughly 1.30 – 1.45 and resulted in a delay of only some 15-20 minutes as another Brigade came up. I assume therefore this isn't what is being alluded to.

Can we clarify the point at which Ney exibited this 'laziness'????

just a pity forming an opinion has to be substanciated with evidence

Yeah I know what you mean, I much prefer to just make things up and then refuse to answer when I get called on it.

you really bore me

Shane,

I'm not sure you're helping here. I think Daryl's questions are valid and I am enjoying and learning from the exchange.

"Hmmm, the conversation with Reille seems to have occured roughly 1.30 � 1.45 and resulted in a delay of only some 15-20 minutes as another Brigade came up. I assume therefore this isn't what is being alluded to.

"Can we clarify the point at which Ney exibited this 'laziness'????"

By not having that same conversation with Reille at 6:00 AM, or even on the previous afternoon. That was easy.

Ok, so Widowson your saying Ney should have come storming up the road (or whatver) at 6am? Is that the time you want me to run through?

Ney met Reille at 4 PM on June 15, ordering him to drive the Prussians out of Gosselies, which was done. By early evening, Ney was observing the AA positions at Quatre Bras. The high rye made observation difficult, but no attempt was made by cavalry or other troops to thoroughly reconnoiter the enemy position.

On the following morning, Ney rose at 7 AM, but the initial attack on Quatre Bras did not go in until about noon.

So what was Ney doing for those five hours?

The fact is that if Ney had, in fact, "come storming up the road at 6 AM", he would have found the crossroads defended by less than a division of infantry, and would have rolled right over them.

In fairness to Ney, he had reason for caution. But to do virtually nothing from 7 am to noon is beyond cautious.

WE now know that had Ney come up the road at 6am with whatever troops were at hand at that point he would have been confronted by a Div (-) but thats irrelevent to deciding if Ney made a good decision or not.

All that matters is what he believed/should have known were there or nearby.

Your brush is pretty broad, but ok, lets wind the clock back to Neys first discussion/orders to Rielle on the 15th and see what the situation was there. Alternatively I suppose the better question may be 'when is the earliest time it is REASONABLE to expect Ney to secure Quatra Bras, and what would be the level of risk at that time'.

Back to the books….., the obvious first point of research being Neys exact initial orders.

Ney was a soldier's soldier. Not a great strategist, but a fighting General that I would value on my staff.

I agree that history has been pretty rough on him. Not too many critics take into account the mental wear of his constant campaigning(including the Russian campaign). I feel that the man gave France everything, and got dumped on for it.

He will always be my favorite personality of the age. Davout may have been a superior strategist, but yaaaawwwn. I prefer character, leadership, espirit de corps, and unmatched bravery.

Its always interesting when you start looking at an actual situation how big the gaps are of whats actualy KNOWN.

But, seperate to that, I've found something on the road to looking at the situation I thought I'd share.

In Ropes,Campaign of Waterloo….he states about Napoleons plans for the coming campaign (sorry, long extract)….If Blucher fought at all at that stage in the campaign, it stood to reason that he would fight to the south of Sombreffe, for the preservation of his line of communication with Wellington, the Namur-Nivelles road. Hence, the intention of occupying Sombreffe, as a preliminary to a battle with the Prussians, could not, as we venture to think, have entered Napoleon's mind On the contrary, he believed that the seizure of Sombreffe would inevitably necessitate the retreat of the Prussians to some point further north, as Wavre, or even to the neighborhood of Brussels, where their junction with the English could be effected without molestation.

But the last thing which Napoleon wanted was that the allied armies should retire to Wavre, or to the neighborhood of Brussels, and there unite. He needed a battle, and a decisive success, and he needed it at once. A war of manoeuvres was not the game for him to play at this crisis. It was of vital importance for him to rout, if possible, in succession, the armies of Blucher and Wellington ; a battle, therefore, was what he sought, and he expected that Blucher would fight him, and fight him alone. It was only by routing Blucher's army, or forcing it to retreat, that he expected to separate it from that of Wellington.

Now my quesry is this – if Napoleons primary priority was to fight Blucher south of Sombreffe…which blucher would be forced to do to protect communications along the Namur – Nivelles road……why in the world would Blucher fight south of Sombreffe if the Namur-Nivelles road had already been lost by Ney having secured Quatra-Bras on the 15th June??????

Indeed an interesting point.

Another point is why take quatre bras at all, a number of french authors have already adressed this issue.
Neys job on the operational level initially was to fight a tactical passive holding action against a theoretical much stronger opponent, while Nappy did have time to crush the Prussians.
if Ney had moved 5 to 10 kilometers further forward he would have been much farther away from his supports and contact with Wellingtons much stronger force might have been established 2 to 4 hours earlier.

There was no pressing need to take Quatre bras at all, threatening the crossroads was more than enough to draw an opponent approaching from the north into a fight.

The need for taking Quatra Bras would appear to be as a prepatory move, for the advance on Brussels BUT I'm begining to suspect (SUSPECT ONLY) that this should not be done untill Napoleon is guaranteed of his battle before Sombreffe!?!?!?

Possibly, this may also be reading too much into plans that on the 15th were still to be made.

Anyway, interesting…

OK, the story of Ney's actions and orders have been re-hashed a number of times, but it is very interesting to look at the actions of the 15th in detail since many authors seem to have focused on the 16th, and formed their view of Neys actions on the 15th from comments made years later, which in themselves were formed based on a percieved and often partial view of Neys actions on the 16th (figure that one out!!!).

I'd actually love to work through and right this up properly with full references and background, and actually intend to so sometime but that is a long, complicated process so will start with the main thrust and drill down based on any initial queries.

This is initial thoughts only – fully developed could take a loooong time :-).

I'm still trying to confirm the details of the conversation between Napoleon and Ney at Charleroi at roughly 3.30pm 15th June, at which Ney was given command of the left wing (but not a staff�che had only Heymes with him). Not in debate is that Napoleon:

�� Appointed Ney Commander of the 1st (d'Erlon) & 2nd (Reille) Corps (of whom Ney had no idea of their exact location, organisation, or even names of Division Commanders).
�� Directed his direction of advance towards Brussels.
�� Also attached to Ney the Guard Light Cavalry Division.

All else beyond this is entirely unclear at this point, with numerous conflicting accounts and after interpretations.

It is even entirely unclear at this point whether Napoleon outlined his Operational Concept for the plan at this stage or not, but as it is possible he did so either at this point, or their second meeting at midnight 15th/16th, but definitely in the orders received the morning of the 16th by Ney, I have developed what seems to have been that concept, or at least what it may have been prior to commencement of the campaign.

Napoleons plan for the campaign is still hotly debated, but appears to be based upon his need to achieve a quick result, allowing him to move to threaten other allied armies entering France. He therefore needs to achieve battlefield victories against each allied army, and quickly. Bluchers force is better concentrated than Wellingtons who can be expected to take a day or 2 to do so. Bluchers basic options for concentration include:

A. Concentrate forward, so as to fight south of Sombreffe to maintain the Namur-Nivelles communication with Wellington.
B. Concentrate well back and east – effectively isolated from Wellington.
C. Concentrate well back and west (Wavre?) – sacrificing both the Namur-Nivelles communications with Wellington, and potentialy uncovering his own supply lines.

For Napoleon B & C are undesirable. B as it means the Prussian Army still intact and in the field (a-la 1814) while he faces Wellington, and C as it means facing the joint allied armies on their terms.

A is the preferred option, with Blucher standing, waiting for Wellington to concentrate and come to his aid BUT, it can be assumed Blucher will only stand to fight south of Sombreffe if the Nivelles-Namur road is not held by the French in force (in which case Bluchers option A is not possible, and he MUST revert to B or C).

Napoleons planning therefore seems to be based on a timeline of:

Day 1 (15th June) advancing through Charleroi, thus establishing the central position, and advancing along the dual axis of the Charleroi-Brussels road on the left, and Sombreffe on the right to have both places at least within reach, and under reconnaissance by nightfall.

Day 2 (16th) Option 1. Assuming Prussians standing at Sombreffe-Fleurus, then conduct battle around that place with the Prussians, and secure Quatra Bras on the left in order to prevent Wellington assisting Prussians, and prepare for advance on Brussels.

Plus various other Day 2 options, including that of the Prussians NOT standing south of Sombreffe etc.

A precondition of planning being that Sombreffe must NOT be advanced on in force during the 15th until it is clear the Prussians are making a stand there. On the left, the taking of Quatra-Bras is not critical (or even desirable if it scares off the Prussians from standing at Sombreffe), but this will depend on local circumstances as by no means must the Anglo-Allied army be allowed to advance from here towards the Prussians at Frasnes-Sombreffe, and should the Prussians not be standing then the Brussels road becomes the main effort.

Still searching�c.