Agreed, however having had the book in my hand since Trotmans republished it years ago, it often leads up wrong alleys. While S. was present and commanding, he cites the rest of the battle where HE WAS NOT PRESENT on heresay and/ or third hand knowledge, and perhaps some research later.
Not an uncreditable work, but limited as to precision.
Further, when I wrote
This is just one of many 'encounters' where despite the state of knowledge, surprise was to some extent mutual. The Austrian line was advancing and deploying in response to the push back…
I hadn't fully read in completeness M. Goetz/ Carnots authoritive comment on the same; ergo
The action on the heights was basically an "encounter" battle – Napoleon (and therefore presumably Vandamme) had expected that the heights would be empty..,
so I wasn't actually quoting him directly. But I'm glad my analysis concurred with the great author!
In case it was missed, I'm also pleased to read the revision on artillery attachment at regimental level:
So IR23 should have had them, the other Austrian battalions at Austerlitz should not have had them (Author of):- [the book] 1805 Austerlitz shows all battalions having them which I now believe to be an error). We can consider the possibility of loss between Vienna and Olmütz due to broken axles and such, but these problems seem to have hit the heavier pieces more. In other 1805 battles I have seen references to them being attached to the battalions per the regs, but Dave [Hollins] suspects they may have been massed.
Another possibility no-one touched upon, and as it affected the French the same, was that insufficient horse-power was available anyway to mobilise all the ordnance. The cavalry was woefully deficient in strength, even as deployed sub-units (ie divisions parcelled out).
From the concentrated reading of this battle within a battle (epic!) the to and fro effect of both waves of movement by troops, static firing and alternate pauses without much action as both sides 'regrouped', there is much leeway to interpret the events.
Robert alluded to the 'linearity' which must be seen also in a time and motion construct; it all did not happen at once and it was not all along the front.
Vandamme certainly was slower than St.Hilaires Division to arrive on the heights, thus the initial contact action around Pratze [by St.Hilaires Division] that lead to the 10eme/ 14eme firefights and the repulse of the 4th 'Column' avant-garde (really an ad-hoc regiment of 3 Russian battallions cut from the main 'Division') had been largely completed (lapsed into catching their breath and reforming) BEFORE the right of Miloradovich line was 'encountered' by Vandamme.
On the far left of Vandamme, the simple expedient of detaching a sole infantry battalion round an unknown obstacle as the 24e Legere swarmed or trudged up the steeper portion and through the vineyards, led later to a tragedy as the isolated battalion was confronted by the Russian Guard cavalry.
Where the Tsar and higher command had sat earlier in the day observing the Goldbach 'valley' shrouded in mist, they were now 'retired' to the Eastern lower reverse slopes of the 'plateau' and devoid of wider knowledge of the French advance.
Just as the French were devoid of knowledge of what was left. I point out again the summarily strange phenomina of zero mounted scouts with the French advance. Any man on a horse would have greatly increased the awareness of what was before them, yet apparently none were used.
All in all, a most complicated affair!
regards d
looks at the new U.S.S. Constitution for Black Seas.