"Austerlitz - Vandamme and IR23" Topic

I'm particularly interested in the combat and fire fight at Austerlitz near Stare Vinohrady between the Austrian IR23 and four regiments under Vandamme`s command.
It is described in Ian Castle's Osprey on the battle but does anyone have more detail as to how this fight developed?
Any relevant information would be greatly appreciated.
Regards,
Mike.

Refer to the Scott Bowden book on the 1805 campaign for more details.

Also try the "1805: Austerlitz" book by Robert Goetz. I have not read Ian Castle's book yet so don't know if there is anything on that fight in his book. Goetz does cover the combat from what I recall (read the book over the summer and don't have it handy at the moment to be precise).

Erik

Castle does cover the IV Column Austrians, although, as his book is an account of the full 1805 campaign and not just Austerlitz, he does not generally go into the level of detail that Goetz does. Both are excellent books IMHO and well worth getting.

Yes a copy of Austerlitz by Robert Goetz is a must if you are interested in the battle, then get Scott Bowdens & Hourtoulles book.

Of possible interest:

A Detailed Account of the Battle of Austerlitz by Karl Stutterheim. 1810. 146 pages:

link

A nice English translation of the Austrian original.

@Steven H Smith

Dear colleague, may I please trouble you to look in at the bottom of the nessages "Russian Cavalry 1799", to see my slightly late response to you ?

Thank you,

- votre ami

PS – I am now finishing the Goetz on Austerlitz, and cannot say enough good about him and do reccommend him for anglo-phones most eagerly.

Thank you Gentelmen for the responses so far – I`m downloading the Stutterheim as I write this – does anyone know off hand what artillery support the two sides had in this.
It would be interesting to see if the French divisional artillery was employed in either of the two attacks/assaults and if the 23rd had gun sections supporting its firing line.
Mike.

A quick skim through of the Stutterheim account shows only a brief honourable mention for the courage of the Saltzbourg Regiment (IR23) and Auersperg Battalion (IR24)
Mike.

The Scott Bowden book is the best one on this battle.

I have ordered both the Goetz and the Bowden books.
From some earlier discussions I understand that they have their own particluar characteristics and strengths.

Thanks again everyone!

Mike.

I only have the Duffy book on this topic and was so far quite satisfied with Duffy´s handling of the campaign and battle.
Can anybody who did read all three works say if Bowden or Goetz do offer any new perspectives?

Well, Bowden offers the most biased account that it is possible to give; short of one being written by the Corsician guy himself. It almost sinks to the level of Bowden's hagiography "Last Chance of Victor" that tries to show that everyone let down St Bobby of Virginia at Gettysburg so the defeat wasn't his fault. Please note Mr. Bowden it's the Civil War and NOT "The War of Southern Independence" – the South lost, get over it! That said it's got lots of details on the smaller actions of the campaign with plenty of maps so it's very popular with American wargamers. My contacts in English wargaming community tell me his ad hominem attacts on David Chandler discredit the work over there. I'd also treat his information on the organization on the Russian army as suspect since it's not in line with Duffy.

Goetz offers another account that is very similar in outlook to Duffy. Indeed, when I got mine I reread Duffy and found the exercise rather repetitious.

Dear Erik, Graf, 138, and Monsieur Ami,

I know we`ve been over the skirmishing methods and capabilities of Austrian Line Infantry before, but here`s the question again; this time concerning 1805.

As you`ve all read the book, can you advise me if IR23 had skirmisher deployed?

Regards,

Mike.

I've only goptten Bowden available at present – I lent out the Duffy and Goertz. Add to this Bowden does not have and index so rereading the reelant section IR23 appears to have been dispursed by artillery fire from Thiebault's artillery – (2nd Brigade under St. Hilaire) Thiebald states

"….let the formidable mass approach to the appointed distance and then my nine pieces of ordinance abruptly unmasked, and my whole line poured in one of the most destructive fires evever seen… My satisfaction may be imagined when I saw every round tear square holes through these regiments until they fled in mobs of fugitives before my three battalions. I had not lost one mand and if I had had a brigade of cavalry at my disposal not one of m assailants would have escaped." (Bowden page 350)

This lead to the obliteration of Rottermund's command. No reference is made to skirmishers.

Hope this helps.

@MichaelCollinsHimself

I did just look in the Goetz – there appears no Austrian skirmishers from IR23.

But the French against them, in the Goetz, are not to include Theibault (of Saint-Hiliare's division, and there to be found the 6 12-pounders of the artillerie of the corps), but only the men of Vandamme, including his divisional artillerie, and some dragon of Boyé attacking up on the Austrian right.

In all the Goetz goes for some 15+ pages in detail on this gernreal area of the fighting, with two good maps and many sources and notes.

I did have the Bowden, some while ago, but was not over interested by him and did give him to a friend, so I do not have a perfect comparison of the two textes of the Bowden and the Goetz.

- votre ami

Thank you Gentlemen for the information,
I`m planning a game based on this combat – seems to be a bit more to this particular epiode than I originally thought after reading the Castle Osprey.
The other area in which I require information about is to what extent the Austrians were supported by battalion guns.
Mike.

Your best bet if your are planning a game is to hold your nose and get hold a copy of Bowden – it's a book geared towards the wargamer and you'll get a lot more detail on the interactions with lots of useful details.

I'm not sure you'll find the detail you're looking for on the battalion guns since Bowden is such a francophile.

For a tactical account of Austerlitz, Goetz is head and shoulders above the competion. The book is also a great bargain, as it was bookclubbed and remaindered almost immediately. Anyone with even a passing interest in the battle, and that probably includes everyone here, really ought to have a copy.

NSN

I`ve just had the books delivered,
Bowden says that IR23 had 12 battalion guns.
Mike.

The detail in Bowden's book even for the Russo/austrians is very indepth and well diecussed. I highly recommend his book because of this reason. It is very hard to get accurate information on the allies of this period but Bowden does a great job here.

Shane

There is little point in rehashing the debate that occurred when Bowden published, except to note that those who were familiar with the Austrian and Russian forces found many technical flaws.

The detail in question, the battalion guns of the IR 23, Bowden says there were 12 guns, i.e. two per battalion. There is no information about their effect, or even if they were deployed. The firefight is covered in 3 paragraphs, from the French point of view. Compare to the pages Goetz devotes to this.

NSN

thx NSN

I hear alot about Goetz on this so I might get his book on the subject as well. It goes to show that what information one has and is the only information you have can seem like that is all there is and thus taint your idea of historical accuracy.

Is it still in print and what is the title ?

Regards,
Shane

1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon And The Destruction Of The Third Coalition

by Robert Goetz

You can purchase it for $15 USD shipped from the reseller at Amazon…

NSN

ahh great, thx mate. I think I might have that one saved to my wish list. thx for the heads up.

It might be best to look at this from a reading list point of view. If you know nothing about the campaign, read Ian Castle's updated Osprey. Then, have a quick read of Chandler before reading Ian's hardback book, "Austerlitz: Nap and the Eagles of Europe" which goes over the whole campaign in a reasonable amount of detail and the main battle more so. Read it in conjunction with Goetz, as he is really only writing about Austerlitz and gets into some quite deep detail, so you need to understand the terrain and layout of forces in advance.

Bowden is the tricky one – excellent new research on the set up of the GA, it starts getting into bias with pretty much senior officers in Bavaria and by Austerlitz, it is a mix of official propaganda and an overactive imagination. Under no circumstances should you accept anything about the Allies as correct per se. He has only used Duffy and some guesing – he was found out for presenting Germanic refs as his own work when actually copied from Duffy and likewise for Russia with some refs not even saying what the original said. It should not be an acceptable practice, but some years later it still goes on. He really ruined his reputation by the childish attack on the already unwell Dr. Chandler, but it is the refs that should make anyone dubious of his methods.

In terms of his guesswork, the artillery is a good example. he has read that Austrian battalions had two guns each adn so, presented "12 guns" as fact – makes the French sound even more heroic in 138's example. In fact, he "forgets" that the Austrian regts were the same size as pre-05, just in smaller battalions. Consequently, we should remember that this means 6 guns per regt and then, it was usually the case that regts deployed to Germany usually had 4 x 3pdr and 1 x 6pdr if all three (pre-05) batts went. Unfortunately, you can see from the KA records that even the Austrian staff are guessing about their numbers of troops, so there is no record of the regt guns. However, Mahler with 6th batt IR49 makes no mention of guns and so, no guns should be with the 6th batts. WIth IR23, we are probably talking about a handful of 3pdrs.

Belated thanks for all your responses.

We played a "game" of this encounter last week.
The skirmishing question, was ruled out because the Austrians must have been formed in two ranks and so, therefore no 3rd rankers to be deployed.

Seems the French light infantry was not so effective on the day and it failed to dislodge or soften up the first Austrian line of battle – this was the case in the game too.

Now, it just happened that one of my players is rather pro-French and seemed to think that in the 20 minutes, or so under fire should have been a lot more effective.
My rules may have got it wrong, but it seems to me that Vandamme gave up with the first assault after realising that an engagement of a properly deployed line of battle was necessary to defeat IR23.

What do you all think?

Regards,

Mike.

Anyone care to comment on the above?

I wouldn`t normally bump my own thread up to the top, but I`ve made an exception because it seems to me that too much attention has been paid to petty arguments in the playground recently!

Mike.

Seems to me your rules produced an appropriate result, in actuality it took a formed line to dislodge IR23. Reading through the thread, I think there are a few things to consider.

1. Vandamme first encountered Miloradovich's Russians. the Russians were driven back fairly quickly due to the collapse of their left around Pratze, but Ferey's brigade was involved already (more than just Vandamme's lights). Vandamme then advanced to meet IR23.

2. IR23 had formed up behind the Russian line with their right anchored on the Stare Vinohrady. So skirmishers are unlikely in context. This was the 2nd line Vandamme's forces encountered.

3. Vandamme made contact with the Austrian sometime around 10am or shortly before. IR23 was driven from its position around 11am, so it maintained itself against the French for a full hour and at one point counterattacked and drove back Vandamme's left (Hubler and the IR23 grenadiers) before Boyé charged in with some dragoons to stabilize the situation.

So I'm not sure it is reasonable to expect two battalions of light infantry to "soften up" the 6 battalions of IR23 and achieve dramatic results in 20 minutes when it took some 8 battalions a full hour to dislodge them in actuality. Or am I misunderstanding what you are saying your opponent said? I may be confused about what sort of responses you are looking for!

Carnot,

Well yes, I also doubt that the two light battalions were enough to do sufficient damage to the Austrians on their own.
Vandamme`s artillery was delayed and only came into action once the main battle with IR23 had unfolded.
I just wonder what expectations Vandamme had of his own light infantry operating, as it had to, without the support of his divisional guns. I suspect that these were not as high as my Francophile friend.
But my friend`s main point was that that the French light skirmishers would have been firing at longer range than the Austrian line would have employed volley fire and therefore my game mechanism of opposed rolls between skirmisher and formed lines was in error.

I`m not looking for specific responses as one may like to be surprised and informed, but I guess the subject of the nature of "skirmishing" methods may have been resurrected – in that perhaps the French light companies may have been operating on the flanks in a more concentrated manner -perhaps in a loose, or open order and therefore, may have been more effective. This may have been the case, as the grenadiers of IR23 were posted on the right of the line of battle and were perhaps suffering more than the rest when the initiative was taken to see off the French light infantry with the bayonet?

Mike.

I'll have a look at Frèche's memoirs when I get a chance to see if he says anything relevant, although as I recall his comments were pretty brief. I have envisioned Hubler's counterattack as 24e leg penetrating the vineyards and then being driven back with a concentrated push coming around their left flank. The suggestion that Hubler's counterattack on the French left might have been motivated by a desire to stop the "sting" of 24e leg. in loose/open order and drive them off is certainly plausible.

The extent of the vineyards on the Stare Vinohrady in 1805 is not known, but given the need of grapevines for morning sun it would have been planted on the south and east slopes only, which would be the reverse slopes from Vandamme's perspective. Austrians deployed on the crest or north and west slopes would likely have been exposed which might support your suggestion.

For Vandamme's expectations, hard to say. The action on the heights was basically an "encounter" battle – Napoleon (and therefore presumably Vandamme) had expected that the heights would be empty or only very lightly held, which they would have been had Kutuzov set off as early as he was supposed to. So maybe an initial loose/open order action of 24e leg against the Russians until Ferey's brigade comes up makes sense, with 24e leg then working around to the north around the Stare Vinohrady.

Thank you Carnot,

"…Hubler's counterattack on the French left might have been motivated by a desire to stop the "sting" of 24e leg. …"

Its just a thought, but that "sting" may not have been felt so much on the Austrian left flank which was supported by IR23`s battalion pieces. These may have deterred the 24th`s skirmish line in approaching to an effective range?

Mike.

Mike -

Frèche of 24e leg doesn't say much on the attack on the heights, but notes that they marched on the Austrian position which included 4 pieces (I suspect 4 x 6 pdrs rather than IR23 battalion guns) that fired canister. A brisk 15 minute assault resulted in the capture of the better part of an Austrian battalion.

From this, it would seem that Frèche was not involved in any skirmishing or preliminary action, just the final push after 24e leg had worked around the Austrian flank. This would support your suggestion of a skirmish line from 24e leg doing most of the fighting initially, although the regiment does shift to the left between the initial clash with the Russians and engaging the Austrians which would take some time. If the Austrians are driven back around 11am and the success of the 24e was a main catalyst for this, we can suppose that Frèche's 15 minute action might be around 10:30-10:45 or immediately after Hubler was driven back. 10:45-11:00 or so would see the consolidation of the French position and the crumbling of the remainder of the Austrian line.

From this timeline, Hubler's counterattack could be viewed as driving off the skirmishers and pushing back/delaying the advance of the regiment formed up behind them. Maybe more likely that Hubler's advance was designed to forestall Schiner's flanking maneuver rather than as an indicator that the French skirmishers were intolerable and needed to be driven off. But could be some of both involved.

Carnot93,

Very informative, as usual. You should write a book.

Steve

Keep the Internet free of ‘Milk Dud' posts!

Writing a book is too much work!

Carnot93,

Someone would probably say, "It had too many details" anyway! Yea, lots of work alright.

Steve

Keep the Internet free of ‘Milk Dud' posts!

"which included 4 pieces (I suspect 4 x 6 pdrs rather than IR23 battalion guns) that fired canister." More likely to be the regt 3pdrs I would have thought as firing ball from them was a bit pointless and reserve batteries were almost always six pieces strong.

Dave – could be. but if the battalion pieces were allocated 2 per pair of battalions, massing 4 at one point would seem to be a deviation from normal deployment. Also, in more than one case in 1805 the Austrians were operating with 8-piece batteries, which is the case with the Austrian artillery with the 4th column at Austerlitz. A six-piece battery would imply a 6/2 split of the pieces with the 4th column, 4/4 seems more likely and is consistent with at least one other similar deployment during the 1805 campaign. At Wertingen they positioned the 8 x 6 pdrs with a pair of divisions on each flank and the battalion pieces spread out in close support of the battalions. From what I can piece together for the defense of the Pratzen, we have artillery on the flanks that would be consistent with a 4/4 split of the 6 pdrs, with 4 by the Stare Vinohrady and the other 4 apparently with Jurczik. Kudriatsev's battery of 12 pdrs formed the main column reserve battery more or less in the center of the heights, either as a single battery or 6/6 split in two positions in close proximity to each other.

So my guess remains 4 x 6 pdrs, but 4 x 3 pdrs is certainly possible. The specifics of artillery placement are probably the hardest to determine with any certainty unless you luck out with a memoir by an artillery officer.

@Steven H Smith

You know he did write a book !!

In the truth, our colleague @Carnot93 is simply and purely brilliant with these sujects. My only sadnees of his book was that he was not thrice the length, with a beautiful and rare binding and plates to match the beauty and rarity of the work.

So OK, I do like to see the detailes, it is very true.

:-)

- votre ami

"So my guess remains 4 x 6 pdrs, but 4 x 3 pdrs is certainly possible. The specifics of artillery placement are probably the hardest to determine with any certainty unless you luck out with a memoir by an artillery officer"

True – the clue is often in the source as the staff only worried about the reserve guns, while the regt worried about its own guns. However, don't forget that the Mack reorg had created the six batts where previously there had been only three with 5-6 between them. Mack was certainly pushing for the massing of guns in Germany too.

Dear All,

Comparing the descriptions (Goetz and Bowden) of which French units were involved in the final infantry assault on IR23 and the subsequent firefight the details of this are a little confused.
From left to right, Goetz has the 24th Legere, 46th, 57th & 55th in the French line of battle, with the 4th, 28th & 43rd in support, whereas Bowden has the 4th, 28th, 24th Legere, & the 55th in the first line.
But Goetz does provide a specific detail in that Shiner`s 24th Legere (plus a btn of the 4th in support) manouevred to attack IR 23 from the north.
Now, I thought that this would have implied and resulted in a devastating flank attack, but if the 23rd`s battalions were spaced at greater intervals and if perhaps the positioning of the Grenadiers acted as a flank-guard and prevented this happening?
One would have thought that such a flanking attack would have led to a more speedy collapse of the Austrian line?
But however, the firefight continued for some time.

Now Bowden also mentions casualties from battalion guns suffered by both the 55th and the 24th Legere – now they would be concentrated either on the flanks of the Austrian line (according to Goetz), or on the left to centre of it (according to Bowden).
If this is so, Freche finding 4 guns in the position that his command assaulted (on the left) and the 55th on the right of the French line of battle also suffering casualties from gun fire, then I see, eight-pieces in two "half-batteries" is quite possible.

Again, thanks for the help in this.

Mike.

Mike: a few tidbits that might help in sorting it out. Loose translations follow, my notes in brackets.

IR23 vs. Vandamme

From Le 28e de Ligne: Historique du régiment, by Emile Simond (1889), p. 119:

Describes the attack on the Russians by 1st division [St. Hilaire] and Schiner's brigade of 2nd division [Vandamme] …

To the left of the 1st division [St. Hilaire], General Vandamme quickly made his dispositions against the new enemy line, supported by 2000 horse [Hohenlohe's Austrian cuirassiers and possibly also Rakovsky's detachment of 3 squadrons], which presented themselves in their turn in front of the 2nd division. Ferey's brigade was sent in front, and the 28e ligne was placed behind the brigades of Schiner [24e leg] and Ferey [46e et 57e ligne] in support.

The 2nd division, forming a square [see more detailed description of this formation from the history of the 57e below], held, by its left, the left of the right wing of the enemy army, from which some battalions started forward, and, by its line, completed, in conjunction with the brigade of the left of the 1st Divison [Varé's brigade], to pierce the center of the Austro-Russians and threw back all their scattered battalions and dispersed them beyond Hosteriadek and in the marshy meadows of Krzenowitz and Augezd.

After Ferey's brigade had driven back the enemy with the bayonet, General Vandamme ordered the execution of a change of direction to the right with all his troops to go, by the heights of Augezd …

L'Histoire du 57ème Regiment d'Infanterie, but Patrick Turlan (1990), pp. 109-110, says much the same using the exact same words as Simond in places.

General Vandamme established the brigade of General Ferey, composed of the 46th and 57th, two battalions en bataille, and two others remaining to form a square. [this is the formation described in Soult's report, a precaution against enemy cavalry] The 28th regiment was kept in reserve to support the two attacks.[two attacks being Schiner's and Ferey's? Or Ferey advancing, falling back, and making a second attempt?]

Bigarré (of 4e ligne) notes in his memoirs that one of his battalions was positioned on the left of the division as a flank guard. He doesn't mention any actual fighting until the action with the guard cavalry. I am not sure of the source at the moment, but one source indicated that his other battalion was detached to support Schiner, Bigarré himself remaining with the battalion left on the flank (so no mention of the action in Bigarré's mémoires).

As for the flank attack, Frèche notes that the final assault of the 24e threw back the Austrian line in 15 minutes. So I would say this was a quick and devastating flank attack leading to a speedy collapse of the Austrian line. The starting point of the flanking attack is a good while after the start of the action. No flanking maneuver was possible for Schiner due to the presence of Hohenlohe's cuirassiers and Hubler's counterattack. When Boyé came in and threw back Hubler he also covered Vandamme's left against attack by Hohenlohe, allowing Schiner to maneuver on the flank.

So from 10:00 – 11:00 we can figure some initial advance and maneuvering (say 10-15 minutes) where we can imagine some action of skirmish lines, a formed attack by Ferey's brigade (+ 55e from Varé's brigade) with two battalions in line with supports (say 30-40 minutes with perhaps two assaults and firefight). During this 30-40 minutes, Hubler advances against Schiner and is then thrown back by Boyé's dragoons. Finally comes the flank attack from the north lasting 15 minutes in which the Stare Vinohrady is seized by the French and the Austrian line is hopelessly compromised. The seizure of the SV is the key action, but we would still need to figure some time (maybe 10-15 minutes) for the line to actually crumble/retreat to clear the position by around 11:00.

That's how I piece the various accounts together. Obviously there is some room for variations in interpretation, particularly concerning the timing, but the generalities seem clear enough.

Allied Artillery on the heights

55e ligne did take heavy artillery fire, but Ledru des Essarts specifically attributes this to Russian artillery – 6 pieces defended by two Russian regiments near Pratze. When these are driven off and the artillery captured, Ledru describes them taking refuge behind additional Russian troops supported by 8 pieces (total so far is 14 pieces). These are also overthrown and most of the artillery taken according to his account. Miloradovich's Russian contingent of 4th column had 24 x 6 pdrs, all or nearly all of which fell into French hands in the initial assault – some to Thièbault, some to Varé, some to Ferey. The other four Austrian 6 pdrs may have been positioned on the left of IR23, but Ledru's account doesn't offer anything to support this.

As I recall, Jurczik is mentioned as having some artillery, and his battalions would not have had battalion guns unless they had picked up some stray pieces from Olmütz (something that is not documented anywhere that I have seen), so I favor the idea that the other four Austrian 6pdrs were with Jurczik. Kudriatsev's big guns would have been ample to inflict heavy damage on Ferey's and Varé's guys in the center, I would guess the Austrian 6 pdrs would have been redundant at this point.

This brings us to two interpretations of the allied position on the heights. Three lines are mentioned in French accounts: The first is universally accepted as Miloradovich's line. The other two are sometimes construed as Rottermund (facing west) and Kamensky-1 with Jurczik being a reserve used to counterattack to the south. This can also be viewed as a single zigzag line (Rottermund/Jurczik/Kamensky-1). These two interpretations are key in determining whether there was an additional line encountered by the French after IR23 was driven from the SV. The timing of events after 11:00 suggests to me that there was an additional line formed up farther back on the heights.

OK, so maybe more detail that you wanted. But your fault for getting me started.

OK my fault, and perhaps my fault, in that I shouldn`t have chosen an event in the middle of a battle to play out and test.
Either way though, we can be sure of only 4 guns supporting IR23 in the assaults by Vandamme`s men and that they`d be on the right of the Austrian line opposed to the 24th Legere?

Thanks for your assistance.

Mike.

That sounds good to me. Sprinkle a half dozen 3 pdrs in pairs down the line as well. But be sure to watch out for Russian 12 pdrs on the left of IR23, they're back there somewhere.

Carnot,
I`ll be trying this out in the next week or so…
Are you quite sure there would have been 3 pdr regimental guns available to IR23? – I`ll run two test games then; one with and one without regimental guns and see how they turn out…

Regards,

Mike.

yes. All of the 1805 regiments had their 6 x 3 pdrs. IR23 had remained in Vienna during the Bavarian campaign, so all should have been present. The other Austrian forces included several battalions left behind by their regiments for artillery escort or garrison duties that were collected together at Vienna. For these regiments, the battalion guns would have gone with the regiment. The remaining Austrian forces were reserve battalions (the sixth battalion of the regiment or 5th fusilier battalion). I have not seen any reference to battalion guns being issued to the reserve battalions.

So IR23 should have had them, the other Austrian battalions at Austerlitz should not have had them (1805 Austerlitz shows all battalions having them which I now believe to be an error). We can consider the possibility of loss between Vienna and Olmütz due to broken axles and such, but these problems seem to have hit the heavier pieces more. In other 1805 battles I have seen references to them being attached to the battalions per the regs, but Dave suspects they may have been massed.

There is a difference between *should* and *did* and there is always *might have* and *conceivably* to consider. But I'm quite sure (which is just short of being entirely certain).

Here`s a little account of my second test game of Stare Vinohrady (Austerlitz).
…this one went a bit further than first attempt. This time
16 turns were completed; a scale time of 64 minutes.
In this test, I extended the range of skirmishers so that between 5 and 10 cms they would hit a formed unit on the score of a "6" (it taking two hits, or more to cause a damage point).
In general, the events of the actual battle were followed.
In this test the French light infantry assault by the 24th Legere was split between the two flanks (although I believe that the attack was more concentrated on the Austrian's right flank).
The fight between Austrian light regimental guns, 6 pounders lasted and the skirmishers lasted six turns before the Austrian Grenadiers counter-charged the 2nd battalion of the 24th and forced it to retire.
On the left, the 1st battalion of the 23rd had been subject to skirmish fire but it had only disordered it.
The counter-charging grenadiers were then attacked by the 8th. Dragoons; retiring in disorder back up the hill along with the 6th. battalion 23rd, they regained order and formed into division-masse and received the charge of the cavalry who lost the combat and retired shaken.
In turn 8-10 the French organized their line of battle for the attack and the Austrians reorganised their first line moving the 6/23rd and Gren/23rd to the extreme right and fed forward the 6/24th (as they did on the day) but in this particular case between the 4/23rd and the 2 sections of 6 pounders.
Owing to some bad artillery die rolls, the French advance in turns 10-13 saw no damage from the Austrian guns until the 2/55th was hit by a section of IR23`s 3 pounders at about 160 yards (7 centimetres).
Prior to the infantry combat, almost all the guns along the Austrian line found their targets, but the damage caused was not enough to affect French morale.
And in turn 15, the first infantry combat, the weakness of the Austrian battalions started to tell as the damage caused made the units "shaken", leading to a command reaction test at the start of turn 16. The reaction test was passed.
But in turn 16, The French caused yet more morale damage to the Austrian's first line of battle.
Another command reaction test at the start of turn 17 was failed and most of IR23 and the two other battalions (6/24th and 6/1st) retired to behind the much smaller Austrian second line of battle.
The 6 pounders were obliged to retire too and IR23`s regimental pieces were abandoned on the ridge.

Not quite an exacting recreation of events, but something very similar in result.
The skirmisher rule variation (at 5-10 centimetres) meant that the first assault was really a fight between the French light infantry and the light Austrian guns. The skirmishers were made to recoil several times. But noting how the Austrians in this engagement gave fire at long range, perhaps there is a case for allowing a long range musketry effect here? Perhaps at 5-10 cms it too should be a score of a "6" on a d.6 to cancel out a skirmisher hit – being just as much "a long shot"?

I'll try this again this week, but with the rules as they stand and with 24th Legere`s first assault taking place concentrated on the Austrian right.

Regards,

Mike

I tested this today where the initial skirmish action is concerned, using my standard skirmishing rules and concentrating the action on the Austrian right. This attack by the French light infantry was enough to do some limited damage and provide a trigger for the Grenadiers and the 6th battalion of the 23rd to bayoent charge both of the French light battalions involved.

As far as my rules work out, this problem seems to have been resolved.

Again Gentlemen, thank you all for your help.

And, if I have missed anything please let me know.

Regards,

Mike.

‌‌

++ A thoroughly invaluable thread far too important, clear and concise to be left in the wasteland of 2008! ++

As important for specific information on the correctly titled Austrian KK- Salzbourg IR#23 [rather than it's heretofore misidentification as a 'landwehr' unit]. The ONLY complete Austrian Regiment in the theatre of battle!

I think what is often missing in the knowledge of such big fights, is that it was not a case of one side attacking and the other defending.

This is just one of many 'encounters' where despite the state of knowledge, surprise was to some extent mutual. The Austrian line was advancing and deploying in response to the push back and some routs by the Russian first line (Miloradovich), who took a long time to recover (and some didn't) BEHIND the protection of the now front line of Austrians.

This creditable stance by Gens Rottermund and Jurczik and time spent holding the French back rather more underlies the true spirit of the Austrian soldier than the generally hack 'knowledge' and dismissive essays of English speaking writers and historians.

This ones for the Redux!
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regards davew≠

Thanks for bringing this back up, enjoyed reading the thread.