"Historical inaccuracies in 'Killer Angels'?" Topic

My son has the assignment of discussing four historical inaccuracies in 'The Killer Angels'. He has three. Can anyone help him out? Thanks!

The sergeant calling Chamberlain "Darlin'" did not imply that he was in the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Brigade.

Hmmmm, dialogue comes to mind. I am sure not every word spoken by our historical characters is anything they actually said. It's a novel, why look for historical inaccuracies? Novelists include conscious inaccuracies (inventions) in order to tell a more interesting story….

What three do you have?

Chamberlain's being present at Pickett's charge, the runaway slave, and Longstreet insisting that they move around the Union flank (he didn't).

"Longstreet insisting that they move around the Union flank (he didn't)."

Au contraire, according to Old Pete at least.

From Manassas to Appomattox :

I said "We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital".

To which, Longstreet says, much to his surprise Lee replied, "If he is there tomorrow I will attack him".

Chamberlain's being present at Pickett's charge …

The 20th Maine was sent, I believe, into reserve behind the Union center after they were relieved on Little Round Top, so they were in the vicinity of Pickett's charge.

Here's an inaccuracy of sorts:

The film implies that a Confederate victory north of Gettysburg on the first day caused Lee to decide to attack the Union army. But Doubleday and Howard stopped the Confederate attack. Hancock made a decision to withdraw to Cemetery Hill for the purpose of creating a strong defensive position south of Gettysburg, not because he had been defeated north of the town.

link

"From Manassas to Appomattox :

I said "We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital".

To which, Longstreet says, much to his surprise Lee replied, "If he is there tomorrow I will attack him"."

The thing about Longstreet's whole argument of fighting an offensive campaign but a defensive battle is that he didn't mention/write about it until Lee was safely dead. There is no evidence that that was the way he thought before the battle.

"The boys have found themselves a John Henry, Cunnel dahlin'"

"The 20th Maine Infantry had been in Virginia a year. Why was the sight of a black man such a surprise? Had they been in a Whites Only section, where there were no Blacks or slaves? In fact, Free Blacks were not unusual in Maine.

The name John Henry was never applied to Blacks during the Civil War. John Henry was a mythological railroad worker from West Virginia in the 1870's.

Bonus: Kilrain is not an Irish name, and Buster was not used as knickname or name during the Civil War. The only other Buster I've heard of was the Silent Movies star from the 1920's, Buster Keaton.

"There is no evidence that that was the way he thought before the battle."

So your argument for dismissing the direct testimony of the person about his own actions is that he didn't write about it soon enough to suit you and that no one else collaborates it.

And your argument for believing something different would be?

It seems to me you are calling Longstreet a liar on very dubious grounds. He may well be a lair, I never met him, but what is the sufficiently compelling reason to believe so? That you would like it not to be true? At the very least the matter is clearly in dispute and so is not an inaccuracy.

There is a 1996 book on the subject.

"A Killer Angels Companion" by D. Scott Hartwig.

Thomas Publications, Gettysburg PA 17325.

Well here is an obscure inaccuracy. The part of the book where Buford, Gamble and Devin are together and Gamble goes off about how Buford's troopers held against Longstreet's infantry at Thoroughfare Gap. The problem is tha Buford was nowhere near Thoroughfare Gap which occured on August 28, 1863. Longstreet was delayed instead by extremely stubborn resistance from straight Union infantry that held a chokepoint in the Gap.

General Kemper didn't die at Gettysburg, as is implied.

When the 2oth Maine are resting on Big Roundtop on July 3, the men in the background of one scene include an officer holding binoculars and staring into the distance. He has ramrod-straight posture. The "officer" is really the bronze statue of General Warren on Little Roundtop, where the scene was photographed.

Another part of the same scene shows a car on the horizon. Could this vehicle be part of Longstreet's flank march?

Buster Kilrain did not exist. His name isn't Irish and Buster was not a Civil War era name. The only Buster I've ever heard of was the 1920's movie star, Buster Keaton. Note that his bandaged shoulder wound changes shoulders at one point.

The 20th Maine had not had a very hard time, at least from Confederates, in the war so far. At Fredericksburg, they were in reserve.

Potomac is not pronounced correctly in the first sentence of the movie.

"they never came to help us at Thoroughfare Gap (in 1862)," General Devin or Gamble says to Buford at one point. None of those commanders were at that small battle.

The first Confederate who confronts Harrison the Spy is Santa Claus.

etc., etc. I have found 45 errors, but I still love the movie.

Why should an Irishman hve an Irish name?

Why not call him "Buster" as 'bust' was in use in the UK?

Why not trust Longstreet as any attack on (St) Lee would be refuted anyway? From reading about him (and other 2nd American Civil War generals), it suggests flanking was a normal routine in such situations. [A coat trail there!]

While Longsteet's memoirs are self-serving and unreliable in a few places, they are still a valuable resource. Modern historians such as Stephen Sears (Gettysburg, p.234 ff.-the best one-volume history of Gettysburg) and Jeffry Wert(General James Longstreet, p. 257) accept Longstreet's 1877 account.

At Fredericksburg, they were in reserve.

Incorrect. They were pinned down on the slopes of Marye's Heights.

Assigned to the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac, the 20th Maine served at the Antietam, but did not see action. Later that fall, the regiment was part of the attack on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Though the regiment suffered relatively light casualties, Chamberlain was forced to spend the night on the cold battlefield using corpses for protection against Confederate fire.

They were in reserve at Antietam, and missed Chancellorsville due to an outbreak of smallpox.

John N. Holly -

First, no Union units were pinned down on the slopes of Marye's Heights because they didn't get there.

The right wing of the Army of the Potomac was pinned down on the flat plain in front of the Heights. Many regiments suffered horrendous losses, but the 20th Maine lost 4 men killed. They were in reserve as part of Griffin's Division, on the left part of the field near the railroad.

Two sources that should not be used are the scenes in "Gods and Generals," which are partly fictitious and partly based on Chamberlains' own poetic but largely fictitious account, "My Story of Fredericksburg." See "Joshua Chamberlain; the Soldier and the Man" by Edward Longacre, "The Fredericksburg campaign" by Francis O'Reilly, and "Fredericksburg!, Fredericksburg!" by George Rable.

ACW generals had real beards ? <VBG>

>The first Confederate who confronts Harrison
>the Spy is Santa Claus.

Noticed that too :-)
This might be the only guy in the movie
with a real beard though.

>but I still love the movie.

I also do.

First, no Union units were pinned down on the slopes of Marye's Heights because they didn't get there.

Beg pardon, but several divisions got at least part way up the slopes: Getty, Sturgis, French, etc.

Chamberlain's unit came later (Stockton's Brigade, Griffin's Division, V Corps) and was pinned down as well. For instance, the West Point ACW Atlas (Map 25(b)) states that Griffins Division page ended up becoming intermixed with other divisions at the foot of Marye's Heights. Whether "the foot of the heights" means actually on slopes, or on a flat plain is subject to interpretation, I suppose. In order for Griffin's Division to become intermixed at that location, it had to have advanced forward out of its reserve position.

The fact that 20th Maine only suffered 4 killed is of no moment. It doesn't mean that they weren't at the foot of the heights.

Two sources that should not be used are the scenes in "Gods and Generals,"

Agreed. It's an appalling movie. I would never even think of using that as a reference. I rely on about 60+ books dealing with the ACW that I have in my book collection.

But, we digress from the original question …

Here's another point of view. Maybe Stuart is unfairly maligned. No sources, just a quote from my brother:

- It's easy to criticize Stuart, but Stuart only rode around the AoP because his return route after a recon raid was blocked by large Union infantry forces – he had not planned a "glory ride." Yet Stuart still was where he was supposed to be – at York, Pa., on time (he did not meet Lee there because the ANV had turned toward Gettsyburg – Ewell's II Corps actually counter-marched back south to get to G-burg), *and* Stuart had kept almost all the AoP cavalry busy chasing him instead of impeding Lee. And as you can see form the OB Lee was not entirely without horsemen: Jenkin's bde was at point, with Ewell's II Corps, and Imboden's force was rear guard (they were up front to repel a possible AoP counter-attack after Picket's Charge, though.

John,
I rely on about 60+ books

It appears that none are on the battle of Fredericksburg.

"So your argument for dismissing the direct testimony of the person about his own actions is that he didn't write about it soon enough to suit you and that no one else collaborates it."

There have been several articles written about this over the last few years. It's not that no one collaborates it, it's that Longstreet himself does not collaborate it. He never mentioned it in letters home, to other people, in speaches after the war, not anywhere, until after Lee was dead. The only source for the idea that Lee had agreed to fight an offensive campaign with a defensive battle is Longstreet. Not any of the other ranking generals of the ANV ever mentioned it and several argued against the existance of any such plan.

The very concept of fighting a defensive battle to gain a victory would have been laughable to a 19th century general. You can not win a battle by trying to get the enemy to attack you. Once you give up the initiative you have to dance to his tune, rather than making him dance to yours. Had Lee followed this 'plan' and dug in some where and waitied to be attacked, then the AoP could have simply marched onto Lee's flank and forced him out of wherever he was and forced Lee to fight at a disadvantage. Just look what happened when Lee was forced to fight defensive battles, The Overland Campaign, he kept putting himself in front of Grant and trying to block his path to Richmond. The result was that Grant attacked only when he wanted to, continually flanked Lee, and fought the campaign on his terms. And this was deep inside friendly territory, knowing where Grant wanted to go.

I agree that we should rely on the people who were present virtually all of the time. However, Longstreet was writing years after the war and was defending himself against people who were accusing him of having lost the battle through his poor performance on the second day. He was trying to shift the blame to Lee who was not present to defend himself, (but who had taken responsability for the defeat already).

Jeff -
The cavalry under Imboden and Jenkins were irregulars, much better suited to looting than more useful cavalry tasks. Stuart had left with Lee the two regular brigades of Jones and Robertson. Lee misused the latter two brigades.

It appears that none are on the battle of Fredericksburg.

From The Fredrricksburg Campaign, Winter War on the Rappahannock, by O'Reilly (which you cite) (p.386):

Ames hurried back to get the 20th Maine. Stockton lead the center of his brigade up the slippery slope to the swale.

…

The fairgrounds divided the 20th Maine in half. The right shied away from the wall when they saw that "a perfect storm of bullets pierced and shattered the fence at every instant."

…

As soon as Stockton's Brigade passed the swale, it felt the full sting of Confederate fire.

That's why I questioned the accuracy of your statement:

They were in reserve as part of Griffin's Division, on the left part of the field near the railroad.

O'Reilly states that they came forward under fire, which contradicts the notion that the 20th Maine remained in reserve for the entire battle.

We're chuckling over the fact that we've got pro and con on every topic from different people on the forum. Tristan's read your points, and did some backup research, and is ready to defend his arguments. Thanks, everyone.

Just a side note: this is an assignment in my son's advanced placement high school history course. His teacher is a retired Navy captain. The kids get a very good history education for a public school. And the teacher doesn't ignore military history. Dad being an ACW gamer didn't hurt, either.

link

Kilrains in the Civil War and you can do a Google search to find out which county in Ireland your name came from.

Buster was a fictional charecter to reflect the Irish in the war and a veteran soldier.

Well, if it's the film your talking about, the scene where Lee rides the line and is mobbed by the men is complete fiction. The day of the shoot was broiling, there were technical problems, they had done several shots that didn't work, and the director told Sheen to ride over to them and do some P.R. work with them. The result of his little P.R. ride is in the movie. It was done as one shot to test the camera equipment that had been acting up.

"The first Confederate who confronts Harrison the Spy is Santa Claus."

Actually he isn't. He's just a fat slob reenactor who should never have been allowed on the set. :)

"I agree that we should rely on the people who were present virtually all of the time. However, Longstreet was writing years after the war"

And I agree Longstreet's account should be regarded as suspect but that does not justify saying categorically it is false. It's like having a motive and not having an alibi, it makes possible you did the crime but it doesn't make you guilty. If someone writing speculative historical fiction wants to put it in it is not a mistake or an inaccuracy, just an opinion.

From The Fredericksburg Campaign, Winter War on the Rappahannock, by O'Reilly (which you cite) (p.386):

"Ames hurried back to get the 20th Maine. Stockton lead the center of his brigade up the slippery slope to the swale."

Note: [previous paragraph]"Stockton's brigade did not venture farther" (than the swale).

and [Next paragraph] "Colonel Stockton never intended his brigade to attack, and he ordered his men to lie down. The brigade engaged in 'long-range musketry.'"

(From p.252): "… nine hundred yards across an open field that tilted upward to the base of Marye's Heights. A couple of houses and fences dotted the landscape, but otherwise, it was devoid of cover…When Mason's men passed a small ripple in the ground, a swale of negligible proportions--all hell erupted."

Frank O'Reilly and myself have given tours of this area, despite the fact that the plain is now covered with houses.
We estimate that the swale, now very difficult to find, may have been 2 feet high at most. Frank got carried away with the alliteration of "slippery slope." It gave very minimal cover, but as infantrymen know, even a ripple is wecome in a flat landscape. O'Reilly's book does not indicate the contour intervals, but the area between the Millrace and the Stone Wall was and is very flat. Marye's Heights begins, very abruptly, just west of the Stone Wall. O'Reilly's map on p. 366 shows Stockton's position as reserve for its division.

Chamberlain sometimes exaggerates and lies about his exploits. His accounts of the 20th Maine at Fredericksburg and elsewhere have been successfully challenged. That brings to mind another error in the movie/book. The 20th Maine did not execute a swing of the left flank as Chamberlain states it did on Little Roundtop. See Desjardins for details.

Inaccuracies;

First and formost – a one armed man (the other being in a sling) firing a dirty and fouled rifle musket and it doesn't even kick, let alone fly right out of his hand. In fact, NONE of the re-enactors had enough sense to make their rifles apppear to "kick" when fired. And for the record, I have been an ACW re-enactor since 1981.

Second – the dismounted cavalry on the first day was WAY to densely packed – the entire defensive line actually had the density of a skirmish line.

Third – re-enactors insisting on having NCOs repeat officers orders – it didn't happen. It was an officer's job to be heard when giving orders. When a Colonel commanded his regiment to do something, he addressed his company officers who then gave the commands to there men.

Fourth – ignore the airplanes flying overhead – they don't exist :)

The BEST scene in the movie – when Amistead and Garnett meet briefly, under fire, approaching the fence and Armistead tells him to ignore his flank and keep driving on the copse of trees. It is the best representation of generals making instantaneous command decisions, from the front, ever shown in an ACW perion movie.

Mark

There appears to be some confusion here.

The Killer Angels is a book.

Gettysburg is a movie, based on the book. (And we all know what that means.)

Inaccuracies in Gettysburg do not necessarily reflect inaccuracies in the novel.

Inaccuracies in the novel might or might not have actually made it to the film.

The lad is doing a report on inaccuracies in the novel, not the film. A film is an easy target. (For that matter, novels are fairly easy targets, if not as much so as films.)

But as historian Russell Freedman once told me, "It's historical fiction. You can write any thing you want."

If I hadn't read George McDonald Fraser I would never have had any idea how large an influence on history Sir Harry Flashman had.

Stockton lead the center of his brigade up the slippery slope to the swale.

So, O'Reilly is wrong on this point then? Why would he indicate up a "slope" to a point, if he meant across a flat plain to that same point.

There is much debate about all these topics, made obvious by the plethora of books and articles written. Much of it seems rather a matter of semantics and searching for some detail long obscured by time.

I still do not think one can consider the 20th Maine to have spent the entire battle in reserve, if the regiment went forward and came under fire near or at the front line. My concern is so much about whether he went up a slope or not, but whether it can be properly argued that the 20th was kept in reserve.

I've been the the battlefield a couple of times (last visit over a decade ago). Quite frankly, I do not recall many specifics of geography, other than the most obvious, but I do recall that much seemed to have changed since the ACW. Perhaps the so-called "swale" cannot be found?

His accounts of the 20th Maine at Fredericksburg and elsewhere have been successfully challenged.

Or so those authors think!

<q That brings to mind another error in the movie/book. The 20th Maine did not execute a swing of the left flank as Chamberlain states it did on Little Roundtop. See Desjardins for details.

Well, that's a subject of much debate since sometime after the ACW ended. As a summary on that topic (relying on Desjardins) states:

"The older accounts of the battle emphasizes courage and the competence of the commanders. The newer accounts center on the fog of war, confusion, and the accidents that sometimes turn a battle around. Both accounts are true. The role of the officers, and the men, shouldn't be diminished by the fog and confusion. However, the nature of war is not understood if the desire for glory wipes clean the fog."

Nice discussion--albeit off-topic. I learned a couple of things.

Thanks.

The very concept of fighting a defensive battle to gain a victory would have been laughable to a 19th century general

The French were convinced of this as a tactical method in 1870. They were defeated, but it was clearly 'conceivable' at the time. It was specifically based on recent military experience and the improvement in weaponry.

Have not read all the thread but how about the "Myth" that the 20th Maine saved the Union Army?
(Now ducking for cover)
VR
James Mattes

Yeah, we all know it was Tom Hanks who saved the Union and won the war…

No, Tom Hanks won WWII.

advocate,
Perhaps I used the wrong term. A general schooled up to the 1860s where Napoleon and Jomini were strongly taught would not have thought of fighting a defensive battle to gain victory was realistic. The only time I can think such a system was plausable would be the colonial wars of the period. Where you stand in a square and let the natives try to close to pointy stick range.

T Meier –
"And I agree Longstreet's account should be regarded as suspect but that does not justify saying categorically it is false. It's like having a motive and not having an alibi, it makes possible you did the crime but it doesn't make you guilty. If someone writing speculative historical fiction wants to put it in it is not a mistake or an inaccuracy, just an opinion."

I think we'll disagree on this one. The articles I've read have convinced me that Longstreet's writing was both self serving, and false. However, your caveat concerning historical fiction is spot-on.

"I think we'll disagree on this one."

I'm not saying you are wrong, I'm saying we just don't know. I a work of history I'd expect to see the topic explored and the reader left to his own opinion, in a work of historical fiction that would still be best but coming down one way or the other is acceptable and can not be characterized as inaccurate.

The way I see it is you have uncorroborated testimony, so you must consider other factors and circumstances. Longstreet didn't say anything about it till Lee was dead, that could be to avoid being refuted (though this is doubtful, Lee almost never got involved in such arguments)or out of shame at having Lee know he lied or it could be he did not want to distress Lee. They were great friends and remained so to Lee's death. It's one thing for Lee to say "this has all been my fault", he was no fool and knew few would blame him and those who did would be shouted down but it's quite another to have a good friend say, "yes, you are to blame, it was monumentally stupid and I warned you".

It not being standard doctrine does not have much weight, Longstreet was pig-headed and had his own ideas about military matters.

On the plus side Longstreet was a notably honest man, at least in pecuniary matters, in an age when such honesty was not altogether common. He was contentious but not as much as many other officers he was not known for being prickly about his reputation and was thought very highly of by all his comrades in arms until he took a job after the war with the U.S. government after which he was vilified.

His memoir does seem a bit disigeuous, particularly about what kept him in the Carolinas just prior to the battle of Chancellorsville but to tell a flat whopper of a lie of such magnitude. I don't know…

The articles I've read have convinced me that Longstreet's writing was both self serving, and false.

Could very well be true, but don't forget that he was bitterly attacked by many Southerners after the war when he became a part of the Grant administration. There were those in the South, members of the "Lost Cause" movement, who scapegoated many, except their "beloved" General Lee and a few others. The "movement" (if it can be called that) is still alive in some circles.

If Longstreet was wrong to criticize Lee after his death, what does that make criticism of Longstreet? (Who, to the best of my knowledge, is also quite dead.)

Longstreet's reputation as a general and an honorable man strikes me to support his assertions as to what happened at the battle. He was there, he was privy to Lee's decisions (which were indeed poor), and we were not. Furthermore, I see his silence until after Lee's death to be a sign of loyalty to his commander and friend. Had he criticized Lee prior to the beloved general's death, what would we have thought of him? What is more pathetically shallow than the man who, for political gain, accuses those he formerly supported of folly and opens them to ridicule while aggrandizing himself? Longstreet kept his silence while Lee was alive, and spoke to correct the record in his own memoirs. (What, was he supposed to lie about his experiences to satisfy the "Sainted Lee" fervor?)

I am an admirer of Lee, but there is no question he screwed up at Gettysburg, to the cost of many men's lives and the victory he'd hoped for. (For which, Southern though I am, I am glad the South did not achieve.) I find it hard to believe that no experienced officer advised Lee to attempt a flanking maneuver as Longstreet suggests. Indeed, with the absence of Jackson, Longstreet was the most likely officer to suggest such an action, and the man most likely to actually confront Lee in opposition to his desire for a frontal assault. Hood wouldn't have. Pickett with his head full of glory certainly wouldn't have. In this instance, I think the benefit of the doubt falls squarely on the side of Longstreet, and the burden of proof on his critics.

In any case, Longstreet's claims are not an inaccuracy in the novel.

Actually, Lee did attempt a flank manuver. The second day's fighting would have rolled up the federal line nicely, had Longstreet not been so slow to act on his orders. He was ordered to attack the Federal left. Had his troops moved into position and attacked first thing in the morning he would have rolled up and over the round tops and into the Federal left and rear. There were no Yanks there until relativly late in the day. Longstreet marched his troops behind the wrong ridgeline,(don't have my books handy to confirm which ridge it was), until it ran out, counter-marched his troops, went over that one and marhced behind a second to get into position. In the end he telegraphed his blow and warned the Feds. Even with all that he still wrecked Sickle's Corps.

Had he sent scouts out the day before and prepared the route in advance he could have gone straight through the area and Gettysburg might very well have been a major Rebel victory wrecking several Federal Corps.

This was what Lee's defenders used after the war to shift the blame to Longstreet, with some justification. That and his joining of the Republican party made him almost a traitor in many eyes.

Had he sent scouts out the day before…

Wasn't most of his corps still marching towards G-Burg on the first day?

…and prepared the route in advance he could have gone straight through the area and Gettysburg might very well have been a major Rebel victory wrecking several Federal Corps.

Or, had Stuart done what he was supposed to do.

He had two division in position to attack on day two, the third, Pickett's came in later.

"Or, had Stuart done what he was supposed to do."

Different situations. Had Stuart remained in contact with Lee then the battle would probably never been fought at Gettysburg. Lee would have had time to concentrate his force and fight where he wanted to. Had Longstreet plotted out his movement ahead of time he would have saved hours and launched his attack before any Federals were in position to defend the left flank.

Back in 1976 I visited Fort Laramie which was hosting a "camp of instruction" for National Park Service employees on the post Civil War army. I got to talk to some of the rangers/privates and heard an amuzing account of how they consistently were encountering tourists who were confused by their most recent visit to say Forts Lowell, or Laramie. What was causing the amusement was how many visitors were confusing images from old Hollywood log-pallisade fight off the Indians movies with actual posts built where the local trees couldn't support that sort of construction then or now. Some of the rangers I spoke with actually had indignant visitors demand to know why the NPS had torn down the walls they remembered so well!

I've since named this condition "mental ground clutter" a state in which personal memories get combined and confused with information from other sources to the point it becomes "real" to the observer. I wonder if this effect might not explain this controversy over General Longstreet?

Dn Jackson, et al,

The "attack at dawn myth" for 2 July is, unfortunately, one of the most enduring inaccuracies ever forced on American historiography. There never was any such order. Rather, it was a total fabrication first suggested by Jubal Early and then formally made by "Parson" Pendleton soon after Lee's death.

And if there had been such an order for the First and Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia to attack at dawn on 2 July, then Robert E. Lee would be accused of being one of the most careless and inept army commanders imaginable, because the enemy's positions were not then known. As it turned out, the time table for the Confederate attack on 2 July was that of the commanding general, for he was the one who Ok'd that Longstreet delay his march to the south end of the field pending the arrival of Law's Brigade that was at the rear of the First Corps column.

Extensive examination, discussion and detailed analysis of this specific topic, and much, much more, exists in the pages of LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY: ROBERT E. LEE AND THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. I would certainly encourage you to read about this in the above-captioned work, and many of the other aspects of Southern leadership for this epic campaign that are examined therein.

Regards,

SCOTT BOWDEN

The Longstreet debate:

According to one source I read, it was Hood who continually asked for permission to swing around the Union left flank and Longstreet's final response was: "We must follow General Lee's orders," or words to that effect.

JW

JackWhite,

The Hood request is a separate issue wrapped around the Longstreet 2 July attack.

Once the First Corps arrived at the south end of the field, and as Hood's Division was extending the Confederate line further south by deploying onto Warfield Ridge that was to McLaw's right, Hood sent forward his scouts from the famed Texas Brigade. According to these guys, who skirted past the already deployed Federals on Houck's Ridge/Devil's Den area, they got up on the Round Tops, saw the Federal rear areas, then made their way back to Hood with the news.

While this was happening, Lee was also on the south end of the field conducting his recon of the recently-repositioned Federal Third Corps and modifying his plan of attack. He decided to launch the attack "en echelon" that would still accommodate his earlier-announced desire to roll up the Federal line from the left by attacking up the Emmitsburg Road. After receiving his instructions from Lee (who, by the way, thereafter gave specifics concerning the upcoming attack to others in the Third Corps), Longstreet went to visit Hood about the attack. It was at that time that Hood made his pitch about swinging his entire division around (Big) Round Top. Longstreet, wisely, nixed the request.

Orders were to roll up the Federal line starting with the advance of the far right of Hood's division and progressing up the line with Hood's left holding as well as could be towards the Emmitsburg Road. Thus, detaching Hood's entire command from the rest of the corps would wreck the modified "en echelon" plan and result in the divisions of Hood and McLaws not being able to work in conjunction with each other. That, coupled with the distance involved in moving a division-sized command around (Big) Round Top, the problem of proper artillery supporting such a move, the advancing time of day (it was approaching 4:00PM), and more, made Hood's request an unreasonable one.

Regards,

SCOTT BOWDEN