"Canister fire revelation" Topic

Canister Fire, my interpretation of a paper given George Jeffrey called "THE FIREPOWER SYNDROME PART THREE – ARTILLERY FIRE EFFECT – CANNISTER"

In his article George discusses Canister in detail citing Muller etc and his findings. George, after studying the research comes to the conclusion that Canister fired by Guns of the Black powder days will fire off a canister charge which effectively forms a Cone shape or in a 2D perspective a diamond shape. The mouth of the barrel being only inches wide the individual balls rocket out of the canister as it disintegrates at maximum possible velocity. The Cone increases with distance as the balls travel along their flight path in an ever increasing spread or "Grouping" (military term) towards the target. The balls towards the centre of the grouping travelling further simply because they are travelling in a directly straight forward line more or less. The balls in the outer grouping are spreading further and further apart and thus become more susceptible to the eventuality of increasing wind resistance as time elapses simply because their flight path is diverging away from the direct path.

George explains to us that the actual grouping as detailed by Muller in his trials was a cone spread of 32ft per 100yds distance or a divergence of around 3 degrees. George assumes that Muller was including the rounds of the entire cone including extreme diversions and stray balls. Now, it is well known that an average canister round had about 80-120 balls in it so one might think that one round from one gun might potentially hit 80-120 men. However, as can be imagined a cone means that the balls are all travelling within the said cone, not all in the one small central part of the cone, some to the left, some to the right, some high and some low. Muller says that as much as 25-33% of these balls are lost one way or another due to the large diversion expected in the cone and thus many will miss the intended target; 25-33% in fact. So mathematically the potential hit rate would probably be more like say 50-80 potential hits depending on the gun and its number of balls per canister round. This is in fact totally improbable but it is exactly what some rules systems try to portray in Napoleonic war gaming.

As it is obvious that Canister was not a penetrate round but more an area affect round fired across the frontage of its intended target one begins to understand that men in the second and further ranks in all probability would not get hit while the poor fellow in front of him was still standing. Now, if you take into account that roughly there was a space of 2ft per soldier in a File you could easily see that with Muller's trials at 100yds you could expect to hit 16 men with one gun firing canister in the front rank or 8 cavalrymen (4ft) with one shot. At 200yds it would be 32 soldiers or 16 cavalry, at 300yds 48 soldiers or 24 cavalry etc…So, as can be seen the potential casualties of between 50-80 could never be achieved as some war games rules try to tell us. So a designer must understand that even though a round like canister potentially might cause massive casualties in fact did not.

Now, if we look more closely into George Jeffrey's own discussion on Muller's trials he states that Muller includes in his finding stray balls etc that were fully divergent from the main grouping which travelled more or less directly forward. If you take out this from your equation and concern yourself more so with the main grouping you find the divergence was more like 1.6 degrees or a grouping of about 8ft at the 100yd mark, 16ft at the 200yd mark and so on. Now, putting this into perspective as to potential killing power one begins to understand that the actually kill zone is much smaller and potential casualties on the front rank drops significantly. At 100yds and 8 ft grouping you get no more than 4 casualties if infantry are the target! 200yds and 8men and so on and you can halve this if trying to fire at cavalry!!

Another point to be made here is that at 100yds the grouping will be half the size of what it would be at 200yds. So at 100yds those two men can be expected to suffer possibly a large number of multiple hits and die horribly. At 200yds 4 men might be also hit multiple times but at 300yds and a spread of 24ft 12 men would be hit with many of them singularly.

Now, if we put all this into perspective from a full battery point of view of say 6 guns spaced equally at military spacing of 10yds per gun you will get a frontage or kill zone of 60yds or if you include the possible divergence of 1.6 degrees at 100yds it would be 62 yds kill zone. Now, 62yrds converts to 186ft or a frontage of infantry in line of 93 men roughly. So potentially a battery of six guns firing at an infantry line 100yds away potentially might send down range 480-720 balls over a 62yd frontage but will never score more than 93 hits due to only 93 men ever being in front of the guns!! A point often lost with Rules designers. However, if the range to target is 200yds and basing the spread or grouping at 8ft per 100yds as said by George Jeffrey this 62yds doubles to 124yds or in infantry terms 186 potential casualties. If we go one more and advance the range to 300yds one can see the potential casualties caused increases to 279men.

I did an experiment myself by drawing up a to scale diagram of a battery of guns 10yds apart firing at range increments of 50yds to 300yds and drew in the cones of fire according to George Jeffrey's finding and was shocked at what I found. The gap created by the beaten zone between each gun's kill zone (cone of fire) was enormous at 50yds and only spread to full 100% coverage or overlap for each gun at around 300-350yds!! At 50yds the coverage on a potential infantry or cavalry line was a mere 14%!! And only a 7% increase was attained per 50yds range increase!! This means that even if an enemy Line was shot at by a full battery at 50yds by 6 guns 86% of the men in that line could expect not to get hit. At 100yds only 21% of the line was covered and 35% at 200yds and so on. To me this was devastating to find out and totally changed my entire perception of Canister fire. I have changed my entire artillery system because of this and am convinced of the authenticity and accuracy of his findings.

As George Jeffrey rightly tells us, nearly every rules writer for Napoleonic's and other black powder periods for that matter have totally got it wrong! Canister was not more effective close in but far more effective further out to what was one could call, "Optimal Range" Anything closer or further away in range is going to decrease the potential casualties; Close range due to less frontage covered by the gun's individual cone or kill zone and at long range due to loss of velocity and windage affects on the balls.

I want to thank Michael Collins for emailing me his material regarding this and I strongly suggest some of you guys ask him to politely send the same material on to your selves. It was a pure eye opener for me and this without saying a word about his conclusions regarding Round Shot and it propensity to cause far greater casualties than Canister ever could due to its penetrate capabilities as against canister. He rightly asks the question why canister was then used over round shot at closer ranges of 400yds or less and correctly concludes that the physiological effect of the canister fire was far greater on the enemy than the greater number casualties caused on a dense formation.

Regards,
Shane

>>>>Another point to be made here is that at 100yds the grouping will be half the size of what it would be at 200yds. So at 100yds those two men can be expected to suffer possibly a large number of multiple hits and die horribly. At 200yds 4 men might be also hit multiple times but at 300yds and a spread of 24ft 12 men would be hit with many of them singularly.<<<<

sigh, mistake made, should have read :

Another point to be made here is that at 100yds the grouping will be half the size of what it would be at 200yds. So at 100yds those 4 men can be expected to suffer possibly a large number of multiple hits and die horribly. At 200yds 8 men might be also hit multiple times but at 300yds and a spread of 24ft 12 men would be hit with many of them singularly.

sorry.

Come back Charles Grant with your canister cone; all is forgiven.

I'm sorry if this sounds rude, its not meant to, but isn't the response…..well, d'uh!?!?!

Simialar effect to a modern GPMG. Fired at a group of targets at a distance, say 600m+ you take advantage of the grouping, or beaten zone, and get the same effect of an area of fire. Fired at a target at, say, 200m range the grouping is so small the MG is basically another rifle.

This was the reason the Bren Gun was not suitable as a MG – it was too accurate (too small a cone of fire even at range).

Daryl

Oh, Charles was right – and his bounce sticks too. There has been a period I think in which the reality has been overlooked in favour of the colour and devastation. As I said before several time,s the French at Wagram fired 96K rounds for about 20K Austrian dead and wounded from all weaponry – do some calculations and you can see that any artilelry round has about a 5-10% chance of hitting.

Muller is in the British Library, so I will have a look at his original thoughts next time I go. I am not convinced about even spread across the front curve of the cone, so it will be important to see M's targets and distances.

I know little about Napoleonics and cannister but just going by the maths presented. It seems most of the analysis and conclusion is predicated on this assumption.

George assumes that Muller was including the rounds of the entire cone including extreme diversions and stray balls.

Take away that assumption and divergence goes to 3 degrees and the coverage doubles.

In fact Muller's stated 32 feet spread at 100 yards is almost exactly the 10 yard interval between guns, i.e.100% coverage.

That would make more sense as the period manuals emphasise overlapping fire in general. I think a look at Muller would help.

George Jeffrey was quoting Muller's work in which Muller arrived at a cone or grouping of 32ft at 100yds which George said would have to of taken into account the entire spread of the blast including the extreme balls. George calcuated that 25%-33% of the balls were lost either too wide of the mark or orver or under the target. He concluded that Muller, in his trials actually added this 25-33% into his grouping to arrive at the 32ft spread.

George took this away from the equation to arrive at an actual spread of 8ft per 100yds of the mass of the grouping which increased to 16ft at 200yds and 24ft at 300yds etc.

I took these numbers and did some calculations, at first I thought it was an increase of 7% per 50yds but in acuality it is 7% per 25yds. At at 50yds the coverage was a mere 14% for 6 guns spaced at 10yds a piece against an equal frontage target. The actual increase was 7% per 25yds the range so that 100yds is 28% – 200yds was 56% and 300yds was 84% while 375yds hit 100% coverage. The magical number seemed to be 7% per 25yds at a regimented 10yds spacing per gun, bring the guns closer and the percentage increases while widening the spacing obviously lowers the percentage.

Shane

Fascinating stuff no doubt to those who are interested in such things, but most rules seem to deal with round shot and cannister in a common sense way that presumably the average wargamer can happily accept, I certainly can but then I confess the minutia of Napoleonic ballistics/buttons/precise shades etc. tend to send me off to slee………

D,

"Simialar effect to a modern GPMG. Fired at a group of targets at a distance, say 600m+ you take advantage of the grouping, or beaten zone, and get the same effect of an area of fire. Fired at a target at, say, 200m range the grouping is so small the MG is basically another rifle."

Appreciate what you're aiming at (no pun intended) but you can actually move a GMPG – and thus create a far wider grouping and go for increased bursts, thus it's much, much more effective than any rifle at 200m or less.

Obviously with artillery firng cansiter its a bit harder to achieve the same effect.

DB

Our popular perception of canister fire (and often roundshot fire) is that it was whitheringly devastating and a single gun would drop scores with each shot. Oh the humanity! Imagine a battery, hub-to-hub, and nothing could stand before such carnage spewing death machines but…

..but they did, regularly.

Artilelry was frontally assaulted. I'm sure it wasn't a task that troops looked forward to but you could, if you were courageous, walk up to them in formed ranks and reach them.

When I think of accounts of units repulsed from an assault by a battery of guns, they do not mention massacre or a loss of entire regiments. They would more likely say that the action was too hot or that they were obliged to retire until support could be brought up.

It really couldn't have been as violent as we imagine. (Toss in the screams of the wounded, the soldiers soldiering on with smashed arms, the brain bits on the front of your tunic, and stepping through the guts of a friend and it also gets worse than we imagine)

The same though, I think, happens with respect to WWI machine guns and pushes over the top. There were perfect storms such as the Newfoundland Regiment, but even on the bloody opening day of the Somme where they ran full on into prepared machine gun positions, average casualty rates were 10-15%. They carried some positions also. You could frontally charge machine guns, reach and overwhelm them, and suffer 'acceptable' casualty rates. We though imagine that nothing could survive such fusilades.

A Napoleonic battlefield had much higher casualty rates than units 'going over the top' generally but if musketry and artillery was anywhere near as brutal as popular imagination colours it, nothing would survive… which is something similar to what happens in most miniature games. :)

@Shane

May be of interest ?

link

- votre ami

And here ?

link

- votre ami

un ami,

I don't know how you find this stuff but god man I appreciate it very much !! well done once more.

Shane

Also my thoughts.

Batteries rarely could stop a determined assaults for themselves. I was puzzled for the apparent contradiction between the common knowledge of carnage from cannister fire and the real accounts of the actions.

The narratives usually had a common pattern (though there are exceptions, of course): the formed unit advances – battery shots round ball, then cannister – if the formed unit pressed the attack the artillerists tried to pull out the guns and retire; then the infantry tried to shot the horses to avoid the guns being pulled out… Sometimes they succeed and some gun were captured, sometimes the battery was able to retreat unharmed.

That flow of advance-retreat-advance is never represented in rulesets. At least, the ones I have gamed. Still, it looked to be the common experience.

To avoid the unwanted results, batteries were supported by infantry (formed and skirmishers) and/or cavalry. How exactly, I have not able to fully understand yet.

The thoughts of Shane looks very interesting. Though, I have some doubts about how cannister was actually fired and the effects of different types of ammunition (ready cannister vs improvised cannister, for example)

Is this why they fired double and triple canister just to make sure they hit someBODY?

@Shane

You are very kind. Thank you.
I do not know some times what I will find to search in English, and especially to search in the language of the German people. So, it is very interesting to me to see new things.

:-)

@vonLoudon

It is this problem of hitting SOME body, one might think, that did lead to the licorne for the Russians. It was longer than a howitzer, and vould fire a nice shell with area effect to good distance, thence to switch to cannister.
Also, the extra size of a Russian companie (12 pièces) would help to put in more fires.
But yes, dear colleague, to hit SOME body was not so much assured.

- votre ami

good points basil,

If one really thinks about the results of canister on an enemy line one would come to a totally different conclusion than is the normal idea today as to how canisters affects are shown.

If 6 guns fire canister at an enemy line at say 300yds range the Infantry in the line can be assured that they are at almost optimal range for larger calibre guns firing canister where the spread of shot will be 84% covered by the guns frontage of 60yds. So if this frontage is equal to the width of the battery of 60yds it would be 93 men counting in the spread of the outer guns on both guns. Now 84% of 93 men is 78 men.

So if the 6 guns fired one salvo they theoretically should cause 78 men casualties to the enemy line for their frontage. Now if the gun line fires two rounds per minute then that means the enemy line, or whats left of it should be able to continue their advance for 30seconds or approx 45 paces (at 90paces per min). Which is roughly another 35yds. This would bring the range down to 265yds.

Now, if you equate a 7% coverage on an enemy line per 25yds range increase then this would roughly drop from 84% down to say 70% coverage. If the guns fired again and the Infantry continued to advance and moving second and third ranks forward to plug the gaps the number of men possibly hit in the next salvo would be 93men x70% = 65men. Now, providing the Infantry still came on after another salvo the distance would drop to about 230yds. At this range the Line coverage by the cones would drop to about 60% or 56men possibly hit in the front rank and so on.

As the enemy line advances the cone coverage is reducing all the time and will continue to drop at 7$% increments per 25tds decrease. The problem is, if the Battery continues to fire every 35yds the Infantry will still potentially suffer horrendous casualties along its front rank and as said earlier probably be repulsed because the fire is considered too hot.

Now, my mathematics is based on 35yds per salvo for an average crew providing the enemy is marching at 90paces per min with one salvo per 30seconds. Change any one part of this equation and the entire mathematics change along with it. If the enemy are marching at 75paces per min then the gun line would fire off a salvo every 30yds thus the line would suffer an extra salvo every six fired at the faster infantry. Or, if the artillery crew was very well trained and skilled they might be able to get off one salvo every 20seconds rather than 30seconds. This alone would be devestating to an enemy Line trying to assault the gun line. It would effectively add a third more salvos!!

So much can be seen from this mathematically that the mind boggles with the figure. But one point I would also like to show is that the number I explained above are based on the entire possible coverage resulting in casualties as per the fired range. Meaning that if the coverage of 6guns spaced 10yds apart fired on an enemy line 200yds away the coverage would be as follows : 200yds divided by 25yd increments = 8. x 7% per would equate to 56% coverage for 60yds +1.6% for the cone = 62yds.

So one salvo of six guns equals 6 cones of 16ft wide (total 96ft or 32yds). If you have 1 man per 2 ft then one cone would cover 8men. add all six guns together you get – 6x8=48men potential hit for one salvo. Now add to this the possibility of stray shots hitting left and right of the cones and you climb to 52men potential hits. Or, 200yds / 25yds = 8 x 7% = 56%. 93men x56% = 52.

So, if you know that 52 men are potential casualties then you also know that the other 41 men along that 62yds frontage are NOT casualties. However, 52 men potential casualties in reality probably never occurred. Many of the men hit probably were hit multiple times and this would have been prevalent even more so the closer the range became while that fire of 41men NOT hit increased as the range decreased…

So if a Line Advanced to say point blank range from 300yds distance at an advance pace of 90paces per minute while the guns fired at a rate of one salvo per 30seconds it potentially would suffer 8.57 salvos along the way with maximum potential casualties of:

Salvo at : 300yds = 78 potential casualties
Salvo at : 265yds = 65 potential casualties
Salvo at : 230yds = 56 potential casualties
Salvo at : 195yds = 52 potential casualties
Salvo at : 160yds = 39 potential casualties
Salvo at : 125yds = 32 potential casualties
Salvo at : 90yds = 23 potential casualties
Salvo at : 55yds = 13 potential casualties
Salvo at : 20yds = 7 potential casualties

This comes to a grand total of 365 potential casualties over the 9 salvos or an average of 41 per salvo. Funny thing is that the frontage of the enemy line of 62yds would only equate to 93men per rank and even if three ranks were there this would only be 279men! I have never read of a gun battery totally slaughtering everything in its path to 100% casualties on the enemy. Eylau and Frieland come to mind for devastatingly effects but even they do not add up to 100% casualties along an entire frontage.

So the secret lays in the word, "potential"casualties. This is the "maximum" number of casualties one might hope for, not the actual casualties. Batteries often failed to achieve even anything remotely close to optimal maximum casualties potentially inflicted. The real figures fell well short of this for any number of reasons. Fatigue, smoke and conditions, own casualties or smashed guns, poor fire control or slower fire rate, superior enemy march speed which meant less salvos and so on. But the largest factor by far is the grouping of the cone. The closer the enemy line is the smaller the actual grouping and even at longer ranges some of the balls would be relatively close together as to hit the same mark (man) multiple times.

You may achieve say 56% coverage on an enemy line at say 200yds or 52 potential hits but just how many of these potential hits actually hit the same man, two, three, four or even more times? It is hard to say with any clarity as every gun grouping is different on every shot with any gun fired. Couple this with the number of balls carried in the canister, the wind-age effects on velocity and gravity itself and things become complicated to say the least.

Suffice to say that if the average hits caused were 41 per salvo then this is 82 hits per minute roughly maximum. If you average out that each hit is roughly 2 per man along the frontage giver or take then this equals about 41 men per minute per six guns or 6.8 casualties per gun per minute. As most rules sets are based on an average of between 40-60 men per figure one does not need to be a mathematician to understand this is far from devestating at all.

The main problem hen becomes for the rules designer to work out the casualty rates per turn and what ever time factor that may be set to.

Regards
Shane

p.s.

I would like to point out that the above is only theoretical and providing the Infantry kept on coming while the Artillerists stayed to the guns til the final 25yds. This, on a battlefield probably would never of happened to the degree I have depicted. It is just an exercise to explain my point.

Shane

@Shane
"while the Artillerists stayed to the guns til the final 25yds. "

At the Borodino battle, the Major-General of Artillerie Alexander Ivanovich Graf Kutaisov did invite his officiers to not withdraw the guns nor allow the artilleurs to leave from them too early. This invitation was well received, and none did leave leave their pièces or remove them, but did chose to die beside them when such was required.
This was a final breaking of the concept of saving the guns "too soon" that did afflickt the Russian artillerie until 1805.
The Graf Kutaisov did himself lose his life on the field of honor that day. He was 28 years old.

picture

- votre ami

Stunning job, Shane!

Keep sharing your thoughts. I learnt a lot of them.

Best.

All this is very interesting indeed, but putting the mathematics aside for a moment, didn't some artillerymen of the time insist that the final discharges of a battery standing its ground were always the most deadly? The Russians seemed to believe this in the later Napoleonic Wars, and at Waterloo, Mercer, after seeing the devastation his guns inflicted at close range, ordered his men not to fire until the enemy was 60 yards away.

The number of cannister balls per battery disharge looks the same as a battalion could discharge in musket balls. It's hard to say which one would be more effective.

Interesting point, Captain Snort.

In theory the musket ball should be more effective than the canister ball. A musket has obviously much better internal ballistics and a lead ball with much higher structural density than an iron canister ball has even better external ballistics.
So if canister is the killer round at 300 yds, the musket ball when shot in huge numbers should be too, but it obviously wasn´t.
I think what is missed is the fact that balls are not only spread sideways. If the target zone is 90ft wide at 300 yds, its 90ft high too, so at that distance over 90% of all canister balls are over or short misses.

QUTE: "Suffice to say that if the average hits caused were 41 per salvo then this is 82 hits per minute roughly maximum. If you average out that each hit is roughly 2 per man along the frontage giver or take then this equals about 41 men per minute per six guns or 6.8 casualties per gun per minute."

I find this number very high also. If you remember that generally one battery is firing on a single company of 120 men, we get a casualty rate of proportions that would amount to suicide and these soldiers were brave but not suicidal. 30% casualties in a minute would completely destroy the combat effectiveness of a company.

Fascinating discussion.

The problem with the old Charles Grant (and other) cannister cones is that everyone in the pattern is a target not just the front rank. It lead to cannister fire being a kind of death ray that destroyed anything in cannister range.

Possibly if you use similar rules you could only dice for the front rank of figures. However each rank of figures under his rules represents one and a half ranks.

This type of rule also doesn't take into account the rate of fire.

>>>>Mercer, after seeing the devastation his guns inflicted at close range, ordered his men not to fire until the enemy was 60 yards away<<<<

This is a very good point. From Mercer's point of view it would look devestating indeed as he and his gunners could see each cone entering the enemy line and blowing great holes in it. I would imagine this would be the same for any battery commander simply because he was witnessing a slaughter.

If Mercer's battery of 6 guns were firing canister at 60yds range and were spaced 10yds apart as is standard practice then according to Jeffrey each gun would produce a cone roughly 5ft wide x this by 6 guns and you get a coverage of about 30ft or 10yds. Now, if you look at the maths Mercer's battery is taking up 60yds frontage so if the enemy line also took up 60+ yards then the cone total of all 6 guns would only cover 10yds combined of the 60yds frontage of the enemy infantry. This means 50yds of the enemy frontage is is the beaten zone or to put it in simple turns, in a safe zone between the guns.

So if only a total of 10yds is covered by the guns then this becomes 10ydsx3 = 30ft. each man being 2ft across this becomes a mere 15men susceptible to being hit! Hardly a slaughter.

However, if you believe Muller then the maths completely change. At 60yds the cone of each gun would be 19.2ft! add all 6 guns together and you have a coverage area of 6x19.2ft = 115ft! Now, if each man covers 2ft you get this : 115ft divided by 2ft = 58men! So at 60yds according to Muller Mercer's troop would have fired a salvo causing about 58 hits!!

So who do you believe on this, Jeffrey or Muller ? If you read Mercer's view then you would have to say Muller but Jeffrey is adamant that Muller's reports accounted for a much larger cone because Muller added every stray ball into his grouping.

Which ever is correct will give you the accurate cone we are looking for and thus be more able to predict casualties from it. This is the whole purpose of my discussion, to get to the bottom if it all. I tend to agree with Jeffrey but cannot be sure.

Also Jeffrey is adamant that the balls do not have a penetrative power at all but at 60yds I really wonder if this is true. It is said that black powder balls do not have the kinetic energy to punch through one man and into the next one behind and so on. I would question that on two points, 1/ canister balls were supposed to be a little larger than musket balls for a start and thus a larger kinetic enemy within them. 2/ At 60yds or less I feel the balls are probably travelling as such a speed as to punch through flesh quite easily and hit ranks behind? I am not sure on this.

So this begs the question,"If canister balls do have penetrative power to what point would the kinetic energy be sufficient enough to allow each ball to punch through a rank or two?

Shane

I've fiddled with the mathematics of artillery fire, areas of effect, area of a cone, etc, etc,..here and there. As I recall what I was most impressed with was the sheer volume of area encompassing a 'miss' in the verticle plane. I've always tended to think a little too 2-dimensionally in terms of area of effect, and I was surprised to learn that the vast majority of 'misses' occur due to the vertical deviations as opposed to the lateral.

Either way you wouldn't catch me marching cooly up to a battery any way you slice it. No thankee!

>>>>think what is missed is the fact that balls are not only spread sideways. If the target zone is 90ft wide at 300 yds, its 90ft high too, so at that distance over 90% of all canister balls are over or short misses.<<<<

In my original post in explaining the grouping I did say that the grouping went in all direction as follows:

""""However, as can be imagined a cone means that the balls are all travelling within the said cone, not all in the one small central part of the cone, some to the left, some to the right, some high and some low. Muller says that as much as 25-33% of these balls are lost one way or another due to the large diversion expected in the cone and thus many will miss the intended target; 25-33% in fact.""""

George Jeffrey explained this in his paper on the subject and said that as much as 25-33% of the incoming balls would be lost due to stray shots divergent from the main group and also the ever increasing spread of the cone. Muller rated the spread (including strays – 100% of the balls) as much as 32ft per 100yds while Jeffrey tells us the cone of the main group was more like 8ft per 100yds. Jeffrey is already taking out of the equation the strays, under shoots, over shoots and so on. He basically takes out the 33% loss rate which would hit nothing.

Jeffrey says that at 100yds the cone is already 8ft (already 2ft larger than a 6ft man so if you say that the cone is 1ft higher than the man and one foot lower yo will see some of the main grouping already flying over the enemy's heads while other balls slamming into the ground in front of them.

If the range doubles to 200yds then this grouping of the cone doubles to 16ft while the average man is still only less than 6ft tall this tells us the main cone grouping is already 10 whole feet wider in a vertical sense than the line of men!! If you excuse the lateral cone spread simply because the balls are probably still going to find a mark you are still left with the problem of the vertical spread which increases with range thus increases the loss rate of the balls over or under the target.

Nothing can be done with regards to the loss rate of the balls which fall short, they simply plough into the ground. However, if you consider the loss rate which fly's over the target they still have to come down to ground eventually. Jeffrey in his work explained that according to Muller's work a 9pndr actually recorded a 55% accuracy at 150yds while it increased at 250yds. While lower calibre guns such as the 6pndr decreased. This is interesting as Jeffrey states, the increase in accuracy at the longer range is due to the downward arc of the balls that flu high when they left the barrels!!

So according to Jeffrey the same thing would happen with a 6pndr at a shorter range while the same thing would happen when firing a 12pndr at a longer range. The balls which fly high eventually come down ad in all probability hit the target. So hit point was that you cant do anything about balls that fly low and eventually hit the ground but high ones do come down and begin to hit the target at longer ranges.

So if you deduct 33% of a grouping to account for strays, short and high balls you still have 67% in the main grouping. This loss rate of 33% is made up of balls which are spread out outside in all positions around the main cone grouping. So if you break this up into 4 sections 33/4 you get 8.25% which go, left, right, high, low. Deduct the 8.25% for the low ones and you still have 24.75% for the other three, left, right and high. If your target has a sufficiently long frontage you can safely assure that the left and rights will potentially hit, +16.5%. The last 8.25% balls which fly over the target at say a short range would actually hit at a longer range because they eventually drop when wind resistance and gravity become more dominant than the kinetic energy the balls possess.

Jeffrey says this is what is missing in many people's summation of canister and rules writters do not account for any of this. He is basically saying that although the cone increases with range the accuracy also increases to a point. Once kinetic energy of the balls drops so does the cone and all the balls although still travelling outwards in an increasing cone still arc towards the ground and the target. However, he also says that there comes a point (range) where the advantages of this slowly fade away when the kinetic energy drops so much and the spread so large that the potential casualties drops again under optimal and quickly as the downward arc increases with extreme ranges.

This is obviously why heavy canister was used at long ranges because much larger balls carry much more kinetic energy. Problem is that much larger balls also means less balls in the canister thus less potential hits.

Shane

@Shane

"Nothing can be done with regards to the loss rate of the balls which fall short, they simply plough into the ground. "

Or they will ricochet if the condition of the ground serves. In effect, if the ground will serve, this is preferred, as it reduces the shooting spread that is too high if one will aim in to the ground before the enemy.

- un ami

Hehe, thanks Shane, I err… missed that. :) Gotta say, this is a heck of an interesting thread by the way.

I have more data available from the ACW than from the Napoleonic Wars, but permit me to submit the following (from Arms & Equipment of the Civil War by Jack Coggins): An ACW 12-pounder smoothbore used a cannister that contained 27 cast-iron balls, each having a diameter of almost 1.5 inches. They were packed in four tiers, with sawdust holding them in place, inside a tin cannister, which was nailed to a sabot. "Cannister was used at close range, 350 yards or less. In an emergency, double cannister with a single charge was used." Note the large size and relatively small number of balls used. Naturally, a 9, 8, or 6-pdr would hold even less. Note also the nominal range of only 350 yards even with such large balls.

The book includes a diagram illustrating infantry charging artillery at the quick step from a starting range of 1,500 yards. It takes the infantry nearly 10 minutes to close to 650 yards, during which each gun gets off 20 rounds of spherical case (shrapnel). (In the Napoleonic era only the Brits had shrapnel, so others would be using solid shot). At 650 yards the guns change to solid shot and get off another 7 rounds each over the next 3.5 minutes, which brings the infantry to 350 yards, at which range the guns switch to cannister and get off 9 rounds each before the infantry reaches the range of 100 yards and breaks into a double-quick charge, after which the guns get off another 2 rounds of cannister (or double cannister) during the 40 seconds it takes the infantry to reach the guns.

>>>>Or they will ricochet if the condition of the ground serves. In effect, if the ground will serve, this is preferred, as it reduces the shooting spread that is too high if one will aim in to the ground before the enemy.<<<<

Aye this is true but as you say, you have to have the right conditions and ground to be flat and hard, not just firm for it to happen. If the conditions are right for richocet then great but don't be counting on it. I think the only real place you might find conditions sifficiently good for rickocet fire to be spain in any consistant form ? dunno ?

Shane

If anyone wants copies of the "Firepower Syndrome" articles by George Jeffrey, which by the way, included a discussion on musketry effectiveness then just mail me.

em_see@btinternet.com

These articles were originally in "Empires Eagles & Lions" (before it went glossy!).
All this technical stuff may have put some individuals to sleep, but here are just a few points that relate to how wargames rules deal with canister fire:

The effectiveness of a battery is ultimately tied up with the particular circumstances that exist on the day.
(e.g. regarding the range to the target; with the choice of large, or small canister being selected at the short and longer "ranges" respectively).
It`s been noted already (on another thread) that it would not be very uncommon that any battery would continue to fire until the last seconds and this would make sense too, if the gunners understood that their fire would be more effective at the mid-range of the ammunition type. The exception to this would seem to be if the battery was protected in some way by terrain.
It`s very easy to end up with "overkill" casualty figures if you disregard the target size.
Maybe the most important factors are visibity and terrain – the amount of smoke generated and how long it persists for would be limiting factor – perhaps someone with experience in artillery reenactment can enlighten us here – but I`d say so much smoke would get in the way as to slow the rate of fire and or make the estimation of the range and postition of the target difficult. On a parade ground, level terrain not problematic, but even with the slightest of dips and rises in ground level; a different kettle…?

eeerrr! I think I should have said:

"…it would not be very common that any battery would continue to fire until the last seconds…"

In the same way that it was rare for cavalry to impact with one another frontally at the charge and it was very rare that infantry ever got into bayonet fights (when not contesting villages), I suppose it ought to have been rare that artillery ever had the courage to stick it out against an aggressive assault.

Yes, the artillery would have had the psychological anchor of the guns to encourage them to stay but that would be offset by their not being designed/trained to fight at close quarters. If they had unloaded a few volleys of canister into an approaching enemy and those enemy continued to come on, they'd be wanting to beat feet.

An artillery commander, in the interest of keeping his guns, would therefore need to watch to gauge his gunners carefully and give an order to limber up and withdraw (if possible) if he felt there was any danger of being impacted but more importantly, if he thought his men thought there was enough danger to induce them to flee. In other words, in the big game of chicken that was played out all across the Napoleonic battlefields, artillery would necessarily tend to err on the side of caution.

A charging unit did not have to have the courage to charge home against artillery firing up until the very last instant. They had to just convince the enemy that they possessed that much courage.

Nafziger touches on this in Imperial Bayonets, citing both Muller's tests and the famous Strasbourg experiments run by Gribeauval.
Interestingly, Charles Grant also cites Muller and also Adaye who, uniquely as far as I'm aware, conducted his tests using British artillery.
Life's too short to go into the various results for each nation's guns per calibre. I think the figure of 80 to 100 balls per canister however appears to be a little too high.
Comparing the ammunition of the major antagonists an average figure of around 60 balls would seem more accurate- it should be noted that there were normally two weights of canister used, the larger projectiles being fewer in number, which implies that the case itself had a standard size for each nation.
The tables shown begin at a range of 300 metres. The graphs imply a greatly increased accuracy- or strictly speaking 'hit percentage'- below this range and down to point blank.
Unfortunately the graphs don't reflect the tables but only imply this accuracy. In other words, it would seem safe to infer that 300 metres was optimum range for canister.
The key here, when relating to wargames, seems to be exactly how artillery is represented- to be precise, how many models represent each gun.
To say that canister fire is far too powerful in wargames rules is true to a point. However, if we remember that one gun may well represent an entire battery, then the maths changes.
Grant's 'The Wargame' has just, appositely, come into my possession and is a case, excuse the pun, in point.
Dave Hollins wrote:
"Oh, Charles was right – and his bounce sticks too."
Well, he did consult the data mentioned, but unfortunately he misinterpreted it. Or, at best, he totally misapplied its findings.
The Adaye results concluded, as Grant points out, that the average 6lb canister round of 34 balls achieved just ten hits, the target being 30 yds wide and 6ft high.
Now we must remember that these tests were carried out in daylight, in peacetime, and against a solid target.
The only allowance Grant makes is for the solid nature of the target. He therefore takes into account the gaps between files and reduces the number of hits to just five.
This equates to roughly one in seven balls hitting a target.
It's then that things go badly wrong for Grant's canister cone- incidentally the term cone is a bit of a misnomer. If you've ever seen the device it's more akin to an irregular lozenge shape with a truncated end. I think he chose the name for reasons of alliteration as it only alluded to the fire bursts mentioned in the tests and not to the device's actual shape. I think 'canister kite' would have been more appropriate-.
For a start, Grant increases the odds from 1 in 7 to 1 in 6 in order to accomodate the practicalities of a six-sided die. In addition, he makes no allowance for actual battlefield conditions, notably smoke, fear, tiredness,multiple hits on the same man, etc.
But his biggest mistake, and this is where Grant most definitely got it wrong, is this- he, incredibly used two totally different ratios for infantry/cavalry and guns. Yes, I hear you cry, this is often done in wargames rules. Indeed it is, as a way of increasing the number of artillery models on the table.
But Grant makes no allowance for this in his calculations. So one gun firing represents, in essence, one and a half guns in actuality(the figure arrived at is that 4 guns will represent a battery of six).
His figure ratio is 1:20, although again this is implied as he calculates figures per battalion based on actual unit frontages and relates this to his ground scale. It works out at around this figure.
But there's more!- he uses the cone by placing it at the mouth of the gun firing and points it outward- woe betide ANY enemy figures within its framework.
He use it more akin to a cluster bomb attack. ANY figures, even those some ten ranks back, are fair game for this 'uber-weapon'. That the vast majority of casualties would be incurred in the front rank of an assault seems to be completely ignored.
You could quite feasibly see casualties of some 200 figures per canister round using these mechanics. I swear if his rules were used in tournament play today you would see wall to wall artillery armies- it's all you'd need! Thank heavens he decided to base his mechanics on the 6 pounder- I dread to think what a 12 pounder could do.

I should say, in fairness, that I'm delighted to be re-acquainted with this book after a gap of some 25 years. It has a charm about it that somehow modern efforts seem to lack. It's certainly rekindled my flagging interest in wargaming, which had waned somewhat over the last few months.
One thing that did surprise me- Charles Grant was actually in the RAF, not the army, as I'd always assumed.
Maybe that explains his penchant for 'Lancaster Bomber Squadron' style artillery.

Steve.

I should make it clerar that the Adaye tests were conducted at a range of 300 yards.

'clerar'?- clear'.

The interesting thing I found is that I used the data collected by George Jeffrey over Muller. GJ says that the Muller tests included every ball that hit the target from one extreme to the other of the solid target to get his grouping size or cone. This he said was in the vicinity of around 32ft per 100yds so 300yds was 96ft.

GJ does his own calculations and figured the "actual" real size of the cone was more likely 8ft across per 100yds. He explains that Mullers tests also showed the main area of the cone was around this mark but that Muller added in every stray shot that hit the target thus getting his 32ft. If you take this out says GJ the cone quickly drops to about 8ft.

So working on 8ft per 100yds I did a perfectly to scale drawing (tech drawing skills here) of a battery of six guns firing out to 300yds with increments of 25yds along the way what I noticed which astonished me was that the increase of cone coverage every 25yds was exactly 7% of the frontage of the battery at regimental spacings of 10yds per gun. Meaning at 25yds the 6 cones equaled 7% of the frontage of the battery, at 50yds it was 14%, at 75yds it was 21% and so on…

What hit me like a tone of bricks is the range of complete 100% coverage was between 350-375yds. This of course would completely change if the gun spacing changed but working on the average set spacing of 10yds gave me this picture. Now armed with this I was able to figure out the cone coverage at any range and figure out the number of potential casualties based on this data.

The important thing to understand is that it does not matter how many men are marching towards a battery firing canister, the round was not a penatrive one and thus the number of casualties potentially caused is limited to the cone coverage of each gun. This is something most war games designers do not take into account when figuring out their rules.

Shane

"What hit me like a tone of bricks is the range of complete 100% coverage was between 350-375yds."
Which is why optimum range was considered to be around 300 metres.
I think psychologically wargamers are atuned to thinking in terms of one gun, as opposed to a battery, simply because so many rule sets use the one model = one battery ratio.
And however much we may think that the effects of artillery are exaggerated in rule sets, it is as nothing compared to the 'old school' approach as, I think, a look at Charles Grant's mechanics demonstrate!

agreed, I have Charles Grant's book also but have not looked at it in years. Opening it up again was an eye opener also. He might have got a few things slightly incorrect but you can see he understood even back then what many rules designers since have totally misunderstood, ignored or just plain forgot.

Another way you can look at this is as follows:

If you take George Jeffery's 8ft cone per 100yds you get a 7% coverage per barrel every 25yds as I explained earlier.

If a battery of 6 guns spaced at 10yds apart = 60yds frontage and you factor in an extra 1.6% either side for the cone you get 186ft frontage. Now if you say 1 man covers 2ft you end up with a frontage of infantry of 93 men.

Now, with these 93 men you can begin to see in 25yd increments how many are in the direct firing lines of the cones of the 6 guns based on 7% coverage every 25yds.

25yds (7% coverage) = 6.5men potential casualties
50yds (14% coverage) = 13men potential casualties
75yds (21% coverage) = 19.5men potential casualties
100yds (28% coverage) = 26men potential casualties
125yds (35% coverage) = 32.5men potential casualties
150yds (42% coverage) = 39men potential casualties
175yds (49% coverage) = 45.5men potential casualties
200yds (56% coverage) = 52men potential casualties
225yds (63% coverage) = 58.5men potential casualties
250yds (70% coverage) = 65men potential casualties
275yds (77% coverage) = 71.5men potential casualties
300yds (84% coverage) = 78men potential casualties
325yds (91% coverage) = 84.5men potential casualties
350yds (98% coverage) = 91men potential casualties
375yds (100% coverage) = 93men potential casualties
400yds (100% coverage) = 93men potential casualties

So it can be seen clearly that it is the cones and their width when the canister makes contact with the enemy line which determines just how effective they will be. The longer out the range the more coverage and the higher the optimal coverage will be for potential hits. If you add in a small factor for stray balls or balls on erratic flight paths and even ricochet you can increase this number marginally by maybe 5-10%.

Also, if you look at the chart above you can see that 6 guns firing canister at 150yds might potentially get 39 casualties scored but this also leaves 54men who are left unscathed at that range!

The main problem or dilemma to work out is the actual speed the infantry is advancing at (if indeed they are) and the fire rate of the gunners which is more to do with fire control, ability and experience also. I base my figures on a fire rate average of 1 salvo per 30 seconds which on average is around one shot per 35yds walking pace of infantry.

Shane

"The balls towards the centre of the grouping travelling further simply because they are travelling in a directly straight forward line more or less. The balls in the outer grouping are spreading further and further apart and thus become more susceptible to the eventuality of increasing wind resistance as time elapses simply because their flight path is diverging away from the direct path."

Yep- which is why Grant's 'cone' wasn't a cone at all. Once a certain distance is reached(around 350 meteres depending on the type of canister used)the balls at the edges of the cone lose their velocity. This is a physics thing apparently and has something to do with the direction of the balls on leaving the barrel. I have no idea of the formula used in the calculation.
So in effect the cone 'straightens up' at around this distance. In other words it stops moving outwards as the knetic energy is only retained within the centre portion of balls.
If Grant had simply said that wherever the front rank was located within his cone was where the casualties would occur, he would have at least been on the right track. Although, as I've mentioned, his artillery would still have been much too powerful.
It's interesting in fact to extrapolate the figures that Grant quotes and to apply them a little more scientifically. He arrives at a working figure- and we're using a British canister here- of one hit in seven.
If we play around with that number a bit, taking into account the effects of a battlefield situation such as I've listed above, you could reasonably increase those odds to one in ten or eleven. A precise equation is impossible as there are too many imponderables but I think that's a plausable figure.
Amazingly, that would give average casualties per canister round of about 3 men. And remember, this is at optimum distance.
As I've already alluded to, balls per canister round did vary from one army to the next. Some French and Danish rounds had upwards of a hundred shot per round. It's why I gave a mean of about 60. Even with this figure you could expect no more than half a dozen or so casualties to occur per round expended.

A fascinating thread, gentlemen.

SteveJ -- as a regular 'old school' Grant rules player, I can confirm that indeed, a round or two of canister can reduce a grown player to tears!

The lethality of the canister cone is, I would agree, partly to do with shoe-horning results into a d6-based system. Even if we remember that, as each move represents sufficient time for the gunners to unleash more than one round -- certainly two, perhaps even three in extremis -- it takes a brave man indeed to march his Spencer Smith battalions towards a Grant battery.

I also agree that results can seem skewed by Grant's predeliction for taking the area occupied by a miniature unit as paramount, rather than the number of men they represent, but _proportionally_, the results remain the same.

I am going to be undertaking some experiments with d10, which ought to give a more reasonable range of possibilities.

But, in the end, it's just a game, and those of us that love the Grant rules just accept that Grant's artillery is not to be trifled with!

Henry
Battlegames

P.S. Interestingly, Brigadier Peter Young's "Charge!" rules took a different approach and didn't use a device, so there's plenty of debate, even amongst 'old schoolers'.

Hi

There is more to the problem than you realize.

You are trying to consider the rounds as if they were flying some sort of lazer like path and mostly two dimensionally. In fact, we are dealing with round balls of steel, which have a lower "sectional density" than similar size round balls in lead. Muskets don't kill at 350 yards, simply, you would be firing at a high angle and lofting rounds into the target. This means that your target now is also not much of a target being only 2 or 3 ranks deep, while the ellipse of the decending shot is well deepr than that.

Similarly with canister or shrapnel. This is a target area described by an ellipst that is mostly empty, even if on target.

At these long ranges, the angle of decent, assuming the gunner got the range right, is about 55 degrees.

But even at close range, the "company front" is full of empty space. I considered the same tests the rest of you did, and started with the assumption that half the frontage was empty for the purposes of casualties, and then threw in mods for those multiple hits.

But ultimately, the reason your numbers don't work for various ranges versus the understanding of the gunners is the simple question of the balls slowing down, losing energy not only for penetraction, but DROPPING.

Rocky

"You are trying to consider the rounds as if they were flying some sort of lazer like path and mostly two dimensionally."
Absolutely not- the cone shaped trajectory is very much three dimensional. If only ten rounds per 34 hit the target then obviously 24 don't. Of these, some will be wide of the mark and others will fly overhead. Yet more will fall short and hit the space in front of the target.
Grant is trying to simulate this but he overeggs the pudding by including ANY rank or file within the 'cone'. Yes. there would be casualties further back, but the front rank would take the brunt of the discharge.

Henry- Grant's book opened up a whole new world when I first plucked it from the shelf of the local library some 25 years past. I'm considering having a go at these rules using plastic AWI figures, with some 'modifications' (heresy I know). I may even make a few 'concentric cowpats' for hills!

Steve.

Shane,

I just cannot see that canister fire was more effective at 400 yards than it was at say 150, if that is what you are actually saying. Surely just looking at the width of a theoretical cone is very misleading, and the emphasis is on theoretical here as you seem to be relying on the ideas of a modern historian/wargamer. Perhaps if the fire was taking place over a perfectly level concrete runway these figures may have some value, but in any type of undulating terrain, as found on battlefields, this purely mathematical approach is wrong, and the further the target was from the firer, the more chance that the impact of most of the balls would have been absorbed by any irregularities in the ground.

Have you any historical, rather than theoretical, evidence that this is what artillerymen believed at the time?

Hi,

Actually my figures are based purely on range above all. In the system I developed the actual Effective (Optimal Range) for Canister is well below that of 400yds and closer to 150-250yds. My system factors in also the calibre of the guns as well. For example I came to the conclusion that a 6pndr Effective range was more like 150-200yds while that of say a 8-9pndr is around 200-250yds while that of a 12pndr is more attune to the range around 250-300yds.

The mathematical equation I worked out earlier in the thread was based purely on a 12pndr firing canister. In my system once a target is hit above Effective range the effects drop off significantly so for example a 1pndr firing above 300yds is considered to be at Long Range and thus far less effective due to increased angle of trajectory and loss of kinetic energy of the rounds.

For example this is a table for French guns I developed for our system:

4pndr
PB – 01-50yds
ER – 51-200yds
LR – 201-400yds

6pndr
PB – 01-55yds
EF – 56-225yds
LR – 226-450yds

8pndr
PB – 01-70yds
EF – 71-275yds
LR – 276-550yds

12pndr
PB – 01-75yds
ER – 76-300yds
LR – 301-600yds

I am very confident I have the ranges about right however, I am thinking the PB range is probably too low and should be extended somewhat, not sure yet.

All my data was taken from various books I own on the subject too many to list and some inevitable calculations based on a gut feel for what would have been correct based on the data I collected. Many books I own cite test results such as Muller amongst others especially Prussian tests and some British tests as well. These test tables give very precise percentages as for hits etc so I merely factored them into my calculations for my casualty tables I also developed.

I am old school Bruce Quarrie which used Casualty tables in men not figures and book keeping keeping track of current losses etc. These casualty tables although not liked by many gamers purely because of the needed book keeping are very well liked by more than a few players I know because they (in our opinion) give realistic accounts of losses in actual men, not figures and thus give a more realistic feel to a battle and the casualties they cause. Yes a general might not know or even should know how many men feel in a volley but that is beside the point of casualty tables. They are just a more accurate way to depict losses for those that way inclined and there are many of us still out there!

As I said earlier I have taken my calculations purely off many tests cited in many books and arrived at a factored firing chart in my rules to include them. From a pure mathematical point of view you are correct, you cannot account for the battlefield conditions which can and do deplete the effectiveness of weaponry of the period and this also is factored into my system. My tables are purely mathematical to arrive at what I always call a, "Optimal or Potential" number of casualties. My own system factors in many negatives which will deplete this Optimal number and in some cases greatly decrease them.

I have also added in under my Engineering section complete tables for such things as ground condition, ground firmness, undulations and weather conditions. All of which play a significant role in decreasing the effectiveness of black powder weaponry too many to list here.

Some of my books I own are as follows:
Imperial Bayonets – George Nafziger
All Osprey Artillery books
Weapons and tactics of the Nap wars – Hawthornthwaite
With Musket… – Nosworthy
Roy Muir's book (title cant remember, at work currently)
Rothenburg's book – Age of Napoleon?
Artillery – Kevin Kiley
George Jeffrey's esay based on Hughes / Muller
And many many more I cannot recall right now while at work.

All of these books aided me with various amounts of information for my Artillery rules in many aspects to one degree or another.

What hooked me the most with Canister was the revelation by George Jeffrey that regardless of the suspected and expected degree of destruction it was thought a canister salvo "should" cause, the truth was in truth, less than expected. If Canister was not a penetrate round it can only be expected to kill up to and equal to the same number of men in the enemy formation. Equal to the frontage of the firing battery at best! And then only at optimal ranges where the line was saturated by the overlapping cones of the guns which was not at Point Blank range as some rules writers think but actually way out at ranges of over 150-250yds.

I was never happy with my Canister rules as the number of casualties caused was based on my own notion like most others of Point Blank devastation. Once I understood what George was saying I had a revelation that everyone has got it wrong like I had and that I had to correct the problem.

You can only expect to kill enemy equal at maximum to the size of the cone at the range the target is currently occupying and no more! This is where most rules writers have it wrong, their casualty tables are so open ended that in some systems you could expect to kill a number of men equal to a frontage two or even three times the frontage of the firing battery ! Which is totally incorrect.

The point was missed totally by many designers, Ball (rounds hot) could and did create far more casualties on the enemy especially if firing at columns but as the effects of this penetrate round are not just on the front rank but all the way through the formation the morale decreases are far less. Canister, not being a penetrate round relies on casualties purely along the front of the enemy formation. This fact even if the casualties are not as high as some might think have a far greater effect on the enemy formation in regards to Morale or psychological effects. Men can see what is happening in front and around them far more so than what might be happening behind them, therefore Canister has a far greater effect on Morale and this is why batteries switched to canister at close range!!

I thank Michael Collins for emailing me the information he had on this. I have totally re formatted my entire Canister system to encompass all this data and already have done many successful trials on this. I again urge you all to get in contact with Michael to gain a copy of this information; it is an eye opener indeed and might affect your ideas on artillery effectiveness as it did for me.

Regards,
Shane