"Osprey: French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792–1815" Topic

Cacadore, do everyone a favour and go away, this time for good.

The typical cacadore scenario reads out like this:

1/ Automatic personal attack on anyone who dares to question Wellington, the British empire and its army or its motives.
2/ Automatic "personal" attacks on Kevin Kiley, simply because he enjoys it. You would have to be blind not to see it.
3/ Typical stubbiness of someone who unreasonably will not see an answer to questions in a different light. He sticks to his own opinions and actually believes he is correct every time even when shown to be wrong no matter what.
4/ Tells people not to quote internet sources as they are wrong but yet shows us links to them anyway.
5/ Argumentative for the sake of being argumentative.
6/ Baits others into replying in a progressive manor which he hopes will get them banned but all it seems to do is get "him" banned in the end.
7/ Ends up showing everyone his true colours every single time through his own personality which shines clearly on the forum.
8/ Can't help himself, has to keep an argument going no matter what.
9/ Is constantly hitting the "Complain" button to Bill trying to ban others.
10/ Follows me around the forum personally attacking me and or Kevin amongst others when and where ever he can even if he gets banned.
11/ Cries murder when he gets banned and says, "but it wasn't me, it was him" every time.
12/ Returns to TMP and every time the same thing happens…someone see a pattern here ?
13/ Tries to point fingers and blame on others for his own problems, faults or inability to speak on an amiable social level of discussion.
14/ Tries to divert attention from himself by personally attacking others but fails to see in so doing he paints a clearer and clearer picture of his own faults and personal problems to all and sundry.
15/ Says sensational things on TMP for attention and nothing more, not to sure why? Maybe no attention at home ? or no one socially in real life actually likes him? Dunno, just a suspicion…
16/ Apt at totally destroying a thread and turning everyone off with his attacks which in the end only get him banned resulting in an intervening period of relative peace and quiet.
17/ Stubbin refusal to see fault with his own worshipped hero Wellington or his army, but never fails to attack those who actually admire his adversaries…go figure.
18/ Actually had no understanding or real depth of knowledge of anything outside the British army and has actually admitted as much previously but quickly "googles" what he needs and splashes in on TMP when he needs too only to be found out as fake, misunderstood the original question or plain takes things out of context resulting in a misinterpretation of the facts and or question in the first place.
18/ Assures himself every day that he is somehow an expert on all things Napoleonic when in fact all he seems to be an expert in is confrontation, arguments and poor behaviour.
19/ Is one of these guys who reads a book by its cover and makes mistakes as a result.
20/ Has no respect for his fellow posters and insults them further by calling them by their last name with no curtesy at all to even respect them by calling them by their first name when available to him. This shows me a deep ceded inability to respect others around him.
21/ When asked not to drop the tone of a thread he does so anyway to prove some deranged point that he cannot be told what to do.
22/ Attempts to humiliate others with his personal attacks as he has once more accomplished. In the end though it is cacadore who gets banned…

Need I go on ???

Cacadore, when you were last banned supposedly for a full month somehow you got out of the doghouse ??? how did ya manage that ? This is one of the greatest escape acts of the TMP site. Did you also personally impose your own banning to take some kind of hiatus or holiday ? we were all concerned about you, no, really we were.

As can be seen here a leopard cannot change its spots…

oohh, and cacadore uses a multiple list of TMP call names for some unknown reason. I think it has alot to do with his ever assending "stifle" counter. Whenever one gets too high he switches to another…but this is just my personal opinion ;-p

Cacadore
Cacadores II
Cacadores
Cacad0res
Cacadores I

I always laugh when I see them all !!!!!!

And when things get too heated on a threat cacadore tries to divert attention by starting a new thread starting with the word; "Myth" his seemingly favourite world in his vocabulary!!!

Are you a myth buster cacadore ??? Honestly, don't try it as a career move; I fear it would not bode well for you.

>"Ordre mixte as I understand it is not the first line in line and the second in column, but troops of the same line in a combination of column and line, or stacked lines in some sort of column."<

I understand it to be: three battalions (of the same regiment), with the 1 in the middle (the old regulars?) formed in line, and the other two (conscripts?) in battalion columns that have their front companies on the same line as the center battalion.

Cacadore,

You just don't get it do you? You sir seem blind to all notions of actual military logistics and understanding of lines of communication and army preservation. You have this quite shallow view of an army as some kind of blunt instrument which has only a single purpose to hammer the enemy at all costs regardless of any consequences. You fail to understand the role of a commander like Gneisenau and his duty to maintain and preserve the army as it marched while Blucher's role was that of field commander on the day of battle.

When Blucher went under his horse and was given up for dead Gneisenau, if you truly understood his position he had to think very long and hard about just what to do next. It was felt in the Prussian staff that Wellington had failed to support the Prussians as was agreed upon previously. Wellington had failed to aid the Prussians as was trusted he would have done had he not been attacked himself. Wellington was indeed contacted by Ney's forces but Wellington was so slow in forming his army up that precious time was lost, he was lucky Ney was as timid as he was!

The Prussians also had recourse not to trust Wellington after the Vienna conference and his stance while representing the British Empire and the unofficial alliance being formed between Britain, France and Austria against Prussia's stance on Saxony and Russia's on Poland. Regardless of whether this was a legitimate or reasonable or unreasonable concern the fact remained that Wellington was seen as the number one cause of friction with his position against Prussian and Russian dealings.

This distrust over flowed into the Waterloo campaign to an extent but Blucher, not driven by politics and only by war against Napoleon and France moved past this to focus on the job at hand. Gneisenau should be commended for his actions in overcoming his own prejudices he felt against Wellington and focusing on the task at hand, namely defeating the French. Your unfounded assumption backed by a total lack of evidence that I can find speaks volumes. Your total worship of Wellington blinds you into mistrusting anyone not flying the British Union Jack and the slightest of flimsy excuses or evidence (or lack of it) allows you to blow things totally out of proportion and even to make stuff up to suit your own arguments.

You sir tend to rely on your own perception of situations which as usual you take out of context from their true meaning and or situation. You then come up with your own opinions and theories which you then, through some kind of miraculous divine intervention, start to believe as the truth and woe to those who do not agree with you or dare to question your "truth's", theories and summations you come up with. If anyone dares to question your ideals, motives and beliefs you stoop to personal insults which know no depths of depravity and sarcasm which only result in your own credibility nose diving every time.

Your word phrasing of say using the word, "Myth" usually has no founding's that I can see on most occasions. You constantly blind yourself into believing your own theories and summations of a situation so much so that you often lead yourself into some kind of blind faith of your own understanding of the facts "as you see them" that you cannot see reason even with confronted with it by others. This to me is a serious personal problem you have and I would seek some kind of help if I were you. Your lack of understanding of others and total lack of respect of others actually has a name and is a serious medical condition. I am not saying you have it but you may want to check it out at least.

The sad part is that while you were away the last few months there was peace and I dare say a good harmony amongst most TMP'rs which even when strained never stooped anywhere near the depths you constantly lower the tone of a debate too. The sad thing for us all is your return and your immediate indication to all that despite the constant and eventual dog housing in the past (the last one was over a month!) you show us all right away your lack of remorse and restraint which only deepens my and I dare say many other's opinions as to your personal problems dealing amicably with others in a social setting.

I wonder if people around you in your life have to walk on egg shells, live in fear or even leave you alone in the end because of this problem. Take my advice and go seek professional help, it is out there.

Shane

Two nutters now, each on separate sides of this debate. So much for any chance of sanity in this discussion. And we wonder why other wargamers think so poorly of Napoleonics?

:-(

By two nutters, I don't mean you Shane … well, not yet anyway ;-)

haha, it is entertaining you must admit. I will purchase a large cinema sized box of pop corn me thinks. This movie is going to be a block buster and I seem to be one of the main stars !!

I want my own trailer !

Shane,

Some folks use the term 'myth' to characterize something they disagree with whether or not it is true. It has been done on the forums since I started posting almost ten years ago.

Strawmen are then created for those types to make a point and then personal attacks begin to 'discredit' anyone who disagrees. That's the way of it as I see it. There are more than enough members here with common sense to see through the nonsense.

Sincerely,
Kevin

"The term 'creatures' hints at something a little more than incompetent and the term isn't warranted."

It is not so much down to competence as creation. Boney created a group of officers around him that were not a threat to him. I am far more convinced by Jourdan, seemingly, but he had been winning battles against the allies before Napoleon and was the last Revolutionary General that he could consider a threat to his position. His memory of how he came to power must have been a clear reminder not to appoint anyone who could do the same to him unless he could possbly help it.

Eugene's performance in the 1809 campaign is somewhat less than outstanding, IMHO, he is soundly beaten by John, and only turns the tables when he is heavily reinforced. Much of his army is tied up watching the Tyrolean border. To bring the Armee d'Italie to Wagram Boney gets Macdonald, not Eugene, to do it. I do feel sorry for him in 1812, though, having the whole mess dumped on his lap as Boney dashes to Paris to stave of a potential political disaster to match the military one.

As for Murat, well, anything involving the exercise of the cerebral cortex (i.e being something other than a cavalryman) seems to have been beyond him. Even when handling his cavalry at Lieberwolkwitz he is defeated by the allies who are outnumbered but adopt more flexible tactics. Not to mention Tolentino…

Then get them to co-operate with each other when Boney has gone off to run the Empire.

K

"There are more than enough members here with common sense to see through the nonsense."

At this point in the thread you may find that the members with any common sense at all may have lost the patience to wade through it all.

Shucks, I've been waiting to see an actual review of this new book, before I go out and buy a copy. So.. is it worth the coin, or no?

Yorck, Can I assume from your infantile response to my post about the Waterloo Despatch that you concede that Lord W did in fact give full credit to the Prussians for saving the day at Waterloo, and thus any attempts to 'reveal' that the Prussians saved the day are something of a blinding flash of the bloody obvious?
Kevin, Interested in your point about Eugene being underated…Got to be a book in it (hint, hint)(Can't be too subtle with you Gunners)! Or has this field been covered already? I know that Robert M Epstein in 'Prince Eugene at War' looked at his development in 1809, but I believe he had a longer career than that…

Stavka,

I bought it anyway and it is inbound. Anything by Paddy Griffith is interesting and valuable whether or not you agree with it.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Prince Eugene I mean, not Robert Epstein, who is still flourishing I hope!

K,

The marshalate was made and the promotions given to deserving soldiers of the Republic, whether or not they had served Napoleon before or not. Jourdan hadn't; neither had Ney. Some, like Bernadotte, who was known as a fanatic {read Jacobin}, as described by Desaix, were promoted not only for military competence but to reconcile outlying political factions to Napoleon's rule. Most commanders do what people they know around them, as they can trust them and are used to working with them.

Murat was none too bright, but it was he who fetched the artillery for the whiff of grapeshot incident when Napoleon put down the Royalist coup attempt. Murat also had the innate ability to animate and move forward masses of men. If for nothing else, he was the one to lead the great charge at Eylau. He never learned to care for either men or horses, and that is the result of too little regimental service.

Eugene is another matter. He was slightly outnumbered at Sacile in 1809 and lost. He had nuberical superiority at the crossing of the Piave by about 15,000 and executed the crossing skillfully. At Raab he only outnumbered his opponnet by about 3,000-that is not an overwhelming superiority. He clearly outgeneraled the Austrians after Sacile both strategically and tactically, as well as outfighting them.

Macdonald was not Eugene'a military mentor in Italy and was sent to the Army of Italy as a wing commander to serve at Eugene's discretion. Napoleon did not rely on Macdonald to do anything but be a loyal subordinate to his stepson. Macdonald has remembered big in his unreliable memoirs. Eugene would have won with or without Macdonald. Both Broussier and Grenier were better generals than Macdonald in my opinion.

If you haven't already, you might want to get Robert Epstein's Prince Eugene at War in 1809. It is an excellent campaign study and puts to rest some of Macdonald's nonsense about the 1809 Italian compaign.

As for 1812, after Napoleon's departure for Paris, Murat was left in command of the wreck of the Grande Armee and he promptly deserted. Berthier persuaded Eugene to take over as all of the marshals would obey him (that is another of Berthier's ignored accomplishments-he is another greatly underestimated general officer of the period), and Berthier wrote to Napoleon urging him to confirm Eugene as the new commander. This Napoleon did and Eugene performed superbly from January to April 1813 as the commander of the newly-christened Army of the Elbe. Not only did he wage an effective campaign of maneuver and delay until Napoleon could again take the field, but he built up an effective field army which was added to Napoleon's force in April 1813.

Eugene's defense of northern Italy was a masterpiece. There's an excellent study on that campaign out also, but I can't find it at the moment and the title and author escapes me.

Lastly, even though the French general officers cannot be characterized as a band of brothers, they seldom failed each other in combat. Bessieres failed Massena in Portugal once; Bernadotte definitely failed to support anyone at Jena/Auerstadt, and St. Cyr really screwed up on the pursuit after Dresden in 1813 and left Vandamme on his own too long.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Sparker,

I did half a chapter on Eugene in Titans, but it is a ripe topic for a book, as is Berthier. And they are two of my favorites.

Sincerely,
Kevin

@Kevin F Kiley

For the King Murat, one may say he did not do well at Ostrovno and did very poorly at Vinkovo (Tarutino), except for his own personal bravery at the head of a charge.

For the Prince Eugène, one may add his good perfomance at Ostrovno, Borodino (except the need to extend to the left in the initial deployment) and Maloyaroslavets, where his men did fight like lions against greater numbers of the Russian army in good positions. His firmness and competence in the retreat from Russia was also noted by many.

It is a sadness if the Prince Eugène is under rated among the anglophones, or so is my opinion.

- votre ami

- votre ami

"If you haven't already, you might want to get Robert Epstein's Prince Eugene at War in 1809. It is an excellent campaign study and puts to rest some of Macdonald's nonsense about the 1809 Italian compaign."

I have read this book, I found it extremely biased. The author clearly never used any sources other than French, skates over any Austrian moves which may have been vaguely competent and puts the blame for Eugene's defeat at The Piave down to him not following Bonaparte's detailed instructions.

In fact it is this long screwdrivering of subordinates and robbing them of initiative and the power to make mistakes that makes one really understand why no alternate capable army commander was able to flourish: a chicken that came home to roost in the 1813 campaign having to rely on Macdonald, Oudinot and Ney to undertake strategic roles that were clearly beyond them.

That, rather than any reliable analysis of the 1809 campaign, runs like a red thread through Epstein's book. If you ever do get around to writing anything on Eugene I beg you to not have any preconceptions and use sources beyond the French…

"Both Broussier and Grenier were better generals than Macdonald in my opinion."

Very likely, but why did they not become Marshals after 1809, whereas Macdonald, Marmont and Oudinot did?

"At Raab he only outnumbered his opponnet by about 3,000-that is not an overwhelming superiority."

True, but you need to add the qualatative superiority as well, especially over the Insurrectio.

1813 in particular seems the height of screw-ups by the Marshalate, a factor exploited by the Trachenberg plan, and those Boney relied upon proved to be broken reeds whilst Davout was packed off the Hamburg.

K

K,

If you're writing about a French general and French operations, most of your sources are probably going to be French.

Someone on one of the forums years ago criticized Col Elting's Swords because 'most' of the references were in French. No kidding, it was a study of the organizational history of the Grande Armee. Conversely, I've seen 'North American historians' criticized for even attempting to write about the Prussians, when only Germans are capable of it.

Epstein's book is still one of the best on the subject, and if there is a qualitative superiority of the French over the Austrians by the time of Raab, then whose fault was that? The Austrians, perhaps?

For 1813 Napoleon appears to me to have lost some of his strategic ability. Berthier and others urged him to pull out half of the troops from Spain to stop the Russians and Prussians in January of 1813, and that would also have had the added benefit of keeping the Austrians in their place.

Napoleon's choice of independent subordinates in 1813 is also strange-Oudinot, Ney, and Macdonald. All three of them did terribly and Davout was kept in a fortress. Davout with either the Berlin front command or with the Army of the Bober might have proven decisive, the so-called Tachenberg Plan or not.

And in Italy, Eugene was doing superbly, fighting off the Austrians on his front and dealing with an ever-more-treacherous Murat to the south, and rebuffing Austrian hints of a crown if he turned on Napoleon. Good man and good general all round I'd say. Napoleon's comment about him (Eugene never caused me the least chagrin) is a testament of the esteem in which Napoleon held him and his abilities.

Perhaps you could do a study, and turn it into a book, on the Austrians on the Italian front in 1809? I have that volume of Krieg 1809 if you need help. It might be most illuminating.

Sincerely,
Kevin

"Someone on one of the forums years ago criticized Col Elting's Swords because 'most' of the references were in French. No kidding, it was a study of the organizational history of the Grande Armee. Conversely, I've seen 'North American historians' criticized for even attempting to write about the Prussians, when only Germans are capable of it."

Well, good historical analysis is based on both temporal and spatial perspectives. If you concentrate on the temporal then you are not able to refer to parallel or differing developments in other countries. This is common in studies of allied armies when compared to the Grande armee, assuming they somehow learn to ape it in order to defeat it, thus missing the internal developments, pressures, policies and jealousies that ifluenced their own changes.

As for the latter, well, if that principle was carried to its extreme the whole of the historical establishment might as well pack its bags. Although there is a case for saying that the treatment of a subject by a foreigner may be more superficial than by a native, particularly if language is an issue I am not sure that even then it is a statement worth taking seriously.

"if there is a qualitative superiority of the French over the Austrians by the time of Raab, then whose fault was that? The Austrians, perhaps?"

Depends on your point of view. If you argue that the Austrians should have had more manpower then where would it have come from? The real misjudgement is that of Metternich in Paris before the war who assumed that Spain would tie down more French and that the Confederation would prove less than reliable. I do not think the fault can be laid at the door of operational commanders.

Boney does make some questionable decisions in 1813, like accepting the armistice and assuming that the Austrians would not take the opportunity to kick him out of Germany and Italy. Similarly with his choice of subordinates, but then again the available pool had shrivelled, I must say due to his own actions as much as any other.

I agree, Davout on the Berlin front would have been a far better and logical choice. I am baffled by the initial choice of Oudinot, terribly brave but not very cerebral, and then his jealousy when Ney is brought in over him is palpable. Not that he is much of a thinking soldier either, and not one I would be in a hurry to trust with an independent strategic role.

I would love to write a book about the 1809 campaign in Italy using whatever scope of available sources are around (including the Illyrian stuff too) but when your hobby becomes your work it is usually time to look for another hobby. Better finish my thesis first in any event.

Certainly the 1813/14 period in Italy is even more in need of serious treatment. Until Bellegarde is placed in command Hiller looks paralysed and indecisive. Then there is the whole mess going on in Naples with Murat playing the weather vane.

Certainly campaigns that deserve better treatment than they have had so far.

K

Shane and Cacadores,

What about starting your own thread, entitled "Shane and Cacadores"?

That way, we could tune in if we were interested in the latest insults, and required some light relief from Napoleonic matters. Yorck von Hofshcroer could also contribute periodically if things fell a bit flat, or if the Prussians were mentioned.

How about it eh?

Well, I actually have received Paddy Griffith's book from Amazon and read it in an afternoon.[64 pages total] It is illustrated by Peter Dennis.

FRENCH NAPOLEONIC INFANTRY TACTICS 1792-1815

The contents are:

*The Legacy of the Seven Years War page 3
*Guibert and the 1791 Reglement page 9
*"Revolutionary Warfare page 13
*From the "Terror to the Coup
of Bumaire page 21
*La Grand Armee page 28
*The Peninsular War page 43
*'Corrupt Gigantism', 1809-14 page 49
Further reading page 54
Plate commentaries page 55
Index page 64

This is vintage Osprey, right down to eight color plates with commentaries in the middle of the book.

In general the book does a good job of giving an overview of the French tactics for the period. The plates show different attack and defense configurations from different battles from 1792-1815.

Other than a few asides about Napoleon, such as the suggestion that Napoleon claimed to have invented the mixed order, I didn't see anything particularly anti-Napoleon or French.

He spends alot of time on the development of tactics before 1805, which makes sense. He gives some good examples of the development of a 'French system' and the plates are good for showing this. Peter Dennis does something that I found annoying. In each plate are little pictures of soldiers fighting, with a number that references some portion of the battlefield shown on the plate--most of the time. A few numbers aren't to be found on the field, and some are so outside the engagement shown, you wonder why that was chosen. Overall, they add very little in the way of information and simply give Peter a chance to show off his talent.

The thing that did bother me about Paddy's work was what bothers me with many Osprey efforts: the lack of references or footnotes to statements in the books, and the rather glib generalizations made with no explanation. I'll give a few examples:

1. On page 4-5 Paddy states that "At the level of tactics, an enormously important lesson from the Seven Years' War--particularly the French-Indian War in American, and from the American Revolutionary War, had been the the great value of skirmishers."

The problem with this is this leaves the impression that the following light infantry development was a result, which is far from the case, for Franch, and the other nations including Britain. The French went into the American Revolution with light companies in their line regiments, as did the British [though not universally, unlike the French]

Before the SYW and AWI, light infantry units were produced on an "as needed" basis by the British, French, and Allied armies. They were after the wars, into the 1790s. The French, Prussians and Russians all created light infantry battalions almost at the same time,[Legere/chasseurs, fusiliers and Jagers]. The Russians and Prussians had no experience with the American wilderness.

2. L'ordre Mixe page 22. Paddy says that "In his Italian campaign Bonaparte lodged a rather dubious claim to tactical originality when he favored the ordre mixte, although in fact it had already--like so many things--been described in Guibert. Now, as Paddy had made a point to say most ALL French officers had read Guibert and had used ordre mixte by this time, how could Napoleon actually think anyone would believe such a claim?

3. On the the next page, in speaking of l'ordre mixte, Paddy says "In practice, however, the whole idea of l'ordre mixte smacked of an over-theoritical solution." I have no idea what he means by that.

He follows by describing what HE thinks are the weaknesses of the formation. Finishing by saying that Napoleon continued to avocate the mixed order,then finishing by saying Marmont was openly critical of the formation and Napoleon's tactical knowledge "which appeared after Bonaparte was safely dead."

Talk about leaving the issue vague, particularly when he gives a number of examples of 'mixed order' in the rest of the booklet, and not all of the ones I know of.

What has he told us in those two pages then?

I give it a C+/B- for what it provides, an B+/A- for what it provides compared to the average Osprey Elite. For most folks that know something about French tactics already, Chandler, Nosworthy, Nafziger, Jeffery, it will provide very little that is new, though there are some great tidbits scattered through the work, all unreferenced, of course, and a decent analysis of French tactics in the Peninsula.

Personally, I'd wait until I could get it used on-line for $5. USD I don't think it contains $18 USD worth of information and diagrams. It doesn't hold a candle to Paddy and Dennis's book on the Civil War for instance, which hardly cost more.

Well, I tried to delete the first post, but the powers that be decided against it. Sorry.

I did want to mention one other item in the book that I found interesting. On page 24 he has a little chart called the "Analysis of French Infantry Attacks, 1792-15

Total sample 226 [nothing about what is sampled or when.]

In column 174 [78% of total sample]
In line 30 [13%]
In order mixte 19 [8%]
In skirmish order 3 [1%]

Then he notes: This same includes 15 attacks [16%] in enchelon; 148 [65%] on rough or narrow ground,; and 58 [26%] against British troops.

The problem here is huge, and I don't understand why Paddy didn't say or do something about. Here is the problem:

Which attacks were on rough or narrow ground makes a big difference in the reading of the statistics. For intance, if ALL the attacks on rough ground were in column or/and skirmisher, as you would expect that means that only 11.5% of all attacks across open ground would be in column, or about equal to line combat. The context is extremely important for the numbers to be meaningful at all.

Paddy doesn't explain any of the where, how and why of the numbers. He makes no comment on what he thought of the passing note on what the sample included. Man, the survey would have meant something interesting if he had…

*sigh* Another example of an Osprey book.

I haven't received my copy yet, but the chart/table you mention is interesting, especially the overwhelming numbers in the samples that are labeled as columns attacks.

The normal French column was a battalion column which could be by company or division (two companies). The battalion column was handy to manuever with and the usual battle array of the Grande Armee was in a double line of battalion columns arranged in checkerboard fashion at deployment intervals. Merely attacking in column seems to me to be somewhat naive. The columns advancing would be covered by swarms of skirmishers which would be the offensive fire support element, usually supported by field artillery.

Further, French tactics during the Revolutionary period were dictated also by the terrain in which they fought. The Low Countries being different from Germany and from Italy, commanders and armies operating in those areas would adapt their tactics not only to the developing French system, but to the terrain.

I am really looking forward to this book.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin:

That's the problem. When he says 'attacks', are we talking about battalion, brigade, division, what? Or are they a mixed bag.

And of course, how many were simply attacks that failed to deploy into line, rather than being intentionally column attacks?

When you have these kinds of questions, the information presented becomes pretty meaningless. We don't know what we're lookin at.

You're right.

I just got the book this afternoon and I'm not overly impressed. There are numerous errors in fact, such as the references to the experience in the Seven Years War and American Revolution being an example for French light infantry in the Revolution and that all British line regiments didn't have a light company in the Revolution (that may be true, but I haven't found any and I just finished a study of the War of the Revolution).

Further errors are the numbers of men per company in the nine company battalions; the number of guns employed by Senarmont at Friedland and Drouot at Lutzen; Napoleon being imprisoned more than once during the Revolution (I've only found one and that was after Toulon); naming Victor as both a division and corps commander at Friedland (he commanded I Corps); describing Macdonald's formation at Wagram as a column when it was not; claiming that Napoleon said he had thought up l'ordre mixte when I haven't found any evidence that he claimed that, merely that it might have been his favorite; stating that a French corps would operate 'with its own separate aims;' stating that Ney was a consummate tactician; that the Ulm campaign had no serious combat (forgetting Durenstein and Haslach apparently); has a French horse artillery detachment with soldier drivers at Wattignies in 1793 when the artillery train was not established until 1800; that Soult attacked at Austerlitz with only four infantry regiments when he attacked with two divisions; stating that the French and Spanish artillery were 'evenly matched;' charactizes the 1805 Grande Armee as 'relatively small.' That's enough to get the feel of too many errors in the booklet.

Further, the 'cheap shots' at Napoleon should not be undertaken. Referencing him as 'Bonaparte' throughout the book is typical, however incorrect, but two statements stand out that are at best 'unscholarly.' The first is on page 32 and references 'the hysterical excesses of Bonaparte's idolators, then and since,' is certainly out of place (how would the author characterize himself, I wonder?), and on page 49 characterizing the period as 'Bonaparte's whole mad adventure' which is only 'mad' because he lost and is also out of place in what should be a scholarly attempt at a tactical study.

For the overall impressions of the booklet, I agree that it should have been done in two volumes, not one. Duhesme is overestimated, as is St. Cyr, especially regarding the 1791 Reglement. The experimentation during the maneuvers in Normandy in 1778 is badly done and doesn't reflect the amount of work or writing that was done with those experiments and that a middle ground was reached by the proponents of the profond and mince schools of thought.

Lastly, I cannot for the life of me see why someone of Griffith's stature would use any of Nosworthy's books, especially the Napoleonic one which is Nosworthy's worst. Further, he has misconstrued Quimby's book, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, and in many ways I don't think the author actually understands the French tactical system, though that is probably an unfair assessment. This work had so much potential and I was very happy to see that Griffith was writing it. However, I do believe the mark was missed on this one and that is an opportunity lost. There are too many erroneous statements and errors of fact in the booklet.

I'd rate it three stars out of five. However, I would also recommend getting it, as it is another arrow in the quiver.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Thanks Kevin,

I have been thinking of buying this book and probably will in the end but after your assessment of it I will drop its order of priority.

Regards,
Shane