"Zieten's letter: Do Hofschroer's books bend the facts?" Topic

Rather than mess up Shane's H-W thread, I thought I'd address it here. Peter Hofschroer claims that the only person who saw all the original dispatches, Dr Pflugk-Harttung, 'supports' him. Is that true, intellectual dishonesty, or an 'error'?
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Briefly, if General Zieten had sent a dispatch before 5 am (as Hofschroer claims), then Wellington could have recieved it in the morning & helped the Prussians at Ligney but dishonourably chose not to do so.

Dave Hollins wrote:
''So, I seem to be right then…..although he made a single (albeit unfortunately significant) error in saying Pf-Ha's conclusion agreed with him.''

'Error'? Let's see what Horshroer said after he knew the truth:
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Pflugk-Harttung wrote:

In the periodical Berichterstattung, page 55, Pflugk-Harttung wrote:
''Wellington received no report from Zeiten that morning and the only one he received was the one sent by the Prussian general between 8 and 9 am, which only arrived in the afternoon between 6 and 7 pm.''

On page 57 Pflugk-Harttung concludes with his own belief:
''Zieten sent just one dispatch to Wellington or Muffling (the Allied liaison officer) which left Charleroi beteen 8 and 9 am and arrived in Brussels between 6 and 7 pm''. Pflugk-Harttung also wrote a large history of the campaign beginnings, 'Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance – Wellington.' It reaches the same conclusions.
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Peter Horshroer's claims

Then, Peter Horshroer claims in the 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research' that Pflugk-Harttung (not his destroyed sources, but Pflugk-Harttung) supported Hofschorer's claim! Hofschorer sites the periodical Berichterstattung!
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Attempts to correct Horschroer's howler:

Next, historians Gary Cousins and John Hussey wrote letters pointing out the 'error' to Hofschorer and his publishers. He ignored them.

Academic articles are written by other historians. Peter ignnores them.

Gregory Pedlow of Belgium sends both Peter and Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research a note on his mistaken facts. Both ignored him.
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Peter Hofschorer's response

PH:''Such people are advised to seek professional help – though they normally deny their are bonkers. But I should add that head banging is not an Olympic sport, but an indication of a serious condition''

No 'error' Dave.

A summary of your 'error' (and a rare Hoffie photo) is at:
link

Apologies for interposing an R for the F in Hofschroer.

well said cacy, in short PH is wrong and tried to avert all our eyes away from history to tell us fairly tale. I read Gregor'W. Pedow's essay in Empire and he puts everything into a proper historical context that seems pretty much irrifutible to me.

I despise authors who use written words to pass on their agendas to the flock sheep they think we are.

Thanks again cacy,
Regards,
Shane

p.s. if PH just stuck to historical fact from the Prussian view he would have a good credability but he chose not too.

I with Condottiere on this one, both his comments seem right on to me.

One question: Even if would be true that Wellington ignored a single letter from Ziethen, why would be 'dishonorable' behaviour?

Anyone who makes so much fuss about that proves that: a) He doesn't understand communications of the era; b) Has not a clue about the meaning of honor in early XIXth Century; c) Has not idea about the balance of conflicting interests that Wellington -or Blucher, for that matter- had to take in mind before decide for an action course.

And, of course, doesn't understand that Waterloo wasn't an event out-of-time but firmly anchored in an horizon of experience. Ask you for an instant: What was the experience of allied warfare and co-operation that Wellington had? Wellington hadn't even confidence in his own subordinates… How was he to put much faith in a panicky report of an unknown entity -for him- as Ziethen? Specially, when he was receiving reports from other sources that told the French were strong in his right, thus risking his lines of communication with the sea… Sorry, but it makes no sense to me. Even being true that Wellington received a communication from Ziethen early in the morning, I don't believe he would have acted differently as he did.

I would be interested who read in full – both the article of Plugk – Harttung and the book – about that subject.

As I wrote in the other thread – you can come to the other conclusion as well, that Zieten did write this early message.

What nobody (in my view) can judge is – how long this message did take to arrive, simply plotting distances and then asses what a mounted messanger can cover in time, is very difficult.

In AoN nr. 22 Peter Hofschröer quotes Wellington that he did know earlier than 3 o clock in the afternoon about the French attack on the Prussians.

I haven't read Pflugk-Harttung's articles, and don't know what his conclusions are.

Peter once sent me photocopies of a short biography of Hans Carl Ernst count von Zieten, by Dietrich Hafner, which was published in 1896 in the journal "Militärische Rundschau" (in the category: "Militärisches").

There (p. 252) the manuscript of an unpublished autobiography by Zieten is literally quoted. Zieten says he did expect the French attack for the 15th, and had already sent back all the baggage of the corps on 13th and 14th. He had given orders to the orderly on duty, to wake him up on the first cannon shot heard, which happened on 15th at "2 1/4" = a quarter past 2 a.m., when 3 cannon shots had been heard. He was in his headquarters in Charleroi.

Zieten states he woke up the other officers of his staff, dictated a German and a French letter and sent them to the headquarters at Namur and Brussels. The letter to Wellington was carried by Kolonnenjäger "Merinsky" (i.e. Merensky of the Reitendes Feldjägerkorps, No. 955, born 1781 in Silesia, served from October 1804 until 1817).

Zieten doesn't give the words of these two letters, but states he wrote "daß der Krieg angegangen sei" (that the war had started).

So this a factum that Zieten states himself he sent such an early letter. How to bring this in harmony with contradicting facta (Wellinton stating he did not receive such a letter), is basically a matter of taste. We cannot arrive for sure at the "historical truth", as the information which survived the pass of time always leaves room for different interpretations.

Even Pflugk-Harttung could have been wrong in his conclusions, whether he supports Peter's opinion or not.

Zieten's recollections on which Hafner's biography is based seem to have been written some years after 1815. And we will never know whether Zieten lied, or maybe Hafner invented or altered this passage. Or perhaps Merensky had an accident on the way ?

Also a message saying the War has started is very different to one saying, we are under heavy attack.

The biggest part of this debate seems to be the problem that Blucher and Wellington knew what they were trying to do, and lots of subordinates of both wanted there slice of credit when it got done.

Condottiere
Yes the linked forum has an agenda
And that is to enjoy sharing ideas with fellow gamers,to promote the hobby of wargaming and to encourage new recruits to the hobby,to try to educate and inform across a wide range of different periods and genres and basically just to have fun.
Something that some on here seem to have forgotten how to do.

I rest my case

@Oliver Schmid

In 1819, Zieten was a according to JvPH a little bit evasive to answer Grolmans question regarding the message to Wellington:

1) No copy of the message or entry in a official journal existed, because no officer was available, who wrote French, so Zietens himself wrote the message which was brought to Bruessel by a ….

2) Kurier-Jäger, dessen Namen mir (Zieten) entfallen ist….

3) The French attack occured after 4 am.

4) No other officer in Zietens staff remembred a early message to Wellington

5) Nobody in Wellingtons staff remebred a second message from Zieten.

The autobiography which was written about 25 years later seems to be unreliable and Pedlow makes a good case in his First Empire paper.

Ulenspiegel

Condottiere-Correct

I think this thread illustrates what can happen after years of a campaign, like the one waged against PH's whole work (not just this one point). Positions become so entrenched because each side knows that giving he slightest ground will result in much crowing and repetition of the points once more. As noted in the long Shane thread about H-W, there are a few memoirs, which suggest Z was right – but Pedlow ignores them. As for calling Hussey and Cousins historians, their bizarre essay campaign in FE rather suggest they are not and has only turned FE into a "Waterloo/PH bashing mag".

Youre a class act Condottiere

Oh dear!
Well ,for what its worth.
Yes I am a member of the linked forum.
I am giving you the benefit of the assumption that you have a reasonably advanced level of intelligence as most posters on here have
So I expect you be able to distinguish between "a swipe" at your attack on the forum and an assumed defence of one of its members ,in this case, Cacadores.
I have no issues at all with Hoefschroer.I own his books and enjoyed them.I try to follow these threads for good or worse as they usually reveal matters of interest about the history involved not because of any preference for any of the personalities involved or because I feel particularly strongly about any of their respective interpretations of the history.
Rest assured I feel no need to defend Cacadores nor does he need any defence from me.
I do feel agrieved at your comments about the linked forum
As far as I am aware you are not a frequent vistor to it ,certainly not a member and yet you malign it and all of its members repeatedly.
That doesnt seem like the conduct of a "decent" man and yet I am criticised for lacking this quality as well as being accused of being devoid of courage.
If you have issues with Cacadores they should be addressed directly to him.
You are not entitled to assume that his views are those of the members of the said forum particularly as you are wholly ignorant of any of those views and the way in which its members behave to one another-which is most definitely infinitely better than the behaviour you have exhibited thus far.

Ulenspiegel, thanks for this info.

In the meantime I have found and read a PDF of Pflugk-Harttung's article (Berichterstattung), which I once downloaded from the net.

That Zieten's 1819 version varied from the one on his autobiography, could have been caused that in 1819 he didn't give any importance to the questions and answered from memory ("Kurier-Jäger, dessen Namen mir entfallen ist"), whereas perhaps in his autobiography he refered to written notes – at least a Kolonnenjäger Merensky really existed.

The contradictions in timing could be (but needn't be) the result of bad memory in 1819 and misread handwritten numbers in his original notes by Zieten, or in Zieten's autobiography by Hafner, or in Hafner' mansucript for the biography by the typesetter.

But if the early letter by Zieten was written, it seems (to Pflugk-Harttung, and on the basis of his article to me) unprobable that this early letter arrived. Or, if it arrived, perhaps it was ignored by Wellington for being too vague – an attack on the Prussian outpost chain doesn't necessarily mean an offensive of the French army started.

Anyway, Pflugk-Harttung comes to the conclusion (p. 57) that Zieten did send only one letter, which was despatched form Charleroi between 8 and 9 a.m., and arrived at Brussels as late as between 6 and 7 p.m.

However, this conclusion is not mandatory.

It is based on the assumption that Wellington and Müffling, who in the 1840s both stated that a letter from Zieten arrived at 3 p.m., mixed this up with the arrival of a letter by Blücher at 3. p.m.

Pflugk-Harttung also interprets a letter by Wellington (Despatches XII, 473) of the evening of 15th June, in which he says he didn't hear anything from Charleroi since 9 a.m., to mean no letters reached him which were posted from Charleroi after 9 a.m.

I haven't seen this letter, but perhaps another possible interpretion is that the last letter from Charleroi which Wellington had received, arrived at Brussels at 9 a.m. – and thus must have been sent shortly after at 4 a.m. – this would be Zieten's early morning letter …

If this helps to judge whether Peter was citing Pflugk-Harttung correctly, the article ends with the statement:

"It is therefore not justified to substentially assign Wellington blame for the result of Ligny."

This wording doesn't exclude that Wellington had some guilt.

What is the excact wording of Peter Hofschröer's reference to Pflugk-Harttung's article ?

@Oliver Schmidt

On page 54 of the Berichterstattung JvPH disussed the two possible versions of the 9 am. It could be both, the time when the letter was written OR the time it arrived.
(I do not speak French so I have to believe him :-)))

The problem with Zietens autobiography is according to Pedlow that it contains a lot of inaccurate statements and "observations". (And Zieten could have of course a strong motiv to invent such a messenger in 1819 :-))

I do not think that Wellington is off the hook, but my feeling is, that he did not waste a lot of time, which was one of PH main complaints.

Ulenspiegel

Yes,the letter seems to be ambiguous.

In the meantime, on my harddrive I also found the PDF of Gregory Pedlow's article, which cites from another article by Pflugk-Harttung, giving some evidence that Zieten's autobiography is not very reliable. Of course this doesn't rule out that it is reliable in particular points, such as the events of 15th June 1815.

To form my own opinion, would have to gather all the sources and read and compare them myself.

I cannot see why Zieten would not have written a letter to Wellingto as early as possible. Why should he only inform Blücher and then forget about Wellington?

Pflugk – Harttung is very critical to the Prussians and he states that they were better informed then Wellington, but he also cannot exculpate Wellington as well, like he criticises the alarm plans of Wellington as well.

@v.Winterfeld

In principle he could have written an early message to Wellington. However, in the stress situation with no officers at hand who could write it in French, maybe he has simply forgotten? Or he wrote to Wellington when the situation was more clear and he could deliver more useful intel, i.e. at 8 am.

For me an important question still is, how clear was it for Zieten on June 15th that the situation was so critical that 4 or 5 hours delay could really prevent a coordination of the allied efforts? Later, after the Prussian defeat at Ligny it looked more critical :-))

Ulenspiegel

I recall someone (on an entirely different forum) saying that the Prussians had detected the relocation of some of Napoleon's Corps to the Charleroi area, but had not passed the intelligence on to Wellington. If it is true that Zieten was preparing on the 13th and 14th to be attacked,
he must have had some basis for that. Why didn't he send messages about that? – the answer seems to be that communications between the two armies were rather haphazard.

If I am not mistaken, we do not have any public statement from Zieten on the matter. His autobiography was unpublished, the interview with Grohlman was internal. It really isn't a matter of having to chose between W. or Z.

There is no copy of the message, there is no British record of its reception, there is no receipt from the messenger, there is no (contemporary) name for the messenger. Those are the first facts which everything else has to build upon. (Of course lack of evidence is strong evidence of a guilty coverup in any good conspiracy theory;-)

NSN

Condottiere
I as read this sorry tale I was quite happy to make my point and disappear into the ether.
I felt you extended your umbrage to others beyond Cacadores unreasonably.
You were not happy with that clearly and decided to goad me into a reply by asking me to "go to hell" and then calling me a coward.
Well it worked,and I replied with the explanation you requested.
Now I am "dragging it out"
Did you want me to reply or didnt you ?
I am sorry that you feel mistreated in some way.
I expect we both have better things to do than witter on about this.
I cant see you doing what I thought you might do when in receipt of my explanation-namely apologise for the personal insults.But perhaps you might restore my faith in human nature and consider it

I'm sorry but I got halfway through this thread and just burst out laughung- it actually has got to the point where it's genuinely amusing- LOL!

I say we rename the Napoleonic Discussion board the 'Let's have a Ruck' board.
Whaddya think?

There were other messages send on the same day, and when looking at these its quite obvious what did really happen.

at 8.15 am Zieten did inform Blücher that the french had crossed the borders in force , had seized the prussian positions at thuin , the french guards and Nappy were reported to be on the field, zieten did then write that he had informed Wellington of these facts too.

there is no reason to believe that zieten did inform Wellington earlier of these facts than his own C.i.C.

so the message was sent around this time, between 8.15 and 9 am from Charleroi.

On the same day at 7pm Müffling writes to Blücher that he has just received the report that Zieten had been attacked and that he had just consulted Wellington on this.

So the message was received in Brussels sometime between 5 and 6pm.

The only written evidence the Hofschroer view can count on is the Feltre letter, written in the evening by Wellington to the Duke of Feltre in which he states that he had no information from Charleroi "since 9 am".
This expression can naturally be interpreted both ways, either messages received at 9 am or those sent and documenting the situation in the south at 9 pm.
its a neutral document for both views.

"so the message was sent around this time, between 8.15 and 9 am from Charleroi. …. So the message was received in Brussels sometime between 5 and 6pm.

I have "no horse in this race" – NONE.

But one point did always strike me as quite odd : 8 to 10 hours to travel Charleroi to Brussels ? 5 or 6 km/hour ? Was the messenger walking ? Did he stop for a long lunch and a siesta ?

?????

- Evan

French courier example :

As soon as the day of Austerlitz was gained, the Emperor hastened to send the courier Moustache to France to announce the news to the Empress, who was then at the chateau of Saint-Cloud. It was nine o'clock in the evening when loud cries of joy were suddenly heard, and the galloping of a horse at full speed, accompanied by the sound of bells, and repeated blows of the whip which announced a courier. The Empress, who was awaiting with the greatest impatience news from the army, rushed to the window, opened it hurriedly, and the words victory and Austerlitz fell on her ears. Eager to know the details, she ran down the steps, followed by her ladies; and Moustache in the most excited manner related the marvelous news, and handed her Majesty the Emperor's letter, which Josephine read, and then drawing a handsome diamond ring from her finger, gave it to the courier. Poor Moustache had galloped more than fifty leagues that day [10 km/hr – for 24 hours !], and was so exhausted that he had to be lifted from his horse and placed in bed, which it required four persons to accomplish. His last horse, which he had doubtless spared less than the others, fell dead in the court of the chateau.

- Evan

Moustache ….

picture

- Evan

Great picture, Evan … really life-like, and looks to be quite a character!

Salut Arteis

Thanks !
I like the French courriers. An interesting "niche in history"

These were in addition to the normal ways of sending messages : aides-de-camp, ordonnances and light cavalry, augmented by paid locals in wartime. Important messages, such as from Napolen to a maréchal, might thus be sent by 3 or 4 different carriers, the courriers being the fastest and most assured.
They were civilians, but paid like senior officers, and had unlimited expenses. They started with one good horse, rode it as hard as possible until it began to fail and bought the best horse the could find as a replacement. They would NOT, NOT, NOT stop. No rest, no sleep, no food except what they could eat as they galloped. And they usually did have a spell of bed rest under medical care after arrival from a longer trip. I do not know of one message that went undelivered. And some of the "speed records" are amazing, even counting the number of horses that had to be ruined.
Oddly, they were known by nicknames, such as Moustache, Le Simple, Le Jeune, etc. One presumes this was to keep ennemy security services from knowing that they had a courrier if they captured one.
So little towns in France seem to contend a bit for "local honor" of being the home of a courrier.
There are snippets and anecdotes about this service scattered in many memoires, but I do not know of a specific book about them.

I see in your profile that you are "Roly Hermans" from New Zealand. If you "the" Roly Hermans, of the Kapiti Fusiliers, I really want to thank you for your website – I have been a visitor for some years and it is really a favorite among favorites for miniatures sites. You even make me want to vacation in New Zealand (and I am an American working in south-west Asia, and so NZ is not exactly next door).

- Evan

@Chasseur à cheval

there you are such a diligent and serious researcher, I recommend reading Foucart, expecially the tome 2 Prenzlow – Lübeck, and you will be suprised how long it took to transmit reports and orders, 5 – 6 km / hour seems pretty good for me – now, before readinf Foucart I had the immagination that ADCs were fast as lightning.
Also important messages were not always sent 3 – 4 times – how many corps, how many marshalls and how many reports a day, 100 courriers easily.
Also what is very interesting, some reports were sent by regular post ;-))

As said above, I have the opinion that Wellington got a report from Zieten before 9 o ' clock.

C
Apology accepted.Thank you
Do drop by the forum and see if you think it provides a less stressful experience than here.
Regards
Jacko27

CPT: "…at 8.15 am Zieten did inform Blücher that the french had crossed the borders in force , had seized the prussian positions at thuin , the french guards and Nappy were reported to be on the field, zieten did then write that he had informed Wellington of these facts too."

No that is not correct, Zieten sent an officer to Blücher at 4:45 am with a very short message – sound of guns can be heard – and a statement that he has no more information.
I think this message is not disputed. The second message to his boss with more useful content was around 8 am and at this time he send a message to Wellington too (also not disputed).

Ulenspiegel

Salut von Winterfeldt,

I love my Foucart (you seem to read me correctly !)

But come now, the Prussian campaign was in hostile territory, with a largely unexpected advance in the early stages after Jena-Auerstedt at lightning speed, and thence into Polish and far East Prussian territory and deteriorating weather.

It is not the same as sitting nice in early summer on the defensive in Belgium in 1815 !

It is true the French could use an amazing number of messengers. The operations of Davout in 1812 tell repeatedly of orders to detach compagnies and escadrons to form poste relais. Plus his own staff and those of this generals, plus his gendarmes, plus Polish officers, plus local hired people (typically Jewish). 100 at a time so engaged is likely a very low estimate, by at least half, for his corps alone.

- Evan

ulenspiegel,
what is not correct?
My post was about documented evidence for the delivery and reception of Zietens message to Wellington.

The 8.15 message to Blücher contains direct evidence that this message was delivered to Wellington too.

Zieten would not have informed Wellington hours before his own C.i.C, he would not even have known the facts, mentioned in the message hours before, for example the seizure of Thuin.

This is clear evidence for the message to Wellington being brought on the way between 8 and 9 am.

The 4.45 message to Blücher contains no evidence that anything was sent to Wellington.

Nobody has ever claimed that 2 messages were sent to Wellington, but as said there is clear evidence that a message was sent to him between 8 and 9 am. So nothing was sent to him at 4.45 am.
There was no reason to sent the 4.45 message to Wellington .
Its content was not more than "just woke up, hear some shooting".

Still the 4.45 message to Blücher is quite helpful for an in depth analysis.
It indicates that nothing was sent to anybody before 4.45am.
And it indicates that even at this time Zieten did not yet have valuable informations worth sending them to the commander of an allied army.

And again, only one message is disputed, there is hard evidence that one was sent between 8.15 and 9am.

And this one naturally cannot arrive in Brussels at 9 am.

One point should be added.
As mentioned by evan, 8-9 hours from Charleroi is quite a long time.
But there are a lot other examples for messages needing much more time than calculated.
there are multiple reasons for the delay of a courier, if he falls from the horse or the horse gets hurt, all calculations become irrelevant.
And there is anpother reason which is often overlooked.

The time data on the message is documenting the time it is finished and completly written down, not the moment the courier leaves the headquarter.
If there are no couriers available at the moment, an 8am message might indeed go out hours later.

When Zieten´s message was delivered, his staff was under heavy pressure amidst an ongoing fight and the message to Blücher had to be delivered first, naturally.
Perhaps the one for Wellington was forgotten for some time, perhaps no courier was available, perhaps there were delays during the ride to Brussels, we will never find out.

Already in 1819 the prussian war ministry did try to investigate the details of Zieten´s message, the name of the courier was not found out.
Perhaps Zieten had to cover something up, perhaps like Wellington said, the Prussians had used the fattest man and the lamest horse,we will never know.

@CPT. I misunderstood your post. Sorry.

Yes content of the 4:45 message would not be very useful for Wellington. And the content of the message which reached Wellington makes it more likely that it was sent later.

Ulenspiegel

Chasseur à Cheval

Just re – read the chapter about delivering messages in

Philipp, de : Le Serive D'Ètat-Majpr Pendent Les Guerres du Premier Empire, Paris 1900, re – print Paris 2002.

Yes there are astouning deeds by the "courriers" but also failures. I agree that it is different to deliver a message in Spain 1810 or in Belgium 1815. But for a Prussian – also Belgium was a foreign country, where to go?

I don't know when the Prussian messager – who Zienten did sent away at between 3 and 4 o clock ealry morning did arrive at Wellingtons HQ – assuming that Zieten is to be trusted (in my opinion yes).

As Wellington stated that the did not hear anything more from the Prussians after 9 o clock, the messenger Zieten did sent – must have arrived before that time.

vW: "As Wellington stated that the did not hear anything more from the Prussians after 9 o clock, the messenger Zieten did sent – must have arrived before that time."

No, vW, not 'must have arrived', but 'could have arrived'.

In English, if I say I haven't had a message from someone since 9.00, it can mean one of two things:

1) I haven't received any message since one arrived from them at 9.00, or

2) I haven't received any message since they sent me one at 9.00, but which I received later.

Either of those two options is perfectably acceptable (though imprecise) English.

In case 1, then, yes, the message must have arrived *before* 9.00.

In case 2, the message must have arrived an indeterminate time *after* 9.00.

Does Wellington make it clear which of the two options he meant?

Please note – I am not a historian, and I have not really followed this debate in detail. So maybe there is a lot of other evidence that 'must' does apply in this case. But based purely on vW's posting, and nothing else, then either of the two options 'could' apply. Ergo, neither can be said as 'must' apply without any other evidence.

Correction to above:

In case 1, then, yes, the message must have arrived *at about* 9.00.

"Four days earlier, at 10 p.m. on 15 June, Wellington had written a letter to the Duke of Feltre at the French court-in-exile in Ghent outlining developments that day. This letter contained the paragraph : (foot note 16)

I received news that the enemy attacked the Prussian posts this morning at Thuin on the Sambre, and appeared to be menacing Charleroi. I have heard nothing form Charleroi [headquarters of Prussian I Corps] since nine o'clock this morning."

Foot note 16 : Gurwood, Vol XII, page 473

Peter Hofschröer in AoN, see reference given above in one of my mails, page 33

@v.Winterfeld

This problem is discussed on page 54 of JvPH Vorgeschichte.

It is according to JvPH a problem of translation (I do not speak French, so I have to believe him – BTW the French phrase is given there).

Ulenspiegel

A really basic question about the de Feltre letter…

It was written at 10pm after receiving the Zieten letter at 6-7PM. If Wellington is referring to the time he last heard news from Charleroi, why would he not say "since 6-7PM"??

NSN

If Wellington want to state that the news were written down at 9:00 a.m. by Zieten (i.e. represent the available Prussian pieces of information at 9:00 a.m.) and that he has not got any up-date for the period of time afterwards, then his message to the French king would make sense.

Ulenspiegel

My interpretation is that he "could" have received it in between 08:00 and 09:00.

@Ulenspiegel

I cannot find it at page 54, however I find the footnotes on page 52, where Wellington speaks in a letter to Bathurst at the 19th that he did hear of the French attack on the Prussians only at the evening of the 15th, while he back paddled in the supplement Dispatche X. p. 523 that he did got it at about 15:00 – what did Wellingto want to cover up with his first statement.

I guess that it was Wellingtons intention to tell Clarke(the duke of Feltre) about the level of information he had.

He did know about the situation at Charleroi(Zieten´s HQ) at 9 am.
He did know nothing about the situation at 6 pm.

If it was Wellingtons intention to tell Clarke that he didn´t know what happened throughout most of the day since 9 am and that his actions were based on this information level, he should have made a reference to the moment the message was sent.
A claim to have received a message at 6pm has no factual content,it could have been sent the day before actually.

So when looking at the military background only "sent at 9pm" makes sense.

HK,
I couldn´t find a footnote on p.52 making a reference to Wellington learning about the attack in the evening.

To avoid confusion, Wellington didn´t learn about the beginning of hostilities through the Zieten message received at 6pm.
All sources,including Wellington, agree that Wellington was informed about the beginning of hostilities while dining with the Duke of Orange sometimes between 3pm and 4pm.
At this time a number of messages from different sources was coming in.

The question is did Wellington know this already 6 hours earlier and was he able and willing to hide this from all the others.

This is the background of the whole debate around the Zieten message.

If he had done this, he would indeed have a major responsibility for the failure to stop Napoleon at Quatre Bras and Ligny, in case of an additional failure at Waterloo he might have had to bear the major responsibility for a military catastrophy of potentially historical dimensions.

I have

Pflugk-Harttung : Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance – Wellington, Berlin 1903

On page 52 – there is in my copy a foot note about Wellington's two different statements when he did know that the campaign was opened – one at Bathurst, stating he know "till in the evening of the 15th. Disp. XII. 478

and the other hin his Memorandum where the acknowledges that he got the report at three in the after noon.

still one has the statement of Wellington

"Four days earlier, at 10 p.m. on 15 June, Wellington had written a letter to the Duke of Feltre at the French court-in-exile in Ghent outlining developments that day. This letter contained the paragraph : (foot note 16)

I received news that the enemy attacked the Prussian posts this morning at Thuin on the Sambre, and appeared to be menacing Charleroi. I have heard nothing form Charleroi [headquarters of Prussian I Corps] since nine o'clock this morning."

Foot note 16 : Gurwood, Vol XII, page 473

So – my opinion – he did know at around 9 O clock that the Prussians were attacked, Zieten (as he did state) did write a message and it did come through in time.

"I received news that the enemy attacked the Prussian posts this morning at Thuin on the Sambre"
Are you interpreting this as meaning he "received news this morning" of an attack,
or that he "received news of a morning attack"?

Has to be the latter. The former is poorly constructed English which, from all the written documentation I've seen, would have been very untypical.

to be more precise, one would need the original text, I presume in French.