"Tactical Units for TDs and Panzer Jaeger ETO '44-45?" Topic

Soliciting opinions and impressions as much as facts here. When I look at US tank destroyer units in the ETO, I get the distinct impression that group and battalion were admin units only: in the armored divisions, a company was attached to each combat command, and usually a platoon to each team if the combat command made up teams. There would have been a TD company commander, but I haven't found one commanding a team. Use with infantry divisions seems to be by companies or platoons unless they were being used for indirect fire.
(1) Does this match with other people's readings?
(2) Does anyone have a historical feel--as opposed to a wargame feel--of how German practice compared?

Its Wikipedia, but it tends to support your opinion to some degree regarding the administrative groupings of TDs.

link

It would have been interesting to see how the arm developed if the US were facing the Soviets on the eastern front with masses of armour. I would suggest being on the western front and not facing as much allowed more flexibility in use/deployment.

German, not sure but as proponents of KampfGruppe and frequently being on the defensive or counter attacking, units were often parcelled up on an as needs basis. I have a few biographies from the German side and they sometimes refer to TD or Assault guns being deployed to companies and below, in pairs from memory. Again, this was mostly in defensive postures.

Of course I could be completely wrong…..

Yes, the US TD units were generally split up and assigned as subordinate elements to other commands.

The Germans sometimes did this, but often didnt and instead used Panzerjaeger battalions as complete units, even when equipped with towed guns. They often formed the core element of Kampfgruppen, eg Schnell Abteilungs in 1941, and were certainly used as the armoured element in KG in 1944, when they were essentially glorified assault gun battalions. See eg Arnhem, the Bulge etc for the task organisation of various German divisions.

Personally, I'd much rather be a pretend tank battalion in a Stug, Jagdpanzer IV or Jagdpanther than an M10…

Yes, your general impressions of US use is correct.

Harry Yeide's book "The Tank Killers" goes into the ever-shifting US doctrine in very good detail. Their use is quite different operation by operation. Including being parked on slopes to get gun elevation and used for artillery fire in Italy where there wasn't any particularly good avenue to use them as TDs.

Overall, they did quite well as tank destroyers with a very high kill to loss ratio. Kill rates will of course be exaggerated, but the low losses are solidly real.

The biggest danger was when upper level commanders used them as pretend tanks instead of as TDs. A likely hazard when attached to an infantry division.

Typically, they would be split up by the company and platoon like everything else in the combined Armored Combat Commands.

There may have been occaision for a battalion of M18s to push ahead during the breakout period? It's been awhile since I read the book. Companies at least would be on point as armored recon with their speed.

The recon company for the TD battalion might be split off completely to serve as recon for the whole Division, or might be divided up 1 platoon per TD company.

I highly suggest "US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45" by Osprey in their now defunct "Battle Orders" series. (ISBN: 978-1-84176-798-7 It's number 10 in the series).

Need to act fast because they discontinued this excellent series! Shame because the info contained in each volume is a one-stop-shop for a LOT of hard to find info in just one place. Never thought I would recommend using Osprey as a definitive reference source but now that I recommend this series, they drop them! I got several direct from Osprey and had to accept downloads on a few as they are out of stock of the printed copies.

Like I said, you will find answers to your question there and also learn about things you never knew existed on the subject. Good hunting!

I'll second "The Tank Killers". Initially the idea for the tank destroyers was to keep them in battalion or even larger formations in reserve and then when there was a German panzer breakthrough (as was happening a LOT at the time the TDs were being formed) they would rush the TDs up to ambush the breakthrough with mass fire. But by the time the TDs actually got to the front, the days of the mass panzer breakthroughs was pretty much over (at least on the Western Front) and as noted the TDs were usually employed in company or platoon-sized formations for lots of different purposes.

Initially the idea for the tank destroyers was to keep them in battalion or even larger formations in reserve and then when there was a German panzer breakthrough (as was happening a LOT at the time the TDs were being formed) they would rush the TDs up to ambush the breakthrough with mass fire.

Didn't this also involve them being held as a reserve at the corps level or so, instead of being distributed to the individual divisions (where they ended up being used rather like divisional anti-tank battalions).

I believe so. There were brigade level TD headquarters units which rarely ever had anything to do.

According to this list, there were two tank destroyer brigade HQs and 24 tank destroyer group HQs established in 1942-1943:

link

Harry Yeide's book "The Tank Killers" goes into the ever-shifting US doctrine in very good detail.

I also second the recommendations about Yeide's "The Tank Killers". Exceptionally well researched and well written.

BTW his book "The Infantry's Armor" about the US Army's GHQ tank battalions (ie: the independent tank battalions available to be assigned to infantry divisions) is equally well researched and written.

However, the phrase "ever-shifting US doctrine" is not really correct. Doctrine is what is spelled out in the field manuals. TD doctrine did not change very much. TD formations were raised and trained based on this doctrine. When they got into the field, the commanders above them had not been trained or even read the TD FMs, and so had little working understanding of TD doctrine. And also they had little care about that gap in their knowledge.

The biggest danger was when upper level commanders used them as pretend tanks instead of as TDs.

If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck …

In truth the TD doctrine was simply not practical. There was no path by which it would be reasonable to hold a sizeable and highly useful set of armored vehicles with good guns and good speed back as a reserve while the front line units suffered losses and mission compromises in campaigns that were pretty much 100% offensive in nature. And once parcelled out to the front line formations it was almost impossible to convince an infantry division or regiment commander to leave his infantry to be shot up or overrun by German armor before committing the anti-armor firepower of an attached TD formation to action against the German "schwerepunkt".

Initially the idea for the tank destroyers was to keep them in battalion or even larger formations in reserve …

They were raised and trained as battalions. Each battalion had all the resources it needed for independent tactical operation. But they did not have logistical independence. They relied upon the logistics of the Army / Corps and/or Division they were assigned to.

The idea was to keep them as a highly mobile, high anti-armor firepower reserve. When the enemy tanks breakthrough the front, TD battalions would have the mobility to swarm and mass along the enemy's path of advance, conducting their own local recon so they could set up ambushes from advantageous positions. The doctrine relied upon speed, guns and training optimized for anti-tank work, integrated tactical reconnaissance, and … being held in reserve for their moment.

According to this list, there were two tank destroyer brigade HQs and 24 tank destroyer group HQs established in 1942-1943…

The TD battalion was the highest level of active formation. The TD brigade and group HQs were similar in concept to the Armored Division's Combat Command HQs -- a trained staff that would be ready to coordinate the actions of multiple TD battalions assigned to it's control on an as-needed basis.

Personally, I'd much rather be a pretend tank battalion in a Stug, Jagdpanzer IV or Jagdpanther than an M10…

I would not be quite so sure if it were my neck on the line.

The M10 compares reasonably favorably with a Stug or JgdPzr IV. Equivalent anti-armor firepower (until you get to the JgdPzr IV /70), with the M10 having the VERY considerable advantage of a fully rotating turret.

Stugs and JgdPz IVs (and JgdPthrs) suffered greatly when used as ersatz tanks in local counter attacks. If/as the Stugs were allowed to use Stug doctrine (rather than Panzer doctrine) they did well enough. But again, Stugs and M10s often did not get to fight as they had trained.

The Stugs and JgdPzr IVs had the advantage of low profiles for concealment in defense (not so much the JgdPnthr, which was enormous), but the superior mobility of the M10, with the integrated recon at battalion and company levels, gave at least the potential of taking positions that suited the higher profile of an M10.

The frontal armor of the German vehicles was certainly an advantage when slugging it out nose-to-nose. But German AT doctrine was always to set up AT resources (whether Paks, PzrJgrs or JgdPzrs) for flanking shots in any engagement, and the majority of US tanks and TDs that were destroyed in combat were not hit frontally as a result. If brought under fire by a threat to the flank, the M10 had a very substantial advantage in spotting and responding to that threat, when compared to a Stug or JgdPzr.

At least that's what my readings have indicated to me. Never served in any of those vehicles though. But my father did.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)