Stosstaktiken ('k' instead of 'c' and 'en' for plural) were the natural extension of the German pre-war assault tactics. In the pre-war infantry and cavalry training manuals, the term 'Angriff' was usual. 'Sturm' was also used as well to describe the final phases of fire and manoeuvre then assault. Fire superiority was deemed to be essential, with artillery, machine guns, hand grenades and Minenwerfer all playing a part where possible. The latter two weapons were delivered by pioneers in the beginning of the war, later becoming more integrated into standard infantry units as the war progressed. In other words, combined-arms warfare was an accepted/desired tactic from the outset. The specialist stormtrooper units that grew up as independent detachments and as formations within divisions sought more and better ways to increase the supporting fire power as well as the close quarters capabilities of infantry units. This lead to the introduction of light machine guns, Flammenwerfer, grenade launchers and the submachine gun for example. The principles of their use, however, were not fundamentally different.
During late war infantry operations, lead units were heavily equipped with grenades to clear trenches. Not so with submachine guns, which were not produced in large enough numbers. There are numerous photographs of assault infantry formations but it is extremely rare to see the Bergmann submachine gun. I have yet to come across any German or Allied accounts of their use in battle, which is definitely not to say they weren't used. Thomas Wictor's superb 'German Assault Troops in World War 1' makes passing reference to the MP18 at the end of the book. The carbine was more widely used by specialist Stosstruppen but the standard Mauser is frequently seen in photographs. It is the hand grenade that was the ubiquitous close quarters weapon, with photographs of them attached to belts and carried in the specially designed bags.
Many post-war accounts have propagated the myth that Stosstruppen were somehow more effective just by virtue of being almost superhuman. There was nothing intrinsically more powerful about Stosstruppen. They were effective through the application of heavy fire power, including light machine guns and Flammenwerfer, along with the liberal use of hand grenades. It is no accident that German accounts often speak of British and Dominion troops as Sturmtruppen. The same principles were applied by the Allied forces (including the French).
Put another way, a single Stosstrupp stand should not be more effective than the equivalent British, Dominion or French infantry stand. The effectiveness of Stosstruppen should come from the additional stands that are allocated in support, as well as the intensive artillery and Minenwerfer barrage.
Another perspective on this is to recognise that where the British were not so thinly spread, Stosstruppen did poorly. Operation Michael succeeded with 'infiltration' because the British were very spread out. Operation Mars and the southern flank of the attack across the Lys failed completely. British defenders were able to repel Stosstruppen with relative ease in these situations. Multiple attacks were launched from the southern flank of the German salient in Operation Georgette but the storm troopers were unsuccessful on all occasions.
Robert