"French victory over the English in the Peninsula" Topic

French Columns, line and mix order.

Most of the histories I have read stated more or less that as the Napoloenic wars draged on it was not the courage of French soldiers that declined but training and experience.

During the early years French Regiments were able to change from line to column to mix order under fire, etc. However as the years went by and Napoleon had to draft in younger and younger troops into his Regiments, these units had become brittle.

Look at the years of crisis 1812, 1813 and 1814. At times these young troops were only able to pick up training on the march. Thats why the column was used as the main means of movement on the battlefield.

As opposed to a "British better than French" situation, might what we have here is the convergence of several issues that in fusion supported Anglo-Allied success? Here I'm thinking Wellington's own considerable abilities, a top-notch army supported by plucky allies like the Portuguese, a poor Spanish army that nevertheless had to be watched by someone, three years of safely learning how the French did their job as they sliced and diced the Austrians/Prussians/Russians, and terrain that greatly favored the defender and degraded the French tactical system.

We've had a huge thread on this over at the Napoleonic Fire & Fury Yahoo Group (all invited no matter what you play) and a couple of things that stuck out was the terrain issue (as in, would this have worked in 1808 on the Marchfeld) and the fact that the "British in line beats French in column" was a pretty tenuous concept. We found numerous examples of the British in column and the French fighting exactly like the British, eg at Talavera (IIRC, from memory so have a bit of salt), the British Foot Guards advanced in pursuit of retreating French where they ran into French line troops in reserve who:

- deployed into line,
- fired ONE volley,
- then immediately bayonet charged the Guards,
sending them packing minus about a third of their number.

Also, defeat is a very hard issue to define. Wellington failed at several sieges which made his operational position very weak, thus forcing a retreat. Defeat or not?

Ciao, Bill Gray

"Little differentiation of troop types. If you believe that the 1stC BC pila was superior to the 2ndC AD pila, then this is not your set of rules"

This may be true but were they equally as effective against the opponents they faced in each period? Putting that much variation in would need hundreds of lists or variables.

It strikes me that this isn't much of an issue till you get to the "My Vikings should be able to whip your Sea People" type of arguement.

Finally! After almost 200 posts, my first Bug message (above). I now feel part of the gang!

As I was saying…

"As opposed to a "British better than French" situation, might what we have here is the convergence of several issues that in fusion supported Anglo-Allied success? Here I'm thinking Wellington's own considerable abilities, a top-notch army supported by plucky allies like the Portuguese, a poor Spanish army that nevertheless had to be watched by someone, three years of safely learning how the French did their job as they sliced and diced the Austrians/Prussians/Russians, and terrain that greatly favored the defender and degraded the French tactical system."

Well said, I can buy that a lot more than the "British soldiers are better than french soldiers"…or vice-versa. To me, British and French soldiers were both "La crème de la crème" of the era.

Ha, I like these discussions. It seems to have turned into a good old British superiority argument.

I would say that in the Peninsular campaigns from 1812 onwards the French were definately inferior. After Napoleon's Russian disaster the troops left on the Iberian peninsular were mostly second rate troops. They lacked the morale of the older french army and simply wern't as good as the British regulars who were are good quality regulars.

The tactical superiority of the french also comes into question in that they repeatedly attacked British columns and were repeatedly beaten.

As for the "Allies" on the British side, they were often the weakest part of the army. The french sometimes deliberately pressed home their attacks against the weakest element of the British forces; the Spanish or the Portugese. Of course later in the campaign the Portugese were becam emuch better troops.

I am not a Francophobe; i collect and game with a French army; but i recognise it's historical weaknesses. It is the same with German army in World War two; originally brilliant, but they were crippled by a disasterous campaign (Russia again!) and never recovered.

Terry wrote:
"Maybe on paper the armies in the field had something like 40% non redcoats, But in the british battalions themselfs, it was mainly Irish who formed the line, and this could be as high at 75% out of the total."

There were Spaniards in many British units.
For example the Spanish recruits for the 1st Battalion of Rifles comprised 34% of all replacements for the battalion in 1812.
There were very many Portuguese and German units in so-called "British army".

There not many Portuguese and Germans on this forum (2 % ?, 3 % ?) and no one to stand up for their troops,
so you English behave as if freshly after reading Sharpe's adventures :-)

OK< not all of you, I'm sorry.

Well the French must have did something right in the Peninsula. It took the British SIX years to reach the French border.

That is an awful long time to cross one country. i do know that Wellington captured and evacuated madrid a few times instead of fighting French reinforcing armies.

"there is not much there for six or seven years of constant warfare, don't you think? "

sorry but I disagre,

and by the way, according to Jac Weller any battles of importance in Peninsula were Baylen (Spanish victory) and Vittoria (British, Portuguese, Spanish victory).
Not much for the wellingtonian campaigns, don't you think ?

====================================

"I do also say nowever that at waterloo if it had not been for the prussians it would of been Our waterloo."

Terry, if it had not been for the Prussians your Wellington would be embarking his arse a la Dunkirk in Ostende or elsewhere, as your Moore did at La Corunna.

And do it fast, at least as fast as Moore did :-)

You know, what occurs to me when I read these little pokes at Wellington, is that what really es off our continental cousins is that a British bloke actually had the effrontery to be involved Napoleon's final defeat

They would be much happier I'm sure if Wellington and Blucher had waited for the Austrians and Russians to turn up to the party so that they could claim a wholly European victory with negligible help from the offshore part

Tough, it happened the way it happened chaps,it wasn't a re-run of Leipzig, get over it

HH -and by the way, according to Jac Weller any battles of importance in Peninsula were Baylen (Spanish victory) and Vittoria (British, Portuguese, Spanish victory).
Not much for the wellingtonian campaigns, don't you think ?-

Pathetic.

You think without Rolica, Vimeiro, Oporto, Talavera, Fuentes, Bussaco, Torres Vedras, Cuidad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca and hundreds of other clashes, skirmishes, sieges and raids that you actually HAVE Vittoria? You think that the situation which brought Josephs field army to Vittoria happened all by itself? You think the superb, multi-national, veteran army that Wellington wielded so well to crush the French there just happened to appear from nowhere, somehow?

-Well the French must have did something right in the Peninsula. It took the British SIX years to reach the French border-

It took 4 years to liberate Portugal, defend it against numerous French invasions, establish it as a base capable of supporting an army in some of Europe's most logistics-hostile territory, establish a Portuguese army, season and integrate it and wear down the French in Spain, either through direct means or by assisting and supplying the Spanish. Let me put it this way…if you were Wellington would you have gone haring of into Spain in 1810 or 1811, outnumbered and unsupplied, with your raw Portuguese levies and all in the knowledge that the Spanish had virtually nothing organised in the way of field forces to assist?

When Wellington finally began to roll in 1812 it was only a litle over a year between Cuidad Rodrigo and Vittoria. Burgos was a definite disaster, but Wellingtons 'left hook' in 1813 was a masterpiece of planning, preparation and logistics.

Kawasaki:

You mean the rocket troop didn't save the day?

EveryManForHimself

Not one of Wellington's favourite weapons I believe?

Obviously he wasn't at Leipzig

Napgamer
''British faced a lot of 2nd class troops''
I was interested in this post. Do you mean the French generally were second class, or that they just looked second class next to the British?

''It took British Army 6 years to kick out Frogies from Spain''.

I think the British entered the Peninsula with 12000 troops. And the French had anything up to half a million men there. I'm more interested why the French, with so many troops there, couldn't crush the British when there mumbers were so small.

ArchduckCharles,
''The French army of the Napoleonic wars was one of the best military machine of all-time and to diminish that is just plain dishonest.''
Seems you disagree with Napgamer!

''And to compare Peninsular SKIRMISHES with Central European BATTLES is, IMO, ridiculous''.

I don't think we were talking about ''Skirmishes'' were we?
They would be small actions with less than a brigade – normally a few men fighting to control a bridge, or some scouting cavalry surprising a couple of squadrons – of which there were many in Spain. I think the post was more about the 'battles' there with a number of divisons or corps facing each other.

"''British faced a lot of 2nd class troops''
I was interested in this post. Do you mean the French generally were second class, or that they just looked second class next to the British?"
I think he refers to the fact that many French raw troops (Cohortes, Régiments provisoires ou composites) and some allied troops with low motivation (Dutchmen, Napolitans, Hanovrians) were sent to Spain.
These were only part of the troops the Red Coats were facing… others were standard and crack troops. Although the best "non guard" formations remained with the Armée d'Allemagne.

Trokoshea,

Perhaps you're right.
Well, it seems from the battle lists I have that for a considerable period of time the French forces in Spain were standard Grande Armee troops.

In addition the British and Spanish in Spain fought such elite troops as:

Royal Guard
Marine Guard
Polish lancers
Imperial Guard
Imperial Guard cavalry (e.g. Lapic)
Swiss
Grenadier reserve (e.g. Kellermann's)
And the best Italien and German battalions.

led by (in Napoleon's opinion) the best commanders, such as:
Ney,
Soult,
Suchet,
Massina,
Victor
D'Erlon,
Marmont, as well as such leading lights as:
Reille,
Sabastiani
Foy and
Clausel.

And, of course, er….

Napoleon himself!

Cacadore:
You are right about the involvment of the troops and commanders, altough many of these Elite/crack units were in Spain for a relatively short period. But you are missing an important aspect… Cohesion of the fighting units (bataillons, regiments used to fight together in the same Brigade-Division-Corps, under the same commanders, develop a certain level of mutual trust). In Spain, part of the French troops commited remained in the same formations as 1805-1807. But another substantial part of the occupation army was newly "assembled" and had to build its cohesion over time.
If you have access to the 1808 French OoB in Spain, you can see this "duality". All in all, the Brits fought "blended" French troops. Such a situation happened too during the 1809 Austrian campaign (4th batallions formations) but to a much smaller scale… and as a coincidence, all allied formations were kept together too. :-) Could you just imagine how nasty the whole 3 Swiss regiments (12 bataillons) sent to Spain would have been if fighting as a single division?
For any need of extra info, feel free to write to my email address: ericvietnam@hotmail.com

Children please, the British are now and always have been the best troops in the world. We have consistently kicked arse as the quaint colonials would put it, throughout history. Must admit we've had the occasional glitch but the type of person that is British makes our soldiers the best, we have moral fibre and discipline, we do what we are told to do, yes even now and we don't question authority like so many other nations do. bring it on lol

Please guys, this chauvinistic British superiority nonsense is now getting seriously ridiculous.
Do you guys actually like history, or is it just a mean to remember the ol'days when the British Empire was great?

Gentlemen

Mr Walsh was having a (much needed) amusement.

Mike

Cacador

I hope you are joking, Trokoshea is correct, also you should not count what troops are in Spain, since most of them where not facing Brits, but were busy with Spanish or protecting towns and lines of communication, if you look at most of the battles that British and allies have won, the numbers are in their favour.

"Mr Walsh was having a (much needed) amusement."

Whoops, sorry Steve if your post was ironic. I did not get the second degree…

Cacadore :

I would also like to express agreement with mon copain, Trokoshea.

The garde was very little used except during the brief campaign led by Napoleon in person that resulted in Sir John Moore's "Dunkirk".

In general, the French armies in Spain were a pastiche of the available. In specifics, I would be pleased to discuss either here or directly via email the particular quality of French forces in any given order of battle.

All :

If I may reccomend two authors also :
Sir Charles Oman – rather pro-British but not unreservedly so – his multi-volume history of the Peninsula is availble from Greenhill Books
General Max. Foy – a serving French general in the capign and a noted historian – I dont know of modern reprints , but the the French original is not difficult reading and there was an early English edition … a nice balance to Oman.

- Evan

PS for Trokoshea : my father's mother's family left Quebec for the high plains of the west, south of the Canadian border, just before she was born. She spoke French as her preferred language all her life. So, copain indeed , perhaps.

blancard

Alors je ne suis pas le seul à parler Français! I'm from Québec myself (my mother's family is "pure laine" Québécois, my father's family is of Irish descent).

We should have a discussion en Français one day. They are so few Napoleonics wargamers that can talk French (you would think…).

blancard,(and also thanks to Trokoshea)
''The garde was very little used except during the brief campaign led by Napoleon in person that resulted in Sir John Moore's "Dunkirk".''

Thank you. Your post is infomative. I only ask how you would explain the Guard at Fuentes do Onoro (1811) and Vitoria (1813) to name but two?

Napgamer
, ''if you look at most of the battles that British and allies have won, the numbers are in their favour''.

It's called campaign strategy – its how you win. One example: In the Talavera campaign Wellington faced a vastly superior theoretical French force of more than 100,000 with just 56,000! Victor + Joseph (34,000) + Soult with VI, V and II corps of 50,000 plus Sebastiani's 20,000. Wellington (Wellesly) had 56,000 only if he could get Cuesta to work with him. Wellesly was vastly outnumbered but managed to extricate a battle (by using Venegas in the north) with better odds – against 50,000 available French. For 5 years the British were outnumbered.

Humour is obviously an aquiered taste and amusement lies in watching it fly over someone's head!

So guys, back to the question. Did the French ever beat the English in the Peninsula? The criteria of the time (as opposed to the shifting criteria of SauveQP's web link) was simple:

A battle is won by the troops who hold the battle-ground.

Taking the largest multi-divisional battles only, with info relating to British attack or defence (and commanders other than Wellington), we get:

Vimero, defence, British victory.
Corrunna (Moore) defence, British victory*
Crossing of the Douro, attack, British victory
Talavera, defence, British victory
Barossa(Graham),defence, British victory
Busaco, defence, British victory
Fuentes de Onoro, defence, British victory
Albuera (Beresford), defence, British victory¬
Salamanca, attack, British victory
Vitoria, attack, British victory
Sorouren^, defence (there were 2), British victory
Bidossa, attack, British victory
Nivelle, attack, British victory
Nive, defence, British victory
Orthez, attack, British victory
Toulouse, attack, British victory+
Vimero, attack, British victory

Ciudad Rodrego, Badajoz and San Sebastian were sieges, not battles. All fell to Wellington eventually.

What is interesting, is that although French historians like to paint Wellington as a defensive general (presumably based upon Waterloo, not India), actually only 6 out of the standard 14 here were defensive. And two of them were defensive but not out of choice (Talavera and Vimero). Wellington was mainly an attacking commander.

The Coa, was Craufurd's single division against Ney's Corps, so I'm not sure why this was mentioned. Other small or rearguard actions are too numerous to mention and would have to include Rolica, St Jean de Luz or Garris (Hill) but we'd be here all night discussing them.

* Corruna
The aim on the British side was to embark unmolested. Soult's aim was to destroy the British. Soult failed and was forced to withdraw.

+Toulouse
French were pushed back from their positions around the Languedoc and on the heights of Calvinet and were forced to abandon the city so a definate British victory – I'm not sure how there could be doubt.

^Sorouren/Pyranees
Soult clearly driven off. British casualties: 2652. Soult claims 1800 French losses consistant with under- or over-reporting thruoghout the campaign (he even failed to count a division once in order to plea for more troops). His wing commanders (Clausel and Reille) however, actually report over 3000 lost.

¬Albuera
An amazing battle: Soult's cavalry on the Allied flank have a clear run at the Spanish and British rear, but Soult lacks the ruthlessness to push on, a fault he was to display on the Nive. Result is that Soult is forced to retreat over the Sierra Moresa.

Incidentally, in all of Wellington's battles, the French never once manage to break through a British line. Reille claims to have pushed back a line once but the evidence is that he was dealing with advance skirmishers with a formed battalion behind but hidden – a surprise foisted on the French at various times, including at Waterloo.

Last point is that other British commanders such as Hill and Graham also displayed the ability to win independant battles.

''manage to break through a British line''
I mean, a Wellington line of battle.

-as opposed to the shifting criteria of SauveQP's web link)-

If you're referring to the list on the 'Napoleon's Amy' site, that was not actually me, but 'Decabelus'.

-Incidentally, in all of Wellington's battles, the French never once manage to break through a British line-

At Salamanca the French under Clausel did rout the 4th Division. Given that finally stopping the attack cost the 6th Division in reserve around a third of its men it seems a bit churlish not to allow the French to claim that one as a success.

Québécois de A à Z moi itou. Vive l'Empereur… de Chicoutimi! :D

Cacadore :

For Fuentes , the actual presence of the garde was limited to a very small number of horse, which included velites (youngsters) taking the field with the actual guardsmen. They amounted to little more than an honor guard for m'al Bessieres.

cavalerie de la garde, général de brigade Lépic
>>> grenadiers à cheval de la garde – 1 esc., 197
>>> 1er chevau-légers lanciers de la garde (polonaises) – 1 esc. ,370
>>> chasseurs à cheval de la garde – 1 esc., 235
>>> mameluks – 1 cie.. 79

Total : 881 – less than the equivalent of a garde regiment

In general for the Line, early 1811 was one of the better quality periods for the French. With no other campaign in progress, you can see quite a few regiments making a rather typical deployment to Spain (as opposed to detachments, regiments de marche, provisoires, etc.) In overall quality, it was likely the second best force, after the one led earlier by Napoleon in person.

=================

For Vittoria, I may be easily mistaken, but I am not aware of any French garde troops in presence. Joseph's Spanish garde was represented, but with a notable difference in quality vs. the French garde.

Spanish Guard – g'al Janin
>>> King Joseph Guard Brigade, g'al Guy – 3 bns, 2380
>>> Spanish Guard Cavalry – elements of 2 regiments, 425
>>> Spanish Guard Foot Artillery – detachment

=================

As to the remainder of your post, it is a very interesting listing. Your footnotes explaining your position on the "questionable" ones is much appreciated.

Overall, we really cannot say too much for French successes in Spain, except for perhaps the campaigns led by Napoleon in person, and those of Suchet (who faced very little of the British forces) – as you have noted.

- Evan

PS for Trokoshea – my wriiten French is ALOT better than my spoken French …. were we to meet, you will have to accept my apologies in advance for the wrteched accent !
:-)

SauveQuiPeut,

Clausel was a good general. Although he was timid at Arcangues he deserves credit at Salamanca.

It's interesting to see that both the British and the French would advance in columns when they attacked and then deploy in line to fire. Yet the British enjoyed more success. I wonder if the packed nature of the French columns prevented the kind of sudden charges the British sometimes employed? I don't know.

Oopse: Barossa was also an attack.

And I'm not sure if Sabugal (Wellington had 30,000) should be included. Massina was pushed out of his position but he did re-enforce Ciudad Rodrego. Most of the battle was bumbling around in the fog!

Honorer l'homme qui agit avec l'honneur

If I may offer pure opinion ….

Wellington really did have a "key" to beatign the French : his infantry.

Normally, when confronted with resolute or firm enemy infantry in an important or lynch-pin location on the battlefield, the French doctrine by 1809 was to charge them with massed heavy cavalry (absent in Spain) and then , if they formed squares or other closed formations, blast them with massed artillery, often of large calibre (also absent in Spain).

Now, subtituting dragoons for cuirassiers and 8 lbers for 12 lbers really weakens the French – as it impacts a key doctrine for dealing with firm enemy infantry. But still, the doctrine should have worked somewhat, or sometimes. Except ….. for Wellington's eye for the ground.

It was Wellingotn's "trick" to virtually always give battle on ground that inhibited the French assault combination noted above, at least at the most critical points of the British deployment.

The use of light troops played a key role as well, in disrupting any attempted French infantry advance. But it was the inability to actually "get at" the British formed infantry and kill them with heavy cavalry and guns that would repeatedly stymie the French … most notably at Waterloo.

Just an opinion,

- Evan
(who never thought too much of Soult anyway)

blancard
Well, I was only surprised by the idea that the British were somehow fighting 'second rate troops' – which they clearly weren't. I assume now it was simply a Napgamer rhetorical fling!

Otherwise you're quite right about the compositions:

''Spanish Guard – g'al Janin
>>> King Joseph Guard Brigade, g'al Guy – 3 bns, 2380
>>> Spanish Guard Cavalry – elements of 2 regiments, 425
>>> Spanish Guard Foot Artillery – detachment''

Artillery 830. Don't forget your figures are based upon a May census, so by Vitoria they could have been even less.

In Jan 1810 there were also 16,401 Young Guard in Spain, though I've no idea where!

Still, the issue of troop quality is a mute point: the same Portuguese who had let Junot invade them without firing a shot were now (under Beresford) repelling French columns with the best of them. Troop quality is a managed thing and requires constant training and good officers. France had good officers and good commanders there.

As for battlefield performance, the issue of quality cannot really be divorced from the whole issue of local tactics: line verses column and the ability to stand.

Regards

Which is what you just said!

In that case, why wasn't Wellington, with his deficit of horse just as stymied in his attacks as the French?

Cacadore :

15.i.1810 :
Corps de la garde Impériale
1ère Division:
Général de Division Dumoustier.(Léon).
aides de camp:Capitaine Boyel ; Capitaine Fossac-Latour
Régiment de Garde Nationale : Colonel Couloumy.
1er Bat : Zaepffel.(27 officiers ; 405 soldats)
2ème : Jouan.(17 ; 353)
1er Brigade:
Général de Brigade Lanabère.
1er Voltigeurs : Colonel Mallet.
1er Bat : Soulès.(19 ; 703)
2ème : Blondeau.(12 ; 697)
2ème Voltigeurs : Colonel Deshayes.
1er Bat : Penguern.(23 ; 572)
2ème Bat : Schramm.(11 ; 569)
2ème Brigade : Général de Brigade Mouton.
3ème Voltigeurs : Colonel Cambronne.
1er Bat : Bert.(24 ; 578)
2ème Bat : Desalons.(11 ; 569)
4ème Voltigeurs : Colonel Malher.
1er Bat : Kessel.(22 ; 240)
2ème Bat : Suisse.(16 ; 404)

Cavalerie : Général de Brigade Chastel.(Valladolid).
Chevaux-légers Polonais : Colonel Delaistre.(15 officiers ; 296 cavaliers)
Chasseurs à cheval : (11 ; 216)
Mamelucks : Chef d'Escadron Kirmann.(5 ; 58)
Dragons : Colonel Marthon.(18 ; 294)
Lanciers de Berg : Colonel Von Goldstein.
Renard
1er escadron(12 ; 124)
2ème escadron(5 ; 101)
Klein
3ème escadron(5 ; 96)
4éme escadron(6 ; 116)

2ème Division :
Général de Division Rogues.(Burgos).
aide de camp : Capitaine Charrois.
1er Brigade : Général de Brigade Boyeldieu.
1er Tirailleurs : Colonel Longchamps.
1er Bat : (18 ; 604)
2ème Bat : Vautrin.(20 ; 594)
2ème Tirailleurs : Colonel Flamand.
1er Bat : Dorsenne.(20 ; 510)
2ème Bat : Vezu.(18 ; 518)
2ème Brigade : Général de Brigade Rothembourg.
aide de camp : Capitaine Blaze.
3ème Tirailleurs : Colonel Darquier.
1er Bat : (21 ; 561)
2ème Bat : Mosnier. (16 ; 520)
4ème Tirailleurs : Colonel Robert.
1er Bat : Lenoir. (22 ; 504)
2ème Bat : Caillhet. (20 ; 561)
Brigade de Fusiliers :
Fusiliers-Chasseurs : Colonel Vrigny.
1er Bat : Daccantel. (20 ; 521)
2ème Bat : (15 ; 501)
Fusiliers-Grenadiers : Colonel Bodelin.
1er Bat : (18 ; 561)
2ème Bat : Vionnet. (12 ; 548)
Bataillon de Neuchatel : Chef de Bataillon De Gordier. (20 ; 609)

Artillerie :
Artillerie à pied : Chef de Bataillon Henr
1ere Compagnie : Capitaine Claude Joffrenot de Montlebert. (4 ; 93)
2ème Compagnie Lieutenant Moneraux (2 ; 95)
Ouvriers d'Artillerie : (0 ; 57)
Train d'Artillerie : (7 ; 360)
Administration : Lieutnant Begel (4 ; 236)

I odnt think that I have quite 16K of the garde in the list above, but nearly that (I didnt add them up).
But add the Trains, Equipage, garde commissariat, staff, etc. and a few units in march from the depots, and I think that gets to your number.

You will note what a jeune garde is : nothing more than a select conscript. We also see a good number of non-garde attahced units : Bergish Lancers, select national guard, the "canaries", etc.

They were well away from the British …. looks like mostly "blooding" the young ones, or on-the-job-training.

==================
"why wasn't Wellington, with his deficit of horse just as stymied in his attacks as the French?"

Same for his artillery. But the difference I would think to note is that his tactical doctrine , unlike the French by 1809, did not rest upon the use of the assault tactic I described above. Whether this reliance by the French on this doctrine was necessary or useful or optimal is another discussion. It was never Wellington's practise.
To give another example to illustrate the point : imagine that the French had developed some response that essentially neutralized the capabilities of the Cossack hosts …. what exactly would the Russians have been able to accomplish in 1812 ?

=======================

I think there is a mile of difference between thinking of the French in Spain as "second rate troops" (a concept to which I dont subscribe) and Trokoshea's more nuanced comment that the best of the French were elsewhere and that the particular methods (detachments, provisional units, etc. as he noted) further degraded the the quality of the forces facing the British. I would find myself agreeing with Trokoshea's more nuanced view.

===============

You make an excellent point about the Portuguese (which applies to the KGL also , I should think) . Excellent training, a viable comissariat, intelligent unit orgainztions, some good officers, the motivation of having your country invaded …. added together makes for some excellent units. The French allied contingent in Spain , with the exception of the Poles, never enjoyed this constellation of benefits, and their performance suffered accordingly, while the Poles excelled accordingly.
The Dutch, Belgian and Bergish horse were quite good, and the Northern Italian and Peidmontese horse quite acceptable, but I would ascribe these to a professional military tradition in the particular units.

===========================

"As for battlefield performance, the issue of quality cannot really be divorced from the whole issue of local tactics: line verses column and the ability to stand"

Yes, I agree.
The French were no fools. They knew that, especially by 1809 and later, they could not count on their infantry to stand in the way Wellington could rely on his —- and this applies in all the campaigns, not just Spain. By 1809, it had been 18 years – a generation – of essentially constant combat for a nation-in-arms (as opposed to a relatively small army compared to its population).
Although clearly a bit of a Francophile as well as a little bit of a Francophone, it is not possible for me to argue the superiority of the British foot (in training, in morale, in unit cohesion, in steadiness, in the ability to "stand") compared to the French in the Peninsula or at Mont-Saint-Jean (the Old Guard excepted). I doubt the French officiers themselves would say differently.
Increasingly, their doctrine and tactics were evolving away from a reliance on this "standing" and towards greater reliance on heavy cavalry, massed (heavy) artillerie and mass infantry assaults. This was not likely their first choice, but a choice that circumstances put upon them .

Thus your comments about the inter-relationship between quality and tactics seem to me especially relevant for the French.

Excellent discussion, for which my thanks,

- Evan

"Well, I was only surprised by the idea that the British were somehow fighting 'second rate troops' – which they clearly weren't. I assume now it was simply a Napgamer rhetorical fling!"
Please Cacadore, try not to over simplify! :) What I wrote in essence is that at least in the early years (the following examples are all for February 1809 – OoB taken from A Year at War 1809, C.A. Sapherson):
- Some formations (40% approx.) were standard/veteran French regular troops used to fight together. For instance, 1rst Corps under Marechal Victor with the 27th Légère, the 8th, 45th, 54th, 94th, 95th Ligne, 2nd Hussars and 5th Chasseurs à Cheval havong fought together since Austerlitz (then under Bernadotte's command). Ney's small 6th Corps was similarly composed.
- Some formations were mainly made of newly raised regiments or of "adhoc units" tending to become permanent. The 3rd Corps under Junot comprised 5 out of 8 regiments of infantry raised during 1808 from the Provisional regiments (assembled in late 1807) and 3 out of 4 cavalry regiments also quite "new" (13th Cuirassiers, 2nd Prov. Chasseurs, 1rst Prov. Hussars). No wonder all the Vistula Legion's infantry was added to this Corps.
Another example of this is the high amount of 4th bataillons in St-Cyr's 7th Corps (8 bat.) in his 3 French divisions + 113th Line regiment raised in 1808… 1/2 of its French bataillons.
- Some formations also had German, Dutch, Italian, Polish and Napolitan troops put together as they were delivered to the French for discretionary use.
- So the cohesion and experience of the battle formations was not consistent; sometimes quite good and comparable to their French "continental" counterparts, sometimes really deficient.
- Finally, as blancard noted, the situation tended to improve over time until troops were gradually recalled for the campaigns of Russia, Germany and France.

Note on "Régiments d'infanterie de ligne" 113 to 120: assembled as Régiments Provisoires in 1808, they encountered many shortages of all sorts (shoes, pants, greatcoats and equipments of common use) that forced Général Mouton to write a report to the Emperor on the matter. They became shortly after real "Régiments d'infanterie de ligne" and had their own budget and "dépôts" organised. Hopefully, the military supplies in Bayonne provided for their needs meanwhile. (source La Guerre d'Espagne 1807-1813, Tome 1, A. Grasset)

"As for battlefield performance, the issue of quality cannot really be divorced from the whole issue of local tactics: line verses column and the ability to stand."
Indeed mate! And this ability to stand is hardly achieved if you don't trust the units protecting your flanks while suffering from a rolling fire harsher than expected.

We all know that Richard Sharpe was really responsible for the British victories.

If you put any troops in broken ground and are able to maintain surprise through a skillful use of skirmishers and the support of a local population, you'll do well against any over-confident military establishment like the French. If you put highly-trained troops in broken ground screened by crack light troops armed with rifles (they were trained to shoot a moving target on a horse-drawn sled prone and on their backs, and could recognize over 50 whistle commands. They were also taught to read.)and led skillfully, they'll do very well indeed. Wellington knew this, and chose his open-field actions with great care.

Albuera illustrates what happens when British discipline is up against French dash without Wellington. Not a total defeat, but a draw purchased with gallons of blood.

And look no further than the Crimea to see a "Napoleonic" British army commanded by complete idiots. "Lions led by donkies."

Blancard: I take your point about morale and training. And you have some impressive lists there.

''Increasingly, their doctrine and tactics were evolving away from a reliance on this "standing" and towards greater reliance on heavy cavalry, massed (heavy) artillerie and mass infantry assaults.''

I agree. Yet in the Peninsula the commanders had the time to develop tactics to suit conditions where horse and artillery were often less effective and I wonder why we see the massed column attackes without artillery support being employed time after time against broken ground, by even great commanders like Massina and Victor.

Having said that, there were plenty of battles on vertual plains like Salamanca and Vitoria, so the issue of broken ground cannot be given as the whole reason.

Trokoshea,
A misunderstanding – I can only agree with your more explained position regarding quality and that some formations were mainly made of newly raised regiments or of "adhoc units" tending to become permanent – I was instead reacting to a post by 'Napgamer'.

Forrest Harris;
''If you put highly-trained troops in broken ground screened by crack light troops armed with rifles….''
Well, the French would do exactly the same thing with their Voltigeurs (admittedly Napoleon didn't like rifles). What I find interesting is why how the British managed their attacks.

''And look no further than the Crimea to see a "Napoleonic" British army commanded by complete idiots. "Lions led by donkies."

It's too harsh a language Forrest, and add nothing to understanding. Don't let the uniforms fool you: an elite Polish Lancer, a British rifleman and a ex-Spanish guerilla trooper are fundimetally the same animal as their officers at heart. And the harsh Penisula terrain tested them, their ingenuity and their commanders to the limits. Seems to me Blancard is correct in pointing to morale and provisions as well as training as making the differences between soldiers as well as their officers. Idiocy was only a factor in certain officers athough admittedly the British preferment system did throw up it's fair share. Was Murrey an idiot, or did fear of the unknown just expose a flaw, as it possibly did with Junot?

Cardigan or Mayow leading the Light Brigade who captured the Russain battery were no idiots – they were the victims of Raglan's use of the unspecific word 'heights'. Colin Campbell who deployed his highlanders behind the Turks into a 2 deep-line against 1,500 Russain horse was no idiot either – that epithet is more for the generalisers!

Albuera was a battle that involved French dash – Soult's flanking move caught the Spanish on the hop and took all Beresford's leadership qualities to counter. Colbourne's brigade were routed and four colours taken. When Soult rode up he had the moment in his grasp with the British re-enforcements being shredded by artillery and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry ready to deliver the killer blow. But he let the moment slip, preferring to ''maintain the position on which we stand''. Cole's division then pushed him back and Soult withdrew to the other side of the Albuerra brook, leaving the whole position (and by the conventions of the time, victory) in the hands of Beresford. Soult then retired on Llerena.

The issue at Albuera rested upon Blake's refusal to swing back his troops to face Girad and Gazan's attack, despite Beresford's pleas. Wellington found the same difficulty in restraining Cuesta before Talavera. Wellington's only conclusion was a negative one: not to fight with an independant Spanish commander again.

Gents,

Might we have reached the point where we should "agree to disagree" and move on?

Regards, Bill Gray

Cacadore :

Fascinating comments, for which again my thanks.

For Salamanca ….

I would not wish to characterize Salamanca as occuring on a flat plain favorable to artillerie and cavalerie:
picture
picture

The rather steeply sloped hills and their reverse slopes would have been a challenge to the guns+heavy cavalry doctrine, if Marmont had the resources to attempt to use employ this method.

But, to use Rory Muir's figures, …

Marmont disposed of 49,647 men at Salamanca. His cavalry was 3,575 or only 1 in 14. This was already well below the fielding ratios common in central Europe – where the goal was 1 in 6 (often met, occassionally exceed).
Of his cavary, the only approximations ot "heavies" he disposed of where some 1,700 dragons in 8 squadrons taken from 4 regiments. Please note that this is not 8 squadrons from 2 regiments. There is a palpable difference even in this detail. The dragons in question were 6e , 11e, 15e and 25e regiments and could be thought of as of "average" quality for that arme among the French horse.
A typical heavy cavalry division in central Europe – a typical fielding for a force of 50,000 men – would consist of 6 regiments at 4 squadrons each and be composed of cuirassiers and carabiniers – about 5,000 men.

There had, of course, been re-deployments of French cavalry for Russia. Most notably, the better dragoon regiments (converted into lanciers) and the Vistula uhlans. Marmont's order of battle is thus a good example of the nuanced view of French unit quality that Trokoshea described.

Marmont lacked the "punch" that his nation's doctrine of that era required – a doctrine which I have proposed was increasingly incumbent upon them due to almost decades of prior losses in experienced troops.

Nonetheless, Marmont maneuvered well (and had been as well organized as possible both in his comissariat and his force structure decisions) and may have done better than the actual results of the battle had he not been gravely wounded.

Such would have been a ratehr unique event, as you have noted in your list of battles.

For Vittoria ….

I am not a big fan of Jomini, but I think his "apology" for Vittoria is pretty much on target. But Vittoria was, overall, a magnificent British (and allied) victory.

" Il eût été difficile, dit-il, de choisir un plus mauvais point pour y recevoir une bataille, ni de livrer sous de plus fâcheux auspices que Joseph ne le fit . Chacun sait que la surface de l'Espagne est resserrée par le golfe de Biscaye, au point où elle se réunit à la frontière de France, qui forme comme une espèce de gorge entre Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port et Bayonne .

" Une seule chaussée existe à l'ouest des Pyrénées, c'est celle de Bayonne à Madrid; un autre chemin, praticable au canon, va de Vitoria à Pampelune : de là on revient, d'un côté, sur le col de Maya, de l'autre, sur Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port par la vallée de Roncevaux, illustrée sous Charlemagne par la fameuse retraite de Roland .

" Prendre une position à peu près parallèle à la chaussée, c'était faciliter à l'ennemi les moyens de s'établir dans la même direction, où, par le moindre effort de la gauche contre notre droite, la route se trouverait nécessairement interceptée .

" Si l'on ajoute à cela que Vitoria, située dans le fond d'un bassin, est entourée de hautes montagnes, et que cette ceinture dominante se trouvait précisément dans le prolongement de la gauche des anglais et du côté où ils arrivaient, on peut juger combien un tel poste convenait peu à notre armée .

" Il n'y avait pas à hésiter, il fallait chercher l'ennemi et l'attaquer partout où on le trouverait, ou prendre bravement son parti en regagnant les Pyrénées . Le dernier était, certes, bien le plus sage; car un succès contre les anglais, qui eût pu être décisif avant 1812, ne signifiant plus rien dans les circonstances où la France se trouvait .

" La gauche de Joseph, sous Clausel, était restée à Logroño pour couvrir la route importante de Pampelune . Un corps volant fut porté à Bilbao sous les ordres de Foy, pour couvrir le débouché de cette ville sur San-Sébastian .

" Ces deux détachements étaient un malheur inhérent à la position qu'on avait prise, et inséparable en général de toutes les positions défensives . Dans tout autre pays que l'Espagne, il eût été préférable de renoncer à la route de Bayonne pour se retirer parallèlement à l'Èbre, jusqu'auprès de Saragosse, afin de joindre Suchet et de tomber sur Wellington, quand il eût été à cent cinquante lieues de ses vaisseaux et de ses dépôts; les gardes nationales du midi et quelques bataillons de ligne eussent suffi pour surveiller la Bidassoa et garder la place de Bayonne; le général anglais n'eût pas osé pénétrer dans les Pyrénées, en laissant 100 000 français derrière lui .

" Cette manœuvre avait obtenu l'assentiment des généraux les plus distingués de l'armée; toutefois le Roi et le maréchal Jourdan jugèrent que le défaut de la grande route au centre des Pyrénées, depuis Bayonne jusqu'à Perpignan, et l'esprit qui animait les Catalans et les Aragonais, ne permettaient pas de suivre exclusivement la ligne stratégique; mais alors il eût fallu se baser sur Bayonne, éviter une bataille, ou du moins la recevoir sur les hauteurs de Salinas .

" Jourdan en eut, dit-on, le projet; mais l'opinion des généraux repoussait l'idée de s'enfoncer dans les montagnes, sans tenter de disputer encore la possession de la Castille .

" On murmurait d'évacuer le pays depuis le Duero sans avoir tiré l'épée, et on s' aveugla au point de ne pas se débarrasser des " impedimenta" qui obstruaient l'armée .

" Le camp de Joseph ressemblait à celui de Darius; il était encombré de tous les équipages et des familles des malheureux espagnols qui avaient accepté des fonctions sous lui : le nombre en était grand . A la vérité, une partie de ces bagages étaient partis la veille de la bataille pour Tolosa, sous l'escorte de la division Maucune de l'armée du Portugal; toutefois il en restait encore beaucoup plus que n'en permettait la situation des affaires ."

- Evan

"and history has adjusted the number upwards toward 7,000"

not history but British authors increased the French casualties to 8,000 and much more

"Corrunna (Moore) defence, British victory"

The Invincibles fled from thhe battlefield and hastily embarked. They call it victory, the British have several such victories a la Dunkirk style, this is how they made themselves such good troops. hahahahaha

Trokoshea

Do you wargame? I'm always on the lookout for the (so very few) Napoleonic players in Québec. Even if you don't, we could exchange emails; it could be fun discussing in French for a change!

Hmm…j'aurais aussi pu écrire mon message en Français! Ah, l'habitude :)

Cher Archiduc, je suis montréalais et attends depuis longtemps l'occasion d'exercer ce passetemps avec un autre passionné. Serez-vous disposé à de telles pratiques? :)
Son Emminence trouvera mon adresse de courriel un peu plus haut dans cette page. A+

Trok.

blancard:
''Marmont lacked the "punch" that his nation's doctrine of that era required''

He may have, but I agree with you that he was certainly trying the right thing. He had hit upon Wellington's fear: cutting of his communications. And therefore the right way to defeat Wellington was by co-ordinated maneuvere. It's a shame for France that he was in command there for such a short period and that the French armies could not co-oporate with him more.

''Marmont maneuvered well (and had been as well organized as possible both in his comissariat and his force structure decisions) and may have done better than the actual results of the battle had he not been gravely wounded.''

That was Marmont's view (as it would be). At the time he was re-grouping his army on the southern Arapiles, D'Uban and Packenham were pursuing with only Thomieres disoriented infantry to stop them. Foy wrote that the

'left was already checked when he recieved his wound…all that could be done was to attenuate disaster – that Clausel did..we should have been no better off if the marshal had never been hurt.''

Still, it's just a view point and Foy may have had his own reasons for writing this.

''I would not wish to characterize Salamanca as occuring on a flat plain favorable to artillerie and cavalerie''

I would, since cavalry did operate on it. There are two distinct and separated heights; the lessor and the greater Arapile. Both appear to have been plonked on the surface as if they came from the sky. You struggle to the top, and from the top you can no longer affect the rest of the battle. One of them is in the form of a steep roof. Apart from these, the battlefield is vertually flat. There is an undulation which separated the two marching armies. Perhaps a 'plain' is too strict a word, but having been there and explored it at length I'd say, apart from the two alien-like heights, it's comparatively flat land.
"Corrunna (Moore) defence, British victory"

HungarianHussar
''The Invincibles fled from thhe battlefield and hastily embarked''

Do you have any references for this? Both the French and British accounts are concistant with the following:
ELvina: Mermet and Merle puhed out by Warde and Manningham.
San Cristobal: Lahoussaye and Paget's battle line static. Lahoussaye's left pushed back by Frazer. As night draws in Soult's principal attacking force withdraws and the French pinning lines form column and retire. Embarkation (Moores aim) was next morning in daylight and unmolested except by occaisional shell-fire. Moore was buried in Coruna. But if you have other accounts please tell us!

I personally think that understanding both sides comes more from an appreciation of the various campaigns, of which the battles are just a part. Talavera, for example was also a great victory for the British, but Wellington was forced to withdraw afterwards. So many battle-enthusiasts are uninterested in these aspects because the results are less clear-cut.

Moore's army was hounded from Spain and he lost 6000 men, a fifth of his strength. Most of his army losses were from from hunger and desease. Yet he bought time which the Spanish and Portuguese needed: he drew the best of the French to an unimportant part of Galicia when it should have been marching on Lisbon. Wellington wrote: ''you know, we'd not have won, I think, without him''.

Also: Blancard:
Re: Vitoria
" Prendre une position à peu près parallèle à la chaussée, c'était faciliter à l'ennemi les moyens de s'établir dans la même direction, où, par le moindre effort de la gauche contre notre droite, la route se trouverait nécessairement interceptée .

Yet the main problem was surely Joseph's insistance on orienting his army to protect their right flank and then fasing North rather than the position itself? It was fine for a delaying action – expecially as the piont was to allow Clausel to join them and to get their baggage and loot up.

As it was, D-Erlon left approach bridges standing. What is less forgivable, is that if Wellington had gone for their right as they thought, then they would need the Salvatierra road. Yet they left it un-recconoitred.

Out of interest, blancard, have you ever visited the battlefields in Spain or Portugal? If you havn't, I certainly recommend it.

hmgsone
''Might we have reached the point where we should "agree to disagree" and move on?''

It's a sad fact that it's only on TMP we find such posts! What can they mean, and why do people write them? Lordy.

Cacador, you English have more such victories in Dukirk style and I am not surprised you lost Empire (Empire built on INCREDIBLE GREED, blood and slavery. This is overshadowed only by the excesses of the Nazis).

I find your English books very one-sided (to the extreme biased and some poorly reserached). They consist of few facts and a lot of hot air; tall tales, repeated myths, and gloating (people with low self-esteem tend to gloat)

Let me give you an example about the battle of Corunna.
There is a book titled "Corunna 1809" (or the Battle of Corunna, don't remember right now) and on page
P 94 is bibliography. In the section of Biographies and memoirs are:

Anon – English source
Anglesey – English source
Blakeney – English source
Gonneville – English source
Gordon – English source
Green – English source
Hall – English source
Harris – English source
Hayman – English source
Porter – English source
Moore – English source
Morley – English source
Napier – English source
Neale – English source
Oman – English source
Parkinson – English source
Robertson – English source
Ross-Lewin – English source
Schaumann – English source
Smith – English source
Steevens – English source
Surtees – English source
Tylden – English source
Verden – English source

Lejeune – French source
just one (1)

no Spanish sources

ps.
My friend in Glasgow claim that the British Empire was won by the Irish, administered by the Scots and Welsh and the
profits went to the English. In recent years the last line
was amended to read "lost by the English."
You are losers. :-)))))

HungarianHussar

''My friend in Glasgow claim that the British Empire was won by the Irish, administered by the Scots and Welsh and the profits went to the English.''

Propably not one Englishman would disagree with the aptness (at least) of your Scottish friend's line. Which would point to a degree of self-effacing honesty in the English character, wouldn't you think? As for:

''You are losers. :-)))))''

Like at Toulouse and Waterloo? Lol! It's just an unpleasant post: biased in the way you claim the 'English' were!

''There is a book titled "Corunna 1809"''

Is that the only book you've read? You could read 'Memorias del General Don Francisco Espoz y Mina' which is a good Spanish sourse. And if you want the Frecnh viewpoint, ( I already quoted Foy) then……er……….read a French book!

Doh!

One of the reasons for the amount of English sourses, is that:
1) literacy levels were greater – especially among private soldiers, so there is more scope for checking
2) the book printing industry was greater, meaning more memoirs could see the light of day
3) and there was a pluralist, often anti-government and uncentralised press which prevented establishment viewpionts being automatically accepted.

Otherwise thank you for your post and I look forward to more. Humour is always welcome!

RE: from Cacadore,

hmgsone
''Might we have reached the point where we should "agree to disagree" and move on?''

It's a sad fact that it's only on TMP we find such posts! What can they mean, and why do people write them? Lordy.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

Huh?

Regards, Bill Gray

-There is a book titled "Corunna 1809" (or the Battle of Corunna, don't remember right now) and on page
P 94 is bibliography. In the section of Biographies and memoirs are:

Anon – English source
Anglesey – English source
Blakeney – English source
Gonneville – English source
Gordon – English source
Green – English source
Hall – English source
Harris – English source
Hayman – English source
Porter – English source
Moore – English source
Morley – English source
Napier – English source
Neale – English source
Oman – English source
Parkinson – English source
Robertson – English source
Ross-Lewin – English source
Schaumann – English source
Smith – English source
Steevens – English source
Surtees – English source
Tylden – English source
Verden – English source

Lejeune – French source
just one (1)

no Spanish sources-

So, HH, let's just get this straight… You can produce this big, long list of sources off by heart, right? And even remember what page it is on, yeah? But you can't remember what the book is called?

Have you actually ever read this mystery book?

Or is the above a cut-and-paste job from a forum somewhere?