"Do Rules Reward the Wrong Behaviour?" Topic

In wargames I've played (and no particular ruleset in mind), I've occasionally felt that the rules seem to reward behaviour that doesn't quite feel right historically.

By that I mean players sometimes make decisions not because they make sense in a battlefield or historical context but because the mechanics encourage them.

Amongst my pals and I, we tend to label this sort of thing as "gamey"—and we do try to avoid it where we can if only to avoid the shame of being a "gamey player".

A few examples spring to mind:
-Advancing into heavy fire after calculating the odds
-Repeated charges that would likely exhaust troops (& horses!) but remain effective in-game
-Units holding on in situations where, historically, they might have withdrawn or become disordered
-Targeting specific enemy units primarily because the rules make them easier or more rewarding to attack, rather than because they are the most logical or immediate threat on the battlefield

Rules like Valour & Fortitude, Lion Rampant or Hail Caesar (and others) do a great job of producing enjoyable games but I do wonder if all rules—inevitably—encourage certain behaviours that players learn to exploit.

That's not necessarily a criticism. Playability matters. But it does raise a question.

Are we sometimes playing the rules rather than the situation?

Do some rules reward behaviour that real commanders would have avoided?

I'm interested in examples—any period, any rules & your thoughts on this.

Oh, it happens. I think mostly it happens in long rules where the consequences weren't thought through, or as a result of umpire's rulings.

For a certain iteration of CLS, it made good tactical sense to place as many different units in a house as possible. In real live, a command mess. In game terms, since they all had to fail morale before they left the house…

That's a great example—thanks.

It does seem to show how rules can unintentionally reward behaviour that would be completely impractical in reality.

Another example is picking off weak units for easy results.
EG when targeting already shaken or depleted units because they're easier to break and yield points but ignoring a fresh, more dangerous unit nearby.

In reality, commanders often had to deal with the immediate threat, not the easiest win.

And – confession time- as I like the idea of 'Victory Points', – going after "valuable" targets for points rather than tactical reasons.

This makes sense in game terms but perhaps less so from a battlefield perspective.

I remember this Late Antiquity game , where the watch tower had an inordinate number of 'victory points' even though it clearly had no real value:

theminiaturespage.com

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(possibly because I'd just finished making it & I was proud of my efforts:
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Generally, I think any rules that do not have command and control; where all your units do exactly what you want, all of the time, can reward bad behavior.

But to pick on myself, in my game "Tigers and Stalins" I've seen players (more than once) who have vehicles with turrets disabled charge across the battlefield and park in front of enemy tanks to block shots….

Dave

Yeah, I've never liked victory points for terrain--unless someone actually likes fighting Verdun or the Somme. But it was already in use when I started wargaming. I suspect initially it was intended to force the defenders to stand in attacker-defender games, instead of just avoiding contact until people ran out of turns or day. Possibly it can be avoided by ensuring there are too many turns for the defender to avoid contact, so his best option is to stand on what good ground there is?

We fixed the house thing in the next edition by declaring everyone in any given house to be a single morale unit.

PzGen, can you fix yours by increasing the value of disabled tanks at the end of the game? I understand the many difficulties of wargame campaigns, but playing each game as a one-off makes people much too willing to expend elite units, and leads to a cheerful disregard of things like tank reliability, maintenance rates and the importance of recovery and repair.

(I love a comment by Sepp Dietrich of all people, saying the Germans only hung on in Normandy as long as they did thanks to the excellence of the repair echelon, on whom he showered Iron Crosses. No doubt Dietrich was a thug, but he wasn't the brainless thug the Heer officers sometimes made him out to be.)

There are also problems with the numbers in the rules rewarding bad behavior. A friend told me once that classic Featherstone horse & musket turned out a pretty good ACW game as long as both commanders acted like ACW commanders. But if someone forgot how ACW armies were supposed to fight and only paid attention to the rules, cavalry would dominate the board. The balance between infantry fire and cavalry shock is out of whack.

All good points.

The first question should be "Do players know what good historic behavior and tactics are?"

That would mean knowing the right tactics for the situation, formations, fire & maneuver, preserving your men and units, reverse slope defense, halt fire/shoot & scoot, bounding overwatch, falling back when tactically correct, setting up alternative fighting positions, etc.

Historically, initiative is determined by the quicker unit with variety of maneuvers, decisions and tactics to achieve it. There is very little random about it.

From my experience, most players are unaware of the majority of these tactics and even if so using most traditional game mechanics they may not be able to historically perform them.

Think about it. I spent 3 months in boot camp and then 6 weeks in advanced infantry training to learn the tactics we are attempting to portray in a game and I was still considered "Green" and would need 3-5 years experience to be considered a real Squad Leader (Sergeant).

To have a new player step into a game with no military experience or training it is unrealistic to expect them to have that knowledge and historically portray real tactics.

You could even have a new player take the time to read real tactics manuals and watch training videos before playing a game but then he'll be immersed into a game system that in very few ways conforms to the tactics. He may know the tactics but is now playing a system that requires him to activate units, roll for random initiative, etc. that are not covered in the manuals.

A player who is the worlds ASL champion is in no way prepared to lead a real squad into combat. The reverse is true. A combat proven squad leader will find playing ASL most rules and concepts will be completely foreign. Especially because there is no real squad/platoon formation/TO&E and leaders are abstracted so there is no Squad Leader figure.

But when John Hill designed the game he did it for a reason. It was not his intent to have a real platoon TO&E so you can't really criticize him for not having it as other factors were more important.

Reality sucks. Combat is not balanced and fair but a game needs to be. For me, games are for entertainment and social interacting with friends. I developed my own system so I could more accurately play a game based on my military training and experience.

When I introduce my game at a convention I tell the players (mostly new) the game is easy to play. Just do exactly what a real squad leader or tank commander would do. Then I get blank stares and a question of "What is that?"

However, most players pick up pretty quickly because the right thing to do is normally common sense and most do have some knowledge of tactics and learn by watching others. I'll help them out by telling them their historical options and risks and let them make the decision.

I'm not saying players should get to do what they desire all of the time. When not under fire they might but enemy fire, fog of war and SNAFUs should create the friction to slow down executing decisions and orders, not some abstracted game mechanic. That's how I play.

My analysis is that all IGYG systems and their various versions violate the players innate OODA Decision Loop process which all players bring to the table whether they know it or not.

The traditional rule systems and dice prevent them from doing what makes sense but is an excellent way to get new players into the game. There is always tradeoffs.

A game system where each unit fires once is playable and fair but hardly historic as is moving into contact with a tank and shooting it in the flank is historically rare.

Opportunity Fire is almost impossible to historically recreate in an IGYG system. For example, realistically a tank moving at 20kph will cover about 350m in 60 seconds most likely moving into and out of the enemy LOS multiple times. A typical WWII 75mm gun could fire from 4-8 times in that 60 seconds. How do you recreate that in an IGYG system?

There are many traditional rules systems that will create a level of "believability" in the players mind to get buy in to the system but will rarely allow the player to recreate real historical tactics. But you should judge a game design based on the designers intent, not what you think it should be. Playability and fun are what most designers strive for.

Also, from my experience, most players are looking more for fun and entertainment rather than trying to learn something. Learning the wrong lessons is not going to get them killed. To each his own.

Hopefully I have not pissed off too many people. <grin>

Wolfhag

Victory points, which are part of scenario not rules, are what we use to shape the historical perspective.

I can't make players care about "what happens to these people and the people who care about them and their mission tomorrow?". But they should be playing to win, so VP give them historical incentives, if the scenario design aligns them to historical concerns.

Opportunity Fire is almost impossible to historically recreate in an IGYG system. For example, realistically a tank moving at 20kph will cover about 350m in 60 seconds most likely moving into and out of the enemy LOS multiple times. A typical WWII 75mm gun could fire from 4-8 times in that 60 seconds. How do you recreate that in an IGYG system?

Fifteen second steps, potentially within variable step size.

Path targeting instead of discrete entity targeting.

Interrupts.

Time based fire budgeting.

Separate commit and adjudicate phases.

We usually use board design. So instead of visually replicating the architecture of the terrain, we implement the effect of terrain. Not: Streets are 21' wide, Alleys are 11' wide. Instead: Streets mandate opportunity to fire when crossing, alleys can block fire opportunities only on mixes of the mover times it right and the firer doesn't.

Basically, all these approaches are looking at engagements across turns as aggregate things you split up instead of composite things you build from little bits.

Great anecdote, PzGeneral. I laughed. And RP- some great points.

Wolfhag: that's a really thoughtful post with much to agree with there.

I think your point about players not necessarily knowing historical tactics is key. Most of us are, at best, enthusiastic amateurs trying to interpret very complex realities.We have in our group a young fellow from the Warhammer world who knows very little actual history & needs much explaining to play Lion Rampant or an ECW game.

But I do wonder if that makes the role of the rules even more important. If players don't bring detailed tactical knowledge to the table, then the rules almost have to nudge them toward behaviour that feels appropriate for the period.

Otherwise, you can end up with players doing things that make sense in game terms but not in a historical context.

I've certainly found that once you've read a bit about tactics, it's quite hard not to apply them even when they don't belong. For example, using SYW-style light troops like Pandours in a way that looks much more like Napoleonic light infantry, simply because the rules allow it.

That does make me wonder whether rules should sometimes be more restrictive—not to reduce fun, but to encourage the sort of behaviour that actually characterised the period.

Of course, there's a balance here. It could be argued that too much restriction risks making a game less enjoyable.
But then, do we end up playing fantasy?

+1 Wolfhag

There's also the difference between "historian" and "player" mind sets, too. Someone who's read about the conflict has at least some idea of what some of the basics of combat were in a period, and will try to emulate it, to some extent. "Players" may also, but I know some who only want to know the rules and how to win. For them the win is the important thing, and history just provides the colours for their figures' uniforms.

The other point is that while we know that cavalry clashed and infantry went hand-to-hand in pre-firearms times, we don't really understand what actually happened.

What was happening when two phalanxes met? Was it like a rugby scrum, or were the spear points more important? If the rules we're using rely on the scrum effect, and we believe the spear points were more important, then the rules will be at least suspect, if not wrong in our opinion. But it might be our understanding that's wrong, not the rules.

3 months in boot camp and then 6 weeks in advanced infantry training

For us it was 3 months recruit training and then four months Initial Employment Training before we got our "Skippy badge". Then at least two years in a battalion as a rifleman before being cleared as "Proficient"- and our pay went up from level 3 to 4. But over half a year on pay levels 1 and 2 (aka "pocket money") are one reason that getting recruits in the 70's was difficult.

Old memories coming back. One of the real old guard of historical miniatures describing a set of WW2 naval rules. Someone had messed up armor of ships relative to firepower, and they wound up having boarding actions with WW2 battleships, since the gunfire wasn't sinking anyone. The perpetrator was horrified, as one would be, and wanted to correct this. But younger and less historically vested players wanted to stay with the original version, which made for a more fun game.

Robert hits on an interesting point, differing perceptions based on age.

I once read about a game based on exploring Africa. The 60-ish person running the game at the convention explained what you got points for. The game starts and the players are off exploring and doing their best to rack up points. One player (late teens or early 20s) passes through a native village where they are busy roasting a white gal for dinner (yes, this is a Reaper 28 mm figure). He checks, no victory points for rescuing the gal, and heads off towards the next victory point site. Of course, at the end, he had the most points.

The reality is that you don't really gain anything while mucking around the darkest part of Darkest Africa. So, he might have gotten to the coast (Mombasa or Zanzibar) and gotten, say, 5-10 % of the points racked up, as the local European community buys him drinks and lionizes him. The real money and fame come when you get back to civilization, write your book and deliver talks in front of the various Royal Societies, or the Explorer's Club. At that point, the folks in London, Paris, or New York, would have ignored your book and stayed away from your talks in droves. Folks out where I live, say Cheyenne, Colorado Springs, or Fort Worth, would have confirmed that, "You mean you left the white gal to get eaten," then strung him up with the ropes on stage, while somebody yelled, "Hangin's too good for him!" Total Score: Ching, ching, ching (Running the calculations): You're dead. Zero points, and nowadays nobody is sure just where in the potter's field or boot hill you're buried. Or maybe they didn't bother digging a hole, and the coyotes got him.

Now, I know that, and the person running the game knew that. They even had a card with some useful information the gal would have provided, had she been rescued, but the kid didn't know that, and played the game maximizing points, which was unexpected, at least when done to that degree.

Grelber

The AWI rules we use allowed players to charge line units while in column formation, so it was possible for three or more units in column to slam into a unit deployed in line. That worked well enough for Napoleonic warfare, but it does not reflect how combat was generally fought in the American War of Independence. In that period, line usually charged line.

We therefore added a rule, that units may charge in column only when they are moving along a road or when terrain prevents them from forming line. In all other situations, units must charge in line formation.

The other change I would like to make is to prevent cavalry from charging more than two turns in a row. We have had games where cavalry charge repeatedly turn after turn, which, in my opinion, is unrealistic. That kind of constant charging would quickly exhaust the horses and could lead to them breaking down physically.

I don't blame players for not using period correct tactics. I blame the game designer. It shows that there was a lack of playtesting during the development of the rules. Players will take advantage of whatever the rules allows them to do. Can't fault them for that.

I rather use victory point terrain and augment it with casualties points. Some scenarios are written in such a way one side can just turn around and leave the battlefield to score a victory. Terrain objectives helps prevent that.

I agree with Etotheipi on this:

Victory points, which are part of scenario not rules, are what we use to shape the historical perspective.

I can't make players care about "what happens to these people and the people who care about them and their mission tomorrow?". But they should be playing to win, so VP give them historical incentives, if the scenario design aligns them to historical concerns.

@ Old Contemptible re: VPs.

I often use them as well but they are a two edged sword. A "brain storm" of their positives & negatives:

+ Pros

1. Clear win conditions-
Everyone knows what matters. No ambiguity, no post-game arguments.

2. Drives player decisions-
Forces prioritisation: Do I take the hill or protect my flank?

3. Enables asymmetric scenarios-
Different sides can score differently (e.g. attacker gains VPs for ground, defender for delay).

4. Good for time-limited games-
Especially useful in convention/show games—you will get a result.

5. Useful for multi-player games

- Cons

1. "Gamey" behaviour
Players chase points, not realism.
Classic example: abandoning a strong position because a 2-VP objective elsewhere is "worth more".NB Grelber's Darkest Africa anecdote

2. Breaks immersion-
Thinking in VPs instead of battlefield logic can feel artificial.

3. Can distort history-
Real commanders didn't know what was "worth 3 points". NB *this* thread

4. Encourages min-maxing-
Optimising for points rather than narrative or plausible tactics.

5. Risk of poor design-
Badly weighted VPs = broken scenario (one objective dominates everything).

Feel free to add or contradict any of the above.

Good points.

1. "Gamey" behaviour
Players chase points, not realism.
Classic example: abandoning a strong position because a 2-VP objective elsewhere is "worth more".NB Grelber's Darkest Africa anecdote

VP only encourage gamey behaviour if you have gamey VP, just like rules only cause unrealistic maneuver if you have unrealistic rules.

2. Breaks immersion-
Thinking in VPs instead of battlefield logic can feel artificial.

Actually, if focuses you on the battlefield because VP are conditional on objectives. Your decision process must move through the military objectives when considering VP.

Even if a player thinks "I need 3 more VP to win.", they have to think through the objectives and decide which one to go for before making decisions on orders.

3. Can distort history-
Real commanders didn't know what was "worth 3 points". NB *this* thread

If you mean the watchtower above, yes, when you write bad VP, you encourage bad behaviour. So having the watchtower worth enough points to draw people to it is not a problem with VP, it is a problem with the decision process that assigned those VP to that objective. Saying VP caused that problem is like saying cars cause traffic jams.

In the watchtower example, if the watchtower was strategically irrelevant, and thus assigned zero VP, that design would have encouraged ignoring it and treating it as a tactical obstruction to maneuver and fires. So the issue isn't with VP as a system, its with bad VP, that is ones that don't reflect the commander's strategic viewpoint.

VP should not (usually) reflect anything tactical. They should reflect the commanders' strategic priorities which is the part you can't expect players to come in with.

Even if Player X has never heard of The Battle of Schmeggen, if history tells us before the battle the commander of the Slobs discussed either needing to take Big Bridge A or two of Little Bridges B, C, or D in order to enable logisitics for the relief columns and he has an idea of acceptable losses for the operation, ~Z%, we can design a VP system that creates the historical strategic trade-offs for the player, including decisions to withdraw forces and adjust operationally as the tactical situation evolves without morale rolls. Without them reading the history of the battle. We (the game designers) read the history, then embed it in the scenario (not rules).

And commanders do have VP systems. Sometimes they are not written out as numbers, but increasingly since WWII, they are.
* Clausewitz' idea of Center of Gravity says all objectives are not of equal value, but have relative values and encourages weighting objectives based on effect. For him, warfare is not just achieving a bunch of things, but focusing on the most important things.
* "the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased." link
* Effects Based Operations doctrine provides weighted outcomes for different operational effects. It focuses on that strategic level outcomes desired, and that drives tactical decisions.
* Decisive Points/Lines of Effort doctrine ties explicit weightings to operational outcomes.
* The history of the development of Operations Research form WWII on is filled with discussions of the necessity of assigning values while acknowledging that they are inherently abstract.
* The Art of War provides a hierarchy of targets. You can (and many do) argue whether or not his specific hierarchy is as static as it appears in the text. The emphasis on "advantage" creates a system where commanders are maximizing asymmetric payoff. Min-maxing. Min-maxing is not a problem unless the maxes are inconsistent with the intent (in this case, historically plausible commanders' behaviour).
* Antoine-Henri Jomini systematized Napoleon's strategy and uncovered the underlying asymmetric valuation of objectives, and the propensity for high-risk/high-payoff decisions. Which can't exist without the idea of some payoffs being higher than others.

Once again, "can" distort history, yes. No different that poor stats for units can distory effectiveness or poor game rules can distort how engagements occur.

4. Encourages min-maxing-
Optimising for points rather than narrative or plausible tactics.

Again, only if the points don't reflect a plausible narrative. Yes, bad VP are bad. So … don't write bad VP?

VP don't define tactics. Tactics are choices within the strategic framework. A tactice is bad only if it doesn't achieve your desired objective. Having poorly weighted objectives is not a tactical issue, it's a strategic one.

5. Risk of poor design-
Badly weighted VPs = broken scenario (one objective dominates everything).

Napoleon famously valued single objjectives over others. It's exremely historical for certain commanders to do so. Whether that led to victory for them or not is a sign of military commanders doing a good job in their ordering of VP systems.

Capturing Moscow was a poor objective, weighted above everything else. And it cost.

In the Peninsular War, you really needed to focus on multiple smaller objectives and maintaining constant pressure rather than valuing one as above all others together. VP systems allow you to set this up either way.

None of the cons listed are properties of using VP. They are problems with doing a bad job at implementing VP.

If rules allow un historic behaviour to be rewarded then those rules need a rephrase or re write. They are not good rules.

The danger of subjective "that is not historical" allows players to bully others into not carrying out bold actions.

Many of the best commanders in history owe success to "the organisation of the unexpected" (Rommel).

martin

A few examples spring to mind:
-Advancing into heavy fire after calculating the odds

I think you'd generally have an idea. Personally, I think advancing into enemy fire is the toughest thing to do in reality and should be in a game.

In my system, the unit wanting to advance under fire must pass an "Aggressiveness Check." Failing the test essentially means they are pinned down but can try again in a later turn. However, if they fail their leader can add his leadership modifier to "motivate" them to advance. But this comes with a catch. Leaders cannot be individually targeted unless they take part shooting in a firefight or expose themselves to use their modifiers. Each time they use their modifier they take a causality checkso you need to use them wisely. A good leader can get a poor unit to perform better.

-Repeated charges that would likely exhaust troops (& horses!) but remain effective in-game

I'd look to the battle or historically what occurred. Repeated charges would most likely become less effective.

-Units holding on in situations where, historically, they might have withdrawn or become disordered

Withdraw your units in a game? Heresy I say! I've rarely seen it in a game and many tables don't have enough room to effectively do it. A Fighting Withdraw is difficult to pull off effectively and most players are unaware of this tactic.

You need to set up a defense in depth which most tables do not allow. The idea is to ambush and fall back before being hit hard. After this happens a few times the enemy attack slows because of losses. That's when you use your mobile reserves to counterattack. This keeps the game from becoming a boring static shoot out.

-Targeting specific enemy units primarily because the rules make them easier or more rewarding to attack, rather than because they are the most logical or immediate threat on the battlefield

I think that's the fault of the scenario or rules. There should be a fog of war to the point you can't effectively ID leaders all of the time.

Objectives: IIRC most units in an offensive were assigned objectives or held in reserve. To me that means they are always attempting to seize/accomplish their objective without being "reminded" (activated or ordered each turn). I don't use command points, command dice, unit activations, limited orders, etc.

Yes, a commander may not do everything they want in a turn but there should be a reason behind it like delayed communications, fog of war, etc. Attaching your commander to a front line unit enhances his ability to adapt quickly to changes on the battlefield but exposes himself to danger and less influence over other units in his command.

Wolfhag

Much of this seems to me as being about who the rules are aimed at.

First of all if you have a set of rules that emcourage real world tactics, as has been noted it requiers a detailed understanding of the real world tactics and the constraints that contributed to them. That is great for those that already have a deep interest them. Not having that basis means that the first time player and even the longer term player has a big learning overhead.
Now this discriminates againt those that do not have the background, so the designer needs to decide what he wants to do about it. Most rules go for an easy set that can be played adequately occationally by those with little or no knowledge of the period and are optimised to meet that goal. In doing so rules often tactically simplify things unrealistically. Machine guns are not employed as they should be as in the real world thay are hard to deploy well and must be integrated into the overall structure particularly in defence. Great fun if you like tactical detail ,less so if you are not. In modern games defence is depth is difficult fore begginers it requires in depth analysis of terrain and its limitations.

So it is possible to write rules that do reflect reality, I say with comfidence Aswe keep losing to an ex-pltoon commander who does not know the rules and likes it that way, he just tells us his plan on a move by move basis and we move the pieces appropriately. After neatly 20 years we can hold our own sometimes as we are beginning to read terrain effectively which to us is part of the fun.
So you can write rules that reflect tactics, but theys are not optimised for begginers interested a quick not too demanding game. Think Chess rather than checkers.

If your have rules optimumizes immediate gratification they may well be optimise for the"Wrong" answere to make them easier to play. In setting up a game for beginners we had to make this compromise to simplify tactical decisions for players unused to more realistic and complex analysis. Its what you want out of a game.

UshCha, You're really getting to the heart of it here: who are the rules for?

There's always that tension between accessibility and fidelity.

At the end of the day, as you say, it comes down to what experience you want: quick playability or a system that rewards deeper thought (and accepts the learning curve that comes with it).

There's also the difference between "historian" and "player" mind sets, too.

Absolutely. If you don't know the history you don't know the tactics. So players end up playing highly abstracted fair and balanced game rules and learn the wrong lesson. At that point you need unhistorical "fair and balanced" rules that make it even more unhistorical and enforce the wrong lessons. Do they need to learn the right lessons to enjoy the game? No.

Example: Everyone knows Sherman tanks were Ronsons and the Panther was the best tank in the war <groan>. So if Panthers don't kick butt the game is unhistorical right?

Historically not so. My system for AFV combat is pretty much like WaT except I use one second timing to execute commands/actions rather than command dice. I've played both and my system is much quicker to play.

Traditional rules make it very difficult to historically portray the nuances of getting off that all important first shot. If you are in a concealed ambush position, no problem. However, a meeting engagement will expose the weapon system weaknesses.

A Panther (or any other vehicle or gun) in concealed ambush position will almost always get off 1-2 shots before the enemy can spot, engage and shoot.

In a meeting engage it is vastly different. The Sherman turret rotates at 25 degrees/second. The Panther D (first model used in NWE) traversed at about 6 degrees/second. The Sherman commander could control the turret and quickly line up the shot and shoot with the gunner controlling the shooting for follow up shots. The Panther could not. Tanks did not like to pivot in place or neutral turn because of potential track damage from the lateral forces against the treads and pins.

Historical documents show trained and experienced Sherman crews could get off a first shot within 10 seconds. They were the "Quick Draw" champions.

Also, Panthers didn't do well in the bocage because of their long barrel. If trees get in your way of aiming your gun you've lost. The Sherman didn't have that problem.

Flanking a Panther 90 degrees means 15 seconds to get his gun on you. A Sherman could fire up to three times at the 40mm side armor. Game over for the Panther. Try that in your "fair & balanced" game. Again, Reality Sucks.

The Sherman gunner had a panoramic periscope with a 60 degree view helping him line up the shot quicker. German tanks did not have this ability.

Grant it, these are small nuances of seconds but it accumulates and in 1:1 AFV combat seconds count, not the random roll of the dice or an artificial or abstracted rule.

Now I know you are thinking, "So what if the Sherman shoots first, it can't penetrate the armor." Yes. However, starting after D-Day the US 75mm gun had White Phosphorus rounds.

During the intense fighting in Western Europe, specifically during the Lorraine Campaign in late 1944, American Sherman tank crews often found themselves outmatched by the thick frontal armor of the German Panther. When armor-piercing rounds failed, tanker crews utilized a specific tactic involving White Phosphorus (WP) smoke shells to combat these superior vehicles.

Historical Narrative: Blinding the Beast:
A commonly reported scenario involves a Sherman M4, likely equipped with a 75mm gun, encountering a Panther tank in a defensive position. The Sherman crew, knowing their standard rounds would bounce off the Panther's sloped glacis plate, would shift tactics.

The Shot: The Sherman gunner would load a WP shell and fire directly at the Panther's turret, specifically aiming for the vision blocks, cupola, or gun mantlet.

The Effect: Upon impact, the WP would produce a thick, clinging, and blinding white smoke. The phosphorus would cling to the optics, completely blinding the crew and making it impossible for the German gunner to aim.

The Psychological Factor: The acrid smoke produced by the burning phosphorus would often get sucked inside the Panther's fighting compartment through ventilation fans and engine air intakes.

The Result: Convinced their tank was on fire—or choking from the acidic smoke—the German crew would frequently bail out of the tank to avoid burning alive.

This tactic was notoriously used by U.S. tankers to deal with both Panthers and King Tigers when faced with no other option, turning a "smoke" round (burning for about 60 seconds) into an effective anti-tank weapon that forced the abandonment of the vehicle.

For some reason I can't recall this being used in a set of game rules.

At Little Wars in Chicago a few years ago I did four games with Sherman 75 against a combination of Panther A and Tiger II. The result for the weekend was a 4:1 kill ratio for the Sherman's. Why? The Shermans found a small hill and used the Reverse Slope Defense engaging while turret down (not detected), moving to hull down, shoot and immediately reverse to turret down and reload. Then do it again or relocate.

The Germans had only seconds to shoot back and needed to be overwatching (the default order in the game) where they popped up or take an inaccurate Snap Shot at a hull down target. A hit with a WP had a small chance of a fire or bailing out and took the tank out of action for 60 seconds/turns burn time. A miss in front blocked the German LOS to return fire allowing the Shermans to relocate and do it again.

Oh the wailing and gnashing of teeth from the German players was precious as their uber tanks got "historically" smoked.

When the German players protested, I gave them the historic lesson on the tactics and the Sherman advantages. That silenced them but I did show them tactics to help overcome the advantage.

The only way I could portray the action in a mostly historic manner was to use one second timing through a units command OODA Decision Loop. I tried for 6 months using IGYG with 30, 15, and 5 second turns but they didn't deliver the result I wanted.

This also allows me to historically portray opportunity fire synchronizing movement rates with a guns rate of fire on a second-second basis without any additional rules or abstractions.

Based on this Otto Carius quote he would agree with me: "Everything depends on the prompt identification of a dangerous target. Usually, seconds decide."

Wolfhag

(Friends that know me probably saw this post coming from me!)

Such mechanics seem to be imposed in order for the rules to deliver a certain outcome. IMHO, many rules authors have based theirs on value sets that may be interesting but do not reflect better ones. Three examples come to mind:

1. Based upon casualties. Pick any period of history and you will find examples of units running with low or no casualties while others fought to nearly the last man!Casualties are quantifiable and there for easier to fiddle with unit values to get the results you want.

2. Command and Control. This is NOT a radius! ; In real life, it consists of 5 factors:
a. Commanding element
b. Commanded element
c. Downward flow of communication
d. Upward flow of communication
e. Friction at all levels
Even in today's world of multiple fast communications, the human element still must assess threats, possible actions and inform all involved to take action. This can take time! Time and Distance still shape battlefield actions.

3. COHESION- The replacement value set to base games upon: (I define my use here as the unit(s) ability to maintain control over the men- keeping them focused and functioning upon the mission at hand.) How well they accomplish this must be based upon the knowledge and experience of the men, same for the leaders but MORE importantly- How long have these men served under these leaders? None of the above utilize numbers as a value set to base a game on where combat is expressed in figure loss (and subsequent loss of funtioning).

Nowhere can there be adjustments for real life logistical matters. (A logistician by trade) I am NOT a bean counter. Instead, it's the effects of having vs not having the means to sustain a fight DOES matter. Weather, terrain, water, food, ammunition and the means to get from point A to B had an effect on success. Why were battles fought where they did? There were real reasons if you know what to look for.

Sorry for the long post but as a group of historical gamers finding out that the churned out iterations of the same thing is noow a formula for failure. "I" , for one, want to see more of the HISTORY in my games. Of course, I want more to my hobby experience than pushing little troops and throwing dice. Sure, that may satisfy many but some would like more out of their games than "roll a 6 and he's dead, Jim". Thanks for reading this different approach.

Dye4minis,
Nothing I can disagree with on your post. I'll attempt to address them.

Sorry for the long post but as a group of historical gamers finding out that the churned out iterations of the same thing is now a formula for failure

Game system: Regarding the major publishers, I doubt if anything is going to change. To be profitable they need to publish a game that includes the lowest common denominator of players, from intro to experienced and easy to paly IGYG variations. They need to publish or die so a new and improved game is released which is mostly like the previous game. They need to pay their bills. Introducing a completely new system somewhat invalidates their previous publications and may not be profitable. We need to rely on indie publishers for something new.

Player Preference: There is a large % of players that just want to roll the dice and blow things up with little regard to historical factors that come into play. Many players don't like historical rules that prevent them from doing what they want to do. You and I are a minority. If a game does not meet a players expectations he'll give it a thumbs down. Since most players are not familiar with historical actions and low level tactics the game becomes a fun and entertaining event. Nothing wrong with that either.

Balance: Then there is the game balance problem. We all know real combat was anything but balanced. Normally no one wants to play the side that is sure to lose even if that would be historical. Can you blame them?

Logistics: I see that as a pre-game activity that can be variable and it's not just ammo and gas but spare parts too. If a side has poor logistics that could mean a variable % of units don't get to the battle because of maintenance issues or troops moving up from assembly areas don't arrive. This could be kept secret to create a Fog of War.

Historically, anywhere from 20-50% of German tanks were in maintenance being repaired while the US it was about 10%. I've played games where every X number of turns the German player must pass a breakdown roll on his Panthers and Tigers.

Units don't suddenly without warning run out of ammo or gas based on a die roll. Before the game the player should know how many units of fire/fuel he has. From what I've read, German vehicles that ran out of gas and were abandoned was when they were withdrawing, not normally in the middle of a battle but that did happen too.

Small Arms Fire: I think most game rules overcomplicate fire fights. First, there is only initiative when one side opens fire first like in an ambush. After that the fire fight is a simultaneous exchange of fire with units attempting to maneuver under fire.

Suppression is not an all or nothing event. The best definition I've seen is "Small Arms fire always suppresses and sometimes kills." When you are under fire you ability to do what you desire is suppressed by taking cover, withdrawing, decreased observation means less effective return fire and communications, dangerous to move, etc.

It just kills me when I play a game where a unit is shot at and just stands there taking causalities because they can't take cover because it is not their turn yet.

When initially taken under fire units are trained to immediately, generally without being ordered, take a Course of Action or an Immediate Action Drill and not stand there being shot at.

Command & Control: I think another over complication with most games is having to order a unit to do something each turn, unit activations, order dice and command points. I understand the various gamey reason behind it and they do present some interesting strategies but few of them are historical.

However, once a unit is given an order, assignment or objective they'll attempt to achieve it without continually being reminded. Friction and enemy action may slow or stop them which is when communications and delays with higher HQ come into play.

Initiative: How are you going to model leadership initiative at the lowest level? There are many historical accounts of an individual from Private and up performing a heroic action when the rest of the unit failed. When in a tight spot do they wait for orders or take immediate action?

Wolfhag

Hi, Wolfhag. i FIND YOUR COMMENTS SPOT ON! All of them. This one has me commenting on first:

Initiative: How are you going to model leadership initiative at the lowest level? There are many historical accounts of an individual from Private and up performing a heroic action when the rest of the unit failed. When in a tight spot do they wait for orders or take immediate action?

This is why I'd rather play Patton than Sgt. Rock! A lot has to do with the nation's tactical doctrine ad that ususally specifies what to do in certain circumstances. At all levels, put in the simplist form- the 3 "F's apply: Find, Fix and Flank the enemy. If the Squad cannot do that then the Platoon leader must analyze and if too big seek help from the Company- ditto to Battalion, then Regiment, then Dividion then Corps…and up. Some countries (to this day) severely restrict what leaders can do at certain levels and mandate they take specific actions. Others may allow some flexibility but usually depends on how comfortable the next higher level of command has towards the lower level leader's traning and demonstrated experience.

My favoite focus is on your comment on Logistical matters. Firm beliver that all sorts of situations can (and should) be incorporaated into the scenario or rolled for during pre-game prep. Some things should be self evident: when a vehicle breaks down (random chance) the ability for recovery could be nil because assests may not be available during the time frame of the game. In other cases, if arrival of units onto the game table after turn 1, consideration should be given to the unit's fatigue, thirst, well being to get there. Above all, consideration needs to paid to the command's ability to sustain the fight. I'm all in on the idea that that the units would have sufficient ammo, food, water, etc. to allow for initial contact (say -in game turns- an hour's worth of engagement. After that, their basic load could be well be in need of replentishment; casualties evacuated (if a consideration in the period gamed) etc. Agree that units SHOULD carry certain amounts of necessities with them but noit an unlimited amount. This is where the scenario designer needs to step in before the game begins. Here is where pre-game preparations identifying potential shortages needs to be addressed since commanders should be well aware of their limfacs before engaged. Even the Russians in WWII pushed "an allotment" of supplies when units were ordered to attack/defend. They had to be managed and that is entails management my commanders (Gamers). Being a commander is more than ordering sub-units around- Why ignore the problems he faced in our games? (Can be a fun game when the gamer has to husband or coherse higher command to get him more of something! ) Therefore, scenarios can have multiple levels of victory/success and the winner is the one who best accomplished his goals with the resources he had. Again, all such considerations can be incorporated in the pre-game or scenario design before the game starts.

I like to point out that regardless of period of warfare, man is the common element. How well he is trained and experienced, led and use of terrain are the key elements a commander needs knowledge of. How he uses that knowledge determines his success (with soe luck ocassionally playing a big part!)

Thank you for your comments. Indeed, yours on the commercial side of things is reality. I can only add that new rules concepts that we have brought up don't seem to appear very often so who knows if they could be popular unless tried? A MUST is that the gamer must have knowledge why he is rolling the dice for and knows the consequences if it fails as well as consequences if he succeeds. Too often those issues are far too abstracted to be of use until after playing several iterations of the rules. Such decision points should be educated in the rules before the first game IMHO. You'll get a bigger bang for your gaming time if done right. Cheers!

Dye4minis,
Thank you for those kind words.

It appears we are both on the same page. Maybe we could both collaborate on these issues for our own games and trade ideas.

PM me your contact info.

Thanks,
Wolfhag

I have just started a "Big" game. Hours to rationalise deployment, not by rules but by how I expected the enemy to proceed, where to delay, where to block, what resources like Mortars were to be deployed, its WW2 and in this complex scenario can't shoot every where, further componded by having only one MFC with radio. This gane is utterly unsutable for beginners and hence proveds the point a game must ajust to the players. Begiiners in a game like this would be overwhelmed, its hard for me and the rules are second nature, deplyment effctivelt is still not. Horses for courses. However that for me is what makes it incredible fun.