"Deep Dive into the Bren Gun vs BAR use in WWII and why" Topic

So many times you hear: this weapon was better than that weapon because blah, blah, blah and start quoting overall performance factors and firepower without looking at the big picture.

Historical things like:
Why didn't the Germans and Allies just build T-34s?
Why didn't the British just buy M1 Garands?
Why did the Germans not build jets earlier in the war?
Etc.

"Why were these countries so stupid?" says the novice war gamer.

Hey, I was guilty of that in the past. However, in my old age I've become wiser and look at the overall picture and why.

As an American, Marine and my family owning the BAR my Grandpa used, I tend to get my temperature up when comparisons are made about the BAR, which while not a perfect weapon in every way, was not replaced by the US until the late 1950s and serving with other militaries until the late 1960s. As with the Bren Gun.

So I did a deep dive into a comparison between the Bren Gun (excellent weapon) and the BAR almost universally deemed inferior to the Bren because of firepower.

So I took a deep dive into all of the cost, logistical, realistic firepower, TO&E, and tactical factors and included many of the sources. Enjoy:

1. Cost of equipping American vs British squads (production/manufacture cost)
We have some data on unit-costs of small arms during WWII, though it's patchy and inconsistent. One summary list gives approximate wartime unit cost as: Forces News+2warhistoryonline+2
• The Bren gun (British light machine gun) — about US $180 USD (1941, for the gun). warhistoryonline
• The M1 Garand rifle — ~US $83 USD in 1942. warhistoryonline+1
• The Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR, M1918A2) — listed as US $319 USD (1945) in one source. warhistoryonline

For British bolt-action rifles (e.g. Lee-Enfield No. 4 Mk I), a contemporary cost figure is ~ £17.00 GBP 15s per rifle. Forces News+1
Historical currency conversion is tricky — but using the Bren cost in dollars (~$180) gives a rough baseline.

Hypothetical squad-equipment cost (guns only):
• British squad (assuming 1 Bren + 9 bolt-action rifles):
o Bren: ~$180
o 9 × Lee-Enfield: there is no direct dollar-cost but if you equate roughly to rifles at the same era, perhaps similar to Springfield-class rifles; but using the data above, even if we approximate each at, say, $30 USD–40 (note: this is speculative), the total cost might be on the order of $180 USD + 9 × ≈$35 = ~$500–$550.
• American squad (assuming 3 BARs + 9 M1 Garands):
o 3 × BAR: 3 × $319 USD = ~$957
o 9 × Garand: 9 × $83 USD = ~$747
o Total: ≈ $1,700 USD

o For sustained fire the Americans had a Weapons Company that normally has 2 or more belt fed M1919 machine guns mounted on a tripod that could be attached to a platoon with a sustained fire rate of 400-600 rounds per minute and barrel changes. These guns could advance with the rest of the platoon, tripod mounted water cooled machine gun could not. The Marines also had in their TO&E M1918 water cooled machine gun that were set up in defensive positions.

o Conclusion (with caveats): According to these rough figures, it cost substantially more to equip a US squad (with semiautos + BARs) than a British squad built around a single Bren + bolt-action rifles — perhaps 3× as much. However, these are very rough estimates, based on partial data; they exclude ammunition, spare parts, barrels, magazines, and all support equipment (web gear, optics, etc.), which could change the balance. Also wartime procurement contracts, economies of scale, lend-lease issues etc. complicate simple comparisons.
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2. How many men did the Bren-gun crew normally have? — Two? Three?
The standard wartime doctrine for the Bren was that it was operated by a two-man crew: a "Number 1" (gunner) who carried and fired the weapon, and a "Number 2" (loader/assistant) who carried extra magazines, spare barrel, and toolkit, reloaded the gun, replaced overheated barrels, and spotted targets. Toys for Boys+2Owen Guns+2

Some sources note that in practice, especially under combat conditions, the weapon might sometimes be handled by a single soldier — but the ideal and doctrinal standard remains two-man. Firearms+1
So: two-man crew. I'm sure it could be fired by one man for a limited period of time with reduced firepower changing magazines. The BAR was a one man weapon. Everyone in the squad normally carried additional magazines for the automatic weapons.

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3. How easy is it to fire a Bren gun while walking?
The Bren was primarily intended to be fired from a bipod (or tripod), in prone or supported positions. Owen Guns+1

However — and importantly — on occasion it was fired "on the move," using a sling, from standing or kneeling, or even hip-level positions. This was especially common in jungle or close country by Commonwealth forces (for instance, Australian troops used "marching fire" with the Bren from the hip during advances). Encyclopedia Britannica+2Athlon Outdoors Firearm Updates+2

So while firing on the move was possible and did occur, it was not the standard mode — aiming was harder, accuracy reduced, and magazine-changes or barrel-changes could complicate matters. In short: it was feasible, but not easy or ideal; better used from position.
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4. How many rounds would the Bren normally fire in controlled bursts for 3 minutes sustained fire without the barrel overheating?
Here we must distinguish cyclic rate from practical/sustained rate. The Bren's cyclic (theoretical max) rate was about 500–520 rounds per minute. Encyclopedia Britannica+1

But real combat doctrine limited sustained fire to much lower rates. One source notes that a "practical sustained rate" was about 120 rounds per minute (four magazines per minute), with a barrel change after ~10 magazines or when overheating — roughly after ~2.5 minutes of firing at that rate. Owen Guns+2Tombstone History Pages+2

If one sustained fire at 120 rpm for 3 minutes, that would be ~ 360 rounds. However, that is near the limit — after roughly 2.5 minutes a barrel change would normally be required. If no spare barrel was available, firing would have to be significantly curtailed or risk damage/"cook-off."

In practical combat, units rarely burned full 3-minute strings of sustained fire — doctrine emphasised short bursts (4–5 rounds) to control fire, conserve ammo, and avoid overheating. Wikipedia+1

So a more realistic sustained output might be much lower — perhaps a few hundred rounds over several minutes (with pauses, barrel changes, etc.).
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5. How many rounds would one BAR normally fire in controlled bursts for 3 minutes sustained fire without the barrel overheating?
The BAR (M1918A2) had a cyclic rate of approximately 550–650 rounds per minute. Warfare History Network+1
However, it suffers from limitations that make sustained automatic fire problematic:
• It had a fixed barrel: no quick-change barrel, unlike a true light machine gun. Warfare History Network+1
• It used a 20-round magazine, which is small for a sustained-fire weapon, meaning frequent reloads. Warfare History Network+1
• In short, while it could be fired in bursts or semi-auto, sustained full-automatic fire rapidly caused overheating, and magazine capacity limited continuous fire. Warfare History Network+1

I found no credible primary-source figure that says "X rounds in 3 minutes sustained fire" without overheating for the BAR. Many historians argue that the BAR was not truly suitable as a squad-sustained-fire weapon — rather it was intended more as an "automatic rifle," providing walking fire or short bursts to suppress while maneuvering. Reddit+2Warfare History Network+2
Therefore the idea of sustained full-auto fire with a BAR for 3 continuous minutes is unlikely, and would most likely result in overheating or at least unacceptable accuracy loss, stoppages, or barrel wear.
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6. Tactical comparison: British squad (Bren + bolt rifles) vs. US squad (3 BARs + Garands) in a fire & maneuver assault on an enemy position 50 yards away
Here's an evaluation based on doctrine, weapons characteristics, and likely combat dynamics:
• Volume & control of fire: The British squad with one Bren could lay down more sustained, controlled suppressive fire than a BAR-equipped American squad — because the Bren was a purpose-designed light machine gun with a (relatively) quick-change barrel, magazine-feed, and doctrine optimized for bursts. The BAR, being magazine-fed and with a fixed barrel, would likely overheat or require frequent reloads — making continuous suppression difficult.
• Mobility & flexibility: The American squad has an advantage in mobility and fire dispersion. With 9 Garands, every rifleman can engage targets individually. The three BARs, while not ideal for sustained lay-down fire, provide mobile automatic fire capability. For a short-range assault at 50 yards, the American squad's semi-autos give high volume of aimed shots as they advance.

One advantage the Americans had was the auto fire weapons were distributed giving additional targets for the enemy. Squad Leaders could use the "Barking BAR" tactic where all the BARs were grouped together and took turns firing short bursts giving the same performance as the Bren Gun.

• Accuracy at short range: In a 50-yard assault, aimed semi-automatic fire from rifles (Garands) could be very effective. The Bren might be heavier to maneuver, slower to reposition, and more cumbersome if moving, though a trained Bren crew could still deliver bursts.
• Suppressive vs assault mix: The British arrangement may offer more suppressive fire from the Bren, allowing riflemen to maneuver. The American arrangement offers more balanced fire across many riflemen — perhaps more effective in close assault with multiple shooters.
Conclusion: For a 50-yard assault on an enemy position, the American squad (BAR + Garands) likely had an advantage in mobility, flexibility, and volume of aimed fire, especially in rapid, aggressive assaults. The British squad, however, could deliver controlled suppression — but might struggle to maintain that suppression during dynamic movement or rapid assaults.
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7. Evaluate the tactics the British and American squads used — which was better for attacking vs defending, and why
British (Bren + bolt-action rifle sections):
• Doctrine emphasized the Bren as the main fire-support base for the section, with riflemen providing covering or aiming fire. Owen Guns+2Warfare History Network+2
• For defense, this setup is strong: a single Bren can lay down suppressive or defensive fire, riflemen can pick targets, and light support weapons can be employed effectively from fixed positions or prepared lines. The British often used the Bren in bipod or tripod mode, or even vehicle/Carrier-mounted configurations for static defense or support. Owen Guns+2Warfare History Network+2
• For attacking, especially under modern fire & maneuver tactics, the limitations are more apparent: only one automatic support weapon per squad; reloading and magazine capacity may slow fire; squad rate of fire depends heavily on a single gun.

American (BAR + Garand squads):
• American doctrine with BARs was somewhat hybrid: the BAR provided automatic fire, but the squad still relied heavily on Garand riflemen. Wikipedia+1
• For attacking, this was advantageous: the mixture of semi-auto rifles and some automatic weapons gives flexibility, volume of aimed shots, and redundancy (if a BAR gunner is down, riflemen still fire).
• For defense, it's inferior to a dedicated light or medium machine gun-based squad — the BAR's limited sustained fire capacity and small magazine means suppressed fire or area denial is harder compared to a Bren or belt-fed MG.
Conclusion on which is "better":
• For defense — the British approach with a Bren gives concentrated and sustainable automatic fire, beneficial for holding a position, supporting interlocking fields of fire, and managing ammo & crew.
• For attack, the American BAR + multiple riflemen approach offers greater flexibility, redundancy, and distributed firepower, which tends to better support maneuver and assault. Also, attached M1919 machines guns could advance with the platoon.
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8. Evaluate whether US Marine/Army BAR-armed squads (Europe) gave the squad leader greater tactical flexibility

Yes — in many respects, the BAR-equipped squad gave squad leaders greater tactical flexibility, particularly because:
• The squad did not rely on a single support weapon; multiple riflemen with semi-automatic rifles meant that suppression, aimed fire, or suppressing fire could come from various individuals, not just one gunner.
• The BARs, though limited for sustained fire, could provide bursts of automatic fire during assault or movement, supporting "walking fire" or bounding maneuvers.
• Loss or disablement of one BAR did not degrade the squad's overall firepower as drastically as losing the only Bren in a British squad might.
Therefore, for dynamic battlefield conditions — fluid front lines, assaults, rapid movement — American squads likely had more resilience and flexibility.
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9. Evaluate the tactics the US Marines and Army used with their BAR-armed squads in the Pacific / jungles; which configuration was more effective there?
In the Pacific and jungle environments:
• The mobility and lighter weight (compared with heavier tripod-based or belt-fed MGs) of the BAR + Garand squad offered major advantages. Dense terrain, close combat, and frequent movement meant a heavy machine-gun setup would be less practical.
• The BAR's portability allowed automatic fire support without the logistical burden of heavy ammo belts, spare barrels, or tripods — advantageous in jungle patrols, amphibious landings, and small-unit tactics.
• However, the BAR's limited magazine capacity and lack of quick-change barrel meant its ability to deliver sustained suppressive fire was lower. In long firefights, that could be a disadvantage compared to a purpose-built light machine gun.

Overall, I'd argue the BAR-armed squad was relatively well-suited to Pacific/jungle warfare: the trade-offs (less sustained fire, more mobility) aligned well with requirements for fluid, small-unit, dispersed operations, quick movement, and close-range engagements.

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10. Which one (British Bren-based or US BAR/Garand-based) had more tactical flexibility in WWII — why?
Overall, the American BAR + Garand squad likely had more tactical flexibility, because:
• It was less dependent on a single automatic weapon.
• It balanced automatic fire (BAR) with rifle fire (Garands), allowing varied responses — suppressive bursts, aimed rifle shots, maneuver, etc.
• It was more resilient: loss or disabling of a BAR gunner did not cripple the squad.
• It was more adaptable across different combat environments — from open fields to urban fighting, jungles, and amphibious landings.
The Bren-based squad, on the other hand, while delivering higher quality sustained automatic fire, was more rigid: the whole squad's automatic fire support rested on a single weapon and its two-man crew.

The later WWII Marine Squad was composed of three 4 man teams each with an BAR automatic rile that accompanies the team. This gives the squad leader the ability to conduct a fire maneuver with two teams laying down cover fire and one team doing a 5 meter rush and alternating. The final assault is controlled by the squad leader. All three teams get online and reload. On the squad leaders command, after a few grenades, they all rise up and conduct walking fire across the enemy position. I think the best WWII weapons for this were the BAR and M1 Garand and was used throughout the entire war except at Guadalcanal where the Marines had Springfield 1903 rifles, not M1s

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11. Which one performed better in poor weather and sandy / dirty conditions?
This is more nuanced. Some relevant points:
• The Bren was well regarded for reliability and accuracy, and its magazine feed (vs belt-feed) meant fewer complications with sand and mud — provided rounds were loaded carefully and magazines kept clean. Firearms+1
• However: the Bren's top-mounted magazine and magazine feed could be vulnerable to dirt; early versions could jam if magazines were overfilled or cartridges were loaded poorly (rimmed .303 rounds needed careful stacking). Tombstone History Pages+1
• The BAR, being a relatively simpler automatic rifle (magazine-fed, no quick-change barrel), was simpler to maintain under field conditions, but its fixed barrel made it prone to overheating. Soil, sand and grime could also affect magazine feeding or ejection, but its simpler design might mean fewer moving parts to clog — though I found few authoritative sources on BAR performance in sand/dirt.
Given what we know, I'd say the Bren likely had a slight reliability advantage in adverse conditions, assuming proper maintenance and trained crew; but both systems had vulnerabilities — and BAR's simplicity might make field maintenance easier, trading sustained-fire for robustness.
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12. Which one was easier to maintain under combat conditions?
• The BAR's simpler design, fewer moving parts, fixed barrel (no spare-barrel to carry/maintain), and widespread rifle-type maintenance culture likely made it easier to maintain on average under combat conditions.
• The Bren, being a more specialized weapon, required more maintenance discipline — ensuring magazines loaded correctly, keeping dust/sand out, carrying spare barrels, magazines, toolkits, and having a dedicated assistant.
Thus for "ease of maintenance under combat conditions," the BAR + rifle squad probably had an edge — especially in large-scale, prolonged operations or in harsh terrain (jungles, islands, amphibious landings) where logistical simplicity mattered.
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13. Could one Bren put out the same amount of sustained fire rounds as three BARs? Which more effective — why?
Given the technical and doctrinal limitations:
• Three BARs cannot sustain continuous automatic fire for long without overheating (fixed barrels) and are limited by 20-round magazines — meaning frequent reloads, pauses, and risk of stoppages.
• One Bren, with its quicker barrel change capability (and assuming spare barrel + magazines available), is intrinsically better suited for sustained automatic fire. Realistically, over a few minutes of engagement, one well-handled Bren could likely outperform three BARs in terms of sustained suppressive fire.
Therefore, one Bren is likely more effective for sustained fire than three BARs — though the three BARs + riflemen may offer more flexible and distributed firepower overall. The Bren's strength is concentrated automatic support; the BAR-Garand squad's strength is flexible, mobile, and resilient fire from many shooters.
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14. Summary — what you can use in your presentation (with caveats)
• Equipping a US squad with 3 BARs + 9 Garands probably cost significantly more than equipping a British squad with 1 Bren + 9 bolt-action rifles (guns only).
• The Bren was normally operated by a two-man crew, but could be (and sometimes was) used by one man.
• The Bren could be fired on the move with a sling, but was most effective when deployed from bipod/tripod and in controlled firing positions.
• For sustained fire, the Bren could deliver maybe 300–400 rounds over 2–3 minutes (with barrel change), but doctrine preferred short bursts, not continuous fire.
• The BAR was not well suited to sustained automatic fire — fixed barrel, small magazine, overheating — so sustained 3-minute bursts would be unrealistic.
• For a short-range assault (e.g. 50 yards), a US BAR + Garand squad likely had the advantage in mobility, volume of aimed fire, and flexibility; the British Bren-based squad had the advantage in controlled suppressive fire and fire support.
• For defense or suppressive fire, the Bren-based section outperformed a BAR-based squad; for assault, maneuver, and varied terrain (jungles, urban, islands), BAR-based squads arguably had an overall edge in flexibility and resilience. However, for defensive sustained fire the Marines had M1918 water cooled Brownings.
• Maintenance and logistic simplicity also favored the BAR + rifle squad, though the Bren could be reliable if properly maintained.
• In sustained suppression over time, a single Bren probably outclassed three BARs; but in overall tactical flexibility, the BAR-Garand squad likely had the broader advantage.
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15. Important caveats & limitations The "cost" figures are very rough estimates. They don't include ammunition, spare barrels/magazines, webbing, training, transport or logistic overhead. Use them only as illustrative, not definitive.
• Many real-world factors (crew training, terrain, mission type, morale, ammunition supply, weather, leadership, logistics) affect combat performance more than just weapon technical specs.
• The doctrine of a given unit (how they were trained to fight) often mattered more than pure firepower. For example, how aggressively a squad moves, how well they coordinate suppressive vs flanking fire, how ammo discipline is maintained, etc.
• Comparing a "semi-auto + automatic rifle" squad to a "bolt-action + magazine-fed LMG" squad involves tradeoffs — one is not strictly "better" in all conditions; each has strengths depending on mission, terrain, and tactics.
• For sustained fire the Americans had a Weapons Company that normally has 2 or more belt fed M1919 machine guns mounted on a tripod that could be attached to a platoon. These guns could advance with the rest of the platoon, tripod mounted water cooled machine gun could not. The Marines also had in their TO&E M1918 water cooled machine gun that were set up in defensive positions. It had a sustained fire rate of 400-600 rounds per minute.
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16. Conclusion
The comparison shows there is no absolute "winner." The British Bren-based squad offered more sustained and controlled automatic fire power, appropriate for suppression and defense; the American BAR + Garand squad offered greater tactical flexibility, distributed firepower, mobility, and resilience, especially useful for aggressive assault, maneuver warfare, and varied combat environments (Europe towns, Pacific jungles, amphibious operations).
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17. What remains uncertain or contested
I found no authoritative primary-source data giving a precise number of rounds fired by BARs in "sustained-fire mode" over 3 minutes without overheating. Most literature agrees that BARs were not ideal for sustained automatic fire. Warfare History Network+2WW2Aircraft Forums+2

If an enemy defensive position cannot be suppressed in a few minutes with BARs and Garands, heavier weapons would be brought forward.

• Similarly, while the Bren's "practical sustained fire rate" is sometimes given as ~120 rpm, the real-world rate depended heavily on conditions (availability of spare barrels, magazines, ammo, the loader's efficiency, etc.).
• Many post-war assessments and anecdotal veteran reports differ, depending on theater, unit, supply situation, and mission.

Other conclusions:

One of the key factors is gaining immediate fire superiority in a firefight or in a close range ambush. This is about the only time cyclic rates may come into play.

13 man Marine Squad:
9x M1 Garands = 72 rounds
3x BAR = 60 rounds
Total: 132 rounds

10 man British Squad:
1x Bren Gun (two man) 30 rounds
7x SMLE = 70 rounds
Total: 100 rounds

I did not include the squad leaders firepower. In this example, each SMLE is firing more rounds than the Garand. However, the Garand is quicker to reload. The Bren Gun team had two men accounting for 30 rounds. With two BARs two men account for 40 rounds.

So in a "Mad Minute" type scenario the Marine squad has 32% more firepower.

The Bren is better at long range fire but you don't fire & maneuver against a defensive position 500 yards away so the Marine Squad does not need it. But if they do call in an M1919 which is even better than one Bren for long range accurate fire or 60mm mortars.

One factor normally overlooked was the fact that the Bren gunner had a higher profile and the magazine could be spotted by the enemy or a sniper. Personally, I don't like standing out and being shot at. Both can fire single shots as to not give away their auto fire position.

I think this clearly shows that showing a 1:1 comparison does not tell the entire story, it's just not that simple. Understanding the reason, limitations, economics and tactics gives you a better historical picture of how and why. Sometimes you just have to go with what you have and make the best of it.

Well, there are the facts. Come to your own conclusion and form your own opinion.

Wolfhag

Great post! I'm on team MG 42 myself, so I'll stay out of the BAR vs Bren debate, but the BAR is my favorite US small arm.

Came across this re: the BAR a few days ago on Reddit, which may be of interest to you if you haven't seen it before:

link

I appreciate all your cyphering but the comparison is mute of appples to oranges.

A comparison of a light machine gun to an automatic rifle?

Maybe a comparison to the weapons that the BAR replaced is more appropriate. What about BAR to the Chauchat or the Lewis Gun just to figure out why it got there.

Both Bren and BAR are incredible systems with specific applications, benefits and limitations too. Indeed, FN took the BAR as a mechanical system basis and eventually wound up with the MAG57 out of it, probably the most incredible gpmg of all time.

BAR was used to support riflemen armed with self-loading rifles, and it was the riflemen who were expected to produce the main volume of fire, not the BAR.

Just read the appropriate paras of the contemporary FMs.

link

PDF link

Bren was introduced initially to thicken up firepower of Secs/Pls in defence but quickly proved to provide those subunits with a weapon light enough to keep up with infantrymen and capable of projecting a good volume of fire. It was in the Section paired with bolt-action rifles that, in the hands of well trained men, could put up an impressive rate of fire themselves, but not at the rate of the US M1 rifle.

The US system evolved with all their MGs, and the BAR, designed for use in WW1, with the M1 rifle being the new tactical development, while for the British the Bren was the new weapon and had to complement the existing rifles.

The BAR arguably was the end of a developmental line, while the Bren was the beginning of one; then the MG34 was introduced and the GPMG concept went on to to dominate the field for decades after the war. Neither the US nor the UK could realistically introduce their 'own' MG34 during the course of the war so had to use their existing automatic weapon pool to best effect.

Gary

Wolfhag, that is a most impressive assessment of the weapons and how they were employed by each military. You're truly a font of knowledge. I went through your deep dive a half dozen times just attempting to absorb it all. could not think of a single variable that wasn't covered.

The one thought I can share – and you touched on it with doctrine – is that the assault flexibility offered by the BARs is in perfect keeping with US doctrine of taking the offensive whenever possible.

Collective unit firepower, sustainability, close range versus long range performance, small unit tactics (like German Auftragstaktik), etc all come into consideration as I work to characterize platoon performance (for my battalion level rules) across the different militaries and time periods of World War II.

You're 17-point deep dive makes me believe I'm on the right track with my approach to establishing platoon combat performance ratings. Thanks for sharing.

I have sometimes wondered why the U.S. didn't "borrow" the Bren Gun idea. Off course the ammo was different, so a U.S. Bren would have been more like the Czech (?) original.

Some of the comparisons have to be questioned.

Anyone carrying a nine or ten pound rifle is pretty evenly matched when it comes to "mobility" or "flexibiity".

For firepower, you are comparing one weapon to the use of two or three weapons in a single infantry section.

Likewise, 'suppressing fire' is a curios term. The phrase, 'Only accurate fire is interesting', might clarify other peoples attitudes about how the fire was used. having so many automatic weapons does not justify prophalactyc fire or what we used to refer to as 'spray and pray'.

How often did an infantry section operate on its' own as two or three separate fire teams? Most work would be at the platoon level certainly.

Did the army have two or three firetams per infantry squad?
Didn't that change at some point?
I think the USMC kept their three team squads throughout.

You are also comparing two very differing concepts of manouvre. Having two and three fire teams of equivalent firepower and being able to move them about verses having a fixed fire base and an oversized fire team moving about.

That is a useful comparison.

I guess one point I would make is that in WW2 nearly all units in all armies manouvered as complete sections, it was all mass cosncript armies could do, regardless of what the manuals said. Some every well trained or very experienced units didn't.

It doesnt really affect the overall firepower projection, but it does the minor tactics. Having the entire squad armed with Garands meant the US didn't really need anything more than the BAR.

After the war everyone decided they wanted MG42s.

Us infantry squad usually had one or two bar. Or none. Some units didn't think the bar was worth carrying.
The bipod made the bar rather awkward to carry and mostly they were removed and the gun used as an automatic rifle. But rarely as a crew served weapon.
Which is significant in that (it is widely considered) crew served weapons hugely out performed those used by individuals.

The bren could be fired from the hip so was handier than one might imagine. The bar could also of course.

I've always thought it was a bit strange the us army chose to stick with a rather sub optimal squad support weapon which was designed for a failed doctrine ( walking fire ). They copied the 6pdr, so why not the bren.

Of course it's worth considering the wider picture. Pretty much every American vehicle had a machine gun on it, there were tripod mg in support and 105s on call. When you're largely on the attack then maybe lack of a "real" lmg didn't matter so much.

There again. They tried to copy the mg42 so maybe they did want a gpmg despite it's problems in an assault.

Did the army have two or three firetams per infantry squad? Didn't that change at some point?

US Army did not adopt fire team (= identical sub-organisations within a squad) structure during WWII. Though in principle the squad was expected to operate as three elements in action: scout group (2 man), BAR group (4 men) and rifle group (6 men).

I think the USMC kept their three team squads throughout.

The three fireteam structure (with BAR in each) with separate squad leader was only introduced in 1944:

link

In the preceeding 1943 structure rifle squads were 12 men with two BARs, which could in principle split into two identical groups (with squad leader in charge of one half and the assistant squad leader commanding the second):

link

This was preceeded by an early war TOE where the rifle squad consisted of nine men with a single BAR, though the platoon also had a BAR squad (eight men with two BARs), and there was a sixth BAR that could be optionally assigned to somebody:

link

So when making comparisons between a US marine rifle squad and British rifle squad, it would also be entirely possible to take as a reference an early war marine squad with nine men, bolt-action rifles and a single BAR. And for the Brits, there were also eight, nine and eleven man squads during the war (besides the ten man squad adopted in the end).

Wolfhag, I've carried and used a Bren (7.62mm L4A4, not Mk3 I .303", but I played with a Mk3 as a school cadet)- not on OPS, but on EX. I suppose there'd be a few Brits, Kiwis and possibly Canucks who have, too, and I'd like to see if they agree/disagree with me. I've never held a BAR, but I can compare the Bren with the M60, MAG 58 and MG3 (though I only had to carry that pig for a week)- which isn't much use in this thread.

Just some points that your excellent comparison didn't cover, or can confirm some points, or which you may want to think about.

The L4A4 magazine capacity was 30 rounds, but only 28 were loaded, to preserve the mag spring. WWII vet's told me they did the same, for the same reason.

Bursts of three to five rounds are used, with occasional single shots. Again, the same as they used in WWII.

Loading rimmed cartridges doesn't take longer than loading rimless, once you've had some practice. I owned an SLME and the "in and back with the thumb" technique is the same as the 7.62 and 5.56 rimless, when loading magazines. However, you do need to spend more time looking for damaged rims, before loading- especially some of the old Indian ammo' we got at competitions (which turned most shoots into a lucky dip).

Having used a Garand M1 and the SMLE I'd suggest it's quicker to reload the SMLE- if you have spare mag's (I've never used a clip in an SMLE, which was used in WWI and early WWII, at least, for reloads). It's quicker to drop the empty mag and put on a full one then it is to cock and lock the M1 and then place and strip the clip (at least that's how I was shown how to do it, so my mate may have not shown me the correct/quickest method?).

Patrolling with the Bren- which is done more often than attacking or defending positions- is tiring. It's a nose-heavy weapon compared to the M60, and needs a sling to help keep the muzzle up (and remove excess skin from your neck or shoulder). Also, carrying six mag's (gunner had six, No 2 and the section 2IC had three each) takes up a lot of room and, frankly, is a pain in the nether regions. The smaller BAR mag would be more practical- but you'd need more to carry the same amount of ammo'.

The Bren is great for point fire, but for suppressing fire the cone of fire is too narrow, and you have to "wag the tail" to get a decent suppressive spread- more so than the M60 and MAG 58 (I never live fired the MG3).

My overall impression of the Bren? A PITA to carry but nice for competition shoots. NOT a GPMG, more like an over-sized automatic rifle. I was very happy when they sorted out the operating rods issues, had M60's reissued and I could joyfully say goodbye to the Bren. Later on, after I'd left Infantry (injury), I used an L4A4 at the Australian Army Skill At Arms Meet (AASAM's). My No 2 was a RAEME Major and, with just a little practice pre-competition, we kept up with the belt-fed M60's and MAG 58, even in short 50 round serials. (My accuracy, however, was not good enough to get us into the top 20, and a British army team on a MAG 58 won.)

Cheers, mate.

I concur with everything Dal just said except I have no experience with the M60.

Wolfhag, it might be a better thing if you took the use of the BAR as used by either the Belgians, Poles or Swedes. It would be interesting to see if they used them more as automatic rifles or as light machine guns. Especially as the rest of their sections were using bolt action rifles. That only changed when the swedes took up an AG42 or two per section or post war when the Belgians adopteed the FN49. I believe that they had removable and changeable barrels too.

Nothing I really have against the BAR. It is just that the "best", is usually the guy with the most training and experience with that tool.

PS One thing I forgot to mention was cook-offs. The Bren fired from an open bolt, so cook-offs or "runaway guns" weren't a problem, unless the barrel was hot enough to cause a premature detonation (ie before the round was fully home and the breech sealed). But if it got that hot the Bren wasn't going to be useful for much without a rebuild, in any case.

Did the BAR fire from a closed bolt? In that case cook-offs would be an issue (and cook-offs are one reason making an L1A1 SLR fully auto was discouraged- not that I ever did that, of course *innocent*).

Troopwo, thanks for the input. You made one very good point, too:

It is just that the "best", is usually the guy with the most training and experience with that tool.

Thanks wolfhag.. good stuff.
J

Very interesting info Wolfhag. As an aside, whilst at the Royal Armouries Museum in Leeds yesterday, I watched one of the museum curators demonstrate the "Mad Minute" technique with a Lee-Enfield rifle:
link
link
and
YouTube link
"The mad minute turned out to be extremely useful in the early stages of the Great War, when the lightly-armed British Expeditionary Force was on the defensive; the BEF's soldiers could put up a tremendous, murderous volume of fire against advancing close-formation German troops, many of whom reported that they were facing machine-guns."

Wolfhag a great analysis. Some points. In my reading using a Bren on a field tripod (not in the Anti aircaft role) was rare, many units did not have tripods readily available.

The comparison with 3 BAR is perfectly valid but it is not typical for many line American infantry so is not applicable in all cases. Now many Brits had a Universal carrier alloted to them, that upped the firepower tremendously, Now a 12 man suad (2 Brens one in a universal carrier) and 8 rifle men shades. This shades the odds towards the British, Biased I here yoyu. cry well yes – but you are comparing (addmittedly it's a bit vauge, not a derogatiuon but a reflection of actal fact) a far cheaper British squad with 10 men vs an american elite 12 man unit so it shows how difficult the comparison is.

I did talk to an ex serving man who still shoots in competion at a reasonable level. He did like the Bren, very accurate, again almost too accurate in that it needed a very competent gunner to disperse the fire.

How did practial effective range vary between the Bren and the BAR? Some souces put effective range for the Bren about 800yds. Most BAR references put it at 600m. Not sure if this is a valid comparison. To gain much in maneouvre it would need to be used without the bipod, where its range is noted to be shorter.

We ahve left the BAR, at least currently as a Light support weapon, No right really with just 1 or 2 BAR in a squad but the Garand on average makes it less biased. We may have to rethink as we do more work as 3 BAR's as 3 light support weapons is a massive overkill.

I think that basing an analysis on a US Squad having three BARs as standard (?) is utterly atypical of US Army practice and experience. There was a recent post on Axis History forum from a US author who noted there was a deficit of BARs in the ETO against just the basic T/O, which only became more apparent after the Ardennes. I'll see if I can find his figures.

Universal carriers were not deployed singly to increase Section firepower. As a dismounted subunit a Section of three carriers could provide the same LMG firepower as a Rifle Platoon could, and could manoeuvre under small arms fire to positions if required with some degree of protection (certainly more than a rifleman in a tin hat). They did not have the personnel to hold ground though, and their strength was mobility and firepower.

so is not applicable in all cases.

Nothing is. Adapt, improvise and overcome! When near an Army unit: Lie, Cheat and Steal!

Thanks Dal. I'm glad someone with direct experience can contribute.

I own a Korean War vintage M1 Garand (no modifications) that I've fired in CMP matches out to 600 yards. At 600 yards in the slung prone position (not in a mechanical rest) in ideal conditions (no one was shooting at me) it holds a group about 12-15 inches in diameter. That computes to about 2.5 MOA which is pretty good firing Greek Army surplus ammo. At 500 yards that would put almost every round into a torso size target just as I could with my M14 (Expert qual).

With most nations, if a gun was over 4 Mil accuracy it was not accepted. Modern day sniper rifles are < 1 MOA.

Bolt action rifles are almost always going to be more accurate than a semi. But based on the M1 performance, would it really matter in combat?

The BAR and Bren fire from the open bolt position (less accurate than semi) with a reported accuracy of 4-5 MOA which was considered "too accurate" for auto fire. The MG42 was the same with a bipod.

The BAR rear sight is calibrated to 1500 yards and the Bren 2000 yards. At 200-600 you need a bipod. Over 600 yards you'd use the tripod. If I were a Squad Leader and there was a target over 500 yards I'd call in mortars, not use the BAR or even a LMG and give away my position. Does that make sense?

The BAR only had a 20 round magazine, the Bren a 30 round: Yes, but that came at the expense of mounting it on the top exposing the gunner and loader. The 20 round magazine on the BAR does not interfere with the shooting or increase your target profile. It appears to me a 30 round would. Dal, did the mag block your vision when firing the Bren?

Auto fire effectiveness: The BAR was adjustable from 300-500 rpm. The Bren was about 500 rpm. That begs the question: Was the BAR more effective in auto fire because of the more controllable lower 300 rpm rate of fire? We'll never know. I'm sure the Bren was more controllable with the tripod.

Personally, I would not want something sticking up by my head saying, "Shoot me first." I've carried multiple 20 round mags for the M14 and they are a pain. I'd hate to carry multiple 30 round mags unless they were 5.56s

The BAR was too heavy: Well the US tried to replace it with the select fire M14. That didn't work. Why? Because the M14 with a bipod was too light at 12 pounds to handle 7.62 auto fire recoil!

So it appears if you want an automatic weapon firing a full .30cal rifle round you need something weighting at least 15 pounds. Many times the later BAR M1918A2 was stripped of the bipod (terrible design), carrying handle and flash hider getting the weight closer to 19 pounds, the original weight when first issued in 1918.

Some said the BAR was too heavy: Didn't Grunts complain about carrying ANYTHING heavy? Of course we did. If we ain't bitching we ain't happy! I carried an M60 with a bipod weighting about 23 pounds. Before you start comparing that to the BAR or Bren we had a three man team for the M60.

The US could have developed a smaller and shorter round like the Germans did but then there is the logistics and manufacturing problems. You don't want to roll out new weapons in the middle of war but sometimes you are forced to.

They did have the M1 Carbine with a selector switch but it came at the cost of a less lethal and shorter range.

The 8.4 pound Soviet AVT-40 with a 10 round magazine fired 7.62x54mm but had auto fire control issues. Too light and were withdrawn after the war. Why only 10 rounds? Look at it. More than 10 rounds and the mag gets in the way when prone.

The StG44 (10lb unloaded) was successful but fired a weaker cartridge with shorter max range (300 yards) so it is not a fair comparison to the BAR. Soldiers were instructed to use semi-fire because auto fire was not very effective. Shorter range is a tradeoff for an assault weapon and I'm sure auto fire was used.

FG42: Great weapon that was never copied. Why?. It fired the 7.92 rifle cartridge at 900 rpm (that's crazy). Weighted 10 pounds. Again, auto fire was inaccurate except at close range. You empty a 30 round mag in 2 seconds???

M1 Garand rapid fire & reload:
YouTube link

The Belgians did make a BAR with a removable barrel and pistol grip for use as an LMG.

Sweden had a changeable barrel with cooling fins in use until the 1980s.

So the choice comes down to a heavy automatic rifle or a heavier LMG weighting 20+ pounds, plus tripod and more ammo. Again, as a reminder to anyone who has not been shot at, ideally, you don't want to stand out and make yourself a target.

Off topic example: Many Western fighters in Ukraine were real gear hoars wearing the best and latest equipment, weapons and armor. When spotted by the Russians, they threw everything at them for hours at a time. The kill chain when attacking a Russian trench line near Bakhmut was 30-60 seconds before being bracketed by 82mm mortars. When assaulting you are running and gunning, don't stop, even when being bracketed.

My parting words to my son as he went on deployment were, "Keep a low profile." Which did not work because being a Comm/SigInt guy he always had an antenna sticking up advertising, "Shoot me first."

So back on topic. Does comparing individual weapons really matter in the big picture? All weapons had their plus and minus. Grunts were forced to fight with what they were issued and improvised and evolved tactics as needed. The US was never going to adopt an LMG. The British were not going to adopt the M1 Garand. It didn't make sense on many levels.

The BAR was not officially issued to US troops until 1938 and no new ones were produced after WWI. They had just over 100,000 available and 208,000 made during the war. The US relied on marksmanship and maneuver rather than sustained fire so no LMG.

The kill chain in WWII for mortar fire was only a few minutes before being bracketed by mortars. Maneuver is life.

However, the Marines and Army had the water cooled Browning's for defense and sustained fire. These were used in Guadalcanal by Mitchel Paige and John Basilone to stop Banzai charges.

BAR shortage in NWE: Yes, as far as I could find the Army was short of almost everything after Normandy.

BAR's as 3 light support weapons is a massive overkill The Japanese would concur.

Wolfhag

Dal, did the mag block your vision when firing the Bren?

No mate, but I only live fired on the range, and only used the sights with live ammo. On EX it was point in the right direction and let the blanks make noise. (BTW, the blanks barrel made the Bren slightly more nose heavy.)

The offset sights were at roughly the same level above the receiver group and barrel as a rifle's sights, so even with the bipod down, not much more exposed than riflemen (but "not much" can be enough). The only time the No 1 and no 2 were significantly more exposed would be when changing mags (which was done by the gunner- the No 2 was using spray and pray while the Bren wasn't firing) and barrels, because movement draws the eyes. I don't remember the mag being particularly easy to see in the scrub, but I don't remember looking for it, either.

Does comparing individual weapons really matter in the big picture?

As troopwo pointed out, and you already know, training and experience are far more important, mate.

Muzzle velocities, cyclic rates and what sort of wood was used for making the butt are just amusements for rivet counters. You could probably say the same for the beaten zone, first graze, first catch and culminating point data, because it was all measured on a proof and testing range, under perfect conditions- not out in the scrub with soldiers who are tired, irritable, hungry and have more important things on their minds than creating a perfect dangerous space- like not bleeding. What matters when you're carrying the weapon is the weight and balance (the Bren is a kg or so lighter than an M60, but much more tiring to patrol with because of the muzzle to butt imbalance), keeping the ammo and weapon clean and functional, and how long before we can stop for a breather, hot brew and/or smoke?

I'm sure everyone here is familiar already, but Forgotten Weapons has a series on the Bren:

youtu.be/ArsBC8HWiOs

And also the contemporary Army film on its new weapon.

YouTube link

The film also includes footage of the tripod mount (mentioned above), for fixed lines firing, the Motley mount (for AA) and demonstrates the barrel change, which could be effected in around 10 seconds and required no tools.

Gary

which could be effected in around 10 seconds and required no tools.

Interesting video, Starfury. I think I've seen it before, we did a refresher when the the Brens came out of storage. The barrel bag included leather gloves to allow the hot barrel to be pulled out of the receiver. Most of the time, though, the bush hat was used for that.

Good video, some points:

Normal rate-of-fire: One magazine per minute (x30 rounds)
Super rate-of-fire: Four magazines per minute (x120 rnds)
Expected to be able to single-shot (to disguise the fact it is an LMG)

Normal section scale: x24 Bren magazines (x720 rnds)
Rifleman scale: x50 rounds. (plus some of the bren mags)

Meant to be used on a bipod out to 1,000 yards.
(No 4 rifle flip-battle-sight appears to be 400 yds/600 yds)

---

Comparison with 1980s:

Riflemen carry 60 rnds (SLR mag x3), plus 50 rnds link each
Can't remember the scale for the GPMG

- GPMG (heavy role) out to 1,200m
- GPMG (light role) out to 800m
- Section SLR fire to 600m
- Individual SLR fire to 400m
- SLR Battle sight to 300m

GPMGers were also expected to be able to single, or double shot.

---

It ought be noted that British practice was for soldiers to only fire(*) when under fire control of their leaders (bren gun group = lance corporal, section rifle squad = corporal, platoon hq = platoon sergeant). From memory: Firing group, Range to target, Target indication, Type and quantity of fire, FIRE!

(*) Not at CQB obviously

Interesting, stoppage's comments post does to some extent raise an issue on Bren vs Bar at a "wargames" level and the real world. In the real worlds as far as I can ascertain the Squad carried 2 Bren Mags each. Presumably like backpackers there is a weight limit that you can usefully operate. Contributing to that limit is the Bren mags. If I now gave the squad 2 or even 3 Bren guns they would have the same amount of ammo available, in the offensive role, in the defense ammunition could be stockpiled. so you would in many cases not get the equivalent of 3 Bren guns firepwoer.

So the question is If the marines could have 3 BAR's, presumably they don't carry 3 times more ammunitions? So are the 3 BAR's carried for use only for more firepower in very short periods and special scenarios, otherwise do they run out of ammunition very quickly. Or does 3 BAR's equal, roughly, the max fire rate of a single Bren?

The Brits could probably not carry 6 Bren mags each so giving them 3 Bren's most of the time would mean little as expenditure rate of 3 times higher would be impractical. Or is it that 3 BAR's gets them to Bren fire rates so then they are comparable.
Not really clear in my own mind how you resolve this issue. A quad 209mm is used against aircraft as the bursts are very short and rate oif fire is everything. With a light support weapon, the limitations are less obvious.

In the actual real world, where Rifle Sections had one Bren gun as per their WE and AFG1098, said gun came with 25 magazines. The distribution of these across the Section varied for the early years of the war, and was based initially on a Section of eight men. Three LMG magazines per man was regarded as the maximum (Inf Sec Leading 1938). By 1944 with a ten man Section (assumed to be at full strength) was four per man of the Gun Group (three ORs) and two per man of the Rifle Group (six ORs), plus one for the gun (Inf Trg Part VIII 1944). If the Section was understrength it would have to be decided whether to have more mags per man or fewer mags per gun, dependent on the situation. Have to dig my copy out but I think the 1950 manual specified fewer mags, but was based on Sections varying from seven ORs to 11 ORs, based on their being on Lower or Higher Establishment.

The US Army, having one BAR per Squad, as detailed in its T/O, its T/E, its Field Manuals (FM 7-10 of 1942, 1944, 1949), is less helpful in giving the ammunition allotment and magazine dispersal across the Squad. In Ref Data Inf Regt (1943), the US Army School of Infantry outlines 380 rounds for the solitary BAR in each Rifle Squad, with five magazines for the AR man, and seven each for the Asst AR and the Amn Bearer. I've not seen anything on the subject in FMs.

The USMC issued three Manuals on the Rifle Squad adopted in March 1944, which, unlike the US Army, subdivided the Squad into three identical Fire Teams, each with one BAR, meaning that the USMC Squad had three BARs as part of its T/O and T/E, giving a USMC Rifle Squad three times as many BARs as a US Army Rifle Squad.

I've not seen the first Rifle Squad manual but the 2nd Edition of MCS 3-26 of 1945 specified FT members as carrying; FT leader, cartridge belt, machete, compass entrenching tool – AR man, AR belt and nine magazines, plus spares kit and E/Tool – Asst AR man, cartridge belt, two AR bandoliers with total eight mags, plus E/Tool – Rifleman, cartridge belt and E/Tool.

This loading was modified in MCS 3-3 of March 1945 to add four mags to the Asst AR man, with a note that these could be added to the load of the FT leader and Rifleman; these two men also had an M7 launcher allotted for the M1 rifle they carried. The Squad Leader had an M1 Carbine with five magazines plus a bundle of NCO kit. That makes 17 BAR mags under MCS 3-26, increased to 21 with MCS 3-3

I have not seen a definitive list of what ancillary equipment came with each BAR; the Landing Party Manual of 1950 shows 13 mags per AR man and 12 per Asst AR man but that manual is for the US Navy acting as a Landing Party so might not reflect USMC practice.

Gary

Thanks for that, Gary. Interesting to see the change in thinking, over the decades. In my time all the mag's were carried in the gun group, though sometimes there'd be a couple in the secco's pack for a post-contact re-sup. Having them spread from ahole to breakfast did nobody any good, as it would be difficult, at best, to get them to the gunner if they were needed. I'm assuming that the mag's carried by the rifles were given to the gun group during a re-org?

The 2IC also carried some loose rounds in his pack, to refill some mag's when the gun group could. I can't remember how many, certainly not more than two or three mag's worth.

I tended to compare the Bren to the Air Cooled 30 Cal. I never knew anyone had a comparable weapon to the BAR. A genre onto itself.

Again concur with Dal.
Still using the Brens in the Canadian Army reserves right to the end of the sixties.

In theory everyone carried one or two mags for it.
In reality the Bren group tended to be the Bren Gunner, an experienced infantryman/section second in command and most often the youngest recruit/flunky who carried an impressive load of twenty plus odd mags on his muscle-less body. Had to built up his strength somehow, so might as well load him down with half the sections mags or more right?

My friends arms still ache thinking about his mis-spent youth.

Forget the idea of a number one or two on the gun. It was the gunner himself alone who would swear at anyone else to keep out of his way and stop slowing him down.

An unusual feature of the Bren was that it could actually be quite accurate at range if needed. Additionally, as mentioned the beaten zone was not much different than a rifle in being long and thin, really contradicting the idea of a machine gun and area fire.

What this meant was that in either a defensive position or a supporting over-watch position, it was far better at mid to long range than people expected. It could and did achieve quite the accurate results when given targets from 300 to even 800 meters, even from a bipod!

Maybe that explains the near emotional dependancy why so many loved this weapon in places like open desert or even from hill top to hill top in places like Italy and Korea.

Speaking of Korea, while official issue was one Bren per infantry section, as the war became static hill top defences, it was far more normal to see TWO brens per infantry section in the defence. This was near univesal between the UK, Canadians and I believe the Australians too from 'mid '51-'53. Not to mention all the Browning M1919s dismounted off vehicles or bought for a bottle of whiskey from an American, one M1919 for every platoon at least.

I think that the true difference between the two boils down to the fixed vs changeable barrel, the bipod being there or not and the effort put into giving accurate sights to what range.

The US chose portability, the UK went with sustainability.
Maybe an ovesimplification but apt.

From Chauchat and Lewis Gun the US Army wanted something of their very own, but absolutely reliable and portable.

Coming from the Hotchkis Portatif and the Lewis Gun, the UK liked the sustainability of fire but was still being haunted ever since the Boer war about accuracy and range. To this day, most Commonwealth units still ring out the words that "Only accurate fire is interesting".

Might be interesting to see if the USMC who were equally paranoid about rifle accuracy at range, was still testing light machine guns despite having the BAR forced on them?

Wolfhag, I was surprised to see you note the BAR for close(r) range work?!? Given the power, velocity and flat trajectory of the 30'06 round, it is something that given good sights, which I think the BAR had, and the steady footing of the bipod, was lost out on when so many troops removed the bipod. A lot of loss potential?

Mind being an nineteen year old rocking full auto bursts 30'06 out of a fifteen pound frame must have made aiming a nightmare.

Yes, Infantry Section Leading (1938) made specific reference to collecting full magazines from the riflemen to keep the LMG supplied, and the later war Inf Trg Memo No.4 on "Reorganization" underscored the point of collecting Bren mags for the consolidation phase of an attack.

I had a check back on a couple of points and Infantry Section Leading and Platoon Tactics (1950) did show a reduced number of Bren mags than the 1944 version, with just one per rifleman and four per Gun Group member. The Gun Group was still the 2-in-C and two gun numbers, while the Rifle group could range from seven to four men; the Lower Estab WE is a bit ambiguous on Sec org and the orderly and batman and third man for the 2-in mortar might have to be taken out of the Sec strengths.

Re actual BAR availability in NWE, Richard Anderson over on Axis History Forum cited a shortfall of circa 1000 BARs in the ETO post Normandy, against basic T/O strength and reserve. This was deficit was just being filled when there were further loses in the Ardennes. I can only recall seeing the BAR in the Rifle Coy T/O from July 1943 onwards, as far as the US Inf Div was concerned, so there was no obvious source where additional weapons could be liberated from. By comparison there were about 1200 Bren guns distributed throughout the Arms and Services of the typical Br Inf Div of 1944.

Gary

Good stuff Star Fury,
Yes, I think with the Marines from the Marianas on had an "official" AAR as I met one. He said he would also carry and fire the BAR so they may have switched off.

They may have made it official as I'm sure someone needed to help the BAR guy collect up and reload magazines, act as a spotter, etc. Officially the AAR was issued an M1 Carbine. The new TO&E supposedly gave each Team Leader a grenade launcher for his M1 Garand. M1 Carbines could also have grenade launchers too.

I have bandoliers for my M1. If I needed to I could easily carry four of them, two on each side. Depending on what else I had.

During VN the Marines did have an 1x AR (no AAR) in each fire team with an M16 and a cheap clip on bipod which would normally get lost and he was the only one that was supposed to fire automatic. Guess how well that worked out?

From what I can find the US did not attempt to develop a squad LMG between WWI and WWII. Probably because they had the M1919. Later in the war they had the M1919A4 with a shoulder stock and bipod that could function as a sustained fire LMG but with 3 crewman and advance with the rest of the squad.

The Marines appear to have used the M1 Garand first at Bougainville. At Guadalcanal they had M1903s and BAR.

You want a US sustained fire LMG? Here you go:
youtu.be/YgecTgbz3ik

Interesting but different discussion so I'll start a new one about ammo loadouts.

Side note: Can everyone read UshChas last post. It appears our brother UshCha got an early Christmas present of a spell checker. <grin>

Wolfhag

@troopwo
Might be interesting to see if the USMC who were equally paranoid about rifle accuracy at range, was still testing light machine guns despite having the BAR forced on them?

As I recall the USMC kept the Johnson LMG – which was a true LMG; very Bren-like actually – all through Guadalcanal, at least.

Was the Johnson LMG by choice of picking it? or by default of not being able to give them to the Dutch East Indies?

The BAR and the idea of walking fire must have been galling to traditional marine rifle fire practices.

I think the last thing I'll add is that for the US Army, the major pre-war decision was the adoption of the M1 rifle, not the retention of the BAR. It signalled the shift from a base of fire at Sec/Sqd level, provided by a single machine gun (of whatever type) seen everywhere else to a similar degree of fire generated by a Rifle Squad using only rifles. The 1940 US Rifle Platoon was based on three Squads of 12, all armed with M1s. It was up to the riflemen, under the direction of the Squad leader, to produce and distribute the necessary fire to overcome the enemy. The BAR Squad was something of an afterthought, and allowed the retention of a fully automatic weapon under Platoon control, without the logistical requirements of a belt-fed M1919.

Post 1918 there seems to have been a real desire to restore infantry mobility by introducing lighter mortars and MGs that would not slow an infantry advance to the speed of manhandled Maxim type guns. The M1 fitted that image perfectly, the barrage of fire that 30 some rifles could create with a Platoon firing as one would be damn impressive. When the BAR Squad gets deleted in the major reorg of 1942 though, the BARs were kept and merged into the Rifle Squads, which ends the idea of Rifle Squads armed with just rifles, and re-tasks certain of the existing riflemen to serve the BAR. I can't help but feel that shoehorning the BAR into the M1 armed Rifle Squad was the most acceptable compromise aimed at keeping the M1 the predominant weapon, while admitting the Squad did need a proper automatic weapon in its ranks and the BAR filled that gap.

I did look in vain online for a contemporary US Army video showing Rifle Platoon or Company deployment in the attack (and in so doing got an idea of the absolute carnage that 'AI generated content' will wreak on military history) but could only find 1960s era.

I remain of the school that says you cannot directly compare the Bren with the BAR as they were two different tools, built for two different functions and used in different ways by two different Armies (that don't really understand how the other one works).

Gary

@troopwo

As I understand it from what I've read, Forgotten Weapons video, etc., they wanted an LMG, the Johnson's got left at the docks and they said "we'll take them!" happily.

Did they want an LMG because they didn't LIKE the BAR? No idea.

The Johnson LMG was on the T/O for both the Marine Raider Regiment (1943 org) and the Marine Parachute Battalions, later Regiment.

The Marine Raider Regiment T/O for Feb 1943 had six Johnson LMGs per Rifle Company, held in the Weapons Platoon, with two BARs per Rifle Squad. HQ Company had eight M1919A4s as a pool. This was not the more often quoted organisation used under the Sep 1942 T/Os.

Marine Parachute Battalions and the later Regiment had nine Johnson LMGs per Para Platoon, three in each Squad, and six more with the Battalion Demolition Platoon. The Regimental Weapons Company had 12 M1919A4s, in three Platoons, with an equal number of M1917A1s as substitute.

Gary

That's a lot of Johnsosns.

,,,yuck, yuck. yuck,,,

Seriously, that is a lot. Did the para battalion have BARs too or just Johnsons in the squads?

The Johnson had some good points. It appears that if moving through thick underbrush and jungle you'd need to remove the magazine as it would get hung up too much.

The Para Marines performed poorly at Bloody Ridge. The Marines' didn't like "elite" units. They eventually disbanded the Para and Raider units as cadre for the 5th and 6th Marine Division that were being formed up for the invasion of Iwo Jima. When they disbanded they got rid of the Johnsons.

From my point of view: The key aspect and advantage of the 3x Fire Team Marine Rifle Squad was tactical Fire & Maneuver in the assault on a single objective, ideally with Combat Engineer attachments.

F&M: Two teams laid down cover fire while one did a 5 yard rush, hit the deck, rolled to the left or right and started shooting, even if you didn't see a target fire into your assigned sector. The Squad Leader would then give a signal for the next team to rush. Rise and repeat.

In the final assault you generally had three options if the enemy was still resisting:

1- Generally used against pill boxes: Have all three teams suppress while your maneuver assault element flanks and gets into place. The assault element signals (maybe by tossing a smoke grenade on the target) they are ready to assault using flamethrower first and then the demo charge. The Squad Leader signals (maybe with a flare pistol) to lift fire allowing the assault team to do their job.

2- Generally used against trench lines. Fire & Maneuver to within grenade range. The Squad Leader signals for everyone to reload a fresh clip/mag while he tosses a few grenades into the trench for suppression. He then orders the final assault where all three teams raise up firing from the hip or shoulder walking at a brisk pace keeping aligned while shouting nasties at the enemy. We move through the enemy position and then assume a defense perimeter awaiting a counterattack. The Fire Team Leaders redistribute ammo equally between their guys. With luck, a couple of WP grenades tossed into the trench will make the defenders fall back before assaulting.

3- Used against any defense or if you can't flank: Fire & Maneuver as close as you can. Based on the Squad Leaders decision, one or more guys will attempt to get close enough to toss a demo charge or grenades or get something through the loophole or slit. He may try it himself.

This is how I trained using live fire. There is no way I wanted some guy with a LMG staying behind me and shooting me in the back as I zig zagged in front of him. I was scared enough after doing a rush that I'd get shot by the team next to me. I always hoped to be on a flank and not in the middle.

If your BARs are overheating from firing during F&M someone is doing something wrong. If getting too hot go to semi fire. When you are advancing you don't want anyone shooting behind you.

The Assistant BAR guy is armed with an M1 Carbine and does not really need to support the BAR gunner during the F&M or assault which should not take more than a few minutes or less.

My opinion: You don't need or want a sustained fire LMG firing behind you and it takes away guys needed in the F&M and assault. Especially in close terrain.

In VN getting hit in a close range ambush, fire from an M60 would be good suppressing the defenders while you got out of the kill zone or the rear team attempts to flank the enemy.

There are scenarios depending on the defense, terrain and distance you needed to F&M where an LMG would be used and needed. IIRC we never trained F&M coordinating with an M60.

Regarding Suppression: In real life defenders do not have to "Rally" as in a game. As soon as you stop shooting at them they'll pop up and start shooting back at you. Timing in the assault is vital.

When you lift suppressive fire the flamethrower guy should be in range (25 yards or less) to start firing and has about 10 seconds worth of flames. This gives the demo guy time to place the charge INSIDE the bunker/pill box.

If the flamethrower is by himself he can fire bursts while advancing and then stick he nozzle into a vent or slit.

Just firing a flamethrower at a bunker allows the defenders to go into another room or section to avoid it. You need to blow it.

A Japanese bunker may look like one structure but may actually be divided into three sections inside so may take multiple demo charges to destroy it.

Does this make sense?

Wolfhag

Having you base of fire at the same location the manouevre group moves off from,,,

,,,bad,,, bad,,, idea.

I wouldn't give a monkeys about what weapons my troops had been issued with as long as they were reliable and roughly equivalent to my enemy [e.g not muskets v's breech loaders] …]. I'd be more interested in how well they were trained to use them, how much ammunition we had, and all those real impact factors so ignored because you can't play the numbers game like, how tired, wet and hungry we were. Just saying

Re the Para Marine Company, their first T/O of Mar 1941 was quite conventional, having a Wpns Pl with three M1919A4s and three 60-mm mortars, and each Rifle Pl with three ten man Squads with two BARs apiece. The Johnson LMG appears in the Jan 1942 T/O, on a scale of three for the Wpns Pl and just one per Rifle Squad. There is a note that until the 'folding' LMG is available the M1919A4 would be subbed; the BAR isn't mentioned in this T/O. Also with this edition of the T/O, all personnel (except the USN Medical Det) are shown with the abomination that was the Reising SMG, with zero rifles. I know…

The Jul 1942 T/O is the most quoted, and quite mad, with all three Rifle Pls having three Squads each with three Johnson LMGs and ten Reisings. Substitute LMG is again the M1919A4 with authorised T/O being 27 LMGs per Company. Then the final Para T/O from Feb 1943 gives the Squad an extra man, with three each Johnson LMGs and Johnson rifles, and five SMGs. The only substitute weapon mentioned is the SMG for the Carbine where the latter was unavailable. No BARs detailed in the official org at least.

Just on the Marine Rifle Squad proper, when the Fire Team org was introduced in the Mar 1944 T/O, it did specify a Carbine for each Asst AR man, and the Squad leader, leaving a rifle for each Team leader and rifleman. This T/O was amended by Jul 1944, with the Asst AR man switching to a rifle, and also an increase in the Rifle Coy MG Pl (adding two men per Squad). I would suppose that while it increased the weight of the Asst AR man's load, arming a quarter of the Squad with Carbine proved to have a negative impact on their firepower.

Gary

It's slightly wandered off topic, but thanks everyone for contributing- I've learned quite a bit. Especially Gary and Wolfhag, reminding me, yet again, that just because us in Oz do it one way, that doesn't mean anyone else, let alone everyone else, does it the same. And troopwo for chiming in on how the Canadian did things- which let me know I'm not completely senile and remember some things correctly. I think.

Where was I?

IIRC we never trained F&M coordinating with an M60.

That surprises me. Most of our drills and our IMT doctrine was based on coordinating the assault group (rifle and scout-command group) with the gun group. The golden apple situation was to have the GPMG "firing the assault onto the enemy"- ie flank suppressing fire (ye olde enfilading fire from a defilade position was rarely achieved) until the assault reached a predetermined distance from the enemy possie or signalled. Then the gun would move the centre of fire away, wait to be called forward or advance (using "dry" -ie no firing- F&M), or stay ready in place in case of enemy counter.

That suppressing fire on the enemy position was where the Bren's tight cone of fire was a disadvantage, as it required walking the rounds backwards and forwards- not the easiest thing to do in thick scrub.

Dal,

"IIRC we never trained F&M coordinating with an M60.

That surprises me."
We're all speaking the same language here. The reason what Steve is saying sounds foreign to you is because the Marine Corps (US-type) doesn't put machine guns in the rifle squad or rifle platoon (though they can be attached), it puts them in the Weapons Platoon at Company level (and heavy machine guns such as the M-2 and Mk-19, in Weapons Company at Battalion level).

So in the offense you (typically) have a Battalion attack with a rifle company in assault, another (and majority of Wpns Co) in support, and the last in reserve. As we get nearer the objective the assault company has a rifle platoon in assault, another (with Wpns Plt) in support, and the last in reserve. Once the assault platoon has reached the last covered and concealed position before the objective AND the enemy is still defending the objective (hasn't withdrawn) then the assault platoon will have a squad in the assault, one in support, and one in reserve (and this is where the assault platoon's command element will signal the support elements to shift fire).

The assault squad may then, if the tactical situation warrants) devolve into fireteam fire and maneuver (two fireteams laying down fire while the third moves, controlled by the Squad Leader), and from there may even devolve down to what we call "individual rushes" or individual fire and maneuver (three Marines firing while one moves, controlled by the fireteam leader).

I would say that is standard battle drill and, of course, there are variations, such as platoon advance on line until they take fire then move to squad fire and maneuver, and I've even see an entire rifle company on line, "infiltrating" on a night attack, in training, back before widespread use of NVGs were a thing.

In any case, to tie it back together, my point was that once you're down to platoon level, doing squad then fireteam then individual fire and maneuver (which is what the riflemen tend to spend a tremendous amount of time practicing, because that's what happens in the last 50 yards and it's the hard part), then they are relying only on their own organic weapons (BARs/SAWs, depending on era), the MGs are now in a different fight (as you mentioned, displacing forward or working to isolate the objective by fire).

V/R,
Jack

Thanks for the detailed explanation, Jack. It helps me to understand a bit better. Just to avoid a little confusion, though, I was explaining how a section/squad assault would take place. At platoon and higher then the gun group was just a third manoeuvre group, the same as you describe above. A battalion assault was similar to what you describe- Support Company supporting with 81mm mortars, 106mm M40, SFMG and Pioneer Platoon. Rifle companies two up and two back, platoons two up and one back in each company. We advanced in extended line until effective fire cames in, when F&M started, with the platoon commander controlling F&M by sections.

F&M with the Bren was a slog- getting the muzzle up became noticeably harder after a few ups and downs, whereas the M60 sat on the right basic pouch, happily level. :-). We won't mention the MAG-58, the army's finger-print remover…

These days the sections have gone to the fireteams/squad concept, using two teams of four diggers, with two Minimi ("Fd-89" in RAR speak). There was a push to bring back the MAG-58 at section level, but I don't know what became of that.

I'm no expert . . .

A couple of things I thought worth noting:

I think it was the Osprey on the M3?/M5 halftrack that mentioned armoured infantry swapping their tankers' jackets for BARs from the regular infantry, as they didn't have them. So they obviously thought a BAR was better than no BAR. However some infantrymen seem to have thought getting a good jacket was worth handing over a BAR – presumably from stores, not their actual squad weapon.

I note that the Airborne and Ranger formations (new, rather than having a continuity from WWI) (as far as I know from TOEs I've seen) decided to use the M1919 modified for a bipod as their squad weapon. What was the thinking there? To me, looking from the outside, it could be that they decided they had the opportunity so started with a clean slate – not that there MG was new, but incorporating it at squad level was seen as something worth doing.

This thread begins with a comparison between the BAR and the Bren, but very rapidly becomes a comparison between the USMC squad and a standard British squad. that's not the same thing. So much is different (and addressed on in this thread). Doctrine, actual vs theoretical strength, actual vs theoretical allocation. All important but not the same as a direct comparison between the weapons.

Cheers,
John

None of those US Company organisations that had the M1919A4 in their Rifle Platoons had a distinct Weapons Platoon; Armored, Parachute and Ranger Companies all had the LMGs and 60-mm mortars that would be in the Weapons Platoon in the standard Rifle Company integrated into their Rifle Platoons instead.

Seems like that was the distinction, as to whether your Company got the BAR for Rifle Squads on its T/O. Without Company level belt-fed MGs, the Platoons or Squads have to haul M1919A4s, and the necessity for Squad BARs seems to go. Then by 1945 they creep back into the Armored Rifle Company and the late war Parachute Company, even though they keep their LMGs, which by now are supposed to be M1919A6s (I've never seen an indication of how many of those got to units, though they appeared on a lot of T/Es).

Gary

I believe I read/heard somewhere that the BAR was considered to be to heavy for a trooper to jump with, and if you're going to have to drop an MG separately, might as well be the M1919.

I dk if/how that evolved in the latter part of the war.

The U.S. armored infantry is a tough nut to crack. I emailed briefly with the historian Harry Yeide about it a couple of decades ago and he confirmed that, even in the archives he had access to there wasn't a ton of info on actual tactical operations. I mean, you assume that the rifle squads dismounted the .30 and used that as their SAW since they didn't have a BAR and the HTs didn't do much directly in the line of fire. But it's hard to confirm.

I have an (Osprey ?) book about it from 2013 I think, and that author says that the FM for armored infantry (which I also have) was based mostly on theory, not actual confirmed tactics.

Interesting stuff.

Bayonet Strength PDF link says of the US Airborne:

"Headquarters Company had one .30-cal Machine Gun Platoon (with 8 M1919A4 light machine guns) and one 81mm Mortar Platoon (with four such weapons). Each Rifle Company had three Rifle Platoons, each with a 60mm Mortar Squad and two Rifle Squads. The Mortar Squad had a singe 60-mm weapon and each Rifle Squad had an M1919A4 light machine gun. Each Rifle Platoon also had a further two M1919A4s designated as being 'for optional use as directed." So that's 4 per platoon, or 12 per company. That's equivalent in numbers to 3 BARs in 3 platoons plus 3MGs in the Machine Gun Squad of a Weapons Platoon.

Note that the M1919A4 (tripod – not really an LMG) was replaced at some point (late 44 or early 45) by the M1919A6 (bipod) in the rifle companies, which, while a bit heavier, was perhaps more convenient and fired from a lower profile.

It's interesting that the BAR was introduced into the Airborne at the end of 1944, when they were mostly being used as land based infantry (but was it implemented before Operation Varsity?). Maybe that ties in with dalem17's recollection. Also though, the document at Bayonet Strength notes that "Personal accounts show that the BAR was used by at least some Parachute units during the campaign in European before they showed up n the Table of Organization", so maybe they were scrounged on an ad hoc basis.

Cheers,
John