"How much fun is it being crushed? (Valencia, 1811)" Topic

Some players revel in fighting one-sided battles with rubbish armies that are doomed to be crushed. Others of us are less keen … you do need a certain masochistic streak to enjoy commanding the Spanish outside Valencia in 1811, during the Peninsular War. I've fought it as both sides and can confirm it's a lot of fun either way.

What's your preference? Do you share a taste for being the underdog and taking a kicking? Do you think uneven scenarios where one side is bound to lose in "real-world" terms, whatever the scenario victory conditions say, are not worth playing?

I'd love to hear others' thoughts on this. Meanwhile, the report of the game that prompted my musings is on the BBBBlog here:
link

The Spanish army 'outside Valencia' was not a 'rubbish army'. It was a good army. The blame should be put on its commanders.

It is the typical contempt for (Napoleonic) Spanish armies based on old prejudices and lack of historical knowledge.

The real problem regarding Spanish armies was their commanders. They stupidly wasted dozens of good Spanish units.

At Sagunto and Valencia, Blake made many mistakes and his performance was poor. He led a good army to destruction.

I recommend the excellent books by Jose Luis Arcon Dominguez.

You are right, Ruchel, it was not a rubbish army. I have looked at Dr Mark Smith's scenario again and I see I misrepresented it, so I apologise to you, to Mark, and to many brave and competent Spanish soldiers.

Mark's a professional historian so I trust his characterisation of the Spanish army is fair:
"The Spanish were a mixed force including a few veteran troops and a mixture of trained units, recent recruits and a substantial force of civic militia and guerillas."

As against the French:
"The French were a veteran force and include shock cavalry."

I don't mind being the underdog if the victory conditions at least allow me a chance of pulling out a draw or even a minor victory. Since we use dice (for the most part) to adjudicate combat and morale, with good die rolling even a less than average army still has a chance.

Jim

It's all about scenario design. I have played Texans at the Alamo and it is one of my favorite gaming memories.

A lot depends on what you know and your attitude going in.

I'll take the Spanish every time.

Thanks for all the good points, guys.

ColCampbell: yes, the right mix of luck and skill is important in most wargames (I'm not a fan of chess), and especially so for the kind of game we're talking about here.

Extra Crispy: agreed. Indeed, the Alamo was in my mind as I wrote the post.

Korvessa: do you mean, eg, if a gamemaster springs some evil surprise, rather than you knowing up front that the script says your army loses?

79thPA: you are not alone!

Chris, you are a true gentleman. Your second post is a perfect example of how to address a posting controversy. Dear Editor should include that in the FAQ section under good posting manners or grace under fire.

ChrisBBB2,
" you think uneven scenarios where one side is bound to lose in "real-world" terms, whatever the scenario victory conditions say, are not worth playing?"

Well, you said it: easier victory conditions for the side with the worst troops or position is a mainstay of wargaming.

Ruchel,
"It is the typical contempt for (Napoleonic) Spanish armies based on old prejudices and lack of historical knowledge."

Ha! We just going to pretend now, are we?

The Battle of Talavera, 27 – 28 July 1809 by Lynn Bryant
27 Jul 2017 — "Nearly 2,000 ran off on the evening of the 27th… (not 100 yards from where I was standing) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack".

as attested to by more than one witness.

Thanks, RJ, you're very kind. I write a blog post nearly every week so I guess I'm bound to get it wrong occasionally. To keep readers (and myself) interested, I make a conscious effort to entertain as well as inform. Evidently my light-hearted caricaturing erred too much in the former direction. I don't mind being corrected and was happy to put the record straight.

Cacadoress: sure, it's a mainstay, but not every player enjoys it. It wasn't just some of the Spanish troops whose morale was fragile in our game on Monday – we had a mild player morale failure too!

The Battle of Talavera, 27 – 28 July 1809 by Lynn Bryant
27 Jul 2017 — "Nearly 2,000 ran off on the evening of the 27th… (not 100 yards from where I was standing) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack".

Primary Sources? (Please, not just British sources but Spanish and French ones too)

as attested to by more than one witness.

Yes, by British 'witnesses'.

We game historical battles. Lots of them are pretty one-sided. That's life. We don't tend to have nominated victory conditions, although players are told what they are trying to do. Afterwards, due acknowldgement is given to those who did better than their historical counterparts. Somehow we cope. I do, however, acknowledge that some battles are so one-sided that it would be pointless to game them, but that's because it's not worth spending many hours setting up a game and getting all the players over for something that will be over in a couple of hours.

I'll take the Spanish every time, also.

Low expectations by fellows, exceeded, means you get good rep. Take the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, and you get high expectations and harsh words at failure.

Give me the German Inferior Line or Spanish every time! I'll see what I can do!

ChrisBBB2,
"Cacadoress: sure, it's a mainstay, but not every player enjoys it."

True. Never understood that. It's usual attackers have more men and have to take the defender's ground while the defenders only have to maintain position. I remember one very experienced club wargamer, who told everyone that my offer to put on a game based upon the Battle of Oporto, 1809 was "stupid" because the attacking British had up to 27,000 men and the defenders only 13,000. I ignored him, and it was one of the best games we ever played. Because for most of the afternoon, aside from a flank attack, the British only had a handful of men on the table crossing a river-gorge and assaulting a seminary while the French got activated incrementally, matching the numbers. British victory meant stopping the French retreat while the French only had to hold onto the city. In the end it was a draw.

"It wasn't just some of the Spanish troops whose morale was fragile in our game on Monday – we had a mild player morale failure too!"

It's why having a brew on throughout, and a stash of Digestive biscuits ready for those double-one throws is so essential.

Q: DID SPANISH RUN AT TALAVERA?

Ruchel
"Nearly 2,000 ran off on the evening of the 27th… (not 100 yards from where I was standing) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack".
-'Primary Sources? (Please, not just British sources but Spanish and French ones too)'

"as attested to by more than one witness."
'Yes, by British 'witnesses'.

I don't know what you're talking about. I don't think anyone else knows what you're talking about. Georgian England had a free press and an absolutely free publishing industry, historical books from which are nowadays peer-reviewed. There was no propaganda sheet like the Ogre's "Monitor". Half the London chattering classes, most Whigs (including many officers) were Bonapartist, at least idealogically – with every reason to want to debunk Wellesley had he lied. The City of London aldermen, with spies in the Peninsula, even had a financial interest in doing Wellesley down yet never found impropriety to berate him with. Who would want to employ a liar? It could destroy a man.

Approximately a third of the Allied army would have witnessed the Spanish battalions run before being attacked. Any one of them could have debunked the claim when it appeared in newspapers. The French were not in the Allied rear to witness it. The Spanish are not known for reporting retreats. Officers also witnessed the Spanish General Cuesta send a troop of cavalry to deter them from looting the British baggage train.

____

Sources:

Jac Weller, Wellington in the Peninsular 1808-14 (London 1992), p 94.

Peter Edwards, Talavera, Wellington's Early Peninsular Victories 1808-9 (Marlborough, 2005), p 177.

Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War (London, 2003), p.204.

Wellington's Dispatches IV pp80 & 85.

David Gates: 'The Spanish Ulcer' (London 2002) p178

Oman, in his A History of the Peninsular War Vol. II., a synthesis of eyewitness accounts, adds that the regiments included the Leales de Fernando VII; ex-garrisons of Badajoz and Toledo. He adds in the main body of the text that Portago's troops cried 'Treason' before firing.

Longford, Sword op. cit., p193.

Andrew Field, Talavera: Wellington's First Victory in Spain.

Reports of the whole Spanish line firing at nothing:

Leith Hey, Memoirs of the late Lt-Gen. Sir James Leith, pp149.

Richard Holmes, Wellington, pp136.
_____

The questions you should kindly answer are these:

1) Name a single instance where Wellesley lied.

2) If Wellesley had lied about the Spanish in his dispatch, why would the Spanish Junta then appoint him Captain-General of the Spanish Army and supreme commander of the combined Spanish and allied armies… a mere twelve days later?

3) Name one instance when Oman ever misquoted an eyewitness.

4) Where was the Leales de Fernando VII on the 28th?

5) If "British" witnesses were so "prejudiced", why did they impartially report when British troops fell back, broke or ran in the same battle, for example in the British centre on the 28th and some of Hill's division on the 27th?

Take your time.

No hurry.

Cacadoress,

Your Oporto game sounds great. Your club comrade's sniffy comment is daft.

Tea and digestives are good for morale; a shot of something stronger, even better! I favour themed beverages: bourbon for ACW, Madeira for the Peninsular War, etc …

I don't know what you're talking about. I don't think anyone else knows what you're talking about. Georgian England had a free press and an absolutely free publishing industry, historical books from which are nowadays peer-reviewed. There was no propaganda sheet like the Ogre's "Monitor". Half the London chattering classes, most Whigs (including many officers) were Bonapartist, at least idealogically – with every reason to want to debunk Wellesley had he lied. The City of London aldermen, with spies in the Peninsula, even had a financial interest in doing Wellesley down yet never found impropriety to berate him with. Who would want to employ a liar? It could destroy a man.

Your first paragraph is irrelevant to this discussion. I am not interested in your manifesto about the ‘virtues' of British free speech.

Your compulsion to mythologize Wellesley is irrelevant too. It is your obsession, not mine.

This is a discussion on primary sources.

Approximately a third of the Allied army would have witnessed the Spanish battalions run before being attacked

Can you seriously believe that entire battalions ran at Talavera? Could those ‘witnesses' count each and every foot soldier who ran at Talavera?
No. It is an absurdity. Spanish archival sources amend this and they are mentioned bellow.

The Spanish are not known for reporting retreats

It is an example of historical ignorance. Again, the typical contempt and prejudice.

Spanish historical archives (in every town, in every village) are filled with documents and other primary sources: thousands of reports about retreats, defeats and victories. They show a substantial degree of self-criticism and accuracy.

Historical inquiry requires the use of every source from every involved nation, especially primary sources (archives). It is a must. Otherwise, your conclusions will be full of inaccuracies and bias.

Regarding your ‘sources', we do not find any Spanish primary sources (or secondary) and I cannot see any French ones either. So, you can only offer a one-sided version. So, again, the inevitable result is inaccuracy and bias.

Most of those historians you have mentioned never visited Spanish historical archives. They knew (and know) nothing about those primary sources, especially from little towns and villages such as Talavera.

I would like to offer you some Spanish primary sources on this topic (according to the Spanish historian Jose Manuel Rodriguez):

The Talavera Municipal Archive contains almost all the original reports about the foot soldiers who ran (on the 27th). These reports list by name the soldiers who ran from various regiments of the Vanguard, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and Reserve divisions. The total number of foot soldiers who ran at Talavera is 369 (by excess). A document dated August 2nd indicates that 7 soldiers from the Badajoz (3rd) regiment, 17 from the Osuna (3rd) regiment, and 1 grenadier from the Badajoz Provincial (Reserve) regiment were selected by lot for execution and subsequently executed. The other divisions had no soldiers selected by lot for execution. The archive's documentation also includes a list of the names of those executed.

I recommend you the following book:
Talavera 1809: la Batalla, la ciudad, sus gentes.
Luis Francisco Peñalver, Grupo de Investigacion Historica Bicentenario de la Batalla de Talavera. Ayuntamiento de Talavera de la Reina, 2009.

So, only 369 Spanish soldiers run at Talavera, not 2000. Your original question ‘Did Spanish run at Talavera?' is malicious and wrong. The right one is: Did SOME Spanish soldiers run at Talavera? The answer is yes, and some British soldiers ran at Talavera too.

The answers to your questions:

1) Name a single instance where Wellesley lied.

Whether Wellesley deliberately lied or not is irrelevant. Concerning the number of Spanish soldiers who ran at Talavera, his report contained inaccuracies and miscalculations.

2) If Wellesley had lied about the Spanish in his dispatch, why would the Spanish Junta then appoint him Captain-General of the Spanish Army and supreme commander of the combined Spanish and allied armies… a mere twelve days later?

The appointment had nothing to do with his reports' credibility. Reasons for this appointment include many political and financial problems the Junta had to deal with. There was a leadership crisis and there were internal rivalries (including the emerging struggle between liberals and conservatives). It was an alliance of convenience.

3) Name one instance when Oman ever misquoted an eyewitness.

Regarding Oman, the problem is not so much with those ‘quotes' but with the historical sources he deliberately ignored. He never used Spanish primary sources, especially from towns and villages archives. He could not read thousands of reports and documents from those archives. So, his works are outdated, incomplete, inaccurate and biased.

4) Where was the Leales de Fernando VII on the 28th?

In 2007 a group of Spanish historians discovered primary sources that confirmed an accurate Spanish order of battle. Previous ones were speculative.

Fourth Division. D. Rafael Manglano
- Second and third b. Regimiento de Irlanda (871) D. Bernardo Magenis y Ortiz
- Batallon reunido de suizos (995) D. Pedro Halleg
- Second and third b. Regimiento de Trujillo (?) D. Baltasar Retortillo
- Voluntarios Leales de Fernando VII (749) D. Juan Chacon

5) If "British" witnesses were so "prejudiced", why did they impartially report when British troops fell back, broke or ran in the same battle, for example in the British centre on the 28th and some of Hill's division on the 27th?

Yes, some British soldiers ran too. It is no novelty.
Can we conclude that the British army was a 'rubbish army'?

To summarize – Total Spanish army at Talavera: 23000 (approximately). Spanish foot soldiers who ran: 369, that is, 1.60 per cent of the total troops, a very small percentage.

So, the Spanish army was not a ‘rubbish army'.

Just curious: of the battles the Spanish army fought alone against the French, how many did they win, how many did they lose, and what were the odds in each case?

I repeat: the real problem regarding Spanish armies was their commanders. They stupidly wasted dozens of good Spanish units.

The Spanish army lost many big battles due to inept high-level commanders. Besides that, it won dozens of small battles and encounters, commanded by mid-ranking army officers.

OK, could you list a representative set of mid-sized actions, say 5,000-10,000 a side, with the results and odds in those?

Ruchel great postings, relying on anglophone sources only leads you into a cul de sac of national prejudices, you revealed this very well. Without the Spanish Wellington would not have fought the battle.

The following information has been extracted from Digby Smith's "The Napoleonic Wars Data Book". The list of Spanish Victories (excludes any actions involving Spanish allies, sieges, attempted storming or blockades of fortresses, drawn combats & actions around Bailen as the latter are well known) are shown below – I accept Digby Smith's listing may not be exhaustive e.g San Marcial but that is buried amongst action on the Bidassao.

4 June 1808 – Skirmish at El Bruch – French 3,247 men & 4 guns versus Spanish initially home guard of Manresa reinforced by others
15 June 1808 – clash at El Bruch Pass – Franco- Allied force-3,600 men plus 1 foot artillery battery versus Spanish somatenes of Upper Llobregat region & 400 regulars from Lleida (some thousands in total)
28 June 1808 – clash at Valencia – Franco Allied force -47 battalions (24,900 inf), 12 squadrons (2,850 cav, 48 guns (6 foot artillery batteries, 2 horse artillery batteries 1.250 men) versus Spanish 1,500 regulars, 6,500 new levies, 12,000 armed citizens
5 November 1808 – clash at Valmaseda – French 12 battalions & 2 foot artillery batteries (circa 12,000 men) versus Spanish circa 24,000 men & 38 guns
19 May 1809 – failed raid on Monzon – French circa 1,100 men versus armed peasants & some Catalan miqueletes
22 May 1809 – clash at Santiago de Compestela – French 4 battalions, ?? chasseurs a cheval & 6 guns (circa 3,600 men) versus 2,000 men plus 9 guns and 10,000 guerillas (only 7,000 armed)
23 May 1809 – battle of Alcañiz – French 14 battalions (7,292 men), 6 squadrons (526 men) & 18 guns (3 foot artillery batteries) versus Spanish 15 2/3 battalions (8,101 men), 3 squadrons (445 men) & 19 guns
18 October 1809 – battle of Tamames – French 22 battalions, 16 squadrons, 30 guns (circa 11,000 men) versus Spanish about 20,000 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, 5 batteries (30 guns)
21 January 1810 – clashes at Granollers, Mollet & Sta Perpetua – Franco-Italians circa 4,300 men & 6 guns versus Spanish circa 7,000 men
21 march to 5 April 1810 – clashes at Manresa – Confederation of the Rhine 4 battalions (circa 3,000 men) versus Spanish circa 3,000 Miqueletes, local Somatenes circa 2,300 men & 2,000 regulars (in total circa 7,300 men)
15 January 1811 – clash at L'Illa – Italians circa 6,000 men versus Spanish 3,000 infantry & 800 cavalry
23 June 1811 – clash at Cogorderos (French call this action Quintanilla de Valle) – French 6 battalions (circa 1,500 men) versus Spanish (circa 2,000 men)
16 January 1812 – clash at Alicante – French 9 battalions (4,000 men), 8 cavalry regiments (1,500 men), 6 guns versus Spanish circa 6,300 men (mix of infantry & cavalry & 2 horse artillery batteries)
18 January 1812 – skirmish at Col de Balaguer – French 1 battalion & 1 Dragoon troop (circa 850 men) versus Spanish circa 4,000 men & 2 guns, 250 cavalry
5 March 1812 – clash at Roda – Franco-Italians (4 battalions – circa 3,000 men) versus Spanish circa 3,000 men
9 April 1812 – ambush at Puerto de Araban – Franco-Poles 2 battalions (plus sick, civilians, baggage & supplies – circa 2,000 men in the escort) versus Spanish 3-4,000 guerillas
14 April 1812 – clash at Alhourin – French 6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 2 guns (circa 3,000 men) versus Spanish mix of regulars & guerillas (composition & numbers not known)
5 February 1813 – clash at Tiebas – French 8 battalions (circa 3,000 men) 150 cavalry versus Spanish 4 battalions guerillas (circa 2,800 men)
31 March 1813 – clash at Lerin – French 2 battalions (circa 1,500 men) versus Spanish 2 battalions guerillas & 250 lancers (circa 2,100 men)

I would like to add some more examples of Spanish victories:

24 March 1809 – clash at Los Yebenes – Polish lancers (600) versus Spanish cavalry (550)
7/9 June 1809 – Battle of Puente Sampayo – French (11000) versus Spanish (12000)
23 November 1809 – Battle of El Carpio – French (12000) versus Spanish (19000)
25 May 1811 – 1st clash at Arlaban – French (1700) versus Spanish (3000/4000)
30 November 1811 – clash at Osonilla – French (1100) versus Spanish (3200)
11 January 1812 – clash at Rocaforte – French (2500) versus Spanish (3000)
25 August 1812 – clash at Utiel (Tollo) – French (1500) versus Spanish (3500)
26 March 1813 – clash at Orgaz – French (900) versus Spanish (500)

Ruchel,

Well done +1

Ian

Impressive. Did they lose any?

Will produce a list again using Digby Smith's book on Spanish losses where they had a numerical advantage again omitting the categories specified in my earlier posting. However this may not be posted until next week as many entries to review!

Impressive. Did they lose any?

Yes, they lost many battles and small encounters too. It was a long war.

The Spanish army did the best it could, especially taking into account the ineptitude of its senior commanders, the financial problems and the political chaos caused by the French invasion.

Despite suffering many defeats, the Spanish army, as a whole, never surrendered, and it kept fighting until the end of the war.

Thanks, Prince of Essling. Looking forward to seeing more great data when you get the chance.

The following information has in the main been extracted from Digby Smith's "The Napoleonic Wars Data Book" and shows French & Franco-allied victories against Spanish only – it excludes, sieges, storming of towns etc.

For the battle of Medina Rio Seco (14 July 1808), I have used a couple of other sources as numbers in the Data Book seemed incorrect. I have also drawn on other sources for the battle of Saguntum (25 October 1811) as surprisingly there is no entry in the Data Book!!!! The latter does make me wonder what else may be missing from the book……

14 June 1808 – skirmish at Rio Cabriel – French Moncey's corps (only advance guard engaged – details not known versus Spanish 1 Swiss battalion, 500 armed peasants & 4 guns (circa 1,100 men)
23/24 June 1808 – clash at Épila – Franco-Polish 2 battalions Vistula Legion 1 battalion Legion de Reserve, 1 squadron Vistula Legion, 4 guns (circa 2,500 men) versus Spanish 550 regular deserters from captured/disbanded regiments, 350 dragoons, 80armed capuchin monks, gang of mounted smugglers & over 1,000 volunteers (mainly unarmed) (circa 2,200 men)
12 July 1808 – clash at Valladolid (Cabezon) – French 10 battalions & 2 companies of infantry, 7 squadrons, 18 guns (2 foot artillery batteries & 1 horse artillery battery) versus Spanish 4-5000 volunteers from Valladolid area, 400 cavalry & 4 guns
14 July 1808 – battle of Medina del Rioseco – French – 22 battalions (circa 11,800 men), 9 squadrons (circa 1,150 men), 32 guns versus Spanish 32 battalions (circa 21,000 men), 6 ½ squadrons (circa 600 men), 20 guns)
30 October 1808 – clash at Zornoza (now Amorebieta) – Franco-Allied 32 battalions (21,324 men), 6 foot artillery batteries (36 guns) versus Spanish 34 battalions, 6 guns (18,247 men)
10 November 1808 – clash at Gamonal – French 13 battalions, 18 squadrons, 24 guns (circa 14,000 men) versus Spanish 10 battalions, 4 squadrons, 16 guns (circa 11,000 men)
10/11 November 1808 – clash at Espinosa de los Monteros – French 34 battalions (circa 21,000 men), 36 guns (6 foot artillery batteries) versus Spanish ?? men 6 guns
23 November 1909 – battle of Tudela – French 32 battalions, 20 squadrons 48 guns (circa 31,000 men) versus Spanish 17,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry & 36 guns
30 November 1808 – clash at Somosierra – Franco-Allied 10 battalions, 8 squadrons, 12 guns (circa 11,000 men) versus Spanish 13 battalions, 4 squadrons, 16 guns (circa 7,800 men)
16 December 1808 – battle of Cardedeu – Frenco-Allied 23 battalions, 8 squadrons, 30 guns (5 batteries) versus Spanish 18 battalions (12 were new levies), 4 squadrons, 7 guns (circa 9,000 men including 600 cavalry)
21 December 1808 – battle of Molins del Rey – Franco-Allied 29 battalions, 8 squadrons, 48 guns (circa 18,000 men) versus Spanish 18 battalions, 4 squadrons (circa 7,600 men including 400 cavalry)
30 December 1808 – clash at Mansilla de las Mulas – Franco-Allied 4 cavalry regiments (circa 2,200 men) versus Spanish 7 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 company sappers, 2 guns (circa 3,000 men)

2 January 1809 – skirmish at Fonce Badon – French 15 squadrons (circa 650 men (number of men seems on the low side for the total number of squadrons) versus Spanish (circa 2,000 infantry)
13 January 1809 – battle of Ucles – Franco-Allied 21 battalions, 36 squadrons, 48 guns (circa 12,000 infantry & 3,500 cavalry) versus Spanish 25 battalions (9,771 infantry), 1,814 cavalry, 769 artillery men & sappers, 5 guns
17 February 1809 – clash at Capellades – Franco-Swiss 6 battalions, 12 guns (circa 4,000 men) versus Spanish 5 battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 6 guns
18 February 1809 – Franco-Allied 19 battalions, 24 guns (circa 10,300 men) versus Spanish 5 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 guns (circa 3,800 men)
19 February 1809 – clash at San Magin – Franco-Italian 13 battalions, 12 guns (circa 7,200 men) versus Spanish 2 battalions (circa 1,200 men)
25 February 18019 – battle of Valls – Franco-Italian 23 battalions, 20 squadrons (circa 13.000 men) versus Spanish 13 battalions (12,780 men), 6 squadrons (700 men), 8 guns
6 March 1809 – clash at La Treppa – Franco-Allied 16 squadrons versus Spanish (circa 1,200 men from 7 infantry regiments)
17 Match 1809 – clash at Mesa de Ibor – Franco-Allied 9 battalions (circa 3,000 men) versus Spanish 7 regiments old regular army & 2 regiments of new levies/militia, 6 guns (circa 5,000 men)
27 March 1809 – clash at Cuidad Real – Franco-Allied 32 squadrons (circa 3,500 men) versus Spanish (circa 10,000 infantry & 2,500 cavalry)
29 March 1809 – battle of Medellin – Franco-Allied 16 battalions, 1 company, 32 squadrons, 30 guns (3 foot artillery batteries & 1 horse artillery battery)(circa 17,000 men) versus Spanish 27 battalions (circa 20,0000 men), 9 weak cavalry regiments(circa 3,000 men) 30 guns
19 May 1809 – clash at Gallegos = French 12 battalions, 6 squadrons, 8 guns (2 foot artillery batteries) (circa 7,800 men) versus Spanish 2 battalions (circa 1,500 men)
19 May 1809 = clash at Pajares – Fenco-Polish 18 battalions, 2 Dragoon Regiments, 12 guns (circa 12,500 men) versus Spanish 3,000 men 2 guns
15-16 June 1809 – battle of Maria de Huerve – Franco-Polish 16 battalions (10,000 men), 6 squadrons (800 men), 12 guns versus Spanish 14,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 18 guns
18 June 1809 – clash at Belchite – Franco-Polish 21 battalions (12,000 men), 10 squadrons (1,000 men), 12 guns versus Spanish 11,000 infantry, 870 cavalry, 9 guns
8 August 1809 – clash at Arzobispo – French6 battalions, 12 squadrons, 6 guns (circa 4,000 men) versus Spanish 3 battalions, 6 squadrons, 16 guns (circa 2,500 men)
11 August 1809 – battle of Almonacid – Franco-Allied 39 battalions (16,000 men), 40 squadrons (2,200 men) 48 guns versus Spanish 38 battalions, 32 squadrons, 40 guns (circa 23,000 men)
18-19 November 1809 – battle of Ocaña -Franco-Allied 24,0000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 50guns versus Spanish 59 battalions (49,939 men), ? squadrons (5,000 men) 60 guns (1,500 men)
26 November 1809 – clash at Alba de Tormes – French 24 squadrons, 12 guns (circa 3,000 men) versus Spanish 41 battalions (21,300 infantry), ?? squadrons (1,500 men), 18 guns

20 February 1810 – clash at Vic – Franco-Italian 10 battalions (4,000 men), 1,500 cavalry, 12 guns (2 foot artillery batteries) versus Spanish 10 to 11,000 men (including 500 cavalry)
23 April 1810 – clash at Margalef – Franco-Polish 8 battalions (5,500 men) 500 cavalry versus Spanish 7,000 infantry, 300 cavalry, 6 guns
11 August 1810 – clash at Villagarcia – French 12 battalions (7,000 men), 8 squadrons (1,200 men), 30 guns versus Spanish 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 18 guns
4 November 1810 – clash at Baza – Franco-Polish 1,300 cavalry versus Spanish 8,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 12 guns

19 February 1811 – battle of Rio Gebora – Franco-Spanish 4,500 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, 12 guns versus Spanish 12,480 infantry, 2,600 cavalry, 17 guns
3 May 1811 – clash at Figueras – French 21 battalions, 3 squadrons (circa 20,000 men) versus Spanish 6,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, circa 2,000 miqueletes
9 August 1811 – clash at Zujac – French 10 battalions (circa 8,000 men) versus Spanish (number not known)
25 October 1811 – battle of Sagunto – Franco-Allied 24 battalions, 11 ½ squadrons, 12 guns versus Spanish 48 battalions, 26 squadrons, 30 guns
5 November 1811 – clash at Bornos – Franco-Spanish circa 2,300 men versus Spanish (not known)

24 January 1812 – clash at Altafalla – Franco-Allied 8 battalions 3 companies Partisans (circa 8,000 men) versus Spanish circa 4,000 infantry, 250 cavalry, 2 guns
1 June 1812 – clash at Cadiz – French 5 battalions, 1 cavalry regiment (circa 4,500 men) versus Spanish 8.500 men (exact details not known)
21 July 1812 – clash at Castalla – French 8 battalions, 2 cavalry regiments (circa 4,000 men) versus Spanish circa 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 2 guns

11 April 1813 – clash at Yecla – French 4 squadrons (circa 500 men) versus Spanish 4 infantry regiments (circa 3,000 men)

Splendid data, thanks, Prince!

Without having actually tabulated all that data but just from surveying it, it looks as though the Spanish army lost more often than it won, and that the French managed rather more victories against superior numbers than the Spanish did. Overall that must mean the French army was better, mustn't it? (Assuming terrain factors etc cancel out.)

That doesn't mean the Spanish army was 'rubbish' (though I'm sure it included some 'rubbish' units). But it does suggest that those wargamers who enjoy commanding a Spanish army because they regard it as inferior to its foes, and therefore a challenge to command, have some justification in doing so.

Without having actually tabulated all that data but just from surveying it, it looks as though the Spanish army lost more often than it won

Regarding Spanish victories, Digby Smith's list is incomplete because it does not take into account Spanish sources, especially primary ones. Again, it is the same mistake.

As an example, I would like to recommend the following book:

Arsenio Garcia Fuertes: No sin nosotros (Spanish military contribution to allied victory – 1811 and 1812 campaigns). (EEC-CSED Madrid 2018).
It is a must. It offers a compendium of Spanish primary sources, especially concerning the 6th and 7th Spanish armies.

Overall that must mean the French army was better, mustn't it?

It depends on the circumstances. The Spanish armies could have won many lost battles, but their inept commanders prevented this.

Regarding troops quality, organisation and commanders, the French army was better than the Austrian, Prussian and Russian ones. And, in certain aspects, it was better than the British army.
But this does not necessarily mean that the French army had to win every battle.

But it does suggest that those wargamers who enjoy commanding a Spanish army because they regard it as inferior to its foes, and therefore a challenge to command, have some justification in doing so.

Well, I would like to give an example: the battle of Medellin (1809).

Cuesta's infantry divisions were winning against veteran French infantry. But Cuesta decided to protect his left flank with some weak cavalry units. The French cavalry attacked that flank and he lost the battle. If he had protected his left flank with infantry in closed columns and the cavalry behind them, he would have won the battle.
And such mistakes were repeated in other battles.

You should not put the blame on the Spanish troops. Their deployment and the battle plan are responsibility of the senior commanders.

So, an intelligent wargamer does not necessarily have to make the same mistakes as those Spanish commanders.

Smith's list may be incomplete but it's still a lot of data and I find it persuasive. I'm open to persuasion in a different direction if you can provide more comprehensive data.

Certainly in a number of the battles the Franco-Allied cavalry obtained superiority by defeating their Spanish counterparts & then rolled the Spanish battle lines up from a flank. This combined with a frontal infantry assault (and at Gebora an infantry assault on the other flank).

My conclusion is not just poor Spanish leadership but also cavalry that could not in the main stand up to the Francp-Allied equivalents, which left the Spanish infantry as easy prey…

Smith's list may be incomplete but it's still a lot of data and I find it persuasive.

Well, it is your choice.

I'm open to persuasion in a different direction if you can provide more comprehensive data.

It is easy: you should consult Spanish bibliography and/or visit Spanish archives.

My conclusion is not just poor Spanish leadership but also cavalry that could not in the main stand up to the Francp-Allied equivalents, which left the Spanish infantry as easy prey…

In most battles, the British cavalry was outnumbered and could not adequately protect the flanks against the superior French cavalry. But Wellesley, as a rational commander, knew exactly what to do: he used close order infantry and/or terrain features in order to protect his army's flanks.

Wellesley, like other good commanders, knew quite well the strengths and weaknesses of his army, and acted accordingly. On the other hand, the Spanish commanders were inept and ignorant about their armies' characteristics. More surprisingly, they were no concerned about their armies' flanks.

Spanish regular cavalry was good but scarce. The newly raised regiments of volunteers were unreliable, with a few exceptions. It is the commander's responsibility to properly position his units on the battlefield, taking into account their strengths and weaknesses. It is madness to protect the flanks with weak cavalry, even worse if it is facing French cavalry.

You cannot put the blame on the cavalry, but on the commander's decisions. The cavalry cannot be a scapegoat for Spanish leadership's own failures.

"It is easy: you should consult Spanish bibliography and/or visit Spanish archives."

If it's so easy, would you mind sharing all the relevant data with us here please? (A: I don't have time and B: I feel the onus is on you to support your assertions.)

Have you read my previous posts?

I have supported my assertions with some examples of primary sources. I have recommended several books, and I have written some examples of battles and clashes that are not included in Smith's list.

For example, returning to the starting point (Valencia 1811), if you want to learn about that Spanish army (organisation, quality, performance, …) you should read the books by Jose Luis Arcon Dominguez: Sagunto, la batalla por Valencia. It is essential.

If someone really wants to gain real knowledge about the Spanish army, he or she must consult Spanish sources, primary and secondary ones. It is self-evident. I have nothing further to add.

Yes, of course I read your posts. I don't have an axe to grind here, I'm just curious to know the truth. That means seeing the data. Is Smith's data correct as far as it goes, just incomplete?

If you want to discount Medellin, doesn't that work in both directions? E.g., do we dismiss the Spanish victory at Bailen because it was down to poor French generalship?

We do not need to dismiss Spanish or French victories. That is not the point.

At Bailen, the Spanish generalship exploited the enemy's mistakes.

At Medellin, the French generalship exploited the enemy's mistakes.

The fact is that, due to their ineptitude, the Spanish senior commanders made many mistakes and lost many battles, wasting resources and good troops.

I stand by my earlier comment about Spanish commanders combined withd failures by Spanish cavalry resulting in serious defeats for the Spanish armies. In a number of cases the Spanish cavalry failed to charge, stand or exploit potentially winning positions. As always it is "the poor bloody infantry" that copped it!!!

As a matter of information, taken from "El Ejército de los Borbones Tomo V – Reinado de Fernado VII 1808-1833 Volumen 1 La Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814" by M. Gómez Ruiz & V. Alonso Juanola, Published by Ministerio de Defensa 1999

Chapter VI Los Ejércitos – pages 340 et seq.

At the end of 1810 it was decided that the Spanish Army should be reorganised into 6 armies. At the start of 1811 – 1st Army of Catalonia (though actually formed in la isla de León) and part in Mallorca, the 2nd Army of Valencia, Aragon & Cuenca, 3rd Army of Murcia, Granada, Jaén, etc, 4th Army (formed the permanent garrison of Cadiz & la isla de León, 5th Army of Extremadura & Castille, and 6th Army of Galicia, Asturias, León & the part of Castille on the right of Duero (order of battle set out in next section). The 7th Army of Navarra, Guipúzcoa, Alava, Vizcaya & part of Castille on the left of the Duero was formed on 20 February (order of battle set out in next section).

6th Army – Lieutenant General D. Nicholás Mahy
1st Division (Asturias) – Mariscal de Campo D. Francisco Javier Losada
1st Section – Brigadier D. Pedro de la Bárcena
14 Asturian units with 28 battalions
2nd Section – Mariscal de Campo D. Antonio M. Peón
Regimiento de Zamora (3rd battalion)
Regimiento de Aragón (3 battalions)
Regimiento de la Corona (3 battalions)
Regimiento de Castilla (2 battalions)
Regimiento de Maceda (2 battalions)
1st Battalion Light Infantry del Ribero
2nd Battalion Light Infantry del Ribero
1 company of Cavalry

2nd Division – Mariscal de Campo D. Francisco Taboada y Gil
1st Section (in Ponferrada) – Brigadier D. José Mencía
Real Marina (3 battalions)
Cazadores del Rey (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Tuy (1 battalion)
2nd Section (in Villafranca) – Colonel D. Manuel Mascareñas
Voluntarios de León (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Monterrey (3 battalions)
Regimiento de Compestela (1 battalion)
Cavalry (in Villafranca & Ponferrada)
Húsares de Galicia (1 squadron)

3rd Division – Interim Commander Brigadier D. Francisco Cabrera
1st Section (in Puebla de Sanabria)
3rd battalion of Sevilla
Toro (1 battalion)
Logroño (1 battalion)
2nd Section (in Puebla de Sanabria)
Regimiento de Toledo (2nd battalion)
Regimiento de Benavente (3 battalions)
Fernado VII (1 battalion)
Húsares de Galicia (1 dismounted squadron)
Dragones de la Libertad (2 squadrons)

Reserve Division – Brigadier D. José Santocilde
1st Section (in Santiago)
1st of Santiago (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Infanteria de Santiago (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Mondoñedo (1 battalion)
2nd Section (in Santiago)
National Guards (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Zaragoza (1 battalion)
Regimiento de Pontevedra (1 battalion)

Garrisons independent of Divisions
Regimiento de Betanzos (in La Coruña)
Regimiento de Lugo (in Vigo)
Regimiento de Orense (in Orense)
3rd Battalion del Ribero (in Orense)

Artillery
1st Division – 5 pieces
2nd Division (in Villafranca) – 4 pieces
Reserve Division (in Santiago) – 9 pieces
La Coruña – 4th Regiment (2 battalions)

7th Army – Lieutenant General D. Gabriel de Mendizábal
Division in Cantabria – Brigadier D. Juan Diaz Porlier
Regimiento de Laredo
Regimiento de 1st Cántabro
Regimiento de 1st Tiradores de Cantabria
Regimiento de 2nd Tiradores de Cantabria
Regimiento de 3rd Tiradores de Cantabria
Regimiento Húsares de Cantabria

Division de Iberia – Colonel D. Francisco Longa
Regimiento de 1st Iberia
Regimiento de 2nd Iberia
Regimiento de 3rd Iberia
Regimiento de 4th Iberia
National Guards
Húsares de Iberia

Vascongada Division – Mariscal de Campo D. Mariano Renovales
Vizcaya Brigade – Colonel D. Antonio Cano
1st Battalion of Vizcaya
2nd Battalion of Vizcaya
3rd Battalion of Vizcaya
Húsares de Vizcaya (1 squadron)
Alava Brigade – ?
Battalion of Alava
Húsares de Alava (1 squadron)
Guipúzcoa Brigade – Colonel D. Gaspar Jauregui (el Pastor)
1st Battalion of Guipúzcoa
2nd Battalion of Guipúzcoa
3rd Battalion of Guipúzcoa

Navarra Division – Brigadier D. Francisco Espoz y Mina
1st Battalion of Navarra
2nd Battalion of Navarra
3rd Battalion of Navarra
4th Battalion of Navarra
Húsares de Navarra
Rioja Brigade – Brigadier D. Bartolomé Amor
Battalion of Rioja
Squadron de Rioja
Bureba Brigade – Colonel Presbitero D. Francisco Salazar
Battalion of Bureba
Squadron of Lancers
Burgos Brigade – Colonel Presbitero D. Jerónimo Merino
Battalion of Arlanza
Húsares de Burgos
Castilla Brigade – Colonel Presbitero D. Juan de Tapa
Grenadier Battalion of Castille
Tiradores Battalion of Castilla
Squadron of Castilla
Cavalry Brigade of Campos