"Why America never had a decent Sherman. but the UK did." Topic

Wolfhag, you don't always have to punch a hole through the armour, in order to make it either non-functinal or even to get the crews attention to go away.

The one blessing the allies had was numbers. Tigers and Panthers were rare things while Shermans were plentiful. Even though on paper Shermans were lucky to knock out Tigers, it was done.

More importantly, the appearance of one Tiger usually was answererred by the massed gunfire of many Shermans. Each Sherman putting out from five to fifteen rounds a minute depending on the crew training. No tank commander is going to sit there and 'take it' and chance a lucky shot detroying him or having to explain how he had to abandon a disabled tank.

John the postwar report was done by either Ford or Chrysler and it looked at the machinists and die makers.

By the time someone had their machinst or tool and die papers, in the German model the person individually had every tool known to mankind that he would even need to work on that factory floor.

In the US model, machinists and die makers had basic sets of tools but each factory used the 'tool crib' system where the workers would go to the tool crib room and sign out what they needed to do the job and later retunr it to the tool crib.

As for standardization, the US suystem was not neccessarily a standardization of machine parts but of complete systems. It was easier to pull and replcae the entire engine pack or transmission than to fix it in place on the tank at times.

The biggest example of this was something that might have been produced in both the UK and the US simultaneously like the Merlin aircraft engine. All parts on Rolls Royce engines fit on other Rolls Royce engines. Some parts on Packard Merlin engines fit on other Packhard Merlin engines. Nothing fit between Packhard to Rolls Royce engines. The US had a decade or two before gone through the SAE revolution of standardising things like Imperial measurements and screw threads. In the UK, individual manufacturers still maintained their unique company screw thread dimensions!

Deadhead, you forgot the other model of the Sherman the M4A6 with the Guiberson diesel engine. Only 75 made.

A very interesting discussion, with lots of new data I haven't seen in the annual "Hate/Love The Sherman" threads. I expect the same result, though- Nil All Draw.

To me it doesn't matter which tank was fastest, strongest, "best"or "sexiest". Did the Shermans get the job done?

Yes.

It would have been nice to have A41 Centurion Mk.I, two Firefly Mk.Vc per troop, Cromwell Mk.VII (with the really thick frontal armour), A43 Comet, M-26 Pershing, etc, in time for Normandy, but they weren't.

The tankies still got the job done with the Sherman, and that's the only measure of whether they were a "good" tank or not, IMHO.The rest is just nationalistic cheer-squadding.

Dal Gavan You are correct of course.

I suspected my tongue in cheep jibe would result in an interesting response to a Video clip I though was worth watching. I never expected such an interesting and erudite thread on the issue.

I never expected such an interesting and erudite thread on the issue.

I know, it's sadly out of character. But I'm sure we can get back to the usual nasty, argumentative, straw-men filled posts eventually.

The debate of American quantity versus German quality might be interesting academically, but it meant little to the tank crews fighting in Normandy. As historian Steven J. Zaloga notes:

Tank Losses: During the Normandy campaign (June to August 1944), American forces lost around 1,500 tanks. Most of these were Sherman tanks, which typically had a crew of five.

Casualty Rates: Historical estimates suggest that approximately 60-70% of all American tanks knocked out in Normandy resulted in casualties among the crew. This means that in most tank losses, at least one or more crew members were injured or killed.

Crew Survival Rate: While exact survival rates vary, one detailed study on the Sherman tank casualty rates found that roughly 25% of crew members survived unharmed when their tank was hit. This leaves about 75% experiencing some form of casualty (wounded, killed, or missing in action) when their tank was disabled in combat.

Individual Crew Survival: For a more individual perspective, estimates suggest that in a typical tank hit in combat, around 15-20% of crew members were killed outright, while another 40-50% sustained injuries. Thus, the chances of a tank crew member surviving without injury were relatively low, likely around 25-30%.

This is a short but interesting article on the Sherman.
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The article states that "The 3rd Armored Division entered combat in Normandy with 232 M4 Sherman tanks. During the European Campaign, the Division had some 648 Sherman tanks completely destroyed in combat and had another 700 knocked out, repaired and put back into operation. This was a loss rate of 580 percent."

The Tiger was deadly to the Sherman especially at longer ranges. The Panther was deadlier because of its maneuverability but the real Sherman killer was the Panzer IV. Interesting to note, the Panzerfaust was responsible for 13% of the Sherman's destroyed during the war.

In this article is about the delays of deploying the Pershing to Europe. It doesn't mention any issues with the logistics of shipping larger tanks or re-tooling production lines. It cites as one of the main problems, the opposition of Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair, the father of the "tank destroyer doctrine." His opposition was mitigated somewhat by him getting killed during Operation Cobra.

link

"Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who in 1943 directed the buildup of U.S. forces for the invasion of France and earlier was head of the Army's armored forces, advocated the replacement of the Sherman with a more powerful tank."

He eventually went over the head of the Ordinance Dept. directly to Marshall. Marshall agreed with him and expedited the development and production of what would become the Pershing.

I understand the logistical issues of getting the Pershing to the ETO. But apparently they were overcome because they eventually got there. They got there late due to recalcitrant opposition.

All very interesting, but it must be remembered that most tank v tank engagements in the west were apparently at between 300 and 900 yds.

All very interesting, but it must be remembered that most tank v tank engagements in the west were apparently at between 300 and 900 yds.

Yes, that's close enough for German 75mm guns to score a first-round hit from ambush.

Remember, the main idea of a tank was to break through the enemy lines and exploit their rear areas as part of a combined arms force. This means you need a fast and reliable medium tank with a gun optimized to engage mostly rear area support troops, buildings, etc. where there will not be a lot of enemy armor. A heavy tank does not fit the bill. They are breakthrough tanks.

The Allies in NWE had the task of attacking defensive positions against a well-concealed enemy at ranges where the Germans could expect a first-round hit. Most engagements were initiated by flanking fire ambushes or long-range fire from the 88s. There is not much you can do when the enemy has the initiative and tactical advantage.

When the tables were turned on the Germans at Arracourt the same thing happened to their Panthers.

What could the US have done to decrease losses?
About 20% of the losses were to mines and 50% from indirect fire. Not much you can do to stop that.

Additional frontal armor? Now you have a heavy tank that cannot meet the exploitation needs. That would not have helped all that much as the Pershing was knocked out from the front by the 88L71 gun and 50% of the hits on Shermans were on the flank. Probably mostly from Pak 40 ATG and StuGs ambushes. The Jumbo did somewhat meet that need. The Americans experimented with numerous heavy tank designs at the start of the war but none were satisfactory.

With only about 10% of the engagements being against German tanks and the small numbers of Pershings available I don't think they would have had much of an impact or outcome improvement.

Artillery and mortars accounted for about 20% of the losses, not much you can do about that.

Another advantage of the Sherman was that it effectively stopped infantry counterattacks because of a fast-firing 75mm gun with HE, two MGs, and a 50cal. Also, recon by fire. Advancing on a treeline and firing MG and HE into the tree line could be very effective. Even more effective if they had the stabilizer working. An HE round hitting short creates a ricochet air burst as do rounds that go high into the trees. ATG crews did not have overhead cover.

The Sherman did have a roof-mounted smoke launcher but I've heard very little about it.

If you want to get a better idea of what US armored units faced on a day-to-day basis, this report is a good read: link

Data on losses: link

As some others have stated, HE fire did affect German tanks. Shermans faced many Panzer IVs that had about 50mm mantlet and turret front armor which the Sherman AP rounds could deal with. In one AAR I read, Sherman claimed to have pierced the Panzer IV's side turret armor at 100m with an HE round.

Don't forget the other versions of the Sherman with dozer blades, flamethrowers and rocket launchers, recovery vehicles, and mounting 105 guns. Also, it's post-war record.

With the limitations the US had with land and sea transport and needing a tank for amphibious landings, I think the Sherman would have been the only one to work throughout the war.

Many people consider the T-34 to be the best tank of the war. However, the Soviet Union lost 44,900 T-34 tanks during World War II, the most tank losses ever for a single type of tank. The US manufactured about 50,000 tanks in WWII and a higher % were recovered and repaired than the Russian tanks.

The Russians generally viewed the Sherman tank positively, appreciating its reliability, ease of maintenance, good firepower (especially with the 76mm gun version), and decent armor protection, considering it a valuable asset received through Lend-Lease during World War II.

Key points about the Soviet perspective on the Sherman tank:

Positive aspects:
Soviet tank crews often praised the Sherman's reliability, ease of maintenance, and good firepower, particularly the 76mm gun variant. They liked the APU too. They had mostly the M4A2 diesel engine version.

Comparison to T-34:
While the Soviet T-34 was considered their primary tank, some Soviet tankers preferred the Sherman's smoother suspension and better ergonomics.

Wolfhag

The Brits didn't have the best Sherman variant the US kept that, the M4A3 for themselves. Had to make do mostly with the M4A4, with possibly the worst tank engine ever devised, the Chrysler Multibank. One of the Brit independent armoured regiments, might have Sherwood Foresters had them prior to D-day and noted they kept catching fire. This wasn't ammo fires it was engine fires from leaking fuel. They got replaced with diesel M4A2's prior to Normandy which they were happy with.
It is also worth mentioning for all the US 76mm supporters that the Brits would not have got the 76mm in time for Normandy or HVAP ammo either. In that circumstance the Firefly was a superior choice for them. The standard APCBC was as good as the HVAP round of the US 76mm and the sabot round was superior at typical ranges seen in Normandy.

First off for Old Contemptible the issue of quantity.

The issue of what do with with a fairly good tank is always better to have than the problem of what to do without any superb tank. And far be it for me to call either the Tiger or Panther superb. Nice guns and armour but poor mobility, and near fatal unreliabillity.

As for losses, the British, Canadianas and Poles easily lost two to three times as many Shermans in their attempts to batter through German defenses in Normandy. This was actually intentional. For the UK it was far easier to replace Shermans and a percentage of crewman, than it was to replace infantrymen. Additionally, many of those Shermans and even crew would be returned to the fight as repaired and or healed.

German losses on the retreats and defense were usually not recovered and considered lost because they did not control the battlefield after the fight.

The fact that the US made 50, 000 Shermans alone and the relative ease of shipping them, maintaining them and providing logistics for them because of the scale of manufacturer and support was something to behold.

One of the very first computers was even created in order for the US planners to account for where all the Shermans were and to keeep them updated that their allies were not holding any back or using up to many for pet projects like the 'Funnies'.

The US could have had the M6 heavy tank, but again the compromise of testing, developping, working out problems, getting into manufacturing, training, shipping and then supporting it logistically all played a very important negative factors.

Especially when they had some five to eight factories already cranking out Shermans as well as new gun developments in the works as well as other improvements in plan for the factory floors. Why build a tank with a newere gun when the same gun can be put into what you are already making by the hundreds?

While the logisitcal problem was massive, equally big was the promise of these new guns to come. They were good, both the British and the US,,, but they did not live up to all their hyped up promise as wonder weapons.

Wolfhag do not underestimate what even that little stubby 75nn could do against even the Tiger and Panther.

Even the 75mm HE round could do enough cumulative damage to break tracks, gunsights, episcopes, injure exposed commanders nevermind the little AP rounds ability to find ways of getting through the armour. Someone has to win the lottery.

The dirty little secret that people reading history don't get are the secrets and corporate knowledge that soldiers pass on to the next generation, and so on and so on et cetera,,,.

It became standard practice that if one of these monsters tanks were known or expected to carry the loaded round as a WP or a white phosporous round. While supposedly a point detonating smoke round, it would combine to burn any exposed crewman and close in infantrymen supporting it, possibly ignite the vehicle on fire, and more importantly light up the target like a neon sign at night telling the rest of the tank troop or platoon,< "HERE I AM, KILL ME", so everyone would pile on a fire off as many rounds as they could.

It worked well enough we still used it as practice if not published doctrine driving our Leopard 1 around West Germany in the eighties against the, scary to us, T72s and T80s.

There was another smoke round but that was Base Ejection and a fun art to use. (SMK BE)

Yeah, forgot to mention the guys that taught me were pretty much passing on their knowledge as Korean vets and what the WW2 vets passed on to them. Likewise I passed on everything I could to the next generation who will still be serving another twenty years from now.

Fred about the engines.

The British engines until the Meteor were absolutely atrocious. A combination of using engines like the Liberty which were light weight things built out of aluminum components that disassembled themselves by vibration when driven cross country in even a fifteen ton tank.

Otherwise they had make do bus engines that were two engine on a single drive. Because of taxes on truck weights they never bothered developping a decent truck engine before the war.

Worse yet were some designs in how they mangled all the components into a single tank. Like having the engine at the back and the pping for the radiators going through the crew compartment to the radiators in the front.

British automotive engineering deserves its' very own thread for the derision it deseres. Lucas Electrics, into the 1960s was commonly referred to as Electrics By Satan.

The Churchill comes to mind. After two years it was adored by their crews. Yet the initial thousand came with a notice by the factory stating how, they realized how it was rushed into production without proper and testing followed by lists of known problems and how to solve them. But after two years of training and crewing them, suddenly they were incredibly reliable.

All US engines produced were reliable.
By 1944 the Chrysler multibank was in service with the troops for two years or more. Problems were well beyond sorted out. The crews loved them Both US and Canadian crews as well as the British crews loved tinkering with engines and they came to know their every quirk and angle. Part of the crew job includes maintaining and fixing what is in your abaility and reporting to you crew commander what you need fixed or repaired that is beyond your scope by the mechanics and weapons technicians. It is standar SOP even today to have the crew commander give their troop warrant officer a list of defect and defficincies at every stop.

As for units switching out from the Chrysler multibank to the GM twin diesel before DDay, I suspect it was because that unit would have been hasitly re-equipped with the DD or duplex drive conversions that were expected to swim ashore. Those were mostly converted from the M4A2/ Shermann III model because it was easier to convert and used diesel in the salt water environment.

The only Sheramn that the UK didn't really get was the M4A3 model with the Ford V8. That model was priority marked by the US Army.

I apologize to everyone.
I don't intend to be pedantic here.

After some thirty eight years as an armoured crewman, I tend to be picky on some parts, like tanks, tank gunnery and all things passed on by the corporate knowledge of those who went before me, including their love of the old reliable Shermans.

The swifter out there might have figures out by now that 'TROOPWO" is short for Troop Warrant Officer, something done for years. I never really bothered to update it for when I was later an SQ or an SSM.

Have an awesome weekend.

I really would not feel the need to apologise, for just knowing what you are talking about. I do realise that some of the other contributors here have military experience, but some of us can talk with great authority, even if we have only ever seen blood spilt in an OR or ER (and even then we usually had suction and vaguely decent lighting…actually the latter never in my experience)

The Sherman. If you did have to get out, you were out in an instant. OK, you needed a large hatch, the turret not blocking opening, a loader's hatch in the roof, no turret basket to block your alternative. Never mind the MG fire once you were out of course (but that is no design fault) I keep reading it was the ammo that was the risk, not the engine propellant and that wet stowage was far less important than where it was stored.

What a great thread and thanks to Troopwo for a PM that has solved a Xmas present for me from Mrs Deadhead. (She sends her thanks)

So American industry could crank out various types of aircraft in quaintly. But building both the Sherman and Pershing at the same time was far beyond its capability. I'm not buying it.

"The Sherman Tank Scandal would be splashed across front pages all over the Allied world."

"Whoever was responsible for supplying the army with tanks is guilty of supplying material inferior to its enemy counterpart for at least two years or more," one an angry armored cavalry lieutenant told the New York Times in March 1945. "How anyone can escape punishment for neglecting such a vital weapon of war is beyond me."

The young officer didn't stop there.

"I am a tank platoon leader, at present recovering from wounds received during the Battle of the Bulge. Since I have spent three years in a tank platoon doing everything, and at one time or another held every position and have read everything on armor I could get my hands on during this time, I would like to get this off my chest. No statement, claim, or promise made by any part of the Army can justify thousands of dead and wounded tank men, or thousands of others who depended on the tank for support. The German Tiger [and Panther] was more than a match for the M4 Sherman, as many Allied tank crews discovered."

To Corporal Francis Vierling of the U.S. Second Armored Division, "the Sherman's greatest deficiency lies in its firepower, which is most conspicuous by its absence." He continued:

"Lack of a principal gun with sufficient penetrating ability to knock out the German opponent has cost us more tanks, and skilled men to man more tanks, than any failure of our crews- not to mention the heartbreak and sense of defeat I and other men have felt when we see twenty-five or even many more of our rounds fired, and they ricochet off the enemy attackers. To be finally hit, once, and we climb from and leave a burning, blackened, and now useless pile of scrap iron. It would yet have been a tank, had it mounted a gun."

From the article "Tank Busting – Blowing Up the Myth of the Mighty M4 Sherman"

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"For Want of a Gun: The Sherman Tank Scandal of WWII" by by Christian Mark Dejohn

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You build what you can get to the front.
More Shermans could be shipped in Liberty ships than Pershings.

As for manufacturing. Remember the "turret ring" problem? That's an extremely difficult engineering issue, and waving a hand and saying "Make it so!" isn't going to solve it.
The number of factories making Shermans was cited above. Which ones will shut down? How long does it take to retool an entire factory? First the old lines must be dismantled and the tooling hauled elsewhere.
Then, after that, the new tooling must be brought in. During that time a whole factory making an adequate tank is shut down not producing. Let's say that it's 20% of tank production that is not being produced. How long is the turnover going to last? Let's be generous and say 2 months. That's very optimistic.

Most if the factories making airplanes started from ground up. They were only taken out of production for retooling if they were already producing an inferior plane. And those inferior planes were only produced in the early years when their capacity was low to begin with.
The Sherman was adequate. Why stop production and retool?

Let's get a manufacturer's perspective here, rather than a wargamer's. 🙄
I never drove a tank. In fact I never served. 🤷 But I was involved in manufacturing.
The concept of "Rapid Die Change" and retooling on the fly was developed AFTER the War, by Toyota, of all people. They actually used surplus tooling that Ford had discarded. Ironically. And used Ford quality concepts to implement this.
Today's manufacturers MIGHT be able to accomplish retooling from Sherman to Pershing, but there is still the shipping issue. That's another giant bottleneck.
In fact, given how progress is often two steps forward and one back, maybe they wouldn't be that nimble. Who knows?

But we did win the war. Does that count for anything? And we did it by making them in America and shipping them across 3000 mikes of ocean. More to Russia.

Modified Liberty ships and Victory ships were used to ship them. Yeah kind of like "Make it so." Not a stretch for American shipping. I don't think you understand how incredible American logistics and manufacturing were in WW2. Who says we had to stop making Shermans? Keep cranking them out but with a bigger gun and supplement them with the Pershing. Its not easy but that is what we do.

Yeah we won the war but with more dead armored crews than we should have had.

link

Keep making Shermans but stop making take destroyers and retool for Pershings. You don't need any more when you have Pershings.

Making the Pershing simultaneously as manufacturing the Sherman was not the problem.

When was the date of the Pershing being accepted? When they say that is the model now categorize and no more alterations are permitted, get the prints to the factories.

Now determine where your precious resources of labour, steel and skills were to be allocated. Can you retool a factory or do you need to make an entirely new factory? A lot of US battleships were either halted or even cancelled because of determining where the priority was for steel.

There are many examples of aircraft that were far better that were not made because the companies did not have the manufacturing capability or space or because the command determined that the down time to re-tool a plant was not worth the resultant benefits the new thing would have achieved.

Like I said, merely a better gun was no excuse to change the tank model. The 76mm was used on the Sherman and planned by what late '42, but the army didn't feel the pressing need until 1944. Even then models with the 76mm came forth. just like when it was realized that the T34 was deficient, they came out with the T34/85 model. Not every soviet factory shut down, it was a graduated change over. Even the US tank destroyer force got into the act by upgunning the M10 to the M36 model.

The Detroit Tank Arsenal is an absolute record achievemnt. They started building it in 1940, and in 1941 M3 tanks were already being built before the place was even completed. This place was a national priority, and when they switched from M3 to M4 there was good reason to continue the major components of having the same engines, transmissions, radios and guns. They all saved massive amounts of time in redesign and re-tooling.

The reports of people who were in knocked out vehicles reads as disgruntled victims. Most likely vicitms of their own wartime propaganda about being impervious to enemy fire. There were plenty of German tank crews they could have interviewed who would have said the same thing and worse about the Tigers and Panthers. Those comments read like the comments of people who were drafted and then complained that their shirts weren't bulletproof.

There is no such thing as a perfect tank. Every tank can and will get destroyed in some way. I don't recall congressional hearings in the sixties when US crewman realized that a non penetrating hit on their M48 turret would cause the hydraulic fluid to flash fire. But the army in its slowmoving millstone ways found ways to improv or protect it better.

Short answer, they did improve the guns and even made better tanks simultaneously.

Problem was they did it a year and a half to two years too late because the planners at the then War Department thought it best to get by with what they had and not to interrupt production or to bother retooling until the complaining got out of hand.

When Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower all chipped in, **** happened a lot faster. (June/July 1944)

Seriously find a copy of that 600 page book by Hunnicutt. Shermans, development, production, all kinds of details, improvement implemented and not, war department decisions and so much more.

Modified Liberty ships and Victory ships were used to ship them. Yeah kind of like "Make it so."

The question is "how many?"
Liberty ships had to be modified. That's a bottleneck. It also implies that such ships would be scarce enough that they would only be allowed to carry the Pershing.
How many Pershings could said modified Liberty ship carry? As opposed to Shermans?
And let's not forget the "masts" used to unload.

As I pointed out in the beginning, the Quartermaster Corps chaired a Study of the Shipping of Sherman's and other AFV during WW2.
It should still be available to military officers.
Non-on duty staff could view them but not check them out of the library.

Suddenly your a Cargo Officer. I don't know how many a modified Liberty ship or Victory ship could carry, as many as they can. Build more ships. This is exactly the kind of obfuscation that prevented the approval and production of this tank in a timely manner.

It's a wonder we got anything done. You completely underestimate the capacity and ingenuity of American manufacturing during the war. Why would ships only be allowed to carry Pershings and if they are so what? It should be a priority. Guys are dying horrible deaths. Get on with it.

I don't care about the engineering details turn it over to some guys from MIT and get on with it. We built two kinds of atomic bombs in three years. Cranked out Essex Class carriers like nobody's business. Built more variations of aircraft in quantity than stars in the sky. Gee building one version of a tank is beyond our capacity. Lets hold up the Manhattan Project and the B-29 while we figure out how to build and ship a tank.

Like I said you don't stop making Shermans! You stop making Tank Destroyers. Retool and start production. But start your R&D earlier. The Ord. Dept. was more interested in developing a new transmission for the Sherman. That was their priority until General Marshall slapped them down.

TimePortal- look it up and post a link.

There's a lot of interesting insights in this thread. I've often thought that if the real armies of WW2 had to fight with the limitations imposed by most wargaming rules on the Allies, we would all be speaking German! I feel it's a combination of:

1: Wargames rules writers doing research on the apparent items- armour thickness, penetration etc but ignoring ergonomics, tactics and reliability. I accept that they are difficult to include but I suspect most WW2 rules give the Germans significant advantages that were not there in practice.

2: This is an area where the Nazi generals were employed as consultants post war and allowed to write the history. Many couldn't accept that the master race was defeated by superior strategy, tactics and logistics but could accept that they lost to overwhelming numbers. This also allowed them to portray themselves as technical specialists rather than Nazis.

An example of this is the often quoted statistic that it took 4 or 5 Shermans to destroy a Panther, Tiger etc. It ticks all the boxes but I have never seen any figures confirming it. I doubt that it is true. Has anyone else? I also don't see many wargaming tables with that ratio of Sherman to German tanks.

3: We see lots of memoirs stating how inadequate Allied equipment was but not much written by German soldiers. I don't know the reason for this- lack of translations, an unwillingness to speak out, perhaps they were better- who knows? One example that is clear is that in North Africa, Allied softskin vehicles (British, Canadian and US) were superior to German.

One point that hasn't been raised much about the Firely is its effect on morale. It wasn't ideal but it was on the ground in sufficient numbers and gave British, Canadian, Polish, South African and New Zealand troops confidence that they had something that could knock out a Tiger and that's was worth a lot. It wasn't a repeat of North Africa and the 2pdr.

Why were Fireflies not used post-war? The British had moved onto the Comet and Centurion with a 20pdr. The Fireflies had been in frontline service for most of a year and there was no reason for Britain to spend money it didn't have on them.

The 76mm Sherman's handed out were refurbished vehicles given away as part of anti-Soviet aid packages. As I understand it, the US paid for Centurions supplied to Denmark and The Netherlands as it could not supply M47/48s in any reasonable time. I suspect the 76mm Sherman was immediately available and anything else better was years away.

Maybe the biggest thing overlooked is that a defender merely has to use the ground to their best ability and will always have the advantage. The attacker will and does take losses commensurate with the ability to conduct reconnaissance beforehand and their ability to react and alter plans on the fly.

So, from the period of this threads main interest, 1944 forward, the allies were always on the attack and the germans always on the defense. The fact that the allies took the losses that they did is a tribute to their skill that they were actually kept as low as they wee.

If you think I am kidding look at the scale of the russian losses suffered in 1944 and 1945.

Or for that matter the very few times that the germans went on the offensive against the allies. Two fine examples are the attack against Gold and Juno beach in Normandy on June 9th and another great example is the Elsenborn Ridge during the Battle of the Bulge. The allies, with those same 'lousy' Shermans absolutely cleaned the clock of the german attacks.

Someone should mention the intelligence failure. You build weapons and train and organize soldiers to fight anticipated situations. The much-bashed tank destroyers had a superior kill ratio and worked pretty much as specified--when the Germans were attacking. I'm sure all of us, about the time of the Louisiana Maneuvers, could have looked at the world situation and said "by the time we ship major armies overseas, German offensives will be too rare for us to worry much about" and spared everyone the effort and resources used to solve the problems of 1938-42.

I'm equally certain that, having been shown a knocked-out Tiger in early 1942, we'd have immediately foreseen Panthers in every Panzer division and sacrificed some tank production to increase armor penetration.

And of course, none of us would have been influenced by the equipment American troops never received in 1917-18, because the factories kept improving design rather than delivering products.

Because if we weren't ever so much more clever than the "Brass" we'd be right where they were--scrambling to adapt equipment design and manufacturing programs to an unexpected reality.

Next year, instead of our regular "stupid Americans didn't upgun/replace the Shermans fast enough" thread, could we do one on sending Panzer III's to fight T-34's, early Russian radioless tanks, Italian tank design or British tank manufacturing?

"Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who in 1943 directed the buildup of U.S. forces for the invasion of France and earlier was head of the Army's armored forces, advocated the replacement of the Sherman with a more powerful tank."

It seems so easy in hindsight. It was not very easy at that time. There were many priorities in conflict at the time.

You think Devers was all about getting a more powerful tank?

Here are the archive notes from a phone call from Barnes (Ordnance) to Devers (Armored Board) about the potential for upgunning the Sherman.

From US National Archives: Record of General Barnes, head of Research and Development for Ordnance Branch, phone call on with General J. L. Devers, the head of Armored Force at Fort Knox. 5 August 1942

GEN. BARNES: The new 76 mm. gun. The objective that we're after is to be able to give you, in the same space, a gun of 2600 ft .s. muzzle velocity, same power, exterior ballistics as the 3" high power gun. We use the 3" bore for the gun in order to use the 3" projectile which is under manufacture. We have to assemble a new cartridge case in it in order to get the power, so we call the gun a 76 mm so it won't be contused with the 75 or 3". Now, that gun will penetrate 3" of armor at 3,000 yds. and give you all the fire power we feel you'll probably need. And we can put it in the M4 tank without a single change in the tank except in your ammunition racks. While we're making the guns we can, of course, change the face plate on the tank and push the gun about 6" further out into the atmosphere and make a better arrangement inside the turret, because with this long gun we have to add some weight to the gun guard (recoil guard) in order to bring it into balance for the gun stabilizer. Of course we are all crazy about the thing down here because it puts you so far ahead of everybody else in fire power, and so what we want to do is to go ahead with the initial order of 1,000 guns, of which we will be able to get two or three hundred of in a month and a half and as a starter, while you people are making up your mind how many in the long run you'll want of these, and how many of the short guns.

GEN DEVERS: How much longer is this than the 75? It isn't as long as the present 3" is it?

B: Yes, it's a little longer than the 3". It's 52 calibers long. The old 3", I mean the old 75, is 35 calibers or 32, I've forgotten which.

D: Well,. what is the 3" A.A.? How many calibers long?

B: That's about 50.

D: In other words, this is 2" longer than that.

B: 2 calibers – 6" longer.

D: I think that's fine. The only thing that worries me a little bit now is that this isn't going to throw us off on our present set-up so we can get to fighting. I'm anxious to get M-4 tanks with anything in them so we can go to fighting.

…

The call does go on. I am happy to post the rest of the transcript if anyone is interested.

But my point is … even with Devers, look at the conflict of priorities he is already well aware of.

So … the US Army already had the 76mm gun while, as far as they knew, the British were just starting to mount 6prs in tanks, the Italians were mounting 47mm guns, the Soviets had standardized on the 76.2mmL42, and the Germans were just beginning to mount the 75mmL43.

Ordnance provided Shermans with 76mm guns in 1942. The Armored Board (ie: Devers' command) rejected them as unsuitable for service. Not because of some TD doctrine fantasy, or NIH, or will to see US tankers die.

There was no villain in some dime-novel story. It was several senior policy makers, Devers among them, trying to make the best decisions they could when NONE of them had any personal experience in armored warfare, and ALL of them knew the one overwhelming priority was figuring out how to put a million-man army across an ocean with all the equipment and supplies needed to fight for as long as it took -- something that no one else in history had ever done before, and no one else has done since.

Keep that in mind when you are trying to paint villains and heroes.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Keep making Shermans but stop making take destroyers and retool for Pershings. You don't need any more when you have Pershings.

GMC (Tank Destroyer) production:
M10 production ended in early 1944.
M18 production ended in late 1944.
M36 in all variants was not new production. Only conversions, mounting new 90mm turrets on existing hulls.
M36 (baseline) conversion (converted from M10A1s) ended in December 1944, except for very few (something like 10) converted in May 1945.
M36B1 conversion (converted from M4A3s) were completed by December 1944.
M36B2 conversion (converted from baseline M10) was a close-of-war / post-war re-use of surplus vehicles, that started in May 1945 and continued for a few months. There was no new production -- only conversion of surplus/unwanted M10s.

The T26E3 was accepted for service as the M26 Pershing in March of 1945.

No new TDs were built in parallel with the M26 program. There was no conflict of production resource or facility. Even so, most M36 conversions were completed before the first T26E3 prototypes had even been completed. Very few M36s were converted after the T26E3/M26 entered production.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Suddenly your a Cargo Officer. I don't know how many a modified Liberty ship or Victory ship could carry, as many as they can. Build more ships.

Build more ships?
Is this a suggestion that the US was not building ships at absolute maximum capacity during WW2? Building ships was already the single largest program of the country, re-defining coastal and riverene communities across the country and re-located millions of Americans.

You won't be able to use the older Liberty ships, except at a couple of ports on the US eastern seaboard and one port on the western coast of Britain that had the cranes to lift 50 ton loads. So all those ships you built in 1941 and 42 won't serve your tank shipping requirements much at all, unless you are willing to see months of delay as convoys load and unload from the 3 ports you can use while you re-build the cranes on the ones that aren't sailing or waiting in line. Better double-up on building more Victory ships.

Since the Victory ships only had one crane that could load or unload a 50 ton cargo, you will be limited to one hold per ship. So you will need to double the shipping capacity dedicated to moving your tanks. Go ahead. Easy as snapping your fingers.

Oh, and they (heavy tanks) could not be deck-loaded. Too heavy to carry topside … decks won't hold the specific localized weight and the ships will become top-heavy/unstable if you re-enforce the decks AND put tanks on 'em. So actually you need to more than double the number of Victory ships dedicated to your tanks.

How are you going to find the workers to build so many more ships? Shut down tank factories? Maybe take them away from building the Navy ships, so we sacrifice all those Marines in the pacific? Or maybe aircraft factories? Or the factories making artillery? Locomotives? Let's just take 'em off of the farms … we don't need food anyways.

Or to save on the ships you might want to build and install new cranes at all those ports on the East Coast of the US, and in the UK, and in occupied Europe (oh that might be a bit tricky) to handle the heavier loads.

And you also need to build different landing craft. And build more, because the inventory you spent the last year and a half building will not be very useful.

And different engineering bridging equipment. And build more.

Sure, just say so and it happens. It's just that easy. No compromises. No conflicts of resources or capacity. Nothing lost in throwing away so much of 1942 and 1943 production and starting again.

I don't mean to say it couldn't happen. Of course it could. But takes time. The ripple effects would take a year or two to sort out.

The decisions that made D-Day possible in 1944 were taken in 1941 and 1942. If you change those decisions in early 1944, you land on the coast of France in 1946.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

+1 Mk 1
👍

Are you implying that these good men made the best decisions they could, based on the best available information? Shocking!

When was the date of the Pershing being accepted? When they say that is the model now categorize and no more alterations are permitted, get the prints to the factories.

Here is the timeline for availability of the Pershing.

Spoiler Alert: What you will find is that there was NO delay in getting them into production and into the hands of the troops. In fact, it was accelerated at some risk of producing bad results. (Which it kind of did -- the Pershing was automotively the worst tank the US Army ever deployed into an active combat area, and I believe the only tank withdrawn and shipped stateside for factory upgrades during an active conflict.)

Extracted from: link

Early 1943 program genesis: Request for new vehicles as follow-on to the T20/22/23 programs. Designated T25 and T26, both would mount a 90mm gun.
40 T25s were requested, to be equipped with the same level of protection as T23
10 T26s were requested, with heavier armor with 4+ inch basis on the frontal aspect.

24 May, 1943: War Department approves production of 10 T26 prototypes. This is part of the approval of production for a variety of T2n-series tanks. At this time T26 is only a concept. Production of T26 prototypes cannot begin yet, as there are no blueprints.

13 Sept, 1943: T26 blueprints are now available. Ordnance requests production of 500 T26s. LtGeneral McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, successfully opposes this increase to T26 production before any prototypes have been built or tested. Order stands at 10 protoypes. Production begins.

13 Nov, 1943: LtGeneral Devers, Commanding General, European Theater of Operations (prior to Eisenhower), requests 250 T26s. (Please note he is NOT asking to replace Shermans with T26s. He needs thousands of tanks. He asks for 250 T26s, which neither he nor anyone else has ever seen.)

Feb, 1944: First 10 T26s are completed (from May 1943 order / Sept 43 blueprints). Ordnance estimates production of 250 CAN BEGIN IN OCTOBER, 1944. Estimate is based on expectation that there will be some issues identified during testing to be remedied.

20 May, 1944: Armored Board REJECTS T26 prototype as NOT READY for production. Publishes an extensive list of issues that require remedy.

November, 1944: Ordnance asserts Armored Board concerns have been addressed. PRODUCTION BEGINS on E3 revision to T26. This is only ONE month behind the original estimate.

January, 1945: First 20 T26E3s come from Grand Blanc Arsenal. Despite long-standing AGF opposition to using overseas combat units as a testing agency, they were sent directly to ETO for combat testing. Issued 10 each to 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions. Only after 20 have been set aside for shipment to ETO are T26E3s sent to Aberdeen for testing.

March, 1945: T26E3 accepted as Heavy Tank, M26.

June, 1945: 1,426 M26s have been built and accepted by US Army. This is only possible because production started to ramp up even before the first prototypes had been completed.

If we insist that the US Army goes ashore with Pershings on D-Day, then the only tanks available to them will be 10 prototypes that could not successfully pass Aberdeen testing.

As it was, the US Army built more Pershings during WW2 than the Germans built Tiger 1s. But it was not possible to get them onto ships and overseas in time for action. The German army was crushed before they could be shipped and issued to the troops.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

. LtGeneral McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, successfully opposes this increase to T26 production before any prototypes have been built or tested. Order stands at 10 protoypes.

And that makes perfect sense. Anything else suggests panic.
Regarding its reliability, the faction of WW2 gamers that dislike German super tank propaganda, like to point to how often Panthers and Tigers broke down on the way to the battle.
I am guessing that units assigned Panthers were painstakingly trained how to deal with the quirks. Note how few actually fought, and that wasn't until April 1945.

interesting I saw the Sherman Jumbo prototype at the UK Bovington tank museum I believe this is the only one, none in the US. I assume it was later than the Pershore which really never made it to the big time even post war.

Whilst waiting for someone to find a cable to join their(!) telescreen session I googled wikipedia:

Tank – width: ft-in / metres; weight: long tons
===============================================

Cromwell – width: 9' 6.5'' / 2.9083m; weight: 27.6 lt
Comet – width: 9' 10.25'' / 3.00355m; weight: 35 lt
Churchill MkVII – width: 10' 8'' / 3.2512m; weight: 40.1 lt
Centurion – width: 11' 1'' / 3.3782m; weight: 50 lt
Chieftain – width: 12' 0'' / 3.6576m; weight: 55 lt
Challenger 1 – width: 11' 6'' / 3.5052m; weight: 61 lt

M4 Sherman (lesser) – width: 8' 7'' / 2.6162m; weight: 30.3 lt
M4 Sherman (greater) – width: 9' 10'' / 2.9972m; weight: 38.1 lt
M26 Pershing – width: 11' 6'' / 3.5052m; weight: 41.9 lt
M47 Patton – width: 11' 6.25'' / 3.51155m; weight: 44.1 lt
M48 Patton – width: 12' 0'' / 3.6576m; weight: 44.3 lt
M60 – width: 11' 11'' / 3.6322m; weight: 45.3 lt
M1 Abrams – width: 12' 0'' / 3.6576m; weight: 54 lt

T34 – width: 9' 10'' / 2.9972m; weight: 26.1 lt
T34/85 – width: 9' 10'' / 2.9972m; weight: 31 lt

Panzer III – width: 9' 6'' / 2.8956m; weight: 23 lt
Panzer IV – width: 9' 5'' / 2.8702m; weight: 24.6 lt
Panzer V Panther – width: 11' 3'' / 3.429m; weight: 44.1 lt
Panzer VI Tiger – width: 11' 8'' / 3.556m; weight: 54 lt
Kampfpanzer Leopard 1 – width: 11' 0.75'' / 3.37185m; weight: 42.2 lt
Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 – width: 12' 3'' / 3.7338m; weight: 62 lt

UK small roads are usually 14 feet wide – so a Pershing could drive down one, however, I'm not too sure whether it'd go down tracks – which in WW2 would be the majority.

I was surprised at the width of the Churchill – but it might be those air-cleaner-sponson things.

Re logistics – I suppose the Pershings were never sent to UK but unloaded at Antwerp Docks.

Mark very good catch on the Devers conversation.

Robert, it was not a failure of intelligence. They had reports of new builds and then even live examples as early as what the start of 1943 between Leningrad as well as Tunisia a f months later.

In addition to that the simple logic if building the Churchills on your own side should be a 'no-brainer' that if we are building something with four to six inches of armour,,, maybe we should expect them to as well.

If there was a failure perhaps it was just as likely that it was a failure in respect to our own troops beleiving their own propaganda about their invincibility or of the superiority of their own kit. Something the veternas brough in from recent Italian or North African campaigns wee quick to dismiss.

John, I saw a 'war thunder' video with some tall Irish guy looking seriously at crewing a Panther. It was an ergonomic nightmare and we should all be stunned at the reputation that it came away with!

Additionally, Tigers and Panthers were rushed into the field way too fast. The losses and reports from Kursk were atrocious with breakdowns and spontaneous engine combustion being leading reasons for loss.

I really suspect that crews were not as familiar with their maintainence as we think simply because they wee always in heavy demand and use and never had the same chance that allied crews had to know their equipment as thouroughly as they should.

Mark, you also have two other gems hidden away that need stressing.

Firtsly that in as little as three months, ONE US factiry built nearly as many M26 as the germans built Tiger tanks in three years of production.

Secondly was the ability of the tiny 75mm turret to accept the 76mm gun. Something that could have been done at any time but was held off until the new larger T23 turret was being produced.

Strangely enough, the panic of the Korean War is what led to the recovery and repair of massive amount of inventory and tanks, incuding the rebuilding of many small turret Shermans with teh 76mm guns. Like the tanks in Kellys heroes was one of those rebuild given to Yugoslavia as post war aid.

interesting I saw the Sherman Jumbo prototype at the UK Bovington tank museum I believe this is the only one, none in the US.

I have had the good fortune of crawling over/through a couple of Sherman Jumbos in the US.

The one in the picture was in the US Army School of Armor collection, which in the time of the picture (no longer) was located at Fort Knox. It was not refurbished, so in rather tough condition at that time. But at least it was stored indoors, vs many of the other tanks in the collection which were left out in the elements.

This tank was stored in the LST Building. Those who spent time on that post might know of it -- after Torch the US Army took the lesson to spend some time figuring out how to best load and unload vehicles for assault landings. The LST building was constructed to the same interior dimensions, same lighting and ventilation (there were no windows originally), with and exit ramp and the same door size, as the then-current LSTs. Not only was it used to test various load-outs, but also to train some of the units destined for D-Day in loading and unloading their vehicles.

For decades that followed WW2 it served only as a warehouse for historically significant tanks. If you look into the shadows you might notice the prototype MBT70 and an M60A2 in the background.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I am guessing that units assigned Panthers were painstakingly trained how to deal with the quirks.

OFM, Fortunately (for us) often not so. German driver training was done on other--frequently obsolete or captured--tanks, and especially post-COBRA, the records are full of complaints from German unit commanders that there was no fuel for the necessary training. And of course at Kursk you had Panthers spontaneously combusting on their way to the front. There may have been a sweet spot in early 1944 in the West--most of the bugs fixed, and fuel not as short as it would become.

Or are we discussing Panthers in French service post-war? I believe they did pay more attention to crew training and had a much longer interval between breakdowns than the Wehrmacht achieved.

Troopwo, failure to correctly extrapolate from available data is one of the things we in Intel Branch call "intelligence failure." Do they call it something else in Armor Branch? But the failure was not that no one picked up on Germany building Tigers. The failure was not to foresee that Germany would divert sufficient resources to build so many of the "big cats" that they'd be an ongoing problem. US Intel looked at a relative handful of Tigers and thought "special equipment."

We knew the Germans had big rail guns too. No one built special equipment to cope with them, because no one thought the Germans were nuts enough to build hundreds. That time, they were right.

A Panther battalion in every panzer division is another matter, but when were we aware of this? Late 1943? Early 1944? A bit late to react in time for Normandy, I'd say.

"I am guessing that units assigned Panthers were painstakingly trained how to deal with the quirks."

Arrrgh. I MEANT to type "Pershings".
So, either Autocorrect trumped what I meant to say, or I just blundered.
Mea Culpa. 🙄
Sadly I can't blame everything on Autocorrect.

LtGeneral McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, successfully opposes this increase to T26 production before any prototypes have been built or tested. Order stands at 10 protoypes.

And that makes perfect sense. Anything else suggests panic.

In my reading it was not quite "let's not suggest panic here", but more like: "Burned me once, shame on you. Burned me twice, shame on me. Burned me three times, I ought to have my head examined…"

Some recent events that might have contributed to McNair's context could help:

1) The mighty M7 Medium Tank: Ordnance completed the development. The Armored Board completed trials. The T7 was accepted as the M7. A factory was built to produce this new "lightweight medium" tank with a 75mm gun on an up-scaled Stuart chassis … a factory as big and modern as any tank factory in the world (save Tankograd in the USSR). Except … no one wanted them. ETO, MTO, PTO all turned them down. Not a single unit ever rolled off the line at that massive new factory.

The AGF doctrine was "War Need". Don't produce stuff just because you can. Build the stuff that the fighting units need. Shipping was the single most precious resource. It was NOT to be wasted on interesting thingies that might be usable in some odd set of circumstances.

2) The T23 Medium Tank: This was the tank to replace the M4 Sherman. The best of the T20 / T22 / T23 experimental programs. Fast, nimble, low, modern, with that new all-conquering 76mm gun. Hundreds were built before acceptance trials, based on the promises of Ordnance that it was the bees' knees. They were rejected for overseas service because of their dismal reliability. They were only ever used stateside for training.

The AGF doctrine was "War Ready". Don't ship stuff to the other side of the world that isn't going to work for as long as it takes to finish the war. Other nations could send a trainload of tanks to the front, and just as easily bring a trainload of tanks back to the factory for re-build. Other nations could bring an experienced battalion back from the front to the factory to train up on operating and maintaining some new exotic small-production-run finicky-but-interesting thingy. The US Army could NOT.

McNair had these massive 1943 failures, raw and sore, as his context when Barnes came to him again and said: "Let's start volume production on these new things that just might work."

Yeah, maybe not…

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Sounds refreshingly free of Congressional input.

Tank – width: ft-in / metres; weight: long tons
===============================================

…
Churchill MkVII – width: 10' 8'' / 3.2512m; weight: 40.1 lt
…

M4 Sherman (lesser) – width: 8' 7'' / 2.6162m; weight: 30.3 lt
M4 Sherman (greater) – width: 9' 10'' / 2.9972m; weight: 38.1 lt
M26 Pershing – width: 11' 6'' / 3.5052m; weight: 41.9 lt
…

This information highlights how the devil lies in the details. Not only do we need to consider the time penalty to arrange shipping across the Atlantic based on crane lift capacity (on the ships or the ports). We also need to get those tanks ashore.

The original LSTs (the three "Maricaibo" LSTs that participated in the Torch landings, and the LST Mk1s that followed) had 12 ft wide doors in the front.

This was considered inadequate for landing Churchill tanks. Less than a foot on each side was not sufficient for combat off-loading. If a tank even so much as clipped one of the clamshell doors, the LST would not be able to attain a water-tight seal when the doors were closed. That meant the LST could not pull back from the beach, costing both the capacity of any further trips of that LST, and that beach space. Those doors were the BOW of the ship! You had BETTER have a water-tight bow to break the waves.

Because of this, as negotiated between the US Navy Bureau of Ships and a British delegation, so that the US could build LSTs for both nations, the bow opening of the LST Mk2 was expanded to 14 feet. A Churchill could safely offload.

Again, that's a decision taken in early 1942 (January, I think). Now this Pershing thing comes along, and guess what, it's almost a full foot wider than a Churchill. And the steering is not nearly as precise as a Churchill's.

Yes Pershing could off-load from the largest class of LSTs. But it would need several multiples more time, as it had to be done VERY carefully. And there will be wastage of LST capacity as invariably some will be damaged. So fewer tanks over the beach in any given period of time. Unless you start building new LSTs to a spec you develop in a crush for a tank who's blueprints only become available in September 1943. That's good for your landings in France in 1946 … or maybe 1945 if you're lucky.

Oh, and most LSTs after D-Day itself, so the LSTs that carried the great majority of the tanks used for the Normandy campaign, did not actually beach. They used treadway bridges to off-load from floating piers inside the great Mulberry harbor.

The Pershing, of course, far exceeded the weight and width restrictions of the treadway.

The LCMs (landing craft, medium) could carry a single M4 Sherman, but could not carry a Pershing. Just too heavy. So no alternatives there.

The LCTs (landing craft, tank) could carry Pershings. In smaler numbers than Shermans, but they could carry them. And as they had a front drop-ramp rather than clamshell doors, minor clipping did not automatically render the craft un-seaworthy. So some small fraction of your overall tank-landing capacity may be a reliable and efficient way of landing Pershings.

Again it is a matter of time. You are just not getting Pershings over the Normandy beaches at the speed you need for the build-up and the breakout, even if you have them (which you don't) and managed to get them to ol' Blighty (which you couldn't).

Now once you have Antwerp open, it's an entirely different story.

Remind me, when was Antwerp open? If memory serves, it was like December of 1944?

So even if you have a magic wand (or throw a natural 12 on the hocus-pocus table) that allows you to get a perfectly serviceable Pershing in time for the Normandy campaign, you still need to fight all the way across France without having them in any meaningful numbers. You just can't get enough of them ashore and into the hands of the troops before the Battle of the Bulge is upon you.

Something about professionals and logistics might fit here…

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)