"Europe first. Why?" Topic

AfaIk the Japanese not the Germans attacked Pearl Harbour. So why Europe first?
Second question: how much effort really went over the Atlantic, and how much into the Pacific? Is there a way/source to quantify that?

The Japanese would be beaten – it was a given. Plus the US could trade space for time in the Pacific.

Potentially, the Germans could avoid being beaten, given time

Then throw in that your main ally is more threatened by the Germans and are being run by an opinionated prime minister, it's easier to understand why.

I asked Chat GPT:
'The "Europe First" policy, also known as the "Germany First" strategy, was adopted by the United States during World War II in agreement with its Allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This strategy prioritized the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe before focusing fully on the war in the Pacific against Japan. Several key reasons underpinned this decision:

Greater Threat from Germany: Germany was seen as the most formidable and immediate threat. Nazi Germany had significant military capabilities, occupied much of Europe, and had the potential to dominate the entire continent. The Allied leaders believed that a victory in Europe was crucial for the long-term security of the world.

Alliance Commitments: The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were already heavily engaged in fighting Germany. The UK, led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, had been involved in the European theater from the beginning of the war, and the Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, was enduring massive invasions and casualties on the Eastern Front. A coordinated effort against Germany was essential to support these allies.

Resource Allocation: The United States and its allies recognized that they had limited resources and needed to allocate them efficiently. The industrial and military resources of the Allies were more effectively concentrated on a single major front. By focusing on Europe first, they could bring the full weight of their combined resources to bear against Germany.

Geopolitical Considerations: The political landscape in Europe was considered more volatile and critical. The fall of key European countries could lead to significant shifts in power and influence, which the Allies wanted to prevent. Defeating Germany would stabilize Europe and prevent it from becoming a Nazi stronghold.

Strategic Military Planning: The strategy was based on sound military planning. The Allies believed that once Germany was defeated, Japan could be more easily isolated and dealt with. The European theater required immediate attention due to the ongoing battles and the potential for Germany to develop more advanced weaponry, such as rockets and possibly nuclear technology.

Inter-Allied Cooperation: The "Europe First" strategy was a result of extensive discussions and agreements among the Allies, including during conferences such as the Arcadia Conference in late 1941 and early 1942. It represented a consensus among the major Allied powers on the best course of action to achieve a final victory.

In summary, the "Europe First" policy was a strategic decision based on the perceived greater threat posed by Nazi Germany, the need to support key allies, efficient resource allocation, geopolitical stability, and coordinated military planning. This approach ultimately contributed to the successful defeat of Germany in 1945, allowing the Allies to then turn their full attention to the Pacific theater and the defeat of Japan.'

In answer to the second part of your question I remember watching 'The World at War' on TV in the seventies where they said about 2/3 of production and personnel went to Europe, Naval forces were more evenly spread.

While not at war, the US was involved in the war in Europe well before Pearl Harbor. In 1940, we traded 50 four-pipe destroyers to the Brits in exchange for sea and air base agreements. The ETO was simply more important.

Because Hitler was mad enough to declare war on the US. If he hadn't done that there wouldn't have been a Europe first policy. It's even more odd because the Japanese never declared war on the soviet union as it wasn't in their interests. There really wasn't a good reason for Germany to declare war on the USA.

Regardless of the Germany first policy, there was a lot of bickering amongst the allies about how much effort was being put into the Pacific. I just finished the second volume in Ian Toll's Pacific trilogy, it is just astounding how much material we were capable of sending out to the far side of the theater by mid 44. And the fact it didn't slow down the ETO at all is equally amazing.

as to your primary question, Germany was on the rise in late 41, early 42. There was no real indication they were going to be stopped. Had they been able to knock Russia out of the war, and that was a real possibility at the time, things would have been much different.

I'd hedge on "didn't slow down the ETO at all" Stosstruppen. Never enough landing craft to go around, for instance, and I'm thinking of staff officers in late 1944 France complaining that if someone really wanted the war over soon, they should send ten more divisions.

But it was going to happen regardless of Hitler's declaration. For one thing, it was going to take years to build the necessary capital ships for the Pacific War. Possibly more important, consider the strength in the FDR administration of the progressive/borderline Communist faction. They'd been pro-(European) war since June, and they'd never have tolerated a primary effort in the Pacific even if it had been in the US' best interests.

But I agree that on purely military grounds, the defeat of Germany had to be the first priority. It was the war we might have lost.

I asked Chat GPT:

ChatGPT has been known to lie: link

MajorB, I agree, which is why I said it was ChatGPT. I agreed with it in this case however as it mirrored what I had seen and heard previously.

There really wasn't a good reason for Germany to declare war on the USA.

Germany, Italy and Japan had a mutual defence pact (The Tripartite pact) which Hitler honoured.

Japan could never win whereas Germany was perceived as potentially an existential threat. Emotionally post-Pearl Harbor the population held far more animosity for Japan than Germany but a rational risk assessment would always identify Germany as needing the most attention initially.

Admiral King siphoned off as many naval assets as possible to the Pacific and by mid-43, the German threat was only a diminishing U-boat campaign but, as has been mentioned, amphibious assets were always a limiting factor on all Theater Commanders with LST's in particular needed in excess of availability.

Yes but the Tripartite pact was a defensive one only to be invoked if one of the parties was attacked as the Japanese attacked the USA Hitler had no obligation to declare war on the USA. Plus Hitler had a proven track record of ignoring treaties when they stopped being useful like the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

To quantify the resources directed to each theater is easy but also difficult. I'm in the middle of John Keegan's Six Armies in Normandy. He stated that George Marshall and Ernest King agreed to a roughly 75/25 split of major assets between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters for 1942. I'm sure it was never a perfect ratio and it was adjusted as time went on.

US carriers were much more useful in the Pacific than they would have been in the Atlantic… ;-)

American politicians were convinced that German scientists were more dangerous than the Japanese. One factor was the extreme distances the Japanese weapons had to traverse.

The fleet carriers, certainly, Zephyr--at least after HUSKY. And nine escort ("jeep") carriers in DRAGOON)
link

But don't forget the jeep carriers' role as convoy escorts.

And, really, hard to measure "assets" to arrive at more than a very rough and somewhat subjective percentage. What's the exchange ratio between a 1942 "heavy" armored division and construction on an Essex class carrier which won't be ready until 1944?

I guess you could use the amount of dollars spend to build up the forces in the different theatres.
I am not sure that it was clear on the evening of december 7th 1941 that Japan will lose. If there is no battle of Midway at all and the Japanese don´t overstretch their supply lines by attacking the South Pacific, it would be a different strategic situation. And if the Allies attack France instead of Italy in 1943 and get a very bloody nose, maybe someone else get elected in 1944.
Every nation gets war-weary. Maybe not Russia, but democracies for sure.

The different theaters often had disparate needs- fleet carriers for the Pacific, armored divisions for the Atlantic- but the ETO got serious priority for the shortage assets, like tankers in 1942.

One of the interesting aspects of the first two years of the Pacific campaign is the challenge inherent in fighting defensive and then offensive campaigns with a force that was still in the early stages of mobilization and on the lower end of the priority scale. There's an enormous difference between the US fleet of 1942 and 1944.

Old novel--The Soldier, by Richard Powell--does a lot with that, Nine Pound. The desperate clinging by odd regiments at the start of the novel turn into well-equipped full-strength corps by the end. Powell himself pulled staff duty under MacArthur, and he works in some real incidents.

That was one of FDR's fears was that Germany would not declare war. He always thought Germany was the bigger threat, yet Americans were so furious at Japan after Pearl Harbor and were not focused on Germany.

- The USSR had not declared war against Japan and the western allies thought they needed Stalin to open a second front to successfully invade Japan.
- Stalin wanted to defeat Germany before he declared war on Japan.
- They didn't know how long it would take to push Japan back to its borders.
- They did not know that they would have an atomic bomb, so they were still planning Operation Olympic and Coronet up to the dropping of the bombs.
- D-Day was basically a practice for Olympic and Coronet. They would need all of those ships and landing craft. And the men.

Because Hitler was mad enough to declare war on the US.

I think that is a debatable conclusion. The US were already supporting Britain with arms that was only going to increase. Hitler had an opportunity to do serious damage to US shipping before they got organised and maybe for much longer if the US concentrated on Japan. And he was right, for a time German U-Boats rampaged up and down the US west coast, the second happy time as the crews put it. Helped by Admiral King's ignoring of British advice and the lack of a blackout of US ports. The British ended up sending escorts to the Americans so they could protect their costal shipping. By 1943 that threat was diminishing as the US finally got organised.

Japan had already (within weeks of Pearl Harbor) conquered about all it could reasonably reach, so it was just a matter of taking it back when we could. Germany, on the other hand, seemed to be about to defeat the USSR, which would lock up Europe, perhaps for good.

Interesting discussion so far.

I would offer some different views, but please don't take this as denying what others have said. Rather, I am hoping not to take away but add to the discussion with some additional perspectives…

US carriers were much more useful in the Pacific than they would have been in the Atlantic.

I would agree that they were more useful in the Pacific. But that doesn't mean they would not have been useful in the Atlantic -- only that if you had to choose, they made a bigger difference in the Pacific.

Airpower was the single most effective toolkit to use against submarines. True that airpower was not yet proven as the bane of the submarine at the start of the war, but it was already expected that airpower would be important. If the USN had placed more carriers in the Atlantic early in the war, the "mid-Atlantic Gap" could have been closed, the "happy hunting grounds" of the South American coast / Caribbean Sea could have been covered, and the threat of the surface raiders could have been greatly reduced.

As it was, the USN put it's "not ready for prime time" carriers in the Atlantic (I'm talking to you, Ranger) and reserved all of it's first-line fleet carriers for the Pacific. Move those fleet carriers to the Atlantic, and I expect you would see the "Battle of the Atlantic" pretty much won in the first half of 1942 rather than 1943.

American politicians were convinced that German scientists were more dangerous than the Japanese.

I don't see much evidence that "scientists" were perceived as the risk. But Germany as a whole was very definitely seen as a greater risk. Germany was seen a existential risk to the USA. Japan was not.

US war plans and assessments written over the summer of 1941 for Roosevelt all pretty much assumed that the Soviet Union would not survive the German onslaught, and would fall by mid-1942 at the latest. It was doubted that the UK would be able to sustain the fight. The US would then face all of Europe united under German rule.

This perception drove the fleet expansion program, the Manhattan (A-bomb) Project to the B-29 and B-36 programs.

It was always assumed that Japan would be beaten. It was only a matter of time and cost. Japan did not have the natural resources needed for war (metal ores, petroleum), and any routes from resources it might seize could be interdicted.

But Germany, if allowed to consolidate and rationalize the resource base it was expected to conquer, would become a threat to the continued existence of the US.

That was one of FDR's fears was that Germany would not declare war. He always thought Germany was the bigger threat, yet Americans were so furious at Japan after Pearl Harbor and were not focused on Germany.

Yep.

But it was not just that the public was focused on Japan. It was also the slow pace of expanding the European efforts. Roosevelt had perhaps a year of un-questioned support. He had to do something with that year. It was very difficult to re-focus expectations on something that was not going to show results for 2 or 3 years.

The US wanted to go straight back into Europe in 1942, but the Brits (probably rightly) wanted to start slow and build, focusing first on North Africa.

So … Guadalcanal.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Was it ever truly Europe first? American forces went on the offensive at Guadalcanal months before Tourch, and U.S. troops went on the offensive in New Guinea days after the Tourch landings. Large elements of the U.S. and significant elements of the Royal Navy were deployed to the Pacific. As I recall more Australian and Indian forces were deployed against Japan, and then there was the Chineese.

I have often wondered where the Allies might have conducted their landings in northwest Europe had a dozen fleet and light carriers and a corps of well trained and highly motivated amphibious troops (with their landing craft) been available. IF Europe was really the more important theater of war (and I think it was), and OVERLORD was the most important Western Allied operation of that war (again, most likely), one might well question the US Navy's apportionment of assets in mid-1944. As it was, everything worked out well enough, but it is an interesting counterfactual.

Because Hitler was mad enough to declare war on the US.

I think that is a debatable conclusion. The US were already supporting Britain with arms that was only going to increase.

Here I think Hitler was perhaps not "mad", but clearly very very wrong. It is hardly debatable that this was one of the most monumentally stupid decisions he could have made.

To say that the US was "already supporting Britain" may be true, but there was a HUGE difference between facing Britain armed by the US, and facing the US.

Throwing away North Africa and losing half a million troops in the process, having Italy knocked out of the war, and facing invasion from an un-contested southern flank, as well as tripling or quadrupling the number of troops that he might face on his "2nd front" was NOT a smart response to US flow of arms to Britain.

Hitler had an opportunity to do serious damage to US shipping before they got organised and maybe for much longer if the US concentrated on Japan. And he was right…

Deciding to initiate full scale warfare against the US was the wrong response. It was Hitler doing something monumentally stupid.

He already had some appreciation of the importance of industrial power and natural resources. His focus on the the drive into the Caucasus to capture Russia's sources of oil in 1942 shows that (I know that's after the decision to declare war on the US, but it still shows his ability to understand the real issues).

But … the US had a larger population than Germany (132 million in the 1940 census), with a wider distribution of mechanical and industrial experience than Germany.

Germany essentially had a choice of two paths on the question of declaring war vs. the US:

Path 1: Don't declare war. Face some portion of the economic power of the US in the form of US supplies in the hands of the armed forces of the UK and Soviet Union.

Path 2: Declare war. Face the military AND the economic power of the US.

There was no path available by which Germany could interfere with the economic output of the US in a meaningful way. The US did not rely on shipping for it's own economic power -- it was already the world's largest producer of raw petroleum, pig iron, etc. There was no path by which Germany could take US oil fields, mines, or factories out of service.

They could only interfere with that output reaching the UK and the Soviet Union. Which they were doing anyway, and it wasn't working well enough.

Suggesting that they could strike before the US got organized … well, that's true, but so what? Adding the world's largest navy, with the greatest number of slips and the largest output of steel and petroleum for fleet expansion, to the fight would not be a rational approach to improving Germany's ability to interdict supplies to the UK, except for a very limited period of time. So they lose the war in 2 or 3 years, but have a lot of "fun" for several months first? Oh, good plan.

They made much the same mistake the Japanese made. They were guided by the belief that America was weak due to the make-up of the population … that no "mongrel" breed could work effectively.

How they got to that conclusion given the mountains of evidence of US efficiency and effectiveness in the prior 50 years' time … well that's where the stupidity comes in.

If your decision making is guided by beliefs in racial superiority, it's easy to do stupid things.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

After Torch the USN had more capital ships in the Atlantic than was needed. King was able to send ships to the Pacific, Wasp, North Carolina, Washington, etc.

The United States fought a global war on two fronts. Rearm the British and the Soviets. Completely rebuild the French Army and Air Force. Send supplies, troops, and aircraft to China. Build two types of nuclear bombs (in case one type didn't work) and construct the B-29 (which was a billion dollars more expensive than the nuclear bomb project.) No other country but the United States could do all of this.

Here I think Hitler was perhaps not "mad", but clearly very very wrong. It is hardly debatable that this was one of the most monumentally stupid decisions he could have made.

To say that the US was "already supporting Britain" may be true, but there was a HUGE difference between facing Britain armed by the US, and facing the US.

I think that is using the benefit of hindsight. No disputing it proved to be the wrong decision, but it wasn't irrational. In Hitler's thinking he needed to keep American combat power out of the fight for a year or 18 months so he could complete the conquest of Russia planned for 1942. With unrestricted submarine warfare he could disrupt the flow of supplies and prevent the rapid build up of US troops in the UK. With Russia defeated and the raw materials he needed for German armaments he could move the bulk of the German army west. He largely got it. Torch wasn't launched until the end of 1942 with limited US involvement. The US daylight bombing campaign didn't kick off until mid 1943. The battle of the Atlantic was still raging until mid 1943. What he didn't get was a victory over Russia. However in December 1941 very few people would have bet on a crippling defeat of the Wehrmacht at the end of 1942! Had he got that victory 1943 looks very different. With Russian manpower and resources out of the equation Overlord is facing 300+ Wehrmacht divisions that haven't been bled white by massive defeats in 1942 and ‘43.

Suggesting that they could strike before the US got organized … well, that's true, but so what?

That presupposes it wouldn't have happened anyway. At some point US ships or planes would have been attacked giving Roosevelt the excuse to declare war. I don't think the argument that Germany not declaring war on the US would have kept the US out of the war in Europe for very long very credible.

Fred@

But if that is your argument then a declaration of war on the USA is still nuts. If Hitlers aim was to keep the US at arms length until he had destroyed the soviet union then a more obvious course of action is to offer peace until you have all your pieces in play for the confrontation with the USA rather than poke the bald eagle with a stick before you were ready to deal with it. Hitler had all ready done this with the Soviet Union 1939 so he could deal with Poland and western Europe.

@Prince Rupert

Hmmm! What sort of peace would the US accept given that they were already helping the UK? At the very least Hitler would have wanted an end to US shipments to the UK, which means effectively abandoning the UK to its fate. No more lend lease, no more raw material or food from the US. Can't see the UK lasting long under that situation. What happens in the desert in ‘42 with no Stuarts, Grants or Shermans for Alamein? No Torch to trap Rommel either.

The logic for Europe first has been very well presented and, in retrospect anything else would have been disastrous.

But I do wonder about US sentiment at the time. The initial response to 7th December was obviously revenge on the Japanese Empire. That US ground forces were actively at war with the Japanese within days could only have driven them further towards the Pacific first. It is then worth remembering that, as the Japs ran wild over the Western Pacific and threatened Australia and even the US coastline, it was feared, the Germans could wait.

Much of the above is about Hitler's declaring War on the US, (thank God) and less about the US decision for Europe first subsequently. But a very good case was made for that earlier on. I just think I am glad logic triumphed over emotion in early 1942.

No Torch to trap Rommel either.

The TORCH plan was for The Allies to land in North Africa and then to move east into Libya and take Rommels base at Tripoli. Monty was to advance west and Rommel would be surrounded and destroyed. It turned out that the 'cavalry' coming to rescue Monty had to call on him to come and rescue them-which he did!

@mkenny

Very true Torch didn't go to plan, but it did end up eventually in the Germans being surrounded and destroyed.

I worked with a German lady who had been born during the War. She had a certificate from the German government stating that she was 100% pure Aryan and seemed proud of it. At any rate, when I told her Hitler declared war on the US, she refused to believe me, even after I brought in a book or two to back me up.

Grelber

I always find it interesting that the only country to end the war significantly richer than at the beginning was the US! – and it finally dragged US industry out of the Great Depression.
NB: I am glad they were wealthy, as it allowed most of Europe to recover much quicker (via the Marshall plan)!

Not being bombed helped a lot (although being a net creditor didn't hurt). The US was probably the only major combatant nation not to be subject to either a bombing campaign or land battle on its national soil.

Nine pound +1 add we were forced to expand industry, build manufacturing plants and everyone needed our products to rebuild. Thus also allowing us to offer jobs to returning GI's. (All of which we seemed ready to squander starting in the 70's).

What would have been the result if the US had not sponsored the plans to rebuild Germany and Japan, or forced the repayment of loans and leases? Would we have been unchallenged industrially for another 40 plus years?

@35thOVI

Not sure about other countries, but the UK paid around $8 USD billion for lend lease, when the money for the supplies/services Britain supplied the US with is taken into account. That is after having exhausted all its gold reserves and liquidating the vast majority of UK's overseas interests buying US arms and munitions. A lot of the equipment was destroyed/disposed of as the US didn't want it back. If I ever get a Time Machine would go back and try save all of that. Pushing perfectly serviceable aircraft over the side of carriers into the sea. Those planes would be worth a fortune now!

We still do, it was called an Afghanistan "withdraw".

Japan threatened colonies, Germany threatened the homeland.

But Japan actually fought US soldiers in the Philippines. The West coast was afraid of Japanese troops/bats/ balloons. I don´t know if old resentments from WW1 were recycled, and I guess 1941 saw not the kind of news overflow like today. But to me it is kind of astonishing that the government made the right decision. The Navy and the Army were professionals , I expect them to know better, so no surprise there. And maybe MacArthurs foolish fight for the Philippines helped, too.

Well, the reason for that is simple. After two decades of admitting the Philippines were indefensible, the administration decided in July, 1941 to defend them, and began dispatching units to reinforce them. There was a whole division on the West Coast awaiting shipping to move when Pearl Harbor happened.

The US hoped to deter the Japanese until fairly late in the game, and then hoped that they might make a fairly limited series of attacks against the Philippines and Malaya. We overestimated both the deterrent value and the military effectiveness of our forces in the Pacific and greatly underestimated Japanese capabilities and willingness to take risks. The Japanese attack exceeded all of our expectations, but the decision to beat Germany first had been made well before then.