"Howe's reasoning for moving by water in 1777?" Topic

Has anyone ever come across any accounts of the beginnings of Howe's 1777 that makes sense of his moving his army by sea to and then up the Chesapeake to Head of Elk? I'm re-reading Ketchum's book on Saratoga and his opinion is that it was foolish and a waste of over three weeks of prime campaigning weather. I tend to agree and since hindsight is 20/20 I've always thought it made way more sense to go overland. That, and a real move by Clinton up the Hudson to cooperate with Burgoyne's move south from Canada. It really makes you wonder what Howe's thought process was and if jealousy and resentment among the generals could influence them to make such poor decisions. I've read enough military history to know how personalities influence decision making but it still makes me wonder if it's really that simple.

I always thought it was speed and secrecy.

Reminds me of a story I read years ago, where a history professor asked his class why Burgoyne lost the Battle of Saratoga. One wag yelled out, "Lack of no Howe!"

Thanks Mad Anthony. That's the kind of info I was looking for! I'm sure it would have looked better in hindsight if the winds had cooperated as well.

Just my thoughts:

The year before they went overland. New Jersey was captured, but the militia proved very active and cut the supply routes to the outposts on a regular basis. The army was overextended making the attack on Trenton viable. We all know the results.

Going by water meant the army wasn't operating in hostile New Jersey, Philadelphia would have a easy supply route by water, and New Jersey would be cut off from the rest of the colonies with New York on one flank and Pennsylvania on the other. In the context of the time, it makes sense if the Saratoga Campaign wasn't coordinated with Howe.

Had the winds not been contrary and the Americans hadn't kept Philadelphia's water route isolated for an extended period, Howe might have been able to send a significant force back to help Burgoyne.

Just my thoughts.

I'd agree with Mad Anthony and Jackson. He'd already tried the overland route and long overland supply lines hadn't worked well. He could, on paper, have marched on Philadelphia without maintaining a supply line to rendezvous with the Royal Navy on the Delaware, but if for any reason the RN didn't make it…well, I think we all know several versions of that story.

Real problem, as Mad Anthony points out, was that no one on the British side knew what military or diplomatic actions could bring about a British victory. I don't know myself.