"Elite troops definition" Topic

"ELITE: Well-trained men belonging to a unit with a guard or grenadier title, including ad hoc combinations of nominally separate grenadier companies, but not such companies when operating as part of a line unit. They are assumed to be very well drilled and to have an exceptional opinion of themselves. Troops with the right titles but not of the requisite quality, such as Neapolitan or Spanish grenadiers, do not belong in this class and must be fitted in elsewhere as seems appropriate."

Discuss.

Again? Sigh. Looks like something fetched out of a rule book.

So, no cavalry, artillery or light infantry elites (unless they're guard)? Grenadiers' performance improves when they're isolated from center companies. And whatever selectively recruited, well-drilled, long-service line units with an outstanding combat record are, they're certainly not elites, since they're not titled guard or grenadier.

But certain units with the right titles are "not of the requisite quality." So I still don't know who's an elite. Evidently someone makes that decision, but it's not clear who. (I also think he's maligning Spanish grenadiers, at least in 1808-09, but it's not a hill I'd die on.)

I give up. Who did this one? And not that I haven't played with worse.

That definition does not fit regarding the Grande Armee. Grenadier and voltigeur companies with their parent battalions are still elite units.

Sapeurs d'infanterie were also considered elite troops.

Interestingly, Napoleon would not allow newly-raised and newly formed regiments to have elite companies until the unit proved itself in combat.

'It took more than being tall to be considered a grenadier.'

And then you have to consider cavalry, artillery, and engineer units that 'qualify' as being elite troops.

The 95th rifles were certainly elite.

IMHO, for wargaming purposes "Elite"-ness in the Napoleonic Wars could refer to a number of distinct traits:

Training – ability to perform combat evolutions and deliver combat power in rapidly changing or unusual circumstances, such as quickly forming square under battle conditions, defense of built-up areas, or attacking over broken ground.

Enthusiasm – ability to absorb the shock of a sudden infliction of casualties while retaining combat power in the attack or defense. This trait can often be found in patriotic but green troops.

Steadfastness – the converse of Enthusiasm, this is the ability to absorb a long and steady accumulation of casualties or other battlefield shocks while retaining combat power. This trait is generally associated with veteran troops, and is sometimes also linked to national psychology such as the archetype of the stoic Russian infantry.

Self-Regard – Also known as esprit de corps, this is the degree to which the unit holds itself to a high standard, knowing (or imagining) that their reputation and honor demand a certain level of performance. This might be the only distinction of "grenadier" or "guard" units for an army that has been at peace for many years, such as the Prussians in 1806.

Reputation – the converse of Self-Regard, this is the degree to which the unit is held in high regard by the _enemy_. This is a much rarer trait to encounter, most troops and officers being not particularly aware of differences in enemy units, uniforms, etc. But certainly the appearance of the blue greatcoats of the French Guard, for example, would be likely to have a morale effect on the enemy.

"Elite" troops under this taxonomy would have higher-than-average ratings in one or more of these traits. Was a Prussian grenadier battalion – superbly well-trained and with a high self-regard – "elite" versus a French line infantry battalion in 1806? The French unit might be nondescript in terms of numerical designation and uniform distinction, but in 1806 it would be composed almost entirely of veterans with a high degree of devotion to the Emperor (enthusiasm) and long-standing combat experience (Steadfastness), as well as being equally well-trained at this point in the wars due to the preparation at Boulogne as well as the aforementioned combat experience.

I am Elite.

Russ Dunaway

I give up. Who did this one? And not that I haven't played with worse.

This is Phil Barker in WRG 1685-1845.

That definition does not fit regarding the Grande Armee. Grenadier and voltigeur companies with their parent battalions are still elite units.

Older gamers at the time told me that this was very important in the choice of armies at the time: Russians, British and French being thought to have lots of units with the requisite titles. How gloriously effective were the British cavalry with their plentiful "Dragoon guards"; how amazing the French with their high ratio of 'elite' companies to line companies in their infantry – after 1808 of course, one wouldn't want to mess about with the notoriously rubbish French of the 1805-7 period. But the awesomeness of the 1814 Young Guard…and the Russians oh me, oh my! How many troops with Grenadier in the title? And how clever of Junot to fill the Westphalian army with units with 'Guards' in the title! How stupid of the Bavarians not to.

My opinion on this might be inferred from my tone. It was, and is, utter rubbish.

It does remind me though of what I really want to see though: a points/morale system based on pay.

Those rules made the distinction between Elite and Veteran.

I wouldn't sweat the brief examples, knowing what it means in the rules is more important.

Did PB or his crew release army lists to show how they applied the classifications – I know there were some produced here and there but I don;t know what standing they had with the author of the definitions.

Perhaps to this one could add, "Those units who think they are"

Example from out of period – some parachute units in WWII
The 101 is often called elite – yet Normandy was there first campaign.
The 17th in Ardennes campaign are not rated as high even though they had one regiment that served in Normandy with 82.

If it looks like a duck and acts like a duck – it's a duck, regardless as to what they call themselves.

I wore their patch, though I was never worthy of it. "I'm with the 101st, and this is as far as the [krauts] are coming."

My feeling is that if you write a historical scenario, you say what each unit is for that scenario. If you use a generic scenario, players get as many "elite" or whatever as the scenario calls for, using whatever regiments they see fit. A points scenario may say that certain armies don't get certain types or only in certain proportions. But again, they player uses whatever units he cares to--subject to paying the points, and subject to being laughed at by his fellows.

It's when you can declare a unit to rate some advantage and don't have to pay for it that things turn ugly.

Iirc it was in Horse, Foot and Guns that Phil defined Elite as "units with a high opinion of themselves", and was careful to differentiate them from veterans. In the voluminous army lists, very few elements are elite or veteran.

Whirlwind has ID'ed the source correctly.

I was rereading these the other day. They struck me as a good example of the mess you can get yourself into if – for some unfathomable reason – you object to assigning national characteristics. What they are apparently trying to do is generalise troop quality while also limiting which armies can have troops of some of these qualities.

An army's performance is a reflection of its doctrine, training, leadership, equipment, and so on. I just rates 'em all accordingly.

Sometimes the easiest solution is to look at the history rather than try to have an escoteric formula. As has been alluded to status whether earned or granted can vary from any hard and fast rule. Are the Connaught Rangers elite? Or the 9th Leger? Mostly yes in my opinion but on some occasions not so much. So, hit the books and find a fact to use.

Of course, imagi-nations are a different kettle of fish but the key word is ‘imagination' and no one can gainsay the ‘history'?

Sometimes the easiest solution is to look at the history rather than try to have an escoteric formula. As has been alluded to status whether earned or granted can vary from any hard and fast rule. Are the Connaught Rangers elite? Or the 9th Leger? Mostly yes in my opinion but on some occasions not so much. So, hit the books and find a fact to use.

You hit the same problem from the other side. How are you even tolerably certain when you read an account from a battle 200 years ago that the success of a given unit in a given battle was due to its superiority as a unit over the average and not down to the other situational factors or the weakness of the opposition or pure chance – assuming that all those things were actually described accurately anyway? And not just doing that, but putting an effect size on all those things?

Being a big battle sort of guy, for Napoleonics and ACW I really don't worry too much about individual unit ratings apart from broad categories of raw, seasoned and veteran.

It is usually fairly obvious who is who.

I believed for the purposes of having a GAME many things such as this are basic generalizations.

Russ Dunaway

I think "Elite-ness" equals personal bias ?!?

Or more likely how many points you are willing to spend on fewer wargame units ;-)

Have fun.

Like I said, it's a game.
Some properties in Monopoly are more valuable then other's because the game says so -- so as to have a game???

Russ Dunaway

I kind of do care, and do reward or demote ratings on units that perform exceptional or disaster of their own. 1 point which alone doesn't do much but a few have had 2 so that gives them the next rate. Have some that have lost.
Granted its good or bad die rolls but that's the game.

Want a better game based upon real life factors? First, discard the numbers- they and casualties do not determine things but in a vacuum! What really matters is if the unit leaders can maintain control over their men! Training and experience of the men; training and experience of the leaders together account for half of a unit's basic rating. The other half is "How long have THESE men been serving under THESE leaders?" A unit does not to be in combat to have the knowledge of who the leaders need to keep an eye on; the men having confidence in their leaders; and just a simple difference of fatigue. (Did they have to march to the battlefield or did they get to sleep on their arms? When was the last time they ate, slept, had clean water to drink?….all affects the unit's performance among a myriad of other factors (like weather and topography of the land, etc.) For me, typical games of using straight "morale grades" is too linear! Halfway into a game those "veterans" still are rated the same as they were at the beginning of the game! The only linear things in reality is Time, Distance and one's death. Technology can address how far can one travel a certain distance in quicker amounts of time, but a mile is still a mile and an hour is still 60 minutes! Applies to ALL periods of history. The game should be a challenge to the gamer who is playing as a commander and should face decisions that have consequences in the game. This has been a quest for me over the past 20 years, but all I see are the same value sets, same mechanics and same results for the same reasons as if all was linear. Life is not that "regular" so why should our games be? Historical? most are just because of the figures we are using with a lot of disregard for what those little lead guys are supposed to represent and factors that their real-life counterparts had to endure and still fight happily along on an equal playing field! Well, battlefields are not perfectly, billiard ball flat! Yet the illusion is perpetuated….

Not really sorry for the rant, but what has always been the number one common factor in all periods of warfare and will continue to be for the future? Leave your answers here..

@Dye4minis
Tom
You missed the term 'cohesion', my friend!
Kind regards
Allan

Dye4minis, I think you do the many rule writers who serve our hobby, and the players who use those (or their own) rules an injustice. As a whole, they do try to consider all the issues you raise; some writers abstract or ignore some, others select to abstract others. players interpret things like dice splits when they create their game narrative to consider the possibility of these things. I rolled a bunch of 1s? The commander failed to restrain his troops to delay the volley until the optimum time (or something). I partly agree regarding weather. Many rules systems across periods have weather rules. That some players ignore them is not the rule writer's fault (assuming they are playable).

We all know we're playing an abstraction. We all know rules can't actively and specifically include everything, without being unplayably complex. But none of us thinks none of it was significant.

Cheers,
John

Thanks, Allan. What I posted was integral to that value set.

John: Yes, all rules are an abstraction yet most rules are based upon faulty value sets. Rules writers have done the gamers an injustice when they continue to pass on rule concepts that were developed in the 1960s.Take the value set of numbers for example: What's the magic number a unit must suffer before it is ineffective or routs? Where is the connection between how large a unit is and it's ability to function? History (pick any period), you will find examples of units running away with little or no casualties yet, others almost die to the last man.

In most miniature wargames, that value set suggests that casualties determines when a unit is kaput. In many cases, that number remains the same (linear) for all same rated units. The morale die roll is random but the number required to pass applies to all units of the same morale grade when suffering the same casualties. Morale checks? To see if the men stay or run away? The military is NOT a democracy! Why do they run away?

Also, why is it that combat results charts are created linear? (rolling high is always good; low is always bad) In my rules, results on the chart are scattered and it keeps both players active in the game. How well a unit fights is a product of it's training and experience, leadership and control over the men.

I see no one has submitted an answer to my question. I ask it again: What has always been the number one common factor in all periods of warfare and will continue to be for the future? Leave your answers here..(Allan, you know the answer so let them guess a bit.)

Best regards,
Tom Dye

I see no one has submitted an answer to my question. I ask it again: What has always been the number one common factor in all periods of warfare and will continue to be for the future? Leave your answers here..(Allan, you know the answer so let them guess a bit.)

Well, the invitation to play the 'student' to allow the 'master' to give the solution and beat up on the student at the same time is fairly resistible. But in the precise way that you have framed the question, the answer is 'weapons': no weapons = no warfare. But I suspect you were trying to elicit something different and missed out a word or something.

@ Dye4minis

There isn't one factor and you can't produce even a balance of occurrence as evidence to show there is.

@ Dye4minis

Well, according to these venerable WRG rules, the key factor is nationality. For example, in the reaction tests section, we find

If surprised or Spanish +2

It's silent on what you do if surprised and Spanish. Now I used to have a Spanish cleaner, and I have to say, +2 seems fair (assuming Spanish grenadiers and Spanish cleaners are similar). Maybe even +3.

Was that what you meant?

@ 4th

I alway thought the key factor in WRG rules was picking the best army list.

Thanks, all, for your opinions. My answer is MAN. While weapons systems change, society changes, and training changes, it's the man that has to use them. It is interesting trivia that an M-16 can shoot a mile but someone actually hit by a round fired at that range is truly unlucky! This is the premise of what I am getting at. No two men are exactly the same. What are units made up of? Men. Therefore, how can two units be exactly the same? This is my argument against the 60 year continuation of the concept of "morale" in most wargames. The value sets used in most wargames are generally not in sync with reality. How many people remain in a unit can be a factor in the unit's ability to function, but it is the unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit functioning as a unit. That, in my experience and research, is THE most important factor. Of course, there are many other factors involved but it remains the unit's leadership to deal with it all. Do we really need to crank so many charts and modifiers to determine the current value of the unit? Is there ever an accounting for the results of the unit's leadership efforts to regain or maintain control?

While all this sounds like a lot of complication for a rules set, I challenge that. In playtest over a LONG period of time, mechanics have been developed that actually play faster than many popular rules sets. (In fact, the most time consuming part is determining the unit's value for todays battle). Additional scenario impacts can be added or subtracted from those values at that time (like weather effects, accumulated fatigue to get to the battlefield, terrain traversed, hunger, thirst, shortages, etc.) The actual playing chart is one page and mainly consists of ranges, situational modifiers and the Combat results chart.

A word about the non-linear combat results chart: The results are randomly listed; rolling high is not always good and rolling low is not always bad. Combat results are in terms of effect upon unit leader's ability to maintain control over the men (my definition of Unit Cohesion). Combat is unit against unit. Fires at a unit with little or no casualties still can have an effect upon the target unit. A cohesion check is made at the end of a turn to account for how well the unit leadership's efforts have been during this turn. This check is a snapshot of where the unit is at at this point in the game. If the check fails, nothing worse happens because we already know how bad it is. If the check succeeds, their cohesion value recovers 1 point of cohesion. Every unit starts at 100% cohesion. Each loss point is 25% loss of the remaining cohesion and the functioning of the unit reflects that loss. Probably best of all is that no external charts, paperwork or off board record keeping is required!

So do you agree that regardless of whatever a soldier is armed with, it's the trigger puller, bow releaser, etc. that is the MOST common element in the history of warfare? How well he can do his job and use his weapon, in an organized fashion is a better value set to use than "casualties" and generalized, linear morale grades?

Thanks to all who have contributed to this discussion. I hope you will continue to participate. My tone is not meant to be insulting or with teacher to student kind of arrogance so if I came across that way, I apologize. I did need to use some sort of attention getting step to get a discussion going on this subject whose approach goes against current and past game mechanics.

As long as Man continues to wage war, he remains the baseline of all weapon effectiveness, tactics and man will always be behind victory and defeat.

We need to define what elite actually means. Does it mean the troops are at peak condition, superbly trained and armed and filled with self-confidence, or are we talking about the survivors of multiple difficult fighting situations? Steiner in Cross of Iron is a classic result of multiple engagements while Captain Stransky could be classed as a well-trained self-confident, overconfident actually, soldier.

What is the difference between these two types of troops and what does a commander get from them. It was often said the French old guard troopers were very much like Steiner, while the Prussian Guard in 1806 were perhaps well trained, well equipped and overconfident soldiers.

pfmodel. A perfect example of no two people are the same. In my example above, I am talking the efforts of a unit. You at the individual level. The same parameters can be found: Training, experience, length of service together, fatigue, hunger, thirst, sleep deprivation, etc. IIRC in Cross of Iron, the Captain could not really control the efforts of Steiner. Both are members of the unit's leadership. Steiner was more respected. Why? Because of the length of time the survivors who got to know him and his style of leadership. The Captain not so much. Yet, the unit barely remained under control but the aim of the move was the conflict between Steiner and the Captain. Steiner looking after his men and serious consideration of the men over self with the Captain.

While a fictional war movie, the story rang true. I can see your comparison between the Old Guard and 1806 Prussian Guard a very believeable comparison. Knowing the history of units makes the job easier in rating the performance of that unit. Yet, that performance is not linear. There are too many factors to consider (fatigue, hunger, thirst, weather, green apple two step spreading thru the unit, etc.) While at the last battle, they may have been better refreshed they might have performed better than in today's battle. Am pretty sure that at Waterloo, the Old Guard were wet (it was raining), had top march in the muck, cold, hungry and thrown into battle when usually all they had to do was marginal. They just had an "Off Day".

I would suggest that if all contributing factors were equal, Elite Troops are those units that have proven themselves to be more reliable than the rest, most likely to succeed in achieving their objectives without much help from others.(RELIABLE AND ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES THAT WERE ACHIEVABLE.) Yet one never knows if todays battle will yield positive results for that unit, but represent the best choice for a difficult mission over the rest.

@ dye

A units leadership are also men, who need leading, ad infinitum until you reach god, or the Emperor Napoleon depending on your proclivities. I'd also suggest that as soon as the leader is not in the same tactical position and thus under the same tactical stress as the lead his value wanes rapidly.

Am pretty sure that at Waterloo, the Old Guard were wet (it was raining), had top march in the muck, cold, hungry and thrown into battle when usually all they had to do was marginal. They just had an "Off Day".

But how do you know that they had an 'off day'? Isn't it equally likely that it shows that situational factors trump 'quality' factors?

No two men are exactly the same. What are units made up of? Men. Therefore, how can two units be exactly the same?

They are staggeringly unlikely to be 'exactly' the same but that it doesn't stop it being 'very very likely' to be 'broadly similar'. Having more people involved decreases the differential between units, not increases it.

@ Whirlwind

"Having more people involved decreases the differential between units, not increases it".

So logically we should throw more dice for morale for a larger unit thus getting a more average score most times.

@Mark,

Sure. Or you could also assume that the "however many dice you could throw" had a normal distribution and then work from that if you wanted to roll less dice. That is one reason why rules fashion had a brief flirtation with averaged dice, after all.

"ELITE: Well-trained men belonging to a unit with a guard or grenadier title, including ad hoc combinations of nominally separate grenadier companies, but not such companies when operating as part of a line unit. They are assumed to be very well drilled and to have an exceptional opinion of themselves.

Not necessarily one category. It could be size (Large in the case of grenadiers and extra small in the case of voltiguers), youth, education, social class, experience, fanaticism or ideology. It can also be training, esprit de corps, uniforms, leadership.

Troops with the right titles but not of the requisite quality, such as Neapolitan or Spanish grenadiers, do not belong in this class and must be fitted in elsewhere as seems appropriate."

All indications were that Spanish Grenadiers/Guards and Neapolitan Guards (and Elite companies) acquitted themselves well in combat. Where does this dreary little opinion originate from?

Discuss.

Mark J. Wilson: "A units leadership are also men, who need leading, ad infinitum until you reach god, or the Emperor Napoleon depending on your proclivities. I'd also suggest that as soon as the leader is not in the same tactical position and thus under the same tactical stress as the lead his value wanes rapidly."

Not really, just that the higher leaders are faced with different situations.(we may be on the same page here.) Remember that friction exists at all levels. The higher you go up the chain, the problems that need to be addressed are at another level. Being promoted from Regimental Commander (where you only had to worry about one unit) to Brigade Commander- now you need to worry about 4-6 units! Also, now you need to keep your Division Commander out of trouble from the Corps Commander while all the time addressing the needs of your subordinate commands! Can you trust Major Schmuck to be assigned to handle a pressing problem? How well do your know the officers on your staff? Their strengths and weaknesses? Again, the largest factor is how long have these men (staff in this case) served together with this leader? Remember that ALL officers are officers of their country. They are always tasked to safeguard the assets of their government. They always have the A units leadership are also men, who need leading, ad infinitum until you reach god, or the Emperor Napoleon depending on your proclivities. I'd also suggest that as soon as the leader is not in the same tactical position and thus under the same tactical stress as the lead his value wanes rapidly. and authority to defend (protect) those assets (the unit(s) they command). They may not engage in offensive combat unless ordered to from competent higher authority. Of course, history is rife with examples of Commanders not following orders and feel they know more than their superiors. (A glowing sign where the upward flow of communication either was not sent or else not adequately supply actionable intel to their boss!) We wargamers are really bad about the upward flow of communication in the command and control process. The rubber-band style of Command Radius has no provisions for even recognizing this process. If it did, the player acting at Brigade and up should be gaming at that level and not micromanaging the tactical battle from afar.

Whirlwind: "They are staggeringly unlikely to be 'exactly' the same but that it doesn't stop it being 'very very likely' to be 'broadly similar'. Having more people involved decreases the differential between units, not increases it."

What makes you think that? Have some reference? The level of experience and training of the leaders and men, unless serving from when the unit stood up, probably will always be different. As an example, when the North created new regiments their cadres were from Veterans. It was expected they would teach the new recruits the ropes. The Cadre may have battle experience but the new recruits sure as hell didn't! How the cadre dealt with that will vary from unit to unit based upon their knowledge and experience. A very non-linear situation. Linear would be were every regiment had the same training and experience of men and officers and the men served under the same for a long period of time. If you do have some reference to the contrary, I would welcome to see it. It's impossible to read everything y'know, so I'd like to investigate to learn more.

What makes you think that? Have some reference?

You did. You made the argument that:

….This is the premise of what I am getting at. No two men are exactly the same. What are units made up of? Men. Therefore, how can two units be exactly the same?

I agreed with you that beause no two men are exactly the same no unit can be exactly the same. But the same statistical reasoning leads us to know that the 'average' of any group will be less than the outliers. That is what distributions are, no? Pick height, weight, IQ anything you like, that's how it works.

As an example, when the North created new regiments their cadres were from Veterans. It was expected they would teach the new recruits the ropes. The Cadre may have battle experience but the new recruits sure as hell didn't! How the cadre dealt with that will vary from unit to unit based upon their knowledge and experience. A very non-linear situation. Linear would be were every regiment had the same training and experience of men and officers and the men served under the same for a long period of time.

Tom, non-linear =/= random but even then I am not sure that it makes your case. To break it down:

The Union's unit creation system used a cadre of experienced officers and soldiers and then added large numbers of new recruits.
This is not a unique system, lots of armies have done the same.
The Union created a large number of units this way.
The amount of 'skill transference' varied from unit to unit.
You say this is a 'non-linear' process. You could mean a few things by this, but the most obvious one is "the ratio of veterans to recruits does not in itself determine the subsequent skill of that newly-raised unit". (What you call 'linear' th the end of the paragraph above doesn't tally with what I understand by that word…I think what you are saying there is 'all the units are different'. That doesn't have anything to do with linearity?).
I don't know why you would believe this without data but it might be that having better ratios of veterans:recruits does increase the subsequent quality of the unit. The logic of doing this process at all suggests it might work like that but in any case, you would need a lot of evidence to the contrary to disprove it, and the weight would be on you to do it.

In any case – unless you know different – there is no objective standard to tell you how good any individual unit is for wargaming purposes and for pre C20 units, no objective standards at all . There is no objective standard for what constitutes 'good leadership' either. If you are going to derive that from the unit's observed battle record, that is literally the same as deriving it 'just' from the battle record. Even establishing meaningful differences between unit leaderships would be incredibly difficult, probably impossible. As a basic 'sniff' test though, was there a lot of 'fine-grained' decision-making about which officer went where in the Union armies? There certainly wasn't in the Napoleonic Wars, which leads us back to normal distributions of whatever leadership quality actually is…which leads us back to relatively small differences.

This is from a book I lost years ago…it's from chapter III entitled "Assessing Cohesion in Small Units" I scanned the pages but this I feel is important to our discussion:

"Besides reliable logistical support, a cohesive unit
provides the major source of esteem and recognition for unit
members. Because a unit is able to meet this powerful need, the
soldier tends to dedicate his time and energy to it, to its activities,
and to its goals. Conversely, in units where these needs are not
met, the soldier will seek them outside the unit, and often in
groups with goals not congruent with those of the army. Leaders
need to plan and create these conditions for cohesion
systematically.
The cohesive unit also requires an environment that promotes
a strong sense of mutual affection among unit members. The
greater the degree of challenge, hardship, and danger, the greater
the development of mutual affection and attraction among unit
members. Such attraction can occur in peace as well as in combat.
For a purpose to be perceived as worthwhile by the group, what
seems to be necessary is common exposure to hardship, or to difficult training, or to danger. Of course, the role of the leader in establishing the goals and in leading the formation of the unit
members' opinion about the significance of those goals is paramount. "

It highlights that the unit's leadership has a major role in unit performance. To develop that sort of relationship with the men does not happen overnight. Since officers are also men, the methods and even the understanding of the need for them to direct personal efforts will vary from leader to leader. There is a lot more in print on this segment of unit cohesion. When looking at unit performance in battle, more than they were successful comes into play. We have to know a bit more about the unit's history, leadership's confidence in the men and their's into the leaders; fatigue and other physical factors, terrain, weather and just plain old luck of being in the right place, at the right time and in the right condition that lead to their performance….good or bad. Just saying that standards can be established once the understanding of what "leadership" is and how successful the leaders can balance the demands from above and the care and welfare of his men, within the parameters of existing regulations and local situation to work within. Until serious gamers start to question what lies behind the designer's valuation process, nothing will change to make our games more "historical" or in dealing with real life issues. To keep things as a game, we need to boil everything down to looking at the RESULTS rather than dealing with an uncountable factors that COULD have influenced unit actions or even combat. It's the results that the games are based upon and they do not be complex to get there.(If the designer actually knows where to look for such elements.)

Liner means in my use, that things will always end up with the same results all the time. Non-linear is recognition that results can vary due to an incalculable amount of injects to the determining process. Do we really need to know what disease has infected the men making them break ranks to relive themselves? By now, no preventative action can be applied- yet, this is the situation at this moment in the game. This is what I mean by making the gamers playing the parts of unit commander having to deal with situations that are now outside their control. Can the unit still accomplish their mission or will they fail due to circumstances . I feel such events can be incorporated into our games easily and still keep the game moving and creating tension for all playing! SOrry for the long rant but felt "I" needed to toss in at least one reference that could explain what unit leadership must be….and often fail at. (Non-linear, BTW,,,,,smile)

Here is one (of 3 ways) unit cohesion can be used in a game (from my upcoming "Cohesion. It's the Name of the Game" rules set).:

If I have researched out my command:
Use the below chart to determine values for units when you have the historical history for the unit.

The Men

Known Historical Base Begin with
Little/no training (newly raised in last 6 mo.) 1
Unit together under a year w/training 2
Unit together over a year but under 3 years 3
Unit together for over 3 years 4
Converged Elite units (men from different units) Temporary 4
Standing Elite units (in existence over 3 years) 5

Their Leaders
Known Historical Base Add this to the above
Untried Leadership 1 D 6
Demonstrated Ineptitude 1
Limited experience or newly assembled staff 2
Average Competency with some experience on staff 3
Majority of the Leadership with experience and trained 4
Staff has much experience and excellent formal training 5
Led by a political appointee -4

Their Combined history as a unit, together
Known Historical Base
Add to the above
For every year the commander was in the unit after his first +1
If commander was assigned under one year -2
Heavy replacements within the past 6 months (over 10%) -3
Previous known performance (up to 5) -3 to +3
Large Junior Officer/ NCO replacements in last 6 months -4

Higher Command
Subjective 1 D 6
Subtract two if political appointee, Add two if promoted to this position by merit.

Total points are recorded on the command stand of the infantry or cavalry base; on the crew base for artillery.

Line(a)r means in my use, that things will always end up with the same results all the time.

..deterministic

Non-linear is recognition that results can vary due to an incalculable amount of injects to the determining process

…probablistic/stochastic

@Dye4minis,

It is from Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, no?

In any case, I wouldn't argue against the importance of group cohesion and military leadership. But I will maintain that:

We have little idea of the indvidual effect sizes of any of the factors you list in general, and even less for this specific period
We have no idea if the cumulative effect is the right proportion of overall effect compared to immediate situational factor
We have very little idea of the details you mention for most units in history

So it isn't clear that your numbers would make your model more or less accurate than a shared baseline.

I also note that your chart already refers to Elite units without definition (it isn't clear to me if "Known Historical Base" is a separate factor, but again, that would be without definition).

British officers in this period usually barely knew their men, purchased their commissions, and swapped regiments at a whim, yet I don't think anybody would rate the average British regiment as anything but steady at the very least. These long quotes seem very 20th/21st-century in applicability. Napoleonic societies were quite different from our own, and we shouldn't downgrade units because of that. There was also no formal staff training in any army at this time, at the regimental level (nor much need for it, frankly).

I don't see in your list of factors any category at all for how devoted to a cause the men are. Surely that played a huge role for the French under Napoleon, the Rebs in the ACW, the Republicans in the SCW, etc.

Whirlwind. Yes . Probably so. Been doing research for over 20 years and I didn't make careful notes back then. If you believe that man is the common factor in warfare, then you have to also realize that man has certain needs that have to be met in order to see themselves as part of a unit and not just as an individual. There is a certain amount of "herd" factor in operating as a unit. There are many books that describe the behavior of units in history. Pick a period. In the rules, there are two tracks: Starting values (which are what each unit has determined in pre-game or assigned by the scenario designer and Cohesion tracking. It is possible that a unit rated a 10 (the best) can be removed if they suffer 4 cohesion his (each hit is a loss of 25% of the unit's ability to remain functioning). Cohesion can be recovered. There is a mechanism that will decrease the starting value due to fatigue. Regardless of the starting value unit performance will never be as good as it was at the beginning of the battle.

" So it isn't clear that your numbers would make your model more or less accurate than a shared baseline." That is because you haven't seen how it all melds together in game play.

"I also note that your chart already refers to Elite units without definition (it isn't clear to me if "Known Historical Base" is a separate factor, but again, that would be without definition)." The questions are to what degree can you rate the Training and experience of the men and officers. However you assess that based upon YOUR historical research references, it should fall in one of those categories. Ditto for the unit's leaders' training and experience. Some who have studied specific battles will know if (ACW here) did they attend West Point or another military academy?; Have they been with this unit since mustering in? Have they been breveted for bravery before this?; etc. There are more reference available now more than ever. In some cases, if you go back and re-read books you have read, such keywords you overlooked while looking for organizational strengths, uniform info, etc. are really there. What I did not explain in that part 3 is that you together the training and experience of the men, ditto for the Leaders, divide by 2 (round up) then add in how long these men have served under these leaders and that becomes the unit's rating for the beginning of the game.

Stoppage. Just labels without real meaning.

Eumelus: "There was also no formal staff training in any army at this time, at the regimental level (nor much need for it, frankly)." Which time? You cannot get several hundred men to walk together , as a unit, without some training. Not much need for it? REALLY? I totally disagree. Go back and read how the British impressed drunks off the street and turned them into a respected fighting force without the need for training! Sounds like some national pride is seeping into the conversation! 8>)

I deliberately did not mention a period. Run these concepts to your favorite period and I bet they can apply! Even in the future where robots fight our battles, it will be a man involved in the program and control.

"I don't see in your list of factors any category at all for how devoted to a cause the men are. Surely that played a huge role for the French under Napoleon, the Rebs in the ACW, the Republicans in the SCW, etc." Just like most men don't want to be anywhere near they can get hurt, somehow, they do go. How well they perform is directly related to the effects of their comrades, their training and experience and how long the unit has served together. Example: In Vietnam, a large amount of the men were draftees and did not believe in the war. Yet, after a while in country, surviving firefights with the enemy and functioning as a unit a sense of comradery was strong. Leaders that did stupid things and got men killed were getting "fragged". So being devoted to cause is strong- but there can be even stronger forces at play that keeps the functioning of a unit continue on.

"These long quotes seem very 20th/21st-century in applicability. Napoleonic societies were quite different from our own, and we shouldn't downgrade units because of that." The author of those quotes was trying to talk to people with a common core of experience. I submit that all he says can be applied to Napoleonics as easily as Ancients, FP War, AWI, ACW, Conquest of Spain, ….anytime. Men need to know what to do in times of stress, who to look to for guidance, and have belief what he and his comrades can do and if they have his back. So, just as applicable in Napoleonic wars as the Ukrainians are today.

Thank you all for your views!

Stoppage. Just labels without real meaning.

Yours or mine?

Deterministic functions :
Deterministic functions always result in the same output every time they are called with a fixed set of input values and given the same condition of the system.

Just to say that I'm enjoying the back and forth on this, definitely food for thought, thank you. Will come back to it anon. I do wonder what would have happened if some of these conversations had been had earlier in miniature wargaming's history, when arguments at the club and letter's pages in magazines where often the only place for broader discussion.

Hi Tom,

"…So it isn't clear that your numbers would make your model more or less accurate than a shared baseline."

That is because you haven't seen how it all melds together in game play.

No, seeing how it melds together on the table could convince me of two things: that it made a good game (or not), and/or that it was intuitively plausible (or not). I could only be convinced of its accuracy by more exhaustive testing and seeing the numbers behind it compared to real life combats.

"I also note that your chart already refers to Elite units without definition (it isn't clear to me if "Known Historical Base" is a separate factor, but again, that would be without definition)."

The questions are to what degree can you rate the Training and experience of the men and officers. However you assess that based upon YOUR historical research references, it should fall in one of those categories.

I don't think that you are getting what I am saying here. You wrote above:

Known Historical Base Begin with
Little/no training (newly raised in last 6 mo.) 1
Unit together under a year w/training 2
Unit together over a year but under 3 years 3
Unit together for over 3 years 4
Converged Elite units (men from different units) Temporary 4
Standing Elite units (in existence over 3 years) 5

You have already plugged in the concept of 'Elite' before you add in the other numbers to do with training and cohesion. So your actual definition of 'Elite' is an as yet undefined subset of your overall quality ratings.

Hi, Whirlwind. Your posted:

"No, seeing how it melds together on the table could convince me of two things: that it made a good game (or not), and/or that it was intuitively plausible (or not). I could only be convinced of its accuracy by more exhaustive testing and seeing the numbers behind it compared to real life combats."

While I understand you were not there, I wish to share what occurred in my last playtest. (About number 30 so far. Really, not much in over almost 30 years but for about 1/3 of that I was not able to do much wargaming due to the lack of close by gamers and foreign language issues.)

My last playtest was at Veterans War con, held by the Colorado Military Historians, 3 weeks ago. I had an ex-USA Officer and a retired USA senior NCO that taught Jungle Warfare in Panama as players. After teaching the concepts and rules associated with those concepts, they were running the game on turn one. We playtested in the ACW with each running a Division with 2 Brigades each (5 regiments and attached battery). Based upon their inputs, I adjusted two things which made play much faster. They played 5 turns in 2 hours (actual playing time) to a definite conclusion. The confederate Division collapsed in the last turn due to loss of cohesion of 4 regiments in one brigade. The other brigade, by that time, was down to only 3 remaining regiments badly damaged. The Union lost 3 regiments and a battery. Even though Brigades activate one at a time, a complete move (where both sides had opportunities to activate their Brigades using the forces at hand)) went about 30 minutes. The system was well received and several of the onlookers commented that they wished they had signed up for the playtest. (There was an Ancients tournament, 2 Warlord WWII games out on by reps of Warlord, HUGE 15mm Game of Russians verses the Turks, and several iterations of WWII Wings of War, Battle of Britain (among others) going on at the same time. In light of this, I consider the playtest a great success. That is the best way I can respond to your concerns. I must admit that explaining the concepts behind the rules took an hour, but in responses from the two participants eagerly wanted to get "stuck in". They commented that the focus of approaching historical games using these changed value sets was fun, intuitive and once the principals and new approach was explained, it presented challenges to the players that had consequences.

Working on these for almost 30 years, having a FB page dedicated to the background of using Unit Cohesion as the guiding value set

link

has helped prepare me in writing the rules with designer notes inserted in the appropriate places. It may seem heretical that I make you challenge 60 years of game mechanics, so be it.

I use the term "elite" in the same 3rd way of determining unit beginning factors because the use of such terms is more familiar to most gamers. I included that 3rd way at the suggestion of previous playtesters as it helped them better understand how to convert the rules they play using terms more familiar to them. This thread challenges long held beliefs as well. I find this really refreshing as this segment of the hobby is long overdue to see fresh, new ideas come out. If we are to succeed, we need to start from the basics. Man being the common thread in the history of all periods of warfare. So why not focus upon the most important factor first?

Trying to catch up:

Stoppage: Yes, you are right.

La Belle Ruffian: Thank you for being here! Your comment is encouraging.

Whirlwind: Your comments are wonderful. You, sir, are a fine gentleman. I enjoy the discussions here very much. I appreciate your attempt to follow along. I have to be somewhat cryptic in my answers as how it all works is under copyright application. Feel free to email me at tomdye14@yahoo.com. (I see you are not a sponsoring member = if so you could just message me on TMP, but my email I will surely see as I monitor it daily.)

Again, thanks all for taking part in this discussion.
Tom