"Dieppe: A Colossal Blunder" Topic

"Canadian troops were itching for a fight; they got their wish in the most ill-conceived assault of WWII.

The Dieppe raid of August 19, 1942, was a disaster. Within a few hours of landing on the French beach, almost a thousand Canadian soldiers died and twice that many were taken prisoner. Losses of aircraft and naval vessels were very high. It took a long time for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which had provided the foot soldiers for the assault, to recover.

This debacle, spun by those responsible as a glorious failure that paved the way for D-Day two years later, sits like a scar on the Canadian memory of the war, and so it should. Contrary to the public relations experts of 1942, Dieppe was a colossal blunder…"

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Armand

A few years ago there was a documentary that said the reason for Dieppe was as a cover for a snatch raid to grab the Enigma code books from the German Naval Headquarters in Dieppe.

It very nearly succeeded with that.

An idea dreamed up by Royal Navy intelligence including a certain Ian Fleming, later to write James Bond spy novels.

I've never ever heard it referred to as a glorious failure. Nevertheless it was costly. Too costly.
But that being said, a lot of valuable lessons 'were' learnt.
And some invaluable information was gleaned from a German radar installation.
I heartily recommend "Green Beach" by Leasor. A gripping read.

It did the most important thing, Convince the US Military a cross channel invasion in 1942-43 was out of reach for the western Allies.

Also as I recall there was some idea that it would help convince Stalin that the Russians weren't the only ones in the fight

I read one book that said that no way was there going to be a D Day without some real large scale practice. Dieppe was essentially a practice/real attempt at a large scale landing. Its successes and failures ensured that D-day went as well as could be expected.
Plus as Wackemole9 and Frederick said it was an essential strategy in so many ways.

all of the above are true to an extent

i suspect

a forceful raid was needed to convince the soviets that europe first was a viable policy

the british neded to hit back in europe somewhere

the canadians wanted a crack but they were not the first choice the royal marines were and maybe the canadians made things bigger than they need be

flemings raid to get an enigma was a serious add on but not the raison d'etre

information gained was useful and led indirectly to the realisation that taking a working harbour by assault was nor on thus the development of the mulberrys

the raid saw the introduction of the churchill tank in action.

it also showed that capital ships were needed to support the landings not just destroyers

and air supremacy was essential.

Google this for a good (free d/l) PhD thesis on Dieppe

THE PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE, EXECUTION AND AFTERMATH OF THE DIEPPE RAID, 19 AUGUST 1942. Hugh G Henry
repository.cam.ac.uk › bitstream › handle
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Thanks.

Armand

There was no need to capture an Enigma; the machines were sold commercially in the 1930s. What was required was the rotor settings being used. Even if you had those, the messages weren't always useful unless you had other things too, like maps. It was not useful to know that U-boats were gathering in map square 5642 unless you knew where that was.

Thanks also…

Armand

Slightly biased account, when challenged by the main assertion that it provided valuable lessons the article grudgingly states "yes to some extent", Dieppe was badly managed when seen after the event but at the time was reasonable under the circumstances and the answer to lessons learned should be a resoundingly yes, invaluable lessons saving lives in ops Torch, Husky, Avalanche and of course Overlord.

Very costly… but not a 'Failure'.
Some sort of activity was required by Soviets.
Some important lessons. Importance of identifying strongpoints and blasting with Heavy Naval shelling… or air bombing.
Need for specialised 'Funnies'. Experience in co-ordination. Recognition that landings Had to be very large in scale with massive force… not just one limited area.
Very sad losses for Canadians… but Pretty Sure D Day would not have worked without Dieppe.

As for "practice", does Torch, Sicily, Salerno etc count?

None of these had occurred at the time of Dieppe, so. I guess one can view it as the first step on the learning curve of how to invade a beach defended by the Germans, with the later landings built on what was learned at Dieppe.

Wasn't D Day more or less the first opposed landing that wasn't a complete or partial fiasco?

Depends on your definition of fiasco, I guess: most major amphibious operations, including D-Day, had something misfire. The scattered 101st airdrop and big chunks of Omaha were pretty messy, but the overall operation still worked out. I can't think of a really big landing that the Allies attempted on a multi-corps scale that didn't establish a workable bridgehead.

OTOH, Anzio didn't work out so well. But it wasn't thrown back into the sea.

One aspect of Dieppe that I am curious about: is the story that Lovat ordered prisoners to be shot true, or just a canard? I have been reading Donat Gallagher's book on Evelyn Waugh, which documents the conflict between the two men in some detail, and includes the story. Lovat vehemently denied it and the editor of Waugh's diaries expunged a mention of it (presumably because it was libelous), but I have always been curious whether it was true or not.

Strikes me as more likely that the emphasis was more "take no prisoners" in the first place. Light raiding parties, whether amphibious commandos or airborne, tend to avoid the obvious encumbrance of POWs.