"Loose Skirmish Lines 1814" Topic

I saw this statement once and have been searching for it ever since. Eureka! found it whilst looking for something else:

In 1814 infantry would normally fight in loose-skirmish-lines, since they lacked the drill to keep to closer formations under fire:

This technique, however, led to indecisive fire-fights in which few soldiers would be killed on either side, Whenever possible, therefore, the officers would attempt to form columns-of-attack to make a decisive forward movement.

From: A Book of Sandhurst Wargames, Game 2 Craonne – The Troops and Tactics of the French Army, Paddy Griffith, Hutchinson 1982.

? Does anyone know of a source for the loose-skirmish-line statement ?

Although it is stated under the French Troops headline – I've assumed it applies to the Imperialists too.

@ Stoppage

Isn't there a reference? I would be inclined to agree with the statements and cite the behaviour of similarly poorly trained French troops during the revolutionary period who fought in skirmish masses. In 1814 I would not apply it to the Anti-French Alliance [I assume that's who you mean by Imperialists] as they had not suffered the levels of casualties the French had in 1812/13 so more of their troops were better trained.

If you want more information try reading the Osprey 'French Napoleonic Infantry tactics 1792-1815' and 'Forward into Battle' both also by P Griffith.

I'm not sure I would go along with the 'normally' part of it as I reckon it refers to formed troops becoming disorganised under fire and degenerating into a 'skirmish' line. I believe this would be the fate of any body of troops if neither side was prepared to close with the bayonet. Arguably the British line at Albuera must've resembled a skirmish line towards the end of the firefight. With poorly trained troops in 1814 the process would be accelerated but otherwise no different.
Even in the Seven years War there are observations about the infantry not maintaining their ranks in a firefight.

what are loose skirmish lines? In case line infantry cannot control to keep in close order when firing it would be a very dense skirmish line.

The Tsar's infantry brigades would fight with the yegers up front with the heavy infantry in successive lines in columns-formed-on-the-middle.

By 1814 ranks were severely depleted and some yeger regiments were only one (weak) battalion strong.

We could imagine that they would have to operate in open-order lines (two ranks only) in order to cover the brigade frontage.

This light-infantry open-order line could resemble a "loose-skirmish-line".

With the preponderance of artillery compared to infantry – it is not too hard to imagine French regular line battalions operating in a similar manner. Also the dearth of cavalry would obviate having to form close-order infantry in three ranks.

The conscript troops would be better off deployed in masses.

without any doubt the units must have been depleted but otherwise are there sources about those statement or is this pure speculation?

At this moment – a lot of my post of 07/4.02 pm is pure speculation – but I would like to know more.

Hence the original question. Paddy Griffith wrote the statement in his rules. I wondered if anyone had a source.

Just from my personal experience I would say that it's easier to keep control over troops in close order than it is troops in open order.

It seems that these strong skirmish lines were not an 1814 phenonium; from P. Foucart, Campagne de Pologne, (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1882), pp.449-50,

In 1829, General Morand advised the adoption of the order which to him had always succeeded in war in good, as well as in bad, fortune. ‘We formed one line with just the scouts and the grenadiers and the other with columns. The first line, deployed and flexible, very mobile and capable of profiting from all the accidents, of all the resources, of the locality to fortify itself; the other line, composed of columns, is always ready to resist cavalry and to make any movement that could be useful. If the flexible line is repulsed, it came to rally in the intervals of the columns or to move to the rear to establish itself in a position that the columns could then pass through: this can also be done in retreats. The deployed line does not spare its fire, the columns only make use of it when they are approached by the enemy; while the columns retire, the line of scouts use the time to establish, in the accidents of the ground, a ravine, a line of trees, of bushes, where they await the enemy in silence and receive him at point blank range. Surprised by this resistance, the enemy hesitates and prepares to scout them and beat them; but the line of our scouts leaves their position and move rapidly to the rear protected in this retrograde movement by the artillery and columns. One sees in this manoeuvre that one, composed of compact masses supported by guns and always ready to receive a charge; that the other, by its mobility, hidden by the ground, profits from all its resources to increase its strength, avoids committing itself and contents itself with harassing the enemy and delaying his march by forcing it at every step to make a reconnaissance and deployments for an attack. It is thus that a weak brigade rear-guard opposed, in the desert of Elkanka in Egypt, for six hours, all the efforts of the Turkish cavalry…

‘If this order of two lines is best in a retreat, it is no less advantageous for the attack. The line of scouts and grenadiers, which the enemy is unable to estimate its depth nor its strength, especially if its movement is favoured by an accident of the terrain and covered, advances, and at the moment of the attack of the columns occurs which then engage, then the first line, even when covering the flanks of the battalions, stops, reforms and takes a position so that if the columns are repulsed, this line can put up sufficient resistance to give them the time to halt and turnabout.'