Korvessa | 04 Jul 2022 3:59 p.m. PST |
Been reading Rick Atkinson's book on the Italian campaign. He mentions a couple of times that Ike considered giving Patton command in Italy when things weren't going all that well. I suspect that would have killed his reputation. That kind of campaign doesn't seem like it played to his strengths and likely would have accentuated his weaknesses. Any thoughts? |
robert piepenbrink | 04 Jul 2022 4:25 p.m. PST |
He'd have had to learn new things. But he was capable of learning. That said, given the terrain and each side's resources committed to the theater, it's not clear how much any Allied overall commander could have done to speed up victory. I'll tell you what might have been more interesting: ask him to step down a level temporarily and take over the Anzio invasion for the first 30 days, then, win lose or draw, go on to assume command of Third Army in February 44 instead of January. If there was a time Italy could have been broken wide open the first week or so of Anzio was that time. And if anyone could have done it, it was Patton. My guess is that speeds up the Italian campaign by about six months, with the Allies breaking into the Po Valley about the time Patton reached Lorraine. Might bring V-E Day forward a month or so. |
Deucey | 04 Jul 2022 4:26 p.m. PST |
Like Alexander, his reputation is enhanced by the fact that he cashed in early'. |
rmaker | 04 Jul 2022 5:11 p.m. PST |
I'll tell you what might have been more interesting: ask him to step down a level temporarily and take over the Anzio invasion for the first 30 days But that would have meant Patton working for Mark Clark. I can't see that working out. Slapping a soldier is bad enough. Punching out an army commander is far worse. |
robert piepenbrink | 04 Jul 2022 6:29 p.m. PST |
Someone should have punched out Mark Clark. Who better than Patton? Alexander would probably have gotten Georgie an OBE for it. Anyway, give Patton the VI Corps command, put him on the beach at Anzio and as soon as he takes Rome, fly him out of Italy and off to the UK. A couple of good staff officers should be able to ensure Clark and Patton are never in the same room. Or--maybe better--upgrade VI Corps to Army level, so Patton reports to Alexander but not Clark. Deucey, I think you wrong Patton. Given his age and the state of the world, it wasn't early, and he'd have been unlikely to fight another war regardless. Whatever he was, he'd had time to be it. |
Korvessa | 04 Jul 2022 9:38 p.m. PST |
Someone should have punched out Mark Clark. Yeah, wasn't impressed with him at all (I don't know how to do the quote thing) |
mkenny | 04 Jul 2022 10:36 p.m. PST |
I don't know how to do the quote thing TMP link
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Thresher01 | 05 Jul 2022 6:51 a.m. PST |
Given how well Patton did in WWII, I doubt Italy would have been a problem for him. He was a student of history and military warfare, and a brilliant strategist and tactician. He was fully tested, since he survived to the end of WWII and acquitted himself well as a battlefield commander. |
Cormac Mac Art | 05 Jul 2022 9:51 a.m. PST |
He would have relied even more heavily on the Free French forces, particularly the Goumiers. He loved them and their ability to navigate mountains. |
deadhead | 05 Jul 2022 1:08 p.m. PST |
I don't know how to do the quote thing Well neither did I after many years of membership…..but now I do! But my posting looks different. Maybe I need to work on that. I did! I got it!!!!!!!!!! Patton at Anzio is a fascinating suggestion. Either a complete disaster or a triumph. Daring is one thing, drive and aggression is great, but one does need some luck as well and ideally one assumes command just when all the resources grossly favour your side |
Durrati | 06 Jul 2022 5:32 a.m. PST |
I always find such questions puzzling. Although I am aware that for many military enthusiasts in the US Patton is a bit of a cult figure, I just can't see what victories he won in WW2 that lift him above other US or allied generals. For this particular question, the only time I am aware of that Patton had to face a situation similar to the fighting in Italy was when he attacked Metz. And the plan that he came up with – unimaginative and attritional head on attacks against the enemy defenses, I am not sure would have been more effective than what was actually done in Italy? |
Blutarski | 06 Jul 2022 8:26 a.m. PST |
Hi Durrati, The story of Patton versus Metz is a complicated one. Patton was obliged to fight that battle during a period when his entire 3rd Army had been logistically idled by General Bradley in favor of Market Garden. Patton was consequently forced to operate under crippling shortages of both fuel and artillery ammunition. 3rd Army was using captured stocks of German fuel to maintain mobility and captured German artillery to provide fire support (at one point, 3rd Army's artillery ammunition consumption allowance had been reduced to 1.1 rounds per gun per day of 105mm). As well, the fortress complexes surrounding Metz were some of the strongest in Europe and Patton had nothing with which to reduce them at that time. One might reasonably fault Patton for seeking goals beyond his means, but that arguably would only have been made evident after the attempt and Patton was an aggressive general. A decent reference source on the Lorraine/Metz Campaign is "The Battle for Western Europe: Fall 1944. An Operational Assessment" by John Adams. FWIW. B |
donlowry | 06 Jul 2022 8:45 a.m. PST |
I also just read Rick Atkinson's book on the Italian campaign: The Day of Battle. It's a great read. But I still think, as I always have, that VI Corps taking Rome from Anzio is a fantasy. Who was going to protect the flanks of such a move? VI Corps just wasn't large enough. |
Durrati | 06 Jul 2022 10:36 a.m. PST |
Fair enough about Metz – attacking a such an obviously strongly fortified position without the logistics to do so means that you would be on a hiding to nothing – the fault would obviously lie with whoever ordered Metz taken at that time. Was it Bradley or Eisenhower that ordered the attempt? Because to be fair to Montgomery, despite his many faults, if he had been ordered to carry out such a ridiculous ill prepared attack, he would have told the person that issued the order to shove it. Unless they provided adequate means, and would have been right to do so. |
Mserafin | 06 Jul 2022 11:41 a.m. PST |
Completely agree with Don Lowry. They landed enough forces at Anzio to establish a beachhead, but not enough to expand out of it. Given the quick and violent German reaction to Anzio, any attempt to take Rome would have turned into a disaster, whether it was commanded by Lucas or Patton. |
mkenny | 06 Jul 2022 1:48 p.m. PST |
The story of Patton versus Metz is a complicated one. Patton was obliged to fight that battle during a period when his entire 3rd Army had been logistically idled by General Bradley in favor of Market Garden, Blame Monty for Metz? Why not he gets blamed for everything else. Pathetic excuse. |
Blutarski | 06 Jul 2022 5:01 p.m. PST |
Mr Kenny, Read CAREFULLY "Patton was obliged to fight that battle during a period when his entire 3rd Army had been logistically idled by General Bradley in favor of Market Garden …" No one has blamed "Monty" for anything whatsoever in connection with Metz, except in your own pathetically fevered imagination. In fact, Montgomery was not even mentioned in any way, shape or form. Grow up. B |
mkenny | 06 Jul 2022 6:36 p.m. PST |
Montgomery was not even mentioned in any way, shape or form. You said Patton's failure/slowness at Metz was directly as a result of Market Garden. The implication is clear and it is also wrong. Montgomery had secured his own supply lines and he had no need to depend on US supplies. Patton's supply problems were 100% the fault of the US Quartermaster who failed miserably in the field. I suggest you grow up and face facts. |
mkenny | 06 Jul 2022 6:47 p.m. PST |
As well, the fortress complexes surrounding Metz were some of the strongest in Europe Let us rework that and see how it plays with a different city:
As well, the German Forces defending Caen were the strongest in Europe What % of US books/memoirs published 1945-70 accepts that fact as a good reason for the 6 weeks Montgomery spent outside Caen? It compares well to the 8 weeks Patton spent outside Metz. |
Bill N | 07 Jul 2022 2:09 p.m. PST |
Patton's supply problems were 100% the fault of the US Quartermaster who failed miserably in the field. This is a gross oversimplification of what was happening to the Allied supply situation at the end of August/beginning of September of 1944. Things were far from rosy in the British supply chain leading up to Market Garden. It was recognized that a para drop would tie up air cargo capacity affecting supply problems. Linking up with Dragoon forces imposed additional strains on the American supply system. By early September there was just not enough supplies getting to the front to go around. It was not just Patton's attack on Metz that was affected by Market Garden. 7th Army also had to defer its advance through Belfort Gap, probably resulting in a tougher time clearing Alsace. You don't have to believe that Market Garden was a bad move to recognize the decision to pursue Market Garden had costs elsewhere on the front. Not sure how any of this is relevant to Patton in Italy though. |
Mserafin | 07 Jul 2022 3:17 p.m. PST |
Not sure how any of this is relevant to Patton in Italy though. There is an unwritten rule on this board that any mention of Patton requires someone to bring up Montgomery, and vice-versa. |
mkenny | 07 Jul 2022 5:14 p.m. PST |
This is a gross oversimplification of what was happening to the Allied supply situation at the end of August/beginning of September of 1944. Things were far from rosy in the British supply chain leading up to Market Garden. Monty's Mulberry and his possession of the channel ports meant he was able to maintain a reasonable level of supplies. He had none of the ammo/tank problems of the US Army. It is true than the rapid advance had disrupted the supply timetable but it was the delay in taking The Atlantic Ports, the decision to dispense with CHASTITY and the chaotic US supply chain that combined to cause the problems for the US Forces. |
mkenny | 07 Jul 2022 5:20 p.m. PST |
There is an unwritten rule on this board that any mention of Patton requires someone to bring up Montgomery, and vice-versa. If that were it then there would be no problems. The real problem is the constant attempts to shift the 'blame' (for anything that goes wrong) on to Montgomery. It is if some people are unable resist the temptation to slip in a 'Saving Private Ryan' type casual passing disparagement on Monty/The British. |
Thresher01 | 07 Jul 2022 7:07 p.m. PST |
Rome was open for the taking, and Patton's forces would have seized and held it far more quickly than was done. |
Durrati | 08 Jul 2022 5:58 a.m. PST |
What 'Patton's forces'? After Sicily the US high command made sure that Patton had nothing to do with planning or commanding military operations for the next crucial year of the war. You can fantasise about what Patton may have achieved given this command or that command. The US commanders at the time who were responsible for appointing generals to commands made sure Patton didn't get anywhere near a combat command until after the Invasions of Italy and France had safely taken place. |
Blutarski | 08 Jul 2022 11:33 a.m. PST |
Not to put too fine a point upon things, Durrati. but IIUC General Patton laded in Normandy in late July 1944, took command of 3rd Army for Operation Cobra and led it aggressively and competently through to the end of the war. Not exactly a "back-water command" if I may say so. If you want to point to Patton's abrasive manner and lack of "politesse", that's fine. But let's not go overboard here. When General Fredendall fell on his face in Tunisia, Eisenhower chose Patton to restore the calamitous situation in II Corps; Patton turned the situation around magnificently and was rewarded with a promotion and command of 7th Army for Operation Husky. The slapping incident and his ill-concealed dislike for Montgomery that emerged during the Sicilian campaign made Patton a political liability and forced his "side-lining" for a year. Yet, Patton was specifically put in command of 3rd Army by Eisenhower (unquestionably with Marshall's stamp of approval) to spearhead the critical Operation Cobra breakout of US 3rd Armyfrom Normandy. Patton was hardly a surprising choice; he was arguably the most talented, best qualified and aggressive senior armor commander in the US Army. He was not assigned command of 3rd Army because stateside bureaucracy felt sorry for him; he was assigned the job because he was seen (even as abrasive as he could be) as the best man for such a crucial job. Strictly my opinion, of course. YMMV. B |
Durrati | 11 Jul 2022 3:45 a.m. PST |
I am not denying that Patton was a decent general. He did indeed command 3rd army – an important command and was aggressive. HIs operations around Metz probably stretch the definition of 'competent' though. But overall I would probably agree with your summation of his record as 'aggressive and competent'. But even though 3rd army was an important command, it wasn't crucial. The key commands were planning and delivering Overlord and defeat of the German armies in Normandy. I am not pointing to Patton's abrasive manner. I am pointing to the fact that the US high command made sure that Patton had nothing to do with the vital commands and battles of the campaign and he was only given an active command when German defeat was assured. So a decent general yes. But when I see questions like 'what would have happened if Patton had commanded X' or statements comparing Patton with Alexander, Hannibal, Napoleon et al I just don't get it. What victories did Patton deliver that would put him in such a rank? When talking about effective commanders of the Western Allies of WW2 I cant see why Patton is so lionised. Personally, I think Bill Slim is criminally overlooked in such discussions, but that is my personal hobby horse. |
Blutarski | 11 Jul 2022 7:19 a.m. PST |
Again, not to put too fine a point upon things, Patton did participate in the preparatory phases of Overlord as head of FUSAG. One might be tempted to dismiss this as a simple deception operation, but that would beg both the enormity of the operation and the important results it achieved. Criticism of Patton for over-aggressiveness in the 3rd Army operations around Metz needs to viewed alongside a similar display of over-aggressiveness in connection with Market-Garden (coupled with a studied refusal to "follow the plan" with respect to seizing and activating the strategically essential port of Antwerp at the earliest possible opportunity a first order objective clearly stipulated by SHAEF planners well before the first Allied soldier was to set foot in Normandy. Generals quite often are marked by strong personalities, aggressive natures and big egos. - – - As for General Slim, I wholeheartedly agree a magnificent commander and leader of men who performed miracles in a grim but unheralded theater of the war. My opinion there were simply not enough 4-star air-conditioned hotels in his area of operations to suit the press corps. B |
35thOVI | 11 Jul 2022 7:46 a.m. PST |
"My opinion there were simply not enough 4-star air-conditioned hotels in his area of operations to suit the press corps." 100% agree. True for the majority of the non Northern European theaters of WW2. Same with the Civil War and those forces not fighting around Washington DC. |
Mserafin | 11 Jul 2022 8:16 a.m. PST |
My opinion there were simply not enough 4-star air-conditioned hotels in his area of operations to suit the press corps." But Vera Lynn made it out there, didn't she? |
mkenny | 11 Jul 2022 8:58 a.m. PST |
Again, not to put too fine a point upon things, Patton did participate in the preparatory phases of Overlord as head of FUSAG. One might be tempted to dismiss this as a simple deception operation, but that would beg both the enormity of the operation and the important results it achieved. Whilst the deception overall was a success the Germans never linked it the way the Allies had intended. The 'Patton is being held back. He is very important so this must be a real threat' bit went unnoticed.
Criticism of Patton for over-aggressiveness in the 3rd Army operations around Metz needs to viewed alongside a similar display of over-aggressiveness in connection with Market-Garden (coupled with a studied refusal to "follow the plan" with respect to seizing and activating the strategically essential port of Antwerp at the earliest possible opportunity a first order objective clearly stipulated by SHAEF planners well before the first Allied soldier was to set foot in Normandy. Antwerp was never part of the OVERLORD plan as it was not expected to be reached until 1945. True it was an objective but in much the same way Berlin was 'before D-Day'. The catastrophic collapse of the Germans and the unexpected advance that far forward into central France and the Low Countries was not even considered as a possible scenario. It was never expected to be that far forward in September and every commander was mesmerised by the prospect of a quick crossing of the Rhine into Germany and the war being over by Christmas. Eisenhower never made Antwerp a priority because, like EVERYONE else, he expected the war would soon be over. To forestall another 'whataboutism' reply (as the message being replied to is whataboutism) this is nothing to do with defending Monty or claiming Arnhem was a victory merely pointing out how churlish it is to seize every opportunity to relentlessly mark out Monty's mistakes as the 'most frequent/biggest failures/worst defeats and all manner of other over-the-top ways of tarnishing his record so as to polish that of his contemporaries |
Thresher01 | 11 Jul 2022 9:08 a.m. PST |
The original question is a hypothetical of Patton's possible performance in Italy, so I stand by my opinion. His troops/forces performed exceedingly well both in Sicily and in NW Europe, and he helped save the Americans at Bastogne. He was considered brash when he claimed he could pull his troops out of combat in a very short time and have them advance/road march over snowy roads in the dead of Winter, and yet he and they did it. The Germans considered him to be one of the allies' best commanders, and their opinion counts, since they fought him as well as others. The views of professional generals in the German army matter a lot more than those of arm-chair generals here. |
mkenny | 11 Jul 2022 9:18 a.m. PST |
The views of professional generals in the German army matter a lot more than those of arm-chair generals here. Blumentritt considered that the Allied offensive had been too widely and evenly spread. He was particularly critical of the attack towards Metz, pointing out that the forces available to defend this sector along the Moselle were better relatively than elsewhere. "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. Then the Allies' main attack could have continued towards Magdeburg and Berlin, while the side-attack converged in the same direction past Frank-furt-on-Main and Erfurt. All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. |
Durrati | 11 Jul 2022 2:45 p.m. PST |
The Germans considered him to be one of the allies' best commanders, and their opinion counts, since they fought him as well as others.The views of professional generals in the German army matter a lot more than those of arm-chair generals here. I have often read this but am never clear on where it comes from. I have never seen this assertion with footnotes or an indication of what evidence is being used. What German generals said this? When? In what context? |
Bill N | 11 Jul 2022 3:12 p.m. PST |
The usual historical counterfactual assumes the western Allies beat the Soviets to Berlin. There is another valid alternative counterfactual that sees the western Allies on the Rhine rather than the Elbe when the Soviets capture Berlin. Normandy was hugely important to the western Allies reaching the Elbe, but it was just a first step. It was not inevitable that by the end of October the forces of the western Allies would be on the Dutch border, would be in St. Vith preparing to attack Germany, would be in Lorraine or would be on the border of Alsace. Thanks in part to Third Army (along with other units) they got there in early September. @ mkenny, How did Kursk work for the Germans? The advantage of the wide front was it allowed the Allies to advance where the Bermans weren't, or where the Germans were not present in strength. I do agree with Blumentritt's assessment of Patton's decision to attack Metz. However I am doubtful that even if Patton bypassed Metz that he would have had a shot of reaching Berlin in 1944. Getting back to Italy. The problem of launching a hell for leather race from Anzio to Rome was the inability to rapidly reinforce the initial landing. To me the more interesting "what if" is Patton commanding Fifth Army during the breakout. Would he have moved to trap the Germans, or would he have gone for Rome like Clark did? |
Marcus Brutus | 12 Jul 2022 6:00 a.m. PST |
Monty's Mulberry and his possession of the channel ports meant he was able to maintain a reasonable level of supplies. What do you mean by reasonable? The Allies, in total, diverted considerable resources to support Monty's drive into Germany in late August/September of 1944. That meant reducing Patton's 3rd Army to 2000 tons of supplies per day, a totally insufficient number to support active engagement with the Germans. And weren't the Channel ports meant to supply 21st and 12th Army Groups? |
mkenny | 12 Jul 2022 7:50 a.m. PST |
. That meant reducing Patton's 3rd Army to 2000 tons of supplies per day, a totally insufficient number to support active engagement with the Germans Patton's supplies would have been reduced even if there was no Arnhem. Every American Army Group had severe supply shortages. If Arnhem had any effect it was to add to the problem rather than cause the problem. There was at the time, and still is today, a concerted effort to blame Montgomery (directly or indirectly) for the US supply shortage and use him as a convenient way of shifting the responsibility and blaming others for self-inflicted wounds. |
mkenny | 12 Jul 2022 8:19 a.m. PST |
What do you mean by reasonable? A supply chain that was able to provide enough fuel, food and ammunition to his armies to enable them to function efficiently. The UK was never (for example) short of replacement tanks or ammunition. One channel port was handed to Bradley but offhand I can not remember which. The US supply shortage was entirely their own problem caused by the decisions of their own commanders:……………… United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944. : Steve Waddell . Greenwood Press, 1994. The question of whether capturing Quiberon Bay and establishing it as a major port would have eased the American supply situation in late August and September would have enabled the Allies to win the war in the fall of 1944 lay at the center of an often forgotten debate that has continued since 1944. [Harold L.] Mack has most strongly propounded the view that failure to mount Operation Chastity led to the supply difficulties encountered by Patton's Third Army, thus preventing an Allied victory in the fall of 1944. Placing the blame on Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton himself, Mack argued that the three officers did not pay enough attention to logistics. In criticizing Patton, Mack stressed that his failure to see the importance of Brittany occurred because no one informed him of the strategic necessity of the Chastity port. He pointed out that Robert Allen, historian of the Third Army, had asked why Bradley made no effort to clear the Brittany peninsula. Therefore, according to Mack, had Patton been enlightened about the long term importance of the Quiberon Bay port he would have devoted more time and effort to operations in Brittany. Mack claimed that although Bradley grasped the Channel port's importance, he did nothing to implement the program. While "Bradley seemed obsessed with the necessity of capturing Brest; he never made the slightest attempt to capture Quiberon Bay and carry out the Chastity plan." Mack deemed Bradley's claim that the advance that uncovered the channel ports of Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp "made the capture of lower Brittany ports unnecessary," was ridiculous, since Antwerp did not become available until November 26. The Brittany ports could have, according to Mack, been available much sooner." |
mkenny | 12 Jul 2022 9:02 a.m. PST |
Many castigate Monty for not clearing the approached to Antwerp but how many say the same about the mistake at Quiberon Bay? The 4th Armored Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wood, battled across the Brittany peninsula towards the primary objective of Quiberon Bay and Lorient. Several opportunities to seize key Brittany ports were missed, and a combat commander fixated on pursuit of retreating German forces effectively gave the all-important facility of Quiberon Bay away. Much as Field Marshall Montgomery would do later at Antwerp, Maj. Gen. Wood seized the headwaters of Quiberon Bay, but failed to secure the bays approaches, despite the lack of opposition. In both cases, the Germans were able to later fortify the approaches to these key logistics facilities. In the case of Quiberon Bay, the Germans held the terrain until the end of the war. At Antwerp, the 1st Canadian Army, and particularly the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division fought a bitter campaign for the approaches to Antwerp, the result of another commander's decision turn a deaf ear to logistics concerns. After capturing Antwerp, Field Marshall Montgomery had stripped elements from the 1st Canadian Army, which was tasked with sealing off the Beveland Peninsula behind Antwerp and,ultimately, with clearing the approaches. |
Durrati | 15 Jul 2022 11:00 a.m. PST |
So, can we all agree that it is nonsense that the German generals rated Patton at all? Is there in fact any evidence that most German generals were aware that he was in command of the troops they were fighting against, if and when they were? |
Blutarski | 16 Jul 2022 4:45 a.m. PST |
"So, can we all agree that it is nonsense that the German generals rated Patton at all? Is there in fact any evidence that most German generals were aware that he was in command of the troops they were fighting against, if and when they were?" None at all, Durrati. Why would the Germans have been at all interested in that sort of thing? Rest assured that it's ridiculous to even consider such a thing.
B |
mkenny | 17 Jul 2022 10:38 a.m. PST |
There are several examples of German Generals giving their opinion on Allied Generals but they are all post-war and interviews with POWs. However a clear pattern emerges. The 'praise' for any specific Allied General seems to differ depending on where those general were incarcerated. The most striking example is Bayerlein who praises Commonwealth troops and disparages Americans whilst in British captivity and then switched to praising Americans /disparaging Commonwealth troops when in American custody. I have no idea why this sort of thing could happen……….. |