"Napoleonic National differences." Topic

No authenticity in this type of game without Napoleonic National differences or characteristics !

Perhaps Paskal. However a rule set with bad national modifiers could be less authentic than a game with none.

The experience you describe is similar to mine 4th. As with you, I think Austrians should have some disadvantage relative to the French, but not as much as Quarrie did. And, as I said earlier, it should be mainly around issues of command, order transmission etc, not what the actual soldiers are capable of on the battlefield. Marengo is a good example. The Austrians had basically defeated the French but took too long regrouping so were unable to respond effectively to Kellerman's counter attack. As you say, Quarrie clearly knew very little about the Austrians, which didn't help.

@ Johann

The over-egging goes quite a long way down into the mix with ole BQ. If you look for example at light cavalry versus heavy, lights are penalised with a wider frontage so fewer heads in a melee, plus they have lower melee factors, plus of the two melee results tables they use the one that produces lower scores. As a result, light cavalry who make a flank charge against standing cuirassiers are marked down in three cumulative ways, and hence are certain to lose even in very advantageous circumstances.

Now while I'm prepared to accept that there was a difference between light, line and heavy cavalry, I never did buy that it was as great as that.

Likewise with two-deep versus three-deep infantry: the former are penalised once by having one figure per 11mm as opposed to 8mm, but penalised again by using the results table with the lower scores. This double-counts the melee disadvantage of two-deep. If you've reflected it already in your frontages, you don't need to put it in again in the results tables (detached-third-rank skirmishers can't really be represented at all).

I still like the nostalgia, but I'm open to other rules as long as I don't have to rebase…

A game with none.

And it's the talent of the players that makes the difference, but there were nevertheless qualifying differences between the troops, right?

But, as some people say (I don't believe it), there are no bad ones armies, only bad generals…

"No authenticity in this type of game without Napoleonic National differences or characteristics"

There's no authenticity with burdensome Napoleonic National differences either.

It's rare to see differences in national combat abilities which cannot be written off as leadership or positioning issues. Further, too many of these factors distorts the purpose and fun in a wargame. If you want to create evaluations to guarantee the result in a particular battle then that's alright but endlessly coming up with ersatz statistics to justify classification differences is the mark of instability.

It also depends on what information you are consuming. For instance, it is clear that a lot of British Napoleonic writers are happy to mention when French and other nation's troops rout but give the impression that British infantry never did. They dont necessarily ever all say this but they conveniently leave out the ample occasions when British line infantry broke and ran. Rather than a collective national conspiracy, it is probably simply one of those innocent coincidences but it does also illustrate the dangers of creating a false impression of British supermen.

It is better to approach all Nations are equal in their respective class and each nation gets one positive factor where it might apply. For instance, you might want to give Spanish artillery crews a + factor in morale but rather than assuming that Spanish Artillery are special- perhaps it is better just to assume that Spanish line artillery is the same as other nation's guard artillery.

In sum, too many national factors are going to force a player to fret over how to use (or misuse) their army in order to gain factorial advantages rather than just fight the damn battle.

but there were nevertheless qualifying differences between the troops, right?

Unquestionably. My issue is whether those differences were consistent enough across entire campaigns and with different generals in charge to justify building a permanent national modifier into the rules that favors one side over another.

For example you look at what Napoleon accomplished against different Austrian commanders in Italy during 1796 and you might be tempted to build a permanent national modifier that favors French over Austrians. However can that national modifier still be justified when you look at what Austrians under Charles did to the French in Germany at the same time? Or what Kray and Suvarov/Mellas did to French commanders in Italy in 1799? Or what Mellas nearly accomplished at Marengo?

@Au pas de Charge:
So that there are no more British supermen, play a French rule LOL.

@BillN:
It's true what you say, but Napoleon won how many pitched battles against the Austro-Hungarians between 1796 and 1814?

@ Paskal, are you Napoleon or are you Jourdan?

@ Bill N

A very good point and the reason I have personally gone for earlyish (1805) Austrians (who won a lot of battles) rather than the usually-preferred 1809 Austrians.

The intriguing and little noticed thing about the Austrians is that they were clearly the template for the British army. Battalion size, headgear, cut of coat, variety of facing colours, range of regimental distinctions and reliance on linear tactics all point to Austrian practice being the model for British.

@ Bill N

There is another one which is interesting, it is about Jean Victor Marie Moreau, born on February 14, 1763 in Morlaix (Finistère) and died on September 2, 1813 in Laun (sometimes spelled Lahn), in Bohemia, is a French general French of the Revolution, also Field-Marshal of Russia and Marshal of France posthumously.

His father, Gabriel-Louis Moreau, Sieur de Lizoreux (1730-1794), king's adviser, was an esteemed lawyer then judge, civil lieutenant in the bailiwick of Morlaix, and his mother Catherine Chapperon de L'Isle (1730-1775), was the daughter of a merchant and the granddaughter of Pierre Bernard de Basseville, a famous privateer from Morlais.

Jean Victor loses his mother young and is brought up by his father, alongside his brothers and sisters.

The father was guillotined in Brest on July 13, 1794, after having been condemned for having hidden refractory priests, having been the agent of emigrants and having smuggled money to the Marquis de Lescoët.

Of the fifteen children born of the marriage, eight survived.
Victor's younger brother, Joseph (1764-1849), was initially a lawyer; member of the Tribunate on 24 pluviôse year VIII (February 13, 1800), he protested against the accusation brought against his brother.

Under the Restoration he was administrator of the Post Office, deputy of Ille-et-Vilaine on November 4, 1816, prefect of Lozère on August 6, 1817, then prefect of Charente on July 27, 1821 for a year and a half.

The youngest of the brothers, Pierre-Marie-Lubin, was Victor's aide-de-camp, then colonel and baron under the Restoration.

The family is related to Maupertuis (1698-1759), the famous scientist, mathematician, physicist and philosopher.

After he completed his secondary studies at the Kreisker college in Saint-Pol-de-Léon, despite his son's wishes, Gabriel Moreau did not want him to join the army and forced him to study law at the University of Rennes, in order to prepare him for a judicial career.

Rennes law school is renowned and among its professors, we find Jean-Denis Lanjuinais, Isaac Le Chapelier and Gohier.

Moreau is an extended student who stays at school for seven years, becoming the "provost of law", that is to say the one who is responsible for ensuring that order and discipline reign.

The novelist and folklorist, Émile Souvestre, making himself the scribe of his father, Baptiste, also a student in Rennes, describes Moreau in the Memoirs of a Bas-Breton sans-culotte:

"He was renowned for his eye and his good humor.

He exercised a kind of magistracy over his companions: it was he who judged quarrels, tried to appease them or, on the contrary, authorized duels.

He put to the vote the expulsion of the students who had been able to forfeit the honor.

His authority extended to the theater where he decided on the rejection or acceptance of actors.

Simple in taste, generous, devoted, Moreau was beloved by his companions.

In 1788, shortly before the French Revolution, the Parliament of Brittany in Rennes refused to register the edicts of Brienne which upset the judicial organization of Brittany and instituted the same duties and taxes as elsewhere, including the duties on salt (the gabelle) in defiance of the clauses of the Edict of Union of 1532.

Disorders break out to defend the magistrates and soldiers are sent to force them to obey.

Moreau, as provost of the law, organized the students into a militia which took part in the skirmishes between the young nobles and the people, thus becoming famous in Brittany under the name of "General of the Parliament".

This is his first notable act, both political and military.

The arrest of two magistrates provokes a riot in Rennes and the constituted bodies rise up.

Moreau writes to all the universities of the kingdom to inform them that the Rennes bar association "suspended its functions before magistrates who would be cowardly enough to renounce the finest of their rights: registration. Following the example of the Court [of justice] of Rennes, we thought it our duty to refuse to take an oath to the laws of our country, before men who contributed to their destruction, after having sworn to be their defenders."

On January 26, 1789, during the day of odds and ends, a troupe of agitators made up largely of servants of nobles, attacked students outside the door of a café.

Moreau organized the resistance, had the weapons of the bourgeois militia removed from their storehouse, and called 400 students from Nantes to the rescue.

The next morning, the students mastered the pavement, on which there are many odds and ends (ropes used for sedan chairs), hence the name "day of odds and ends" which has remained.

The clashes continue the following day, because all the youth who supported the new ideas come to put themselves under the orders of Moreau.

While the States-General opened on May 20, 1789, Victor Moreau was initiated in October as a Freemason, in the same lodge (the Perfect Union) where Isaac Le Chapelier officiated, he never ceased during his life to be in relation to his mother lodge, where he appears on the acts of the lodge between 1805 and 1810, during the time of his exile and with the rank of "Knight of the Orient".

Companies of national guards having been formed in the cities, he assembled a company of gunners of the national guard of Rennes and was elected captain.

In 1790 he chaired the confederation of Breton and Angevin youth gathered in Pontivy from January 19, 1790.

He deposited the federative act on the altar of the church where the meetings took place and improvised a solemn oath:

"We swear by honor to remain forever united by the bonds of the closest brotherhood; we swear to fight the enemies of the Revolution, to maintain the rights of man and of the citizen, to support the new constitution of the Kingdom and to take, at the first signal of danger, as a rallying cry, live free or die."

Some time later, he passes his lawyer exams, but he will never practice this profession.

In September 1791, he was elected lieutenant-colonel of the 1st Ille-et-Vilaine volunteer battalion, which left immediately for the eastern border.

With them he served in 1792 in the Northern army of Dumouriez.

On February 9, 1793, he captured Fort Stephenswerth.

In March, he reported to Neerwinden.

Under the orders of Joseph Souham, he distinguished himself in the defense of Dunkirk surrounded by the English and received the rank of lieutenant-colonel then that of adjutant general.

At the end of the year 1793 on December 20, the good behavior of his battalion, his martial character and his republican principles ensured him a promotion as brigadier general, at the same time as Napoleon Bonaparte who had just shown himself as the craftsman principal of the recovery of Toulon from the English.

Carnot, reputed to have a good eye for the qualities of a leader, promoted him to major general on April 14, 1794, and gave him command of the right wing of the army in Flanders.

He took Courtrai and Menin and contributed to the victory of Mouscron on April 29, 1794.

First under the orders of Souham, he passed under those of Pichegru and successively took Ypres, Bruges, Ostend, Nieuport and L'Écluse.

After the capture of Nieuport in July 1794, he received the order to massacre the inhabitants of the city. He refused to obey, leading Robespierre to claim his head before the Convention on July 26, 1794. The latter was overthrown the next day, which saved General Moreau's life.

His father was guillotined in Brest a few days later; shocked, Moreau is on the verge of going over to the enemy.

Under the command of Pichegru, Holland is taken.

On March 3, 1795, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army, replacing Pichegru.

Its main role is to maintain the proper functioning of the convention between the French Republic and the Batavian Republic (formerly Republic of the United Provinces) without interfering in the affairs of the latter.

The Battle of Tourcoing established his military celebrity, and the following year he obtained command of the Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle replacing Desaix on April 21, 1796, with which he crossed the Rhine and advanced into Germany.

At first, he was victorious (capture of Mainz and Kehl, victory of Heydenheim on August 11, 1796), but he came up against the Austrians who forced him to retire (given the defeats of Jourdan at Amberg and Wurtzburg in August and September 1796).

This is considered a model of its kind, especially since it brought back more than five thousand prisoners.

Moreau was first in command in April 1796 of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle.

He crossed this river in June, when Napoleon Bonaparte made himself master of all of Italy.

In April 1797, after prolonged difficulties due to lack of money and equipment, he again crossed the Rhine at the same time as Hoche, but their operations were interrupted by the preliminaries of the peace of Leoben.

In Cologne, he had reorganized the Army of Sambre-et-Meuse and then entrusted its command to General Hoche.

In April, he launched the third German campaign and attacked the Austrian forces and recaptured the fort of Kehl, taking several thousand prisoners.

It was at this time that he discovered the secret and coded correspondence establishing the treason between his former comrade and chief Pichegru and the emigrant Prince of Condé (case of the Klinglin van seized during the capture of Offenburg on April 21, 1797).

He was Pichegru's witness against the first denunciations of disloyalty, but he then realizes that his attitude makes him himself suspect of complicity.

He was slow to transmit this evidence to the Directory, while the coup d'etat of 18 Fructidor led to the fall of Pichegru and his imprisonment in Cayenne.

Moreau, summoned to Paris and suspected of disloyalty, was reformed on September 23, losing his command. He is dismissed and it is only in the absence of Bonaparte and the victorious advance of Suvorov which makes the employment of an experienced general necessary, that he receives the command of the army of Italy . On April 21, 1799 he was recalled as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy in place of Scherer. On June 22, 1799, he won the victory of San Giuliano.

He remains with his successor Joubert until the battle of Novi where the latter is killed. He then leads the retreat and puts the troops in the hands of Championnet.

In 1799, Moreau no longer seemed to enjoy any credit, either in the army or within the nation. His conduct during the Coup d'Etat of 18 Fructidor Year V discredited him in all parties.

When Bonaparte returned from Egypt, he found Moreau in Paris, very unhappy with the Directory, both as a soldier and as a Republican.

In 1799, he refused to lead a military uprising against the Directory.

During the coup d'etat of 18 Brumaire, after Bonaparte had taken command of the 17th military division and the troops in Paris, he gave that of the Tuileries to Lannes, that of Saint-Cloud to Murat, that of the chaussée from Paris and Saint-Cloud to Sérurier, that of Versailles to Macdonald and that of Luxembourg to Moreau.

400 men of the 96th are destined to march under his orders to guard this palace; they refuse to do so; saying that they do not want to march under the orders of a general who is not patriotic.

Napoleon must go there himself and harangue them to remove these difficulties.

He lends a hand to Bonaparte by blocking two of the directors, Gohier and Moulin, in Luxembourg and forcing them to sign their resignation.

The new First Consul Bonaparte entrusts him with the Army of the Rhine.

During the armistice of Parsdorf, Moreau, having made a trip to Paris, went down to the Tuileries when he was not expected there.

As he is with the First Consul, the Minister of War, Carnot, arrives from Versailles with a pair of pistols, covered with very expensive diamonds, intended for the First Consul who takes them and gives them to Moreau, saying "They come very timely. This scene is not arranged, and this generosity strikes the minister.

Having rejected Bonaparte's offers to marry him with his sister Caroline Bonaparte or with his daughter-in-law Hortense de Beauharnais, then with the daughter of one of his dependents, Moreau married in 1800, without warning, Miss Eugénie Hulot d'Osery (1781-1821), daughter of Guérit Hulot, treasurer, and Perrine Jeanne Lory, a rich Creole from the Île de France (now Mauritius), opposed to the circle of Joséphine de Beauharnais, whose ambitious family takes an ascendancy complete on him.

The First Consul had little taste for these manifestations of independence and began to be wary of them.

He always behaved very simply, only receiving former soldiers.

Put at the head of the French army of the Rhine during the year 1800, with at his request Charles Malenfant as assistant to the General Staff.

He begins by winning a victory over the Austrians of Kray at the Battle of Engen. At the same time, General Lecourbe, his lieutenant, achieved complete success over an Austrian corps at the Battle of Stockach.

Two days later, Moreau fought a new rather bloody battle at Moëskirch and again succeeded in defeating the Austrians of Kray.

There followed an unbroken series of successes for the French Army of the Rhine.

Moreau and Lecourbe succeeded in particular in forcing the passage of the Danube after a new victory at Höchstadt. Austrian General Kray then signs an armistice.

The French Army of the Rhine, on its way, establishes itself in Bavaria.

A few months later, the armistice is broken.

The Austrian army, henceforth commanded by the Archduke Jean, launched an offensive in the direction of Moreau to drive him back to the Rhine.

The French general prepares the response.

He evacuated his headquarters at Haag, in front of the forest of Hohenlinden, east of Munich, and feigned retreat.

He sets up his army corps on the northern edge of the forest to lay an ambush in a large clearing he has spotted.

Battle of Hohenlinden, Henri Frédéric Schopin, around 1835.

On December 3, 1800, under the snow, the Battle of Hohenlinden began.

The Austrian commander, overconfident and believing them to be falling apart, maneuvered his army in the direction of the French.

Three Austrian columns advanced by the only existing roads, only one of which was paved.

It was then that the French counter-offensive began.

Grouchy, Ney and Richepanse attack the Austrian column in the center from the flank, from the front, and from the rear.

The 48th, 57th, 76th and 46th demi-brigades charged the bayonets forward and knocked over everything they encountered in their path.

The Austrian and Bavarian battalions are pushed into each other, thousands of enemies are captured in a short time, because the Austrian column in the center is crushed.

At the same time, Grenier and Decaen push back the two other Austrian columns and also take a good number of prisoners.

The victory of the French is decisive and therefore strategic.

The French generals Richepanse and Lecourbe immediately set off in pursuit of the Austrians, causing many more prisoners.

Vienna, capital of the Empire of Austria is soon threatened. The Austrians capitulate and demand peace.

It's the end of the war and the French of Moreau ended it victoriously.

It is also the last battle of the French Revolutionary Wars. It was the Treaty of Lunéville which confirmed Austria's defeat some time after.

Entrance gate of the Hotel Moreau in Paris.

Moreau then returned to France to enjoy the fortune obtained during his campaigns, although he never took anything from foreign property for his account.

He became the owner of a hotel rue de la Chaussée-d'Antin in Paris, to which he gave his name, and occupied it from 1799 to 1801.

He fitted out the Hôtel d'Anjou [What?][Where?] and bought for 200,000 francs in 1801 from Paul Barras, who went into exile in Belgium, the Château de Grosbois (Val-de-Marne), where he went. often to hunt.

His wife brings together opponents of Napoleon's rise to power.

Moreau finds himself involved in the conspiracy of 1803 against the First Consul, led by Cadoudal and General Pichegru.

He is arrested along with the other conspirators.

Pichegru is found strangled in his prison. Cadoudal is sentenced to death.

Moreau is initially declared innocent by his judges, then is condemned to two years of prison after a second deliberation required by Bonaparte, sorrow which dissatisfies everyone, including Bonaparte who claimed his head; when he learned of the verdict, Bonaparte unrestrainedly let his anger burst out and exclaimed: "They condemned him to me like a handkerchief thief!"

Bonaparte, happy to be rid of an opponent, commuted the sentence to banishment and had Moreau removed from the ranks of the army on July 6, 1804.

Moreau leaves for the United States of America via Spain where he stays for a long time. When he landed in Philadelphia in 1805, the general was greeted with enthusiasm; a crowd presses on the quays and several deputies and senators have come to greet him.

To their words of welcome, he responds with a bow, for at this moment he does not speak a word of English.

He visits New York and its region, and the American authorities will give his name to the future city of Moreau.

He lives quietly in Morrisville, near Trenton (New Jersey) where he acquired a large property, which became the refuge of all political exiles. He met several times with President Thomas Jefferson.

In the United States, he lost his only son Victor Eugène (1802-1808).

When he learned of Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1807 and the destruction of the Grande Armée in Russia in 1812, he was appalled.

Arresting the bloodthirsty tyrant Bonaparte became an obsession for him.

So, probably at the instigation of his wife, but also after several visits by the Russian ambassador to the United States offering him a position as adviser to Tsar Alexander I, he joined the anti-French Allies and decided to return to Europe.

Bernadotte, who then commanded an army against Napoleon, introduced him to Tsar Alexander I.

Hoping to return to France to establish a republican regime in a peaceful Europe, he gave the Allies advice on the conduct of the war. On July 27, 1813, he landed in Sweden.

On August 27, 1813, the Battle of Dresden took place.

Moreau stands in the middle of the General Staff of the allied allies.

A French ball smashes his right knee and lower left leg. Amputated and transferred to a litter for more than 200 kilometers towards Laun in Bohemia where he arrived on August 30, he died there three days later on September 2.

His last words were: "I have nothing to reproach myself for".

Tsar Alexander I had him buried in the Catholic Cathedral of Saint Petersburg.

Her tomb is on Nevsky Prospekt, in the crypt of St. Catherine's Church, one of the five Catholic churches in St. Petersburg. Following a fire in 1947, the crypt is no longer accessible to the public, only at the entrance a commemorative plaque (in Russian and French) indicates that his remains rest there.

The historian Valynseele quoted by Pierre Savinel in his work published in 1988, obtained photos of the coffin from the Soviet Embassy: on the upper lid, we see the remains of a velvet covering with braids and bronze ornaments.

At the head and at the foot of the coffin there remain ornate plaques in gilded metal, with inscriptions in French; on the plate at the foot, it is engraved:

Names engraved under the Arc de Triomphe de l'Étoile: East pillar, 13th and 14th columns.

"Guide of eternity, he lived on this earth only to die in the career that leads to immortality."

His widow received a pension from the Tsar of 12,000 gold francs and Louis XVIII posthumously made him Marshal.

His name is engraved on the Arc de Triomphe de l'Etoile in Paris.

The brothers and sisters of General Moreau were ennobled by royal decision of October 8, 1814, confirmed on February 3, 1817.

The family took up the name of Lizoreux the same year. Stanislas Moreau de Lizoreux, born in 1846, was the first to bear this surname.

The general's heart is buried in the Chartreuse de Bordeaux cemetery, near Marshal Moreau, his widow, who died in Bordeaux on December 1, 1821.

Maréchal Moreau's marriage to Eugénie Hulot d'Osery produced two children:

Victor Eugene Moreau (1802-1808).

Isabelle Moreau (1804-1877), married to Ernest Dubois de Courval, general councilor of Aisne, son of Alexis Dubois de Courval, general councilor and deputy of Aisne, with whom she had three children: Alexandrine (1824- 1897), Arthur (1826-1873) and Victor (1839-1891).

The Moreau de Lizoreux family survives today.

I've been waiting to see if anyone would mention what the Napoleonic military men thought were 'national characteristics.' They were heavy into that topic. The French military published an entire book on the issue, much of it reproduced throughout the Napoleonic wars by other nations such as the British in 1803:

The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War:

link

European Military Men felt knowing the character of their troops and the enemy was foundational for success.

For instance, a veteran general, writes to his son about what he should know in becoming an officer. His letters are published as the very popular The Military Mentor. There is one letter, XXXII, in the entire two volumes, "On the Present State of Tactics in the Principal Armies of Europe". In it, he describes the various nations' forces, such as the French and Austrians. He follows what the French Treatise says very closely.

What is telling is that he doesn't detail their army organization or battlefield tactics at all, but spends most of the time on the character of each national group, their behavior in battle. The following is from pages 165-66, vol. II. Remember that this was written in 1809 by a veteran general officer to a new officer in the British army about what was deemed important to know as an officer:

"The French soldiers are impetuous; their courage requires something to excite it,and movement to keep up its ardour. Their attack is more violent: but they are not, like the Austrians, able to sustain a regular and open fire from the line; they have not that moral and physical immobility which, without being affected, can see[stand up to] whole ranks swept off by the cannon. The courage of the French is less constitutional than artificial; emulation and vanity are its most powerful incentives; honour, example, and habit, keep it up to its proper pitch."

If this sounds a bit bizarre now, such beliefs had a long history, and were believed by many nations, including the French about the above description of their own troops. Compare these quotes below on the French military character by Frenchmen, both civilians and officers over almost a century, to the British one you've just read:

". . . the fire of French infantry is rarely superior and usually inferior to that of other nations. It can be said with as much truth that the French nation attacks with the greatest impetuosity and that it is very difficult to resist its shock."
---Voltaire, 1734

"It is the distinctive characteristic of the French nation to attack"
---French Marshal de Saxe, Rêveries, 1725

"The French were without discipline, hardly suited to fire fights . . . . redoubtable in all attacks with cold steel . . .. They had then, as today, that initial moment of vigor and impetuosity, that shock which one day nothing can stop, and which the next day, a slight obstacle throws back, that incredible combination of a courage sometimes above everything and a consternation sometimes carried on to a weakness."
---General Comte de Guibert, Essai Génénal, 1783

General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, Scherer

24 Pluviôse year IV (13 February 1796)

Page 424

By observing this method of attacking, you sense, my dear general, that we preserve all the advantages which French impetuosity can give us, and that we risk almost nothing.

Even Napoleon used the National Character argument to justify his strategies:

"It is in the nature of the French to attack. It is why I abhor any defensive action."
---Napoleon 1814

After the Seven Year's War where the French were embarrassed by the Prussians, but after the SYW, decided not to follow the Prussian school of tactics and discipline. A primary reason was because they believed it didn't match the French Character. Any number of French military men used that understanding in developing the French way of war.

In 1804, Colonel de Vernon was charged with writing an officer's training book for French officers: A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, vol.1 (1805) – as translated and published in the US in 1817. It was vetted by a committee of Marshals. On page 29 he writes:

Hence it follows, that the organization of the army of any one powerful nation, affords a general insight into the formations of all European armies, Regard however being paid to the modifications existing in all armies from the national character and government.

Whether you think the descriptions are true or not,the military men of the time did believe them and determined tactics and strategy accordingly. For instance, why did the French keep infantry in three ranks more than a decade after the Napoleonic Wars? The French Character:

Brenier in Le Spectater Militaire S1 V2 & # (1827)

Page 475
One will mention, in favor of the formation in two ranks, that of a few foreign armies, and particularly of the English army, whose fires, however, are lively and sustained; I will answer that the kind of men chosen to be soldiers in these foreign armies, their physical constitution, their character, and the kind of discipline to which they are subjected, make them more suitable for this kind of formation. The French soldier, on the contrary, despite his courage, reasons his position.

In other words, unlike other nations, the French soldier, being more of an individual, needs good reasons to stay in line, the third rank being one such reason.

It would be interesting to use their views to create 'National Characteristics' for our troops.

Bravo McLaddie, a real treat!

Do you have any others like this?

McLaddie

This point has come up before; another example is the widespread contemporary belief that Germans made the best light infantry. One of the reasons these opinions were so widespread was that nothing happened to suggest they were wrong.

If I were doing ancient battles I would certainly include a pre-game phase in which the sides consult the omens, portents etc, with bonuses and deductions for auspicious and inauspicious results. The groupthink of their day was that this stuff was real; it is far more logical to include to it as understood than to leave it out on the basis that current anachronistic groupthink says they had it wrong.

Paskai:

There are a whole raft of period books and articles dealing with National Characteristics in one form or another, certainly military writing from 1730 to the 1850s. What I find amazing is the consistency of opinion over this period about each nation's innate military behaviors.

For instance, Robert Jackson's 1804 treatise:
A Systematic View of the Formation, Discipline and Economy of Armies. It was a description of the National Characteristics of various nations, especially Britain and the training, organization and discipline best employed for efficiency with the various armies. It was acclaimed by the British Academy of Sciences and went through several editions, the last in 1855.

link

Another influential book is Dr. Thomas Foot's Address on National Characteristics to the Literary Societies of Hamilton College, published in 1848.

Remember, John Locke, early in the 1700s had posited that humans were born a 'Tabula Rasa' or blank slate.

As Locke wrote: "No man's knowledge can go beyond his experience."

Every military and Philosophical thinker throughout the 1700s considered themselves 'Lockian' building on that idea with few exceptions. Because of that it was believed that personality and beliefs were created living in a particular environment, and because of that, a culture or nation would share many of the same behaviors and beliefs. Then it was just a matter of determining what those cultural specifics were.

We still believe that to some extent. Our armed forces used such stereotypes in fighting enemies Iraq and Afghanistan, and would have been considered foolish to ignore the national characteristics of those opponents.

One of the reasons these opinions were so widespread was that nothing happened to suggest they were wrong.

4th Cuirassier:

I don't think so. There was 20 years of combat experience to suggest they were wrong, if indeed they were wrong. Opinions, no matter how erroneous or wide-spread, are quickly dropped by combat officers if they fail.

The groupthink of their day was that this stuff was real; it is far more logical to include to it as understood than to leave it out on the basis that current anachronistic groupthink says they had it wrong.

Most military men of the time, as smart and as practical as any today, making decisions based on those beliefs, risking their lives based on those beliefs, felt that experience supported those opinions. Lots of writing to support that belief.

Maxwell, William H. Stories of the Peninsular War or Peninsular Sketches. 1870 [A veteran officer of the war.]
THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN or 1809. P. 71

We could not but feel that here was to be another trial of the ancient military rivalry of England and France; that the cool, constitutional, persevering courage of the former was again to be pitted against the more artificial, however chivalrous, though not less praiseworthy, bravery of the latter.

This view of the relative valour of the two nations cannot be questioned, if we consider that the reminding the British of this moral quality is wholly unnecessary, and instead of language of excitement being constantly applied to our soldiery, that of control, obedience, and composure is solely recommended; while our ancient opponents are obliged incessantly to drive into the ears of their men, that they are nationally and individually the bravest of the human race.

Hearing nothing else so flattering to their unbounded vanity, they become so puffed up by this eternal stimulant, as to be fully convinced of its truth, which, in con sequence, makes their first attack tremendous.

Buonaparte, being aware of this weak point in their character, fed it in every way, and the object of wearing a paltry piece of enamel gained him many battles. But this sort of created courage is not capable of standing a severe test, and the French have always been, in their military character, more Gauls than Franks; and what Caesar said of the former, eighteen centuries ago, is still applicable to the races now occupying their fine country. If stoutly opposed at first, this spurious kind of courage not only diminishes but evaporates, and has, does, and will, ever fail before that of the British.

So, was it superior tactics that won at Talavera in 1809?
Maxwell concluded:

Talavera to try the merit of two systems, and prove the value of different means and education in forming a powerful and efficient military. It was not only to be shown if a chivalrous enthusiasm, and a confidence founded on vanity was to overcome natural and patriotic courage, but if a sense of duty, inculcated by a real discipline, was to sink under feelings created by an absence of control and a long train of excess and military license. It was whether an organized army, worthy of a civilized period and state of warfare, should not overcome a military cast grown up in the heart of Europe (from the peculiarity of the times and circumstances,) little better than the bandits, led by Bourbon to the walls of Rome in the sixteenth
century.

We see this as jingoism and rank prejudice now, but…

Here is upon an account of Talavera by General Chambray which appeared in 1824:

The French charged with shouldered arms as was their custom. When they arrived at short range, and the English line remained motionless, some hesitation was seen in the march. The officers and NCOs shouted at the soldiers, ‘Forward; March, don't fire.' Some even cried, ‘They're surrendering'. The forward movement was therefore resumed; but it was not until extremely close range of the English line that the latter started a two- rank fire which carried destruction into the heart of the French line, stopped its movement, and produced some disorder. While the officers shouted to the soldiers, ‘Forward; Don't open fire' (although firing set in nevertheless), the English suddenly stopped their own fire and charged with the bayonet. Among the French, on the other hand, there was no longer any impetus, but disorder and the surprise caused by the enemy's unexpected resolve: flight was inevitable.

In this description, we can see the previous descriptions of French and British National Character acted out. How much of this was 'future pacing' based on belief and how much of it, innate character is impossible to say.

Applying these military beliefs and conclusion to a wargame can be fun. I designed a Wagram board game way back in 1984 called "Napoleon's Last Victory." In it, I had the Austrians standing stalwartly standing, less likely to retreat than the French, but once forced to retreat, were less likely to rally. I actually had two CRTs, one for the French and one for the Austrians. Just an example of how National Characteristics as believed by contemporaries can be inserted into a game.

@McLaddie:

Yes, national characteristics aren't that stupid…

But there are so many different factors that come into play in war that it's difficult to recreate this in a wargame with figures.

For example, you may have to begins to really reflect on the gaming tables, the balance of power that really existed when playing a historical battle or a battle in a historical context.

on what accounts would you base them, how many non English worksare read about it? Those are based on very thin amount of personal experience, as for the French and the attack, I would say, the same was expressed by Frederick the Great, that the Prussians always attack (at least under his command).

@McLaddie:

But there are so many different factors that come into play in war that it's difficult to recreate this in a wargame with figures.

Paskai:
? Isn't that what this thread is about, how to create National Characteristics? It isn't any more difficult that what you originally proposed with the list of modifiers.

For example, you may have to begins to really reflect on the gaming tables, the balance of power that really existed when playing a historical battle or a battle in a historical context.

Gosh--Really reflect the balance of power that really existed. Again, if that is such a problem or undesirable in a wargame, what were you trying to create with your original question and modifiers?

I only suggested that using contemporary military views of that question as the template might be fun…

On what accounts would you base them, how many non English worksare read about it? Those are based on very thin amount of personal experience, as for the French and the attack, I would say, the same was expressed by Frederick the Great, that the Prussians always attack (at least under his command).

Hi VW: What is based on 'very thin amount of personal experience?' These were military men, experienced officers who wrote about all this as well as those with 'very thin amount of personal experience.' I have only touched on such examples over that one hundred years. You can't help but continually trip over such statements in reading primary sources. For instance:

You can hear the contemporary beliefs in National Characteristics echoed in Scharnhorst's assessment of French vs German skirmishing:

The physical agility and high intelligence of the common man enables the French tirailleurs to profit from all the advantages officered by the terrain and general situation, while the phlegmatic Germans, Bohemians, and Dutch form on open ground and do nothing but what their officer orders them to do.

It is little wonder that Scharnhorst's solution to this issue was to change Prussian society in its entirety rather than just the military. If the environment makes the man, then one must control the environment. The French Revolution reforms and the subsequent Terror were based on this belief. So were the Russian Revolution reforms and 5 year plans.

Frederick did say Prussians will always attack. Napoleon commented on this:

In short, I think like Frederick, one should always be the first to attack…Make war offensively; it is the sole means to become a great captain and to fathom the secrets of the art.

That is not the same thing as saying:

"It is in the nature of the French to attack. It is why I abhor any defensive action.

Frederick never described the Prussians as having that 'nature.'

McLaddie, I like the idea of separate combat results tables for different nations. I have never liked the mechanics of modifiers, it's like waiting in line at the supermarket to get your numbers in order. Eventually you remember a number of them, perhaps. But I think it would be easier to have separate French and Austrian CRTs with clearly marked categories and just roll for results. Unless there are a ton of modifiers, this sounds like a better game.

Yet those phlegmatic Germans produced some of the best light infantry in the world, like Prussian or Hessian Jäger, not speaking of other highly esteemed light infantry units, Scharnhorst remark has to be seen in context – as the rest of it.

@McLaddie:

Now I find it more difficult to create good National Characteristics…

Really reflect the balance of power that really existed.

For example if your army fought at 2 against 3, it is necessary to respect that in quantity of figurines,not to mention the proportions of artillery pieces compared to other types of troops.

The Past is a foreign country, they do things differently there.

L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between

Yet those phlegmatic Germans produced some of the best light infantry in the world, like Prussian or Hessian Jäger, not speaking of other highly esteemed light infantry units, Scharnhorst remark has to be seen in context – as the rest of it.

VW: Yes, so in applying that context:

1. The German Jagers and much of the Prussian specialists were seen as 'natural light infantry' because of where they lived and were recruited: the forests. There is plenty of non-Scharnhorst exampes from military men. Jagers were basically hired 'hunters.' That is why the British hired so many of them at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars before starting to train their own people in 1806: The Germans were naturals at it… at least very particular Germans. So much easier than spending the time and money to train regular infantry.

2. Scharnhorst was writing about line troops comparing them to French line troops, not the specialists. He believed the Prussian problem was not having enough skirmishing infantry, when the French deployed lots of line infantry as tirailleurs.

3. Scharnhorst was writing to Germans, particularly the Prussians, so if the statement was so easily disproved or shy of reality, why would he think it, much less write it? It was 1811 when he voiced that opinion.

Like today, where half the country believes one thing about January 6th, and the other something very different, the past views and beliefs are seldom universal, let alone uniform within that belief. However, it is obvious that Locke's view of human development was as universal as any, such as today's notion of the 'unconscious' or that personality is developed 'growing up.'

The question isn't necessarily what those in the past believed, but how and where they acted on those beliefs.

Now I find it more difficult to create good National Characteristics… Really reflect the balance of power that really existed.

Paskai;
I am not sure why it would be all that difficult, other than using existing game mechanics to express something different. If different creates difficulties you don't want, then do something easier.

For example if your army fought at 2 against 3, it is necessary to respect that in quantity of figurines, not to mention the proportions of artillery pieces compared to other types of troops.

You are losing me here. How are those issues any less difficult to resolve with the approach you suggested at the start of this thread?

The only answer I can see is that those modifiers can be 'tacked on' to some extent for any existing game system. Is that what you want? However, the same difficulties in game balance etc. in your example still exist with your modifiers, regardless.

National characteristics are valid. Although not n the bigoted racist terms expressed by Robert Jackson's treatise (condemning the entire religion of Islam as the result of a deluded prophet).
However national,characteristics are the result of doctrine, training, experience and leadership. All evidenced by historical performance.
So it is valid to make the French better at manoeuvre or in the attack, the British in infantry firepower, the Russians for being stolid and stalwart.

You view "national characteristics" as linear sidley while I view them as circular. A general obtains success on the battlefield by being aggressive attack. This success then influences the recruiting, equipping, training and doctrine of the army which in turn influences how the army's commanders used the army in future campaigns. Commanders did throw out the script with successful results. Sometimes this was because the army was capable of being more than what it has a reputation for.

@McLaddie,

Do something simpler? I had a good idea, let's imagine national characteristics by type of troops of this or that army?

For example,

+1 With British rifles in shooting.
+1 For French cuirassiers in melee.
+1 For French lancers in the first shock of melee.
Ect…

No one has answered this one question: Why do Napoleonic rules, have the most National modifiers of any other rule set?

I have never played another period where National modifiers come into so much play, nor where people are so Vehement about them and what they should be or should not be. Look at the length of this one thread, and it is not the first one.

Number of major protagonists – France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Britain, Spain – who fought separately and jointly often enough and over a long enough period for differences to be observable?

National characteristics are valid. Although not the bigoted racist terms expressed by Robert Jackson's treatise

sidley:

We, today see Jackson's views as bigoted and racist. However, his work was considered based on objective, even scientific evidence at the time. Our bigotry is expressed in different ways today, even scientifically unfortunately. Jackson's tome went through at least five editions over 50 years and was championed by the British Academy of Sciences as well as used by the British Army, and read by most every European military.

However national characteristics are the result of doctrine, training, experience and leadership. All evidenced by historical performance. So it is valid to make the French better at manoeuvre or in the attack, the British in infantry firepower, the Russians for being stolid and stalwart.

The military men of the time saw that reversed. National Characteristics did or should dictate what doctrine, training, experience and leadership would be or should be. The French Red and Blue disputes from 1780 to the Revolution argued that this was so and then created the French form of warfare different than the Prussian style, leading to Napoleon. If you don't believe me, read the first chapter of Guibert's Essay on Tactics dealing with National Characteristics. Those same characteristics was the foundation Jackson used to determine the training and discipline his treatise advocated.

The notion was foundational in the era's thinking on military military matters, right or wrong.

The new royal encyclopædia; or, complete modern dictionary of arts and sciences, on an improved plan. By William Henry Hall, … assisted by other learned and ingenious gentlemen. Hall, William Henry (d. 1807) London : printed for C. Cooke, [1788].

Nation: A collective term, used for a considerable people, inhabiting a certain extent of ground, enclosed within fixed limits and under the same government. Each nation has its particular character, and it is proverbially said, light as a Frenchman, Waggish as an Italian, Grave as a Spaniard, Serious as an Englishman, Fierce as a Scotchman, Drunken as a German, Idle as an Irishman, Deceitful as a Greek etc.

Bigoted, yes, but a core element in their thinking and decision-making on and off the battlefield, nonetheless.

It is one thing to attempt to understanding their point of view where it formed their problem-solving efforts. It is quite another, from what we today believe are our more enlightened points of view, to condemn them for not matching what we believe. I have been presenting the former, their views, not judging them right or wrong from my point of view, just as something that influenced their behavior on the battlefield.

Do something simpler? I had a good idea, let's imagine national characteristics by type of troops of this or that army?

For example,

+1 With British rifles in shooting.
+1 For French cuirassiers in melee.
+1 For French lancers in the first shock of melee.

Paskal:
I mentioned the views of military men of the period as something to consider, not a 'have to' in any sense. Having said that, your assumption that such ideas are simpler representations of National Characteristics is only true if you stop asking historical questions or assume that National Characteristics only refers to army organization and equipment.

+1 With British rifles in shooting. The possible benefits of rifles weren't lost on military men of the time. A +1 on the battlefield was and is always welcomed. However, Scharnhorst did extensive tests comparing Rifle fire to smoothbore fire. He was considering arming the entire Prussian Army with rifles @1808. What he found was, that out to about 120 yards, smoothbore and rifled muskets had the same amount of hits. Why? Because rifles loaded slower, so with twice or three times the shots, smoothbores did the same amount of damage as rifles. Considering the increased cost [50+%] and extra training in aiming etc. necessary to really benefit from the rifles, he decided not to. In his estimation, rifles only were better at distances farther than 120 yards. [1 hit out of 3 shots, so a slow attrition. So, the +1 benefit really isn't the damage done, but the longer range with specialists. This has nothing to do with National Characteristics. Most armies had rifled troops and used them in similar ways. If the 95th Rifles were better than say, the Prussian Fusiliers, that is simply the training of a single regiment with similar weapons, not something that is nation-wide.

+1 For French cuirassiers in melee. Well, first of all, the cuirass was for cavalry vs cavalry fights. Training actually included using the cuirass to take sword blows, freeing the trooper's blade for a strike. The cuirass provided no benefits against infantry fire or squares. [See Wellington's judgement on this at Waterloo]
So, is that +1 for the cuirass or for all heavy cavalry? Would, should Cuirass-protected cavalry have a bonus against other unarmored heavy cavalry? Is there any evidence for this benefit to justify a +1 in a melee? Again, other nations had cavalry with a cuirass. Having a bunch of them in the French Army is a fact, but armored cavalry wasn't a characteristic of the French alone nor are simple numbers of troopers.

+1 For French lancers in the first shock of melee.
Is that for just the French or any lance-armed cavalry? If so, that again isn't a national characteristic.

These aren't national characteristics anymore than a M-1 Garand was a National Characteristic of the US Army in WWII.

National Characteristics involve behavior, not equipment. Armies armed with a weapon of similar capabilities like the AK-47 and M-16 didn't define how those armies fought.

That doesn't mean your approach to weapon differences doesn't work, only that it is equipment centric rather dealing with National Characteristics. All the armies were armed with the same weapons organized in a similar fashion, but as the Military Mentor points out, performed very differently with them.

No one has answered this one question: Why do Napoleonic rules, have the most National modifiers of any other rule set?

4th Cuirassier makes some good points: Large variety of national armies and a long-long period of warfare.

Even so, I think that idea isn't necessarily true. What about Ancient wargame rules with all the National modifiers for types and national characteristics? The Civil War is easy: Two armies from the same culture. If WWII rules stray beyond Russian, British, Americans, Germans and Japanese into the Colonial troops, Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians French, Belgians etc. etc. etc., the rules can and do end up with lots of modifiers.

And don't get me started with the ancient Chinese Empires, Medieval armies or the Japanese Shogan period.

@4th I understand what you are saying but…. War of the Austrian Succession + 7 Years War combined, and "Koning Kreig" had one modifier that I remember, Prussians got a plus on each turn Initiative rolls. Maybe there were a few more I don't remember, but they were darn few. Been quite awhile since I played it, so maybe it has changed.

What about the 30 Years war? Are there a lot of individual country modifiers in there. "Swedes plus one on charge. A minus one when on defense?" I have never played that, only English Civil War, so cannot judge. But I bet not near that of Napoleonic rules.

I wonder if it is more because individuals wrap themselves up in either being pro French or Pro British. That seems to be my experiences.

I never played ancients or medieval, so don't know the rules. Never saw the National difference in any WW2 or Revolutionary War games. Yes English and US Civil War same country. I admit there may be a few minor tweaks here and there, but never like I have seen with Napoleonic.

I have seen it As bad as

French
in Column
charging +2
Defending -1

In line
Charging -1
Defending +0

And more for each formation type

Same for every country

No one has answered this one question: Why do Napoleonic rules, have the most National modifiers of any other rule set?

It's the first war where Nationality was coming into its own. There really isnt a large enough horse and musket period wargamed where it comes up again.

I have never played another period where National modifiers come into so much play, nor where people are so Vehement about them and what they should be or should not be. Look at the length of this one thread, and it is not the first one.

They can play a role but only if backed up by hard evidence and not by the self-amused bigotry of authors whether contemporary to the period or from the enlightened 1970s.

@mcladdie I have actually played Napoleonic rule sets that had all you described and more. It did not make them bad, just cumbersome and required a lot of time to add and subtract all the modifiers.

Everyone to their own taste I guess. If you like all the modifiers, use them.

McLaddie several times mentions "environment" in general, and in particular the forests from which Jagers &c. were drawn, together with the quotation from Hall's encyclopaedia concerning a nation and "a certain extent of ground". Among the influences upon peoples coming from, living in, growing up in different locations, that of Climate was regarded by contemporaries as of particular importance in forming the national "genie", or "spirit", so I think it very likely that any educated person of the time would know and accept this orthodox view (hence the ready assumptions of the various officers &c. quoted above).

mcladdie I have actually played Napoleonic rule sets that had all you described and more. It did not make them bad, just cumbersome and required a lot of time to add and subtract all the modifiers.

35thOVI:
Which were these? Sounds like bad rules design if it was cumbersome. That has nothing to do with the historical content, but the designer's efforts.

Everyone to their own taste I guess. If you like all the modifiers, use them.

Of course. It is kind of silly to suggest otherwise.

They can play a role but only if backed up by hard evidence and not by the self-amused bigotry of authors whether contemporary to the period or from the enlightened 1970s.

Au Pas de Charge: I agree, evidence. The military men of the time believed that too, in making decisions. They didn't last long if they didn't.

…so I think it very likely that any educated person of the time would know and accept this orthodox view (hence the ready assumptions of the various officers &c. quoted above).

Au pas de Charge and Robert:

I have been talking about the opinions and conclusion of military officers, veterans. Officers might accept orthodox views, but if those collapsed when applied on the battlefield, how long do you think they would have held to them in fighting the enemy?

France's military way of war, so successful during the Napoleonic Wars, was developed based on those 'orthodox' views. It was hardly self-amused bigotry, if that is what you meant, de Charge. Read the French debates 1770 through the 1830s by French veterans of the SYW. They chose to jettison the very successful Prussian tactics and discipline, [unlike the British, for instance] not because it was 'wrong', but because it didn't 'fit' the French character. And those beliefs reinforced from experience when they tried to 'enforce' such practices on the French soldiers right after the SYW.

Whatever you think of those opinions, 1. they were believed to represent reality and a good basis for making decisions about men and combat, 2. They created military systems around those beliefs. and 3. Whether 'future pacing' by the soldiers fighting, living out their expectations or actually grounding in fact doesn't really matter if the behaviors and outcomes were the same.

@McLaddie

I will email you.

"Everyone to their own taste I guess. If you like all the modifiers, use them.

Of course. It is kind of silly to suggest otherwise."

I should have said: "if you like a great deal of National modifiers."

I would also say as I did previously:

I should say I don't have issues with a few National modifiers added, but not excessive. I still would be more in favor of leader modifiers, as I think it was the leadership that made the difference and not the National characteristics.

Whatever you think of those opinions, 1. they were believed to represent reality and a good basis for making decisions about men and combat, 2. They created military systems around those beliefs. and 3. Whether 'future pacing' by the soldiers fighting, living out their expectations or actually grounding in fact doesn't really matter if the behaviors and outcomes were the same.

This sounds close to 4th Cuirassier's claim that because they were racist back then, we can neither judge them nor separate their prejudiced observations from reality or from wargaming. The sliding scale of factors could be as detailed as one likes but it isnt going to give someone a better game.

As an extreme example, let's take observations about Natal Natives in the Zulu War who were universally panned at the time and in wargaming friendly books as unreliable, cowardly etc. Are they a case of intrinsic fighting abilities or victims of prejudice at the time?

I understand they were abused, mistreated and considered a joke by the British, by the army and by their own leaders. Although, one could ask, is it any wonder that they ran away, is this a case of prejudice creating and reaffirming a self fulfilling prophecy? According to your logic, perception leads to treatment and treatment leads to results which means it doesnt matter if it is true or not, a stereotype gets assigned to to a certain troop types behavior forever. In any case, do we always want them to be like this in a wargame or do we want Natal Natives to be able to surprise us?

The concept of damning behavior via the lens of limited, faulty observations based on a model that if it wasnt true, the officer wouldnt-have-lasted-very long,-would-he? ignores that things can be true for reasons different from what the observer concludes; the observer perhaps swayed in his perceptions by popular prejudices of the time.

For example, the large amount of NCOs and Officers in British line infantry units might've accounted for more flexible tactical command and control but was this a function of British military foresight or to create more layers to prevent the extremely low class human material of the rank and file from attacking the officer class? Sometimes both concepts can coexist.

Perhaps the survival gene for French officers wasn't so much in what they saw but in how much they went along to get along? We might have what they wrote but we don't know what impulses motivated them to write their observations; they may not even have themselves understood their own motives. We can't assume that French officers were always driven to objective, military efficiency; maybe they were writing to be "fashionable". Certainly, by your own submissions, they didn't seem to want to recognize that their infantry did not want to always charge a la bayonet. This illustrates the exact opposite of a "Gallic" national charging character and makes me wonder if the French just did not want to properly drill their units and, further, whether their officers stayed in command due more to shortages of replacements rather than "survival of the fittest" reasons.

It has been said that the Ancient Greeks didn't record the color blue as a distinct shade. Does that mean blue didn't exist? Does it mean they didnt see it? Did it affect their ability to kill on the battlefied? In a wargame, should they be given a modifier when fighting opponents in blue? If fighting under a non Greek officer and he tells them to attack the unit in blue, should there be a roll for them to attack the wrong unit?

Keeping National modifiers to a minimum doesn't, as one wargamer mentioned above, reduce the Napoleonic game to bland, faceless counters but rather allows one to enjoy what makes Napoleonic games most interesting, a balance of all arms challenge. However, a comment like the one about reducing the game to counters reveals someone who is obsessed with ethnicity determining behavior and being unable to see how the world can be any different for anyone else.

In addition, doubling down with contemporary accounts that fit one's prejudices is narrowing the world to a place where because they said it back then , it must be true. But is the sampling large enough? Do all the officers who left memoirs talk about these national differences or just a few?

(Short clarification of my earlier, tangential, observation re. Climate; I certainly didn't mean to dismiss any of the views of officers and theorists as the mere following of or acquiescence in orthodox wisdom/received opinion, only to indicate one relevant aspect of contemporaneous thinking which hadn't, quite, been adduced. This has been a fascinating and wide-ranging discussion). Relevance might be a matter of judgment:

I don't have much familiarity with team sports, especially at a professional or international level, but perhaps someone with more knowledge could comment on whether, today, different nations have different playing styles at the World Cup? If so, why?

@ Robert

As all teams are made of people, there can be no difference in playing styles. Only a crypto-Nazi like Bruce Quarrie would imagine otherwise.

The evidence that there are no national characteristics in play in the World Cup is that all the games are drawn.

Where there exceptions, it's down to the team manager, not the players, who are of identical quality.

It's funny I just got "WARGMING IN HISTORY-WATERLOO by Charles Grant.

It has no national characteristics, no breastplates or horse lances fo the cavalry and no elite troops for no armies and it works just fine.

What a relief !!! What makes the difference is the players !!!

Well, it works as a game, but does it resemble Napoleonic warfare?

This sounds close to 4th Cuirassier's claim that because they were racist back then, we can neither judge them nor separate their prejudiced observations from reality or from wargaming. The sliding scale of factors could be as detailed as one likes but it isnt going to give someone a better game.

Au pas de Charge:
No, that wasn't what I was saying. Understanding contemporary reasoning, what and why they behaved the way they did is a separate issue from judging their behavior based on what we know.

It is the difference between knowing the recipe for a apple pie and how to bake it from determining whether it tastes good.

The concept of damning behavior via the lens of limited, faulty observations based on a model that if it wasnt true, the officer wouldnt-have-lasted-very long,-would-he? ignores that things can be true for reasons different from what the observer concludes; the observer perhaps swayed in his perceptions by popular prejudices of the time.

The one thing that is obvious from studying military history is that when an army finds it is not successful on the battlefield, it changes its behavior, the way things are done. Whether the Napoleonic Wars or WWI, that is true.

Men can be blind to the obvious because of their culture, time and place. Again, Why? What kinds of behaviors does that produce on the battlefield?

It is the difference between knowing the recipe for a apple pie and how to bake it from determining whether it tastes good.

To take that analogy a bit further. Adding National Characteristics to a wargame system is looking for a historically justified recipe that represents Napoleonic Warfare.

What most folks are doing on this thread is judging whether the resultant recipe is fun to play or not or whether the contemporaries were bigots or not.

Two different issues. Absolutely nothing wrong with choosing what is fun to play or judging historical figures and their ideas, adding modifiers or ignoring all National Characteristic, but it is no help confusing the two issues.