"OPFOR - Ukraine '22" Topic
20 Posts
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Achtung Minen | 04 May 2022 7:32 p.m. PST |
I'm looking into rules to game out some of the early fighting in Phase 1 of the Ukraine-Russian War. I've decided to give OPFOR (the supplement for Panzer Korps) a try, as it seems to cover some of the relevant features of the conflict. Towards that end, I am researching some generic TO&Es for the war and thought I would share them here.
Ukrainian Territorial Defense Brigade Recruits, Blue Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand 1x Supply ColumnUp to 6x Territorial Defense Battalions (3 companies each) Possible battalion attachments include an 82mm Mortar Company or a towed ZU-23-2 AA Company. Soft skin transports may be available.
Ukrainian Mechanized Brigade Reservists, Red Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand 1x Supply Column3x Mechanized Battalions (3 companies each, transported by either BMP-2 or BTR-80) Battalion attachments include 82mm Mortar Company and an ATGM Company (representing massed battalion AT assets). 1x Tank Battalion (3 companies each of T-64B) Up to 2x attached Territorial Defense Battalions with soft skin transports (as above). The tank battalion may also be divided up into company-sized attachments for the mechanized battalions. Brigade level attachments include 2S1 SPG battalion, 2S3 SPG battalion, BM-21 MLRS battalion, towed AT company (100mm T-12 towed by MT-LB), SAM company (SA-8 or SA-10), towed AA company (ZU-23-2), BRDM-2 recce company, engineer company (either sappers, construction or bridging), medical company, EW company and/or UAV company.
Ukrainian Motorized Brigade Reservists, Blue Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand 1x Supply Column3x Motorized Battalions (3 companies each, transported by soft skin vehicles) Battalion attachments include 82mm Mortar Company and an ATGM Company (representing massed battalion AT assets). Brigade support includes a T-64B tank company, a towed 122mm artillery company (D-30), a towed 152mm artillery company (either 2A36 or 2A65), a towed AT company (100mm T-12 towed by MT-LB), a towed AA company (ZU-23-2) and/or a BRDM-2 recce company.
Ukrainian Tank Brigade Regulars, Red Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand 1x Supply Column3x Tank Battalions (3 companies of T-64B each) 1x Mechanized Battalion (as above) 1x Motorized Battalion (as above) Support options similar to mechanized brigade, above. |
Cuprum2 | 05 May 2022 1:43 a.m. PST |
I think this will be of interest to you: link |
korsun0 | 05 May 2022 5:10 a.m. PST |
that is a decent link, nice one. |
Achtung Minen | 05 May 2022 5:54 a.m. PST |
The Russian Army BTG is a flexible, task-based fighting formation with unusually heavy support. It is formed on an ad hoc basis from brigade maneuver units and assets. Russian Motor Rifle Brigade Reservists and/or Recruits, Blue or Red Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand (MT-LB) 1x Supply Column1x or 2x Battalion Tactical Groups (3 companies of BMP-3 Mechanized Rifle Companies or BTR-80 Motorized Rifle Companies) Typical battalion attachments include one T-72B3 tank company and one 82mm or 120mm mortar company. Typically at least one brigade attachment for every battalion, including an 82mm or 120mm mortar company, an ATGM company (9K114 Shturm), an AA company (9K37 Buk or Pantsir-S1), an SPG company (2S3 or 2S19), an MLRS company (BM-21), an engineer company (in BAT-2 or IMR-2), a recce company (BRDM-2), sniper company, an EW company, an UAV company or a medical company. Russian Tank Brigade or Regiment Reservists, Red Decision Die 1x Brigade HQ Stand 1x Supply Company2x Tank Battalion (3 companies of T-72B3) 1x Battalion Tactical Group (as above) Similar brigade attachments to the Motor Rifle Brigade, above. |
williamb | 05 May 2022 8:00 a.m. PST |
Considering the performance of the Russian army and that they are mostly conscripts their rating for OPFOR should be Militia. Red should probably be the maximum rating for their decision die. Their command and control seems to be lacking. The Russians Battalion Tactical Group is a battalion sized mixed force of infantry and tanks supported by the brigade assets. See PDF link The performance of Ukranian forces compared to the Russian army should have them rated higher than Russian formations. The Ukranian 30th mechanized brigade should be rated as at least regulars or veterans see link This also lists the various brigade support units. Ukraine's use of anti-tank missiles should also give their battalions a +2 for an attached anti-tank company vs AFV. Note: Russian BTGs are mechanized infantry and count as an AFV target for this per page 58 of Panzer Korps 2nd edition. As a house rule top attack ATGM should treat all AFV targets as having light armor with no modifiers for listed special armor. This has been the subject of a recent discussion on the Panzer Korps Facebook group. |
Achtung Minen | 05 May 2022 8:41 a.m. PST |
All legitimate comments. I think this will come down to one's own personal analysis. As for my own personal view, I am cautious to rate the Ukrainians as "generally" higher than the Russian formations as I don't think the first two months of the war have provided a fair depiction of either sides' capabilities. The Ukrainian forces have been puffed up by a steady media narrative from Day 1 combined with a very careful control of information regarding Ukrainian losses. The Russians likewise have, in addition to legitimately fairing poorly, been subject to a kind of narrative that obscures mitigating factors, such as the operation commencing under the shadow of very, very poor intelligence. That said, if you feel that these mitigating factors are not all that relevant, then you would certainly be justified in improving the Ukrainian's command decision die and reducing the Russian's. Working against the Russian C2 in this instance is the presence of 25% to 50% conscripts, who have been unknowingly "signed up" as contract soldiers (in many cases posthumously), due to Russian law prohibiting conscripts from extraterritorial maneuvers. Conscripts have proven not just a problem for launching offensive operations (represented in OPFOR by the morale level) but also a C2 liability (represented by the decision die), as they do not show any initiative. The shortage of encrypted radios hardly helps matters. Aiding the Ukrainians on the other hand is the frankly invaluable contribution of NATO and US Air Force intelligence, who have been monitoring Russian movements from nearby NATO airspace. Much ado has been made of the "Ukrainian spirit" for the public Western audience but honestly there are more technical matters that are significant here in my opinion. As for rating the experience of Ukrainian units, I agree that it seems to be frustratingly variable. A lot of the Territorial Defense Brigades contain volunteer battalions that have years of experience from the Donbas fighting. These aren't professional army units, but they probably should be rated as being at least as effective as the formations of career soldiers. Many of these have been folded into regular army formations as well. Other Territorial Defense units are much less experienced. In general, the deployment of Territorial Defense Brigades (and the general lack of organic supporting elements) seem to indicate that they are mostly second-line troops used to support the front-line regular army formations (whether by providing a tenuous "defense in depth" by occupying areas just behind the front lines or by providing a kind of pool of reinforcements). In any case, how you rate them will absolutely come down to the scenario at hand and the specific units involved. Territorial Defense Brigades (and it isn't clear if they *ever* fight in such a capacity) are basically the mirror opposite of Russian BTG's… lots of troops and little kit (as opposed to lots of kit and way too few troops). As for the 30th Mech Brigade you shared, their structure given on that page appears to be close to "ideal." I didn't make this clear in my post above, but many professional Ukrainian brigades will be missing many of their "on paper" assets. For example, it seems that it is quite common for some of the self-propelled artillery and rocket batteries to be missing or (for the artillery anyway) replaced by a towed variant. Again it comes down to researching the individual brigades for the scenario at hand. Likewise for things like AA assets. Even the towed AA assets in the Territorial Defense Battalions seem to be fairly rare, despite the fact that Ukraine has (at least on paper) plenty of ZU-23-2 in supply. By far the most common Ukrainian support items seem to be mortars (Western-made ATGM's, for example, are not nearly as common as Western media would have you believe). |
williamb | 05 May 2022 11:38 a.m. PST |
All valid items. The 30th is something of an exception having taken part in various extra-territorial missions, combat in the eastern territories prior to the Russian invasion, no conscripts, etc. There is also the lack of will to fight on the part of the Russians compared to defending their country on the part of the Ukranians. |
Achtung Minen | 05 May 2022 1:21 p.m. PST |
Here is a good resource for people researching the Ukrainian Mechanized Battalion organizational structure: link |
Cuprum2 | 05 May 2022 9:13 p.m. PST |
The armies of the unrecognized republics of the DPR and LPR are fighting on the side of Russia. They are not part of the Russian army and are considered by the Russian command as allies. The troops of these republics (the troops of the first line – we are not talking about those who were mobilized with the start of the war) have extensive experience in combat operations and high motivation (especially the units of the DPR). They are armed worse than the Russian army (there are no new types of weapons), but they form the basis of the assault units. They are given, if necessary, parts of the support of the Russian army. Information about their composition and abundance is scarce and scattered. Here's what's on Wikipedia: link link A significant part of the regular Russian troops in Ukraine are units and units of the "Rosgvardiya" (National Guard). These are not full-fledged field troops – these are troops that were intended for anti-terrorist operations and rear protection. In fact, these are police units, with relatively light weapons. For example, all Chechen formations also belong to them. In Ukraine, the structures of the "Rosgvardia" are fighting – OMON and SOBR (mobile detachment for special purposes and a special rapid reaction detachment). In my opinion, these are rather weak units in linear combat, lacking the skills of combined arms combat and the appropriate weapons in the required quantity, but they should be good at storming settlements. link link The staff structure of the SOBR detachment (basic – may vary at the discretion of the department in the region where it serves):
The organizational structure of the SOBR is practically no different from the OMON. link |
Achtung Minen | 06 May 2022 4:48 a.m. PST |
Thanks, very useful. It's good to note from those links that the separatist infantry is only partially mechanized (typically enough BMP/BTR for two of their three infantry battalions, with presumably soft skin vehicles for the third) and there are typically only enough T-64/T-72 tanks available to treat the brigades as having a single tank battalion (despite the structure sometimes mentioning a second tank battalion). They are otherwise pretty similar in structure to the Ukrainian brigade organizations (with towed, SPG and rocket artillery, other company-sized support assets and integral 120mm mortar companies in the rifle battalions). |
Cuprum2 | 06 May 2022 5:33 a.m. PST |
Another point about the armies of the DPR and LPR is that all captured weapons, at least those that are not regularly in service with the Russian army, are being transferred to the armies of the unrecognized republics. They already have a significant amount of weapons of Ukrainian and Western designs (for example, NLAW, Javelin, Stugna, Ukrainian and British armored сфкы, T-64 tanks, and so on). I think this is due to facilitating the maintenance and supply of ammunition used non-standard weapons. The soldiers of these republics are easily distinguished by their red identification ribbons, although they now also often use white ribbons as an identification mark. But I have never seen Russian soldiers with red ribbons. |
williamb | 12 May 2022 6:59 a.m. PST |
Former US army Europe commander's observation of the Russian and Ukraine armies from the 1990s to present regarding their training and capabilities link |
Achtung Minen | 18 May 2022 11:17 a.m. PST |
What is everyone thinking for Exceptional Weapons? This is admittedly difficult to determine for modern conflicts, particularly ongoing ones, as an honest assessment of weapon systems requires the hindsight and sober analysis of reflecting on their effectiveness after the fact. With the qualification that any nomination is based on presumptions about their actual effectiveness, I think we could include these systems in the exceptional weapon list for Ukraine '22: • FGM-148 Javelin ATGM Company • T-90 MBT Company • BMP-T Company |
Wolfhag | 18 May 2022 4:54 p.m. PST |
There is a lot of disinformation out there but most of this is from some former US military that enlisted in the Ukrainian Marines (not the International Legion) now outside Odessa. He said their battalion has about 200 guys which is about normal for them. I'm not sure how up to date unit TO&E's may be. Their unit is mostly former US Army and Marines with combat deployments. They have the FBI doing background checks on applicants to make sure no undesirables get in. He said the Ukrainian reserves, National Guard and International Brigade foreign fighters do a lot of the fighting, guard check points and police the cities. The combat proven troops do the dirty work and damage, hit and run, tank hunting, etc. because they are experienced and trained. They have the NLAW's and Javelins. They do rotate from the front line back to the rear to re-equip and bring on new guys. Right now they are using mostly unencrypted handheld walkie talkies that you'd buy at the store for $20 USD/each because that's all they can get. We're trying to get them better equipment. Overall comms are just as bad for the Russians. Some of the verification of Russian General KIA are from their unencrypted radio transmissions reporting the causality to higher HQ. They have no SigInt assets within their unit so no capability to encrypt, detect, monitor and jam enemy transmissions other than listening in on the same channels they are using. Efficient use of encrypted communications involves highly trained operators, technicians and network/computer support along with an efficient way to load and sync the crypto and frequency hopping features. Neither side seems to have a good foundation for long term encrypted communications. Skilled operators can custom build directional antennas that improve their operation and make it harder to detect. Satellite phone are too expensive. I know they are looking for former US SigInt guys that have experience in tracking down high-value targets and are raising money for better radios from the US. They've heard Russian front line troops complain that officers are so far to the rear they are out of radio contact. Evidently there is no reliable logistical support route for individual units that want to get their own gear outside of their HQ. Some US suppliers will not ship to Ukraine and any shipments will most likely be inspected and anything valuable will be stolen. At least that's what I've been told. The factory that made Ukraine's domestic anti-tank missiles is near Kyiv is no longer operating. Another "problem" confronting both sides is civilians that have operating cell phones and internet connection. They'll knowingly or unknowingly post info and pictures that can be used for current intel as it appears the Russians are monitoring social media sites and geo tags and you can't tell if someone is a Russian sympathizer. As time goes on and equipment breaks down, replacements and parts become hard to get equipment available may get lower on the tech tree, at least for the Russians. High tech equipment is not going to work unless you have trained people and support. The more this conflict unfolds and the more info I get the more I think Twilight 2000 is the best way to simulate the war over there. link Wolfhag |
Achtung Minen | 18 May 2022 5:24 p.m. PST |
That confirms what I have already expected, Wolfhag. I.e. that the technology, information security and supply issues are just as bad for the Ukrainians as they are for the Russians. I suspect the casualty situation is also equally atrocious for the Ukrainians, especially after offensive operations like the push around Kharkiv, but the UAF is keeping a tight lid on even general numbers for propaganda reasons. |
Wolfhag | 19 May 2022 7:49 a.m. PST |
In the early years of the conflict, communications security was extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces. In 2015, Pavlenko said that Russia had been able to engage in mass sabotage of Russian-made radios that Ukraine was using at the time by triggering some sort of kill switch, which he described as a "virus," remotely. Radio Wars: link Russian Failed Logistics: YouTube link Problem With Russia's Military Doctrine Russia's military execution is doctrinally challenged. Their long known "Centralized Execution" doctrine means that no one or nothing in the battlespace can do anything until the commanding general gives the go-ahead. Given recent technological advances, the sheer complexity of today's combined operations cannot be managed by a single person. Therefore, the West has doctrinally preached "Decentralized Execution" and trained forces to carry out this approach, allowing young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) the freedom to make local decisions on how to achieve the orders handed down by the leadership. Young NCOs and officers will make mistakes, but they will learn to mitigate most of those through training and more training. Russia's Centralized Execution approach creates the problem of proximity to conflict in which leaders must operate. This is why Russia has lost more than a handful of generals in just a month of fighting. Centralized control demands generals are up close and personal to the battlespace, which comes with increased risk. Russian doctrine demands leaders continually pass orders and directives down the chain of command or their forces won't act. I've often said, a well-trained Russian soldier will allow the enemy to climb into his foxhole before fighting if there's no order to engage. The reason is the soldier has far greater fear of Russian military leadership than they do of the enemy. This makes for some interesting rules and tactics. Wolfhag |
Achtung Minen | 19 May 2022 12:00 p.m. PST |
This makes for some interesting rules and tactics. Indeed. The competing tactical doctrine traditions at play (Ukraine's increasingly US-style decentralized combat command tradition vs the traditional Russian centralized combat command tradition) is one of the main reasons I landed on Panzer Korps as my base ruleset, as I hadn't found many other game systems that allow you to represent how these different tactical doctrines play out in actual combat situations (their different approach to momentum, planning, adaptation and ultimately breakdown of C3). |
Wolfhag | 23 May 2022 3:12 p.m. PST |
Here's another color commentary AAR to give you an idea of some of the engagements from a VN Era Marine. I think you get the "code": AS you noticed a while back Month or so, you did not hear from me for a while. Was taking a "holiday" were you mentioned. Went on a hunting trip with xm109 hunting man eating squirrels. Bagged one. Taught the people I was with how to use, assemble, clean etc, because squirrels sometime are hard to hit. When squirrels are riding in APC to gather nuts. will penetrate and bounce around inside, knocking their bag of peanuts to the deck. I was called, and asked to give classes on how to use this squirrel rifle (gun for any liberal who may be reading my email) Flew in, dropped in, sky hooked out and I did not have to pay for the exciting ride. russians depend upon MASS to attack. MOSTLY not all, they attack TWICE in a day, then settle in for the night. This is the time we would hit between 02-0400 their security is for the most part. Broke my guys into 5 man teams and told them NOT to engage in force fire fights but to pick off a few squirrels and then move down the line. Sun Xu methods. If I could get my hands on some UPS drones because they can carry 75 pounds+ it would be excellent to outfit them with the two method I described before hand. Maybe start a start up converting these drones to carry and release. They would be cheap. Here is one method I found to be very effective. Ambush. One set is Far away. The other set is between 25-30 FEET with cover. when the squirrels walk into the kill zone, the FAR set opens sustained fire and scopes picking off moving targets. This accomplished the following things. 1. The squirrels turn to the area where they are receiving fire. They hunker down with their BACKS to the close ambush. After they have settled down, the CLOSE ambush opens fire with automatic weapons. Sweeping the backs of the squirrels before they realize they are about to donate their pelts to the great green earth. Ambush over in 2 mikes or less, no survivors unless we want some, and those we have popped in legs. After receiving intel, we send them on their way to their good buddy stalin. Also every one who is playing dead received a injection to the head to ensure they are not playing opossum. The BEST ADVICE is to keep moving place to place to keep theses squirrels off guard. Weather to me SUCKS but I am use to jungles where it is nice and warm. Please pass on to your friend and our brother. Wolfhag |
Wolfhag | 24 May 2022 6:30 a.m. PST |
FYI: The person who sent me this is a 75 year old Marine VN vet. Wolfhag |
Achtung Minen | 19 Jun 2022 5:20 p.m. PST |
Just came across this, an excellent document from 2016 (so after the 2014 reform) that describes the organization and tactics of the Ukrainian Mechanized and Tank forces. PDF link Full descriptions of battalion organization are included. If you are like me and do not speak Ukrainian, you can use the "translate document" feature on Google Translate to produce a translated PDF. This is basically a mirror of the Grau & Bartles "The Russian Way of War" book published in the same year, as it seems to be organized similarly, but covers Ukrainian forces rather than the Russians. Interestingly, the tactics and organization I am reading seem very similar to the stated Russian tactics and organization (perhaps a legacy of Ukraine's connection to the military institutions of the Soviet Union). Unfortunately no discussion on the Territorial Defense forces, but a good primer on the regular army units. |
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