"Could Napoleon have won the Peninsular War?" Topic

"Without Britain, Nappy would have sown up all of Europe under his despotic, nepotistic NWO"

I assume we do not count Russia (i.e., east of the Western Dvina and Dneiper rivers) as "Europe" ?

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"for a further 10 years …. the British navy was insignificant."

In 1794/95, the landing of the royalists was all very half-heated. In 1799, the Anglo-Russian descent on Holland was really too small, and rather badly handled. Same for the British landing on Walcheren in 1809. Copenhagen in 1807 was not even a real landing.

But the capability was there.

I have always wondered "what-if" the British – let us assume with 40,000 British, 40,000 Swedes and 120,000+ Russians – had attempted a "D-Day 1807" : landings in Swedish Pomerania to take Denmark, and at the mouth of the Weser to move south into Oldenburg and Hanover (crown possessions of the Russian and English monarchs) and then west to liberate the Low Countries and/or east to Berlin …. while the Grand Armée was almost 1,000 km away on the far side of East Prussia.

The British Navy never did make any large landings, but the possibility tied down 100,000's of men and huge materiel resources in coastal defence – including some of my ancestors, by the way.

In 1812, if one loaded a well-made wagon to its capacity with fodder, and nothing else, the horses could make it from the Niemen river to a little east of Smolensk – 500 to 600 km in Spring or Summer dependng on the state of the roads. However, if you controlled the Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic, you could supply your army from major port cities (not East Prussian or Polish towns) via the Western Dvina to Vitebsk or even Velizh, 100 km north of Smolensk. (Hence the Russian concern to fortify Dünaburg.) From these points, you are less than 500 km by road from Saint Petersburg and Moscow. But the British Navy prevented this.

In 1813, the British did not commit an army of their own to the main conflict in German-speaking central Europe, but the British Navy "lifted" a Swedish army plus Russo-German legionaires into the fight.

Wellington's British forces in 1815 could not have made it to the "show" without either lots of swimming lessons or the British Navy.

Controlling the seas, like all activities that are focussed on military logistics and that take decades of investment to establish, makes for poor war-gaming (or battle-gaming). That does not make controlling the seas unimportant.

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"Had Napoleon won in the Peninsular, there may not have been a desire by the allies to oppose Napoleon"

The Russians, assuming that they had been invaded, wouldn't have cared or even paid any heed, if Napoléon had conquored the rest of the world, the Moon and Mars. They would have fought to the last Russian (and last Ukrainian, and last Cossack, Pole, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Karelian, Vepp, Nogai, Tatar, Circassian, Georgian, Armenian, Adyghe, Azeri, Bashkir, Osseti, Chechen, Kalmyk, Kherghiz, Buryat, Chuvash, Mordvin, Urdmurt, Permyak …. etc., etc., etc. …. Nivkh, Chukchi, Yakuti and Alaskan Iñupiat …. and the lasr Moldovan, Wallach, Bulgar, Serb and Greek …. to a total of about 70 ethnic groups and 70 million people) to destroy the anti-christ.

The Russians, assuming they were not invaded, likely wouldn't have cared or even paid any heed to anything that happened west of the Vistula and Dniester rivers, especially if it meant co-operating with the [****ing] Austrians (again).

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"British subsidies …. deciding to join in coalition against Napoleon"

--- Sweden 1813
--- Austria 1815

Britiah "subsidies" to Russia were mostly loans whose proceeds were used to buy Britsh clothe, some gunpowder and much-admired Brown Bess muskets (and were repaid in wood for ship timber, hemp rope, tar, etc.) …. and bribes to great Russian princes to support pro-British policies.
Russia did not need "money" to have a military : they had an essentially feudal economy as well as feudal social system. The state owned the factories, the remount stud farms, the arsenals …. and the workers at such places …. and the farms which fed them …. and the farmers who grew the crops. Not only was there no need to pay serfs in money, it was essentially illegal for them to posess it in any quantity.
While the nobles (and miniscule bourgeois) were rather generous in donations after the invasion, the state had every right to just take goods, money and property which was only held in the first place by the "grace" of the monarch.
Cossacks and Native troops were essentially free also : they traded service for land and the right to loot enemies in wartime.

Sure he could. He could put everything he had into it and not be at war on any other front. Put someone on the throne that the Spaniard's would accept. Make peace with Portugal. Would the British keep picking at the edges? Sure, but it is but a minor annoyance.

He could put everything he had into it and not be at war on any other front. Put someone on the throne that the Spaniard's would accept. Make peace with Portugal.

So to win, he'd have to abandon the Continental System, as he has no means to force Russia to observe it; reverse his imposition of a puppet Spanish king; and capitulate to Austria and to Portugal?

How is that "winning"? It sounds exactly like losing to me.

4th Cuirassier

So to win, he'd have to abandon the Continental System, as he has no means to force Russia to observe it; reverse his imposition of a puppet Spanish king; and capitulate to Austria and to Portugal?

Even had Nappy subjugated the Peninsula, all it would have done would be to make his Continental system even more porous.

whirlwind

Thanks for proving my point that Brit lovers and apologists always make an excuse for Britain committing an atrocity or doing anything negative but if it was Napoleon it would be evil! LOL

dibble

I was trying to help you understand something you seemed to have had a problem understanding. There is no shame in you admitting that you did not understand my post, but really, even after I explained to you and another member tried to explain it to you, you still would not accept it. And then, to throw an insult that someone is 'squirming' rather than admit you did not understand, is low even for you.

Perhaps some people should keep away from whatif topics, since it seems to get them hot under the collar! They won't change history but some people act as if whatif discussions are a threat to their biased viewpoints. Still, it was fun while it lasted, with only the odd insult being thrown out! LOL

How is that "winning"? It sounds exactly like losing to me.

Napoleon sitting securely on the throne of an expanded France. His family members sitting on the thrones in Holland, Westphalia and Naples. The Napoleonic settlement intact in western Germany and Italy, with a temporary ally in Saxony-Poland further east. How exactly is this losing?

Having to dethrone Joseph would have been awkward. By putting Joseph on the throne Napoleon put his prestige at risk. This is why I think Napoleon would have been better off putting Ferdinand on the throne in 1808. Still, Ferdinand being restored while France was ascendant in the Iberian Penninsula would however create an awkward situation for the British as well.

Napoleon sitting securely on the throne of an expanded France.

He wouldn't be even remotely secure. He would have had to admit error (what!?), reverse completely his previous imposition of Joseph, and replace him with a Bourbon nonentity he obviously still intended to be a puppet, but whose line had showed no previous inclination to enforce the Continental System. This would leak like a sieve via both Spain and Portugal, with which latter he's trying to make peace. But Portugal doesn't need to make peace because Royal Navy, Torres Vedras etc.

Meanwhile, in central Europe, Austria notices this weakness and need to service the military commitment in Spain, and threatens attack in 1809. Austria has to be appeased with, oh, the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine and the return of northern Italy, to avert this attack while he fights his one-front war in Spain. As he is focused on Spain, all the Confederation troops have been sent to the Peninsula, so it's a writeoff anyway as there's nobody left to defend it.

The Tsar likewise notes the weakness, also continues to flout the Continental System and decides he'll have what Austria's having. So Russia unilaterally renegotiates Tilsit by helping herself to Poland. Napoleon has to swallow this too, because his strategy is to fight nowhere else but Spain.

So he has a drooling vegetable on the Spanish throne whose navy has been eviscerated and whose army won't fight. He can't defeat or buy off Portugal. And if he wants to persist with this war he has to hand Italy back to Austria.

We'd be back on the historical timeline by mid-1808 latest.

dibble

You obviously did not know what I meant or are pretending not to know? I'm not sure why you are doing this? Perhaps you just don't want to admit or accept that you made a mistake? It would not have hurt to just say sorry, I got it wrong, there was no other hidden reason or agenda! Lapsang tried to help you understand the context of my post, which I, Lapsang and others thought was pretty straightforward and in line with the question raised by the original post.

But your sad statement 'What was the battles lost in the Peninsula that caused you to post the word 'further' really shows that you just did not understand what my post was referring to. We all know the history of the Peninsular Wars. Anyway, I really suggest you try reading all the posts from the beginning again. I am sure it will become clear to you then. If not, I'm sure Lapsang and others will be happy to help you out. LOL

But my opinion has not changed by anything posted here. Napoleon could have won the Peninsular. Anything could have happened. No one can say that the allies would have stuck or still sided with Britain, had they just become another beaten nation, Navy or no Navy. Just because some people WANT to think that Napoleon could not have won and that the allies would have remained allies, providing the Brits kept paying them, does not mean that it would have happened.

And dare I say it, dibble, the British may have lost 'further' battles, had Napoleon been there. Even Welly thought he would, as I already posted. LOL

One of the drawbacks of TMP's excellent 'Stifle' functionality is that you never know how many "LOL"s you're missing.

I was not going to revive this thread, but since others have done so, here it goes.

That the Continental System was leaking like a sieve was not relevant to Napoleon's ability to sit securely on the throne. The Continental System was simply a means to an end. It was not the end in and of itself. If Napoleon had been anyone other than Napoleon he could have walked away from the Continental System, or he could have ignored transgressions by realms other than his own.

British forces in Portugal are not a threat to Napoleon. It is the attitude of Spain that determines whether Napoleon would need to shift troops from Germany. If Napoleon does not go in, then most likely those French troops would remain in Germany where they can threaten Austria without Russian help. I don't see how non-involvement in the Iberian Peninsula in 1807-early 1808 would lead to an OT situation for late 1808. Even if Napoleon had invaded Portugal in 1807 and intervened in Spain in early 1808, this could still work if Napoleon had promptly recognized Ferdinand.

If Napoleon had stayed in Spain, he would've kicked the allies backsides. He basically caused Moore's death and he wouldve completely eradicated the Spanish armies. The guerillas werent that effective and maybe Wellington never gets a toe hold in Portugal.

ConnaughtRanger

One of the drawbacks of TMP's excellent 'Stifle' functionality is that you never know how many "LOL"s you're missing.

Yup! And they're still coming thick and fast. I wouldn't want to miss them for the world.

"He basically caused Moore's death.."

True, Napoleon had been an artillery officer, but he can hardly be responsible for a round fired by a gun in a battle in which he was not present!

Or are you admitting that Napoleon was ultimately responsible for all the deaths in the Peninsular War because he ordered the invasion of Spain in the first place?

"He basically caused Moore's death.."

True, Napoleon had been an artillery officer, but he can hardly be responsible for a round fired by a gun in a battle in which he was not present!

That's why I qualified my sentence with "basically". He set everything in motion that led to Moore's demise. Or are only the British able to claim credit for intangible strategic results?

Or are you admitting that Napoleon was ultimately responsible for all the deaths in the Peninsular War because he ordered the invasion of Spain in the first place?

I will answer this if given unanimous Supremo status here to assign responsibility, guilt and blame across the board.

Au pas de Charge

Yes, even Welly thought that. The battles that the British won may have all been defeats. (Just in case dibble is reading this post-we are talking about what may have happened had Napoleon returned to the Peninsular. LOL)

4th Cuirassier

I don't think you can safely say that the Austrians or anyone else would have seen Napoleon replacing Joseph with a Spaniard as a sign of weakness. It may well have been the opposite. And I don't believe it really mattered who was placed in charge of Spain if the Austrians felt at the time that they were up to waging war against Napoleon. In the real 1809 (I say 'real' in case dibble is reading this and gets confused again) they felt up to it, no matter who was in charge in 1809 and we know how that turned out.

arthur1815

Are you going to admit that most deaths were caused by the British paying other nations to wage war against Napoleon. No money paying, no wars, no wars, no deaths? LOL

Au pas de Charge

Yes, even Welly thought that. The battles that the British won may have all been defeats. (Just in case dibble is reading this post-we are talking about what may have happened had Napoleon returned to the Peninsular. LOL)

Wellington was a very able general with his head screwed on right. His grasp of what was going on was both clear and masterful. Too bad the same can't be said of some of his fans.

Don't take poor dibble too seriously. He has his own internal challenges such as trying to stop people answering a "what if" question with what ifs.

Gazzola,
No nation was forced to accept subsidies from Britain to fight Bonaparte; they chose to do so, and to fight, for their own reasons.

You are surely not suggesting that those countries went to war simply to pocket the cash?

BTW, I am perfectly happy to accept the idea that Bonaparte might have won [whatever that may mean] the Peninsular War had he behaved differently, or had – for example – a random shot killed Wellington as one did Sir John Moore.

@arthur1815

Gazzola,
No nation was forced to accept subsidies from Britain to fight Bonaparte; they chose to do so, and to fight, for their own reasons.

Very few of the players were as dedicated as the British in single mindedly removing Napoleon. None of those nations were "forced" to take British gold but you dont have to be forced to be tempted or bribed to do something you might not ordinarily do.

You are surely not suggesting that those countries went to war simply to pocket the cash?

Why is this impossible to fathom? Most of the armies were something of the private property of the monarchs and financing was a huge factor.

BTW, I am perfectly happy to accept the idea that Bonaparte might have won [whatever that may mean] the Peninsular War had he behaved differently, or had – for example – a random shot killed Wellington as one did Sir John Moore.

It depends on the definition of "won". There is no reason to doubt he wouldve crushed all armies but he wouldve had to create better systems of supply to hold the country.

Are we sure the shot that killed Moore wasnt aimed? Or are only the British capable of directing general killing fire? Perhaps a Napoleon artillery devotee aimed the shot?

No nation was forced to accept subsidies from Britain to fight Bonaparte; they chose to do so, and to fight, for their own reasons.

You are surely not suggesting that those countries went to war simply to pocket the cash?

This was done to death a few years back – the bottom line was that basically the subsidies were quite a small part of the military expenditure of the main continental powers – the payments were good faith payments rather than decisive contributions. For obvious reasons, British subsidies were vital in keeping Spain, Portugal and Sicily (IIRC) in the fight. The subsidy to Sweden was enormous in comparison to its contribution.
On the other hand, any British subsidy was obviously much better for the ally than Napoleonic plundering, land seizure and enforced contributions: hence why virtually all nations in Europe preferred to ally with Britain when they had the chance. A non-extractive and non-nepotistic Imperial France might have succeeded in changing the balance of power – but Napoleon was far too 'let war pay for war' and 'might is right' for such things.

My understanding was that British finance was vital to keeping Russian and Austrian armies, Napoleons main battle opponents, in the field. The British economy underwent significant change to fund the war, including inflation and an income tax, ending up with a large debt.

Whirlwind, I can't find the previous discussion you mention, can you help? Would like to know more.

The Peninsula does not compare in scope and scale to the campaigns of 1809, 1812, and especially 1813, which really finished off Napoleon as a genuine threat to Europe. Britain's role was different. It's navy, it's money, and the resources the French had to commit to Spain to fight Britain there all helped to weaken Napoleon's ability to function in the later campaigns against the major armies.

Whirlwind, I can't find the previous discussion you mention, can you help? Would like to know more.

In here is one: TMP link

Some extra points and rants and stuff in this one: TMP link

But there have been lots over the years, especially for the French side.

The Peninsula does not compare in scope and scale to the campaigns of 1809, 1812, and especially 1813, which really finished off Napoleon as a genuine threat to Europe. Britain's role was different. It's navy, it's money, and the resources the French had to commit to Spain to fight Britain there all helped to weaken Napoleon's ability to function in the later campaigns against the major armies.

Well, it definitely does compare to 1809, whatever else one may think. Imperial France maintained hundreds of thousands of troops in Spain and Portugal. It looks like it was smaller because the main battles were indeed smaller, but at the operational level it is an illusion: lots of troops, just a lot more spread out.

Some extra points and rants and stuff in this one: TMP link

I was on fire in that thread. Those were the days.

I do not understand the focus on British subsidies. Yes Britain made payments to countries that were fighting Republican and Napoleonic France. Yes Britain made some of those payments for the purpose of encouraging countries to either go to war with or stay at war with France. Canning even said so. In 1808 Caning said "In the greater number of treaties of subsidy which had been contracted with foreign powers, the subsidies had been granted to procure the active co-operation of such powers in carrying on offensive hostilities against the common enemy." To which I say "So what?" In most instances the offers were made to countries that already had serious grievances with France, and British money simply oiled the machinery. It wasn't like the British hiring the Hessians in the AWI.

As to the Swedish subsidies, again Canning's 1808 speech is instructive. "But in the present case, certain pecuniary succours were stipulated to be granted to a power not for the purpose of achieving conquest, but to enable that power to defend its own dominions, which were attacked in consequence of its steady attachment to British interests. Such a treaty of subsidy was not, however, unprecedented in its nature. A similar subsidy had been granted to the king of Prussia in the 7 years war. In other treaties of subsidy it had been usual to stipulate the amount of the force to be employed by the power subsidized, and the particular periods at which that force was to be brought into the field. But in the present case, as well as in the treaty of subsidy with the king of Prussia, to which he had just referred, it had been thought unnecessary to clog the treaty with any such stipulation."

I do not understand the focus on British subsidies.

It's because Britain couldnt win it's grudge match against Napoleon without enlisting the rest of Europe as muscle.

arthur1815

No, I'm suggesting that many would not have been able to afford to wage war against Napoleon, had the British been unable to offer financial aid.

I agree with you that Napoleon would probably have won the Peninsular War, had he returned to take command there or if, as you say, Wellington had been taken out at some point. Wellington was vital for British success in the field. A shame Napoleon and Wellington never got to meet on the battlefield in Spain. But history is history and nothing we say or suggest here can change it, fun as it as times.

dibble

I got nothing wrong. You know that.

You read the posts wrong.

Whirlwind

Yes, the Peninsular was part of the overall Napoleonic Wars and the challenges Napoleon had to face. Unlike Wellington he didn't just have one enemy and one area of War of consider. But without the need to sort out the Austrians, the Russians and the Prussians, Napoleon would have probably returned to the lesser important arena and sorted the Brits and Spanish out once and for all. But such is life. It didn't happen.

In terms of paying for war, even in 1815, the allies refused to move until the British agreed to pay them! Nothing changed it seemed.

Thanks Whirlwind.Le Breton's are very interesting. The 1809 campaign and fighting was a concentrated military confrontation, the kind than Britain did not have the resources to engage in.

Britain's subsidies, the Royal Navy, and the nature and longevity of the Peninsula campaign were decisive factors in Napoleons defeat. The fact that they did not field an army against Napoleon and the GranD Armee at the height iPod their powers takes nothing away from their role

I was on fire in that thread. Those were the days.

It did genuinely make me think about Napoleonic strategy and resourcing a bit differently.

"My understanding was that British finance was vital to keeping Russian and Austrian armies, Napoleons main battle opponents, in the field."

Not vital for Russia.

From 1804 to 1816, Russia spent 2.06 billion paper rubles on its army and navy (plus additional amounts for military support : transport infrastructure, factories, mines, state security, finance & administration, etc., etc.). This was about 790 million silver rubles or about 113 million British pounds converted by weight of silver.

Total British subsidies to Russia in this period were 7.7 million British pounds, less than 7% of the Russian total.
--- 0.9 million British pounds were paid from 1804 through 1812
--- 1.1 million British pounds were paid in 1813
--- 5.7 million British pounds were paid in 1814, 1815 and 1816, after Russia's active campaigning.

Russia used over 1 million British pounds of the subsidies to purchase British and Hanoverian military products : over 110,000 Brown Bess muskets, clothe, gunpowder, horses, ships' equipment, etc., etc. So from 1804 through early 1813, the British subsidies to Russia were (net) received by British manufacturers, including government arsensals.

See : esfdb.org

How many replacement armies could Britain sent to Spain/Portugal if Napoleon had revisited the Peninsula and possibly all but destroyed its small 'professional' army. Would the British have brought in conscription like the rest of Europe?

There is a bit of a tendency among Napoleon fanbois to remind us – often shrilly, and while wetting themselves a bit – that Wellington was lucky not to face Napoleon in Spain. Had he returned with his Grande Armee, he'd have given Wellington a pasting, woo hoo! Yeah, baby!

Events, notably but not only those of 1815, suggest that it was actually Napoleon who was lucky he didn't face Wellington in Spain. In fact, this wasn't luck, it was choice. Napoleon was an absolute dictator; he could have gone wherever he wanted. He chose not to return to Spain.

As previously observed, Napoleon had three years after Wagram in which he could have returned to finish the job. During this time, Spain was the only place anyone was fighting him on land. That he did not take the opportunity strongly suggests he knew the job could not be finished except by capitulating. He also has form for abandoning armies when they're doomed and will only associate him with bad headlines: Egypt, Russia, Waterloo. Spain's just another example.

Wellington did recognise that he commanded Britain's only field army. As a public sector employee, he did not have the option Napoleon had of coercing more men into uniform every time he got his army wiped out. Preservation of the Peninsular force was always a key concern, therefore. Could Britain have generated another field army of 25,000 men? Sure; they had another 50,000 regulars and 50,000 militia at home. Logistically it would have been troublesome and might have taken some months, but if the payoff was you forced Napoleon to keep 2 or 300,000 guys in Spain, where they're all going to get killed eventually, absolutely it would have been done.

Britain did actually have a form of conscription, in that there was an infantry militia that was recruited by a ballot of eligible men (there does not seem to have been any militia cavalry or artillery). One way to get yourself off the list of eligible names was to join a volunteer formation instead. Both of these corps were nominally only liable to serve as home defence, but in practice, the militia provided a steady stream of recruits to the regulars.

Economy of force was a further priority. Anglophobes like to sneer that the Peninsular army wasn't very big, but the fact is it won every battle it fought, so it was clearly as big as it needed to be. Making it bigger would have been wholly wasteful, for no benefit – it would not somehow have improved on its 100% success record. It was big enough that France had to be able to concentrate 50,000 men against it in case it sortied, while needing another 200,000 in country to hold down the rest of Vietnam, er sorry I mean Spain.

From the ally's perspective, Spanish or otherwise, being allied with Britain paid you money, whereas being allied with France cost you money. If you were a French ally you had to pay for the army Napoleon needed you to raise, plus you had to subsidise his armies as well. If you were a British ally, Britain did the opposite – Britain subsidised you. British subsidies worked like foreign aid has always worked and still does. There is usually a proviso that some portion of it be spent buying things in the donor's country. If Britain gives aid money today to, I don't know, Sudan, so Sudan can decide if it's a good idea to build a dam or whatever, they'll be expected to hire a British consulting firm to answer that question. Britain's requirement that the money be spent on British weapons and uniforms ensured the money given was spent usefully and as intended, and was not eg simply embezzled. At the same time, of course, it maintained the export of British manufactures to Europe, which was exactly what Napoleon was trying to stop.

"he did not have the option Napoleon had of coercing more men into uniform every time he got his army wiped out"
"in country to hold down the rest of Vietnam, er sorry I mean Spain"
Well-phrased ! This kind of "wit" (I think you could call it) I will never have no matter how much I practice English !

"and was not eg simply embezzled."
Much of the Russian subsidies were just kept by the State or used to placate prominent noble families for their "losses" in 1812. You did not need actual "money" to fund the Russian army, unless you wanted to buy supplies from allies (as opposed to having the Cossacks and Native cavalry steal everything not nailed down – and half the stuff that was). Inside Russia, paper rubles were forced into acceptance by law – and internal security forces. And serf class people could not collect silver or gold anyway – by law enforced by internal security forces.

The Russians really liked the Brown Bess. Even at 16 silver rubles each, they tried to buy as many as they could. The last 30,000 delivered in 1812 were used and in poor condition (the Tula arsenal rebuilt them). The Russian's own Model 1808 (only 3 paper rubles each, made at a State-owned factory) was a second preference. A couple of regiments had Swedish captured muskets. The few units with Austrian muskets traded them for captured French at the first opportunity.
The Russians tried to buy Baker rifles, but only a 100 or so were avaiable. They were passed to marksmen in the Russo-German Legion.

There is a bit of a tendency among Napoleon fanbois to remind us – often shrilly, and while wetting themselves a bit – that Wellington was lucky not to face Napoleon in Spain. Had he returned with his Grande Armee, he'd have given Wellington a pasting, woo hoo! Yeah, baby!

By "fanboi", I take it you are referring to 99% of people who read about the period because there are 300,000 books on Napoleon and maybe 300 on Wellington?

Wellington was lucky not to face Napoleon. He only just survived at Waterloo basically sitting in place doing nothing while Napoleon fought a battle on two fronts. A battle that most expert analysis agrees Napoleon should've won.

Having said that, it wouldve been great for military enthusiasts to have seen several battles between the two.

Events, notably but not only those of 1815, suggest that it was actually Napoleon who was lucky he didn't face Wellington in Spain. In fact, this wasn't luck, it was choice. Napoleon was an absolute dictator; he could have gone wherever he wanted. He chose not to return to Spain.

That's because it seemed under control until it wasnt. Hindsight is wonderful, but it doesnt explain Napoleon's current thinking at the time. I haven't seen anything that Napoleon was afraid of but he did have an empire to run.

Wellington did recognise that he commanded Britain's only field army. As a public sector employee, he did not have the option Napoleon had of coercing more men into uniform every time he got his army wiped out. Preservation of the Peninsular force was always a key concern, therefore. Could Britain have generated another field army of 25,000 men? Sure; they had another 50,000 regulars and 50,000 militia at home. Logistically it would have been troublesome and might have taken some months, but if the payoff was you forced Napoleon to keep 2 or 300,000 guys in Spain, where they're all going to get killed eventually, absolutely it would have been done.

Your logic…is inconsistent. Napoleon doesnt do things because he cant but Britain doesnt do things even though they could?

Economy of force was a further priority. Anglophobes like to sneer that the Peninsular army wasn't very big, but the fact is it won every battle it fought, so it was clearly as big as it needed to be. Making it bigger would have been wholly wasteful, for no benefit – it would not somehow have improved on its 100% success record. It was big enough that France had to be able to concentrate 50,000 men against it in case it sortied, while needing another 200,000 in country to hold down the rest of Vietnam, er sorry I mean Spain.

But they did make their army bigger, they employed Portuguese muscle with British officers. I hope we're not forgetting the Portuguese contributions? That would be so ethnocentric.

Your accusation that anyone who doesn't see things your personal way is an "Anglophobe" is further delegitimizing. The viewpoint that anyone who isn't 100% against Napoleon and also 100% for Britain during these wars is an "Anglophobe" is as offensive as it is erroneous.

Britain's army didnt win 100% of its actions unless your definition of "win" is "Did not disappear".

Don't get me wrong, the good Duke did a masterful job with the resources he had but I think he would fire you as his PR Firm.

From the ally's perspective, Spanish or otherwise, being allied with Britain paid you money, whereas being allied with France cost you money. If you were a French ally you had to pay for the army Napoleon needed you to raise, plus you had to subsidise his armies as well. If you were a British ally, Britain did the opposite – Britain subsidised you. British subsidies worked like foreign aid has always worked and still does.

To say this, one would have to assume that Britain were the "good guys" in this conflict. That can only come from a place of myopic righteousness. Your premise can easily be interpreted the other way around; Nations were happy to pay to associate with Napoleon while Britain had to pay people to be its friend.

I like to read about Napoleon (I like to read about Wellington too…when I can find the books) but this isn't personal to me. From my viewpoint, I see a handful of overheated Wellington zealots making subjective historical statements. People like to read about Napoleon, he is probably the best general ever. If that frustrates you, it isnt your business to accuse other people of being Anglophobic. It's almost like there is a British Napoleonic equivalent of the Lost Cause.

I have read somewhere, I forget where, that Brown Bess muskets were handed out as a reward to men who had distinguished themselves. The ammunition logistics must have been a nightmare. Doctrinal the Russian army was focused on the bayonet, as I recall, so for gaming purposes I would probably downgrade Russian infantry for muskets but give them a bonus in melee. Very, very tough to break.

@ Michman –

A further interesting point you don't hear made very often is that the distance from the River Neman to Moscow is the same as that across Spain from the French border to the Portuguese at say Badajoz. In both cases it's 1,000km.

Why Napoleon thought he could sustain an assault on Moscow in 1812, when he had not managed to sustain one across similar distances in the Peninsula is, simply, baffling. Perhaps he though that the absence of the Royal Navy would make Russia an easier win? Although as you pointed out above, the Royal Navy was not absent from Russia, of course. Its control of the sea was the reason all Napoleon's supplies had to be moved 15 miles a day by road on mules, instead of 200 miles a day by sea.

In any event, he should either have figured out from the Spanish example what was going to happen to him in Russia in 1812, or he should have figured out from the Russian experience what was now going to happen to him in Spain. By refusing to take heed of either, he assured his catastrophic defeat in both.

"Brown Bess muskets were handed out as a reward to men"
Not that I know of. The traditional award was money – but Paul and even more so Alexander started awarding medals to rankers – not "orders" of chivalry like the Saint-George, but just medals as per modern usage.

"ammunition logistics must have been a nightmare."
From 1805, the policy was same weapon for each regiment – largely acheived for 1812, maybe less so by late 1813. In any case, the rounds were often made up in the regiments and companies, from deliveries of lead, paper and powder. Each regiment had a master gunsmith, master machinist/mechanic and master woodworker, with tools and equipment. Each battalion had 2 junior gunsmiths, 2 junior machinist/mechanics and 4 junior woodworkers. Each company had a master-at-arms senior NCO, an ammunition caisson and several over-complement rankers to keep the weapons and ammunition in good condition.

"Doctrinal …."
Increasingly through the period, the Russian approach was to use Jäger battalions dispersed in open order to provide fires (sometimes augmented by grenadier battalions) and form heavy infantry in columns for shock combat. Heavy Infantry fires were most typical in defense against cavalry. The heavy Infantry was, easpecially in the defense, to be supported by artillery. Hence a typical Russian divisional "formation" :
--- 2-4 battalions of Jäger in front and on flank(s) in open order – and/or – mounted Cossack cavalry on the flank(s)
--- 1st line : 4 battalions of the 1st Infantry brigade in battalion columns, often like the French attack columns, supported by eight 6-lber guns – with the space of a battalion for lateral separation
--- 2nd line : 4 battalions of the 2nd Infantry brigade in battalion columns, often like the French attack columns, supported by eight 6-lber guns – often in "checker board" compared to the 1st Line's battalions
--- reserve : 0-2 battalions of Jäger, and 2 Combined Grenadier battalions (if available), in half-battalion columns on platoon frontage, and 8 1/4-pud unicorns – half on each flank to the rear
--- detached to a grand battery : battery artillery company of 8 12-lbers and 4 1/2-pud unicorns

"for gaming purposes" : generalizations 1812 and later ….
--- "+1" Jäger in open order (i.e. equal or better compared veteran French light infantry)
--- "-1" (or "-2") for heavy Infantry (not Grenadiers) firing skills deployed in line
--- "0" modifier for Grenadiers or Guards firing skills in any formation or heavy Infantry firing skills when formed in column or square
--- "+1" for Jäger or heavy Infantry in shock combat skills
--- "+2" for Grenadiers or Guards in shock combat skills
--- "+2" for Jäger and heavy Infantry on any kind of morale or persistence check
--- "+3" for Grenadiers or Guards on any kind of morale or persistence check (i.e. equal or better compared French Old Guard infantry)
The system should allow for Russians to meet cavarly attacks by mounting a counter-charge bayonet attack delivered in column.

"Its control of the sea was the reason all Napoleon's supplies had to be moved 15 miles a day by road on mules, instead of 200 miles a day by sea."

Yes, exactly – sea nd then river.

Russia and Britain had been squabbling over Russia's attempt to gain a foothold in the Med for almost a generation. And Russia's expansion through the Caucasus and Central Asia was getting them closer to India. I believe that Napoléon counted on (as usual) a quick campaign with a victory before the Anglo-Russian allliance could be finalized and the British Navy dispatched to the Baltic, and that if they did come, he could work ships in close to the difficult shore under cover of coastal guns.

In fact, the British and Russians quickly began very good combined operations, Riga could not be taken, and the Royal Navy showed extraordinary skill in littoral warfare, completely shutting down the Baltic coast. The French coasters not sunk by British small boat work were burned by long distance Russian "flying detachments" of irregular cavalry.

Russian adopted a scortched earth policy on the line of the French advance, and the Grand Armée was essentially "out-of-supply" anywhere east of Smolensk.

Game, Set and Match.

Alexander is said to have shown resolve in refusing to surrender or even negotiate, even after the loss of Moscow. I think the Russians could do the logistics calculus, and knew as early as August that the Grand Armée was doomed.

Back to the orignal question, one could say in theory yes but in reality (as did happen) no – due to the fact that Boney's personal disorder being a narcissist and increasing megalomania prevented him to see a realistic approach for the Spanish and Portuguese problem (he would have to admit to himself that he was completely wrong in assesing the mood of the poeple, their will for resistence and donating the wrong king, his brother, how could he?. Further his operational art of war did only function, as along as it was limited and countries could be plundered to gain food for the soldiers and money for the officers – when the strategic goals became too big, like Russia, and well as his armies – his system failed badly. As good are his early campaigns for successful operational art of war – as good are his later ones to see the failures of his art of war.

Mitchman

The money constantly paid by Britain to 'persuade' other nations to keep waging war against Napoleon is often, even though it is millions of pounds, portrayed as low. However, I would be interested in knowing if the sums stated are in Napoleonic terms or the equivalent to their present day value?

4th Cuirassier

The events of 1815 showed that Wellington needed yet another allied army to come to his aid when facing Napoleon. In Spain, had Napoleon chosen to return, there would have been no Prussian army to come to his rescue. This is supported by the fact that Wellington took years to drive the French out of Spain and was a long struggle even against Napoleon's Marshals and generals. As I've mentioned before even Welly thought that. And I think he would know more about that than you or me, unless you actually think you know more than Welly himself?!

'Britain subsidised you' And I'm sure the bribes were spent helping the people and not wasted on nasty weapons and ammunition. LOL

Even in 1815 the allies refused to move against Napoleon until Britain paid their wages. If Britain did not have the money to pay the other nations to continue war against Napoleon, it would have been all over. It's a fact. Just accept it.

The Peninsular War only became a real problem after 1812 and Leipzig. It was a sideshow until then. Napoleon thought his various commanders could handle it, after all, it took years before the allies were actually capable of forcing the French out of Spain.

In other words, it was not the failure of his art of war but e more failure of his various commanders to carry is out. Otherwise he would not have had so many good victories in 1813, such as Dresden etc.

It is a bit like a football match. The brilliant manager might pick great players and tactics but if those same players fail to score or miss a vital penalty, they lose the game or cup. Of course, in football, you don't have players changing sides during the game. LOL

@ von W

The interesting thing about Spain and Russia is that they were the only two campaigns where Napoleon fought on his own terms and timetable, yet was in effect completely destroyed anyway.

The usual loss figure given for Spain is 250,000 tied down and another 250,000 lost. This is comparable to the overall loss figure for Russia; sources usually say he invaded with 500-600,000 men, but 100,000 were the Prussian and Austrian contingents who withdrew mostly intact. The brunt of the losses fell on the main body of 400,000 or so, his B-team, in which the manpower loss was thus similar to Spain.

The army defeated in Spain, moreover, was the veteran army of 1805-7 that had won at Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland. The scale of these two reverses dwarfs anything accomplished against him in 1805, 1806, 1807, or 1809. In effect, Spain destroyed his quality and much of his quantity, and Russia destroyed the rest of it and started peeling away his unwilling "allies".

Even so, and reduced arguably by Spain and Russia to fielding the C-team, he still came very near to winning the 1813 campaign, and it was the addition of Austria that rescued the Allies. It is interesting that it took that long for the Allies to work out how to win. You don't defeat Napoleon by putting 400,000 men into the field, who are then handily thrashed, so that you lose inside three months and become a French ally. You do it by denying him a decisive battle on his terms – which happened accidentally in Russia, and intentionally in central Europe in 1813.

The significance of the Peninsular entanglement is that without it, none of the 1812 to 1814 defeats could even have happened. Austria would not have attacked the B-team in 1809 if Napoleon had had 200,000 A-team Grande Armee veterans in Germany. No 1809 means no 1812. No 1812 means no 1813-14.

All this came about because Napoleon's strategic ineptitude in failing to understand sea power, and the limits of land power, led to diplomatic ineptitude in trying to enforce the Continental System. You don't defeat a sea power by trying to corner and defeat a small portion of its land forces, fer Gawd's sake. You do it by defeating its navy so you can invade (well, duh, but Napoleon never did work this out).

The misapprehension that you could defeat a sea power by land then persuaded him to attempt to invade and subdue Spain and Russia (apparently wearing boots and greatcoats made in Manchester) simultaneously. Both were military courses forced on him entirely by his own political misjudgment. He won every battle in Russia but lost the campaign, while in Spain his armies won pretty well every battle against the Spanish yet he still lost the campaign. These campaigns were diplomatic mistakes that soldiering was, quite simply, never going to retrieve, which is why he abandoned his armies in both Spain and Russia to their fate.

Napoleon lost thirty or so generals at Wagram, and Lannes, and LsSalle, and perhaps 60,000 troops in the campaign. These were not all the B team and one could argue that the loss of the outspoken Lannes was critical. Napoleon was shaken by this battle and often remarked on it later. The Austrians did well and Charles deserves way more credit than you are allowing, IMO

No one is denying that the British and Allies in Spain played a critical role in weakening Napoleon's armies, so that he could not have won in Russia or at Leipzig.

If Spain destroyed Napoleons best troops, who was left for Wellington and Blucher to fight at Waterloo? Very little of the old leadership was there, and Napoleon was a bit of a question, surely. Veterans mostly destroyed in Spain? Strategic ineptitude, I agree. He had hundreds of thousands of Russians and Austrians heading his way on top of dealing with Wellington.

If Napoleon's losses in Spain were critical, even more critical than the millions he lost on the continent, then, with all due respect, who was left to fight at Waterloo? It was not a huge army by earlier standards. Surely not the A team, or B. I ask this because I am not an expert on the British in these wars and I have only read a couple of the gazillion Waterloo books. I don't get involved in these discussions much. I know Waterloo was a fierce fight and a cherished victory. How good were Napoleon and the French at this point after Spain as you describe it?

Don't forget that those opposing Boney did not fight with A teams either, a not so good British Army (compared to the Peninsular Armies of 1813/14) , at least that is what Clinton says, the Prussians equally poor in the midst of a reformation, mixed regiments, it was the leadership which decided the campaign, both in the operational art of war as well as on the battle field.