Tango01 | 23 Jan 2022 9:10 p.m. PST |
… Of Antietam During The Civil War "It was early September in 1862, and General Robert E. Lee was drafting plans for his Confederate invasion of Maryland. Lee drew up a detailed battle plan for his Army of Northern Virginia, which would be divided during the invasion before regrouping after their battles had been fought.
As this attack would require a number of generals to command the diced-up army, the battle plan was copied and sent to each leader. On Friday the 13th, a copy of this top-secret order was found lying in the grass by a Union soldier, a discovery that changed the course of the American Civil War…" More here link Armand |
mildbill | 24 Jan 2022 5:22 a.m. PST |
The real losers were the Federals. With the info in hand, the war should have ended that day. |
mildbill | 24 Jan 2022 5:24 a.m. PST |
The real losers were the Federals. With the info in hand, the war should have ended that day. Wargamers would have thrown in the 'last reserve of the Republic.' |
Wackmole9 | 24 Jan 2022 7:19 a.m. PST |
Nope. the really losers were all the men on both sides who later died because George MacLellan want a soft war victory instead of a Hard one. |
pzivh43 | 24 Jan 2022 9:43 a.m. PST |
Mostly agree with mildbill. With the Lost Orders in his hand, McClellan wasted the gift, and could have ended the war in a few days. Imagine if Grant or even Meade had that same opportunity? |
doc mcb | 24 Jan 2022 2:03 p.m. PST |
McC was also still operating under the bad intelligence from Pinkerton; he thought Lee had way more men than he (either he) did. |
Tango01 | 24 Jan 2022 3:21 p.m. PST |
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Bill N | 24 Jan 2022 10:26 p.m. PST |
There were more than phantoms playing with Mac's mind. Lee's army had been reinforced after Second Manassas by the divisions of D.H. Hill and McLaws as well as Walker's demi-dvision. |
John Simmons | 25 Jan 2022 8:21 a.m. PST |
Bill N makes an important point, very important. McC did act, orders were issued, he was moving faster then Gen Lee expected. With the Army of Potomac so quickly in Frederick, the campaign had changed. The Lincoln Admin. did not want to see McC win that decisive victory, is Lincoln part of the "Lost Cause" Myth? The "Lost Orders" do not have Gen. Jackson going to Harper's Ferry, so there is that thought. So many threads to pull… Good questions to read on, |
Dn Jackson | 25 Jan 2022 11:44 a.m. PST |
"Tf he had thought the orders were genuine, he would have acted on them. Decisively." That's asking a LOT of McClellan. He was never a dynamic commander and saw hordes of southerners behind every tree. He did react quickly when the orders were found and his alacrity took Lee off guard. However, as soon as he ran into Confederates on South Mountain he convinced himself that he was badly outnumbered and reverted to his normal caution. |
Tango01 | 25 Jan 2022 3:19 p.m. PST |
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Murvihill | 26 Jan 2022 6:52 a.m. PST |
I think there are a lot of what ifs that could have changed the battle. |
Blutarski | 26 Jan 2022 8:22 a.m. PST |
Over-estimation of Confederate numbers seemed to accompany McClellan in every campaign he undertook, starting with the Peninsula. My impression is that his command style was rather tentative in nature and he seemed afraid of making a mistake. Whether this was driven by his further national political ambitions or was intrinsic to his nature is an interesting question. At Antietam, Lee was fortunate that McClellan failed to coordinate two major thrusts simultaneously. B |
Murvihill | 27 Jan 2022 6:40 a.m. PST |
I think he just had a timid personality. Lee and Jackson knew (not thought) they were outnumbered and still managed to win battles. |
Murphy | 27 Jan 2022 9:35 a.m. PST |
Dn Jackson and others…. Let's take a quick gander at McClellan during this time. As an organizer and administrator he was effectively brilliant. He took the shoddy remains of the Army after 1st and 2nd Manassas and brought them together the way they should have been done from the get go. He was actually at the time very popular with the troops. On the field, he was usually slower than what was to be expected, as he was one of those generals that always wanted "all of his pieces placed properly and exactly before his next move." Thus if he was short 50 supply wagons, he would wait until that shortage was made up. This drove Lincoln, his cabinet, and Congress made. Remember. Mac was fighting two enemies, Robert E, Lee, and the US Congress. Both which seemed intent of running him into the ground. Congress (fueled by Greeley and his press), had no problem screaming "ON TO RICHMOND" constantly, as none of them were carrying muskets, wearing brogans, and getting shot at somewhere in Virginia. Mac also had to deal with no only this, but the obvious politicization and ambitions of several of his subordinate commanders, (Hooker for one), as well as several others trying to use political influence to jockey for power. Also you have to remember that Mac was stuck with a very poorly operation and often flat out wrong intelligence service provide by Pinkerton, who seemed to constantly inflate enemy strength which always seemed to force Mac to delay even more. I'm not in any way saying that Mac is perfect, but overall, he did what he thought was best. His relationship with Lincoln, was always sort of shaky, (Election of 64 anyone?), and he seemed not to have the mindset that sent so many more Union troops needlessly into mass graves, such as Burnside did, or even Grant at the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. Honestly, Mac was out of his element I believe. He would've probably been more suited for European 18th Century Warfare, or even Napoleonic. But he did move fast at Sharpsburg, and it did catch Lee by surprise. Don't knock Mac so hard. He was who he was and did what he could. With the knowledge he had then, and the resources he had, and the pressure on him, does anyone here think that they could do better? I doubt it. |
donlowry | 27 Jan 2022 10:46 a.m. PST |
An interesting take on McClellan was provided by Gen. Jacob Cox in his article about the West Virginia campaign of 1861: "But the Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his subordinate was engaged." Battles and Leaders vol. 1, p. 137. |
Tango01 | 27 Jan 2022 12:16 p.m. PST |
Quite interesting… thanks again…. Armand |
Eumelus | 27 Jan 2022 12:34 p.m. PST |
McClellan blossomed early – second in his class at West Point, breveted in the Mexican war, published several books, designed equipment adopted for service (the eponymous saddle), chosen from all American officers to be the official observer of the Crimean War. Maybe too much success too early is bad for a man – might make him hesitant to take any chances in the future. That's an admirable personality trait for an engineer (which Mac was by training and inclination), but a fatal flaw for a commanding general. |
Blutarski | 27 Jan 2022 1:12 p.m. PST |
I've heard it said that military leaders who shine in times of peace tend to fail in times of war. Different personalities traits are called for, I think: the precise and scrupulous accountant in peace and the bold, creative entrepreneur in war. What (IMO) can fairly be said about McClellan is that he handed over a pretty well trained, well equipped and motivated Army of the Potomac to his successor. B
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KimRYoung | 28 Jan 2022 9:09 a.m. PST |
Forget the politics and strategy, McClellan had the instrument for the destruction Lee in place on Sept 17 and failed to use it. He was simply a poor tactician and poor battlefield general. Franklin's VI Corp and Porter's V Corp, a third of his army on the field, were simple not put into the fight. Franklin was stopped first by Sumner on the 17th. McClellan did initially approve Franklin's plan for an attack the next morning but Porter would talk McClellan out of any further action and did not want his own corp committed to the fight. Imagine what Grant would have done to Lee with two fresh corps against an army barely hanging on. Kim |
Marcus Brutus | 28 Jan 2022 10:04 a.m. PST |
I agree overall that McClellan bungled his chance to put away the AoNV. He is reported to have said to John Gibbons, "Here is a paper with which, if I cannot whip Bobby Lee, I will be willing to go home." McClellan understood the immensity of the opportunity but for reasons stated above he missed it. I do think that McClellan was sometimes operating with a political purpose that was at odds with the Lincoln administration. A victory yes, but not too big. Just big enough to get those pesky Rebs back in the Union with the status quo. |
donlowry | 28 Jan 2022 10:11 a.m. PST |
I think that McClellan wanted to win without a lot of bloodshed. A siege of Richmond would have suited him perfectly. He was too sensitive to his men's suffering to get in close and slug it out. |
Tortorella | 28 Jan 2022 3:13 p.m. PST |
He got everything right but the fighting part. His letters show that he thought he was to be the savior of the nation. All hat, no cattle. He could have been a huge figure in American history. He wanted his men to love him and they did. But he could not fight worth a darn and blew his big chance. |
John Simmons | 31 Jan 2022 5:03 p.m. PST |
Sadness, the real losers – the men that would die later…. Interesting comment, part of the lost myth, just wearing Union Blue. MaC did not want blood baths, as an educated man and knowing Europe's history he was seeking that decisive battle to win, but working to save lifes on both sides in a 'Civil War'. The more Blood shed, the more difficult the post war healing would be. Yet others in the Government were not fighting the war to save the Union, but it was a total war to destory the south. Mac might have won the war if left in command but that was not to be as forces within the Lincoln gov't would not let that happen. Focus on the days after Bull Run II and the secret plan of the Cabinet to resign, forcing Lincoln and this country into a even greater crisis. Two Brave men saved the country at this critical time. |
John Simmons | 31 Jan 2022 5:14 p.m. PST |
The books and the magazines we read, author Sears rides large over the MaC actions. Why does he persist in his claim that MaC did not act? Why does he persist in his claim that the telegram to Pres. Lincoln was at Noon not at Midnight? Reading over his body of work, one senses that Sears carries personal issues with Gen. McC that sitting in 2022 I find concerning. Yes, McC did issues orders, men were put on the march, orders went out to Gen. Franklin with the southern column. Yet we continue to read poor history. If all we read and then believe is true, look deep into the pool of information on what Gen. Lee's experience was. He was in what I would discribe as a very concerned – extreme concern the night of Sept. 13/14. Orders sent, resent, then orders changed, not the "normal" Gen. Lee of our reading. The officer that should be looked at to question performance is Gen. Stuart? |
John Simmons | 01 Feb 2022 9:01 a.m. PST |
The Number Game – a large factor in the "Lost Cause" story. An excellent book to look into - "Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles" The most recent study of Order of Battles for this period and the strength of the units, key learning is that Gen. R.E. Lee outnumbered the Army of Potomac under McC. Rewrites the story, the 'narrative' we have learned. Also Key is that the two lawyers in D.C. running the show as President and Sec. of War were playing Head Army General. In so doing they had pulled the I Corps under Gen. McDowell at Fredricksburg from MaC plans. This was the largest Corps by far in strength for the AOP and key to the plan as this Corps would move south down the rail line into the north of Richmond. With this key element removed it openned the flank of the AOP for Gen. Stuart's ride and the move by troops under Gen. A.P. Hill to recapture Hanover Station and threaten the supply lines of the AOP. |
Tortorella | 01 Feb 2022 1:46 p.m. PST |
Marcus B I agree with this. I seem to recall him referring to Lincoln as a baboon and the Original Gorilla in reference to Lincoln's intellect. Mac was big into politics judging by his letters and had no small opinion of himself. But " I will not move until I am ready" does not sound like something Jackson would say. |
Bill N | 02 Feb 2022 10:08 a.m. PST |
I am not sure how the relative strengths at Seven Days is relevant to Antietam John. I have never seen any post-war analysis that claimed that Lee's forces were even close to on par with the Army of the Potomac in September of 1862. |
Blutarski | 02 Feb 2022 1:32 p.m. PST |
When discussing Antietam, another factor that IMO must be taken into consideration is the great success achieved by Jackson in his capture of Harpers Ferry. Not only was the town and its garrison taken at relatively trifling cost, but large amounts of military supplies, ammunition, small arms, field artillery, railroad rolling stock and, perhaps most important of all, weapon manufacturing machinery from the major US government arsenal were carried off. Lee, without question, could play the role of a river boat gambler from time to time (see Chancellorsville if Antietam is insufficient evidence), but he proved himself a pretty smart poker player and won some very large pots. B |
donlowry | 03 Feb 2022 10:16 a.m. PST |
I thought the machinery for manufacturing muskets had already been removed from the arsenal at Harper's Ferry when the Confederates occupied the place before Bull Run/Manassas. |
Blutarski | 03 Feb 2022 12:17 p.m. PST |
You are absolutely correct, donlowry. My bad! B |