"A Counterfactual Consideration of Rommel’s 1st Offensive" Topic

Of possible interest?

link

Armand

Very interesting -thanks for sharing!

This looks like something we have seen. My previous comment still stands. Based on the situation that existed on March 31, 1941, Rommel taking the offensive made sense. Based on the rapid collapse of the British, pushing past Agedabia made sense.

I thought his first offensive was in Belgium/France in 1940.

I was wondering the same thing, Don.

Happy you enjoyed it….

Armand

I recommend:

The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March 1941
Murphy, Norman Kenneth
Department of Politics and International Studies, The University of Hull
link

Thanks!

Armand

Based on the situation that existed on March 31, 1941, Rommel taking the offensive made sense. Based on the rapid collapse of the British, pushing past Agedabia made sense.

The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March 1941

Yes, I agree, after studying, wargaming, etc., the early battles in NA, and Europe of course.

It's important to note that this being a mistake is not just my opinion, it was the view of the German command in Berlin at the time, and is the view of the official German history now.

I'm actually not particularly interested in litigating it, as I don't think anyone has actually spent time looking at primary evidence. So sure, everyone is welcome to their opinion on the matter.

The purpose of the post was to set out what the situation would have been two months down the line, if he hadn't attacked. What I show is that it would have been MORE, not LESS favourable for the Axis. Those are the facts that people might or might not want to consider when looking at the matter.

As to the nominator, the operation is generally referred to as Rommel's First Offensive. Arguably, in France he did not undertake an operational offensive, as he only commanded a division that was part of an operational offensive.

As for Murphy's work, I am not impressed by it. I think the complete absence of any Axis sources isn't great. These can be accessed in the UK, so there is little excuse not to.

All the best

Andreas

As you say everyone is entitled to their opinion, even Franz Halder.

The theoretical strength the British and Axis could deploy during the period from March 31, 1941 until the end of May is not by itself determinative. When you look at the forces the British could actually deploy on March 31, where those troops were, and the condition of their positions, Rommel had a good chance of initial success with the forces he then had available.

But he failed, despite your view that he had a good chance of success. And by failing he put the strategic position of the Axis into a logistical tailspin that it never recovered from. As far as I am concerned that's a matter of fact, not opinion.

The whole point of the article is on whether he would have had a better chance if he had not gone for the low-hanging fruit.

All the best

Andreas

Rommel was able to take the Brega position and gain access to Cyrenaica at a minimal cost. He was able to open up Benghazi as a supply port. He was able to move the defense of Italian Libya from the Gulf of Sirte to the Egyptian border where it remained until Operation Crusader. I would not call that a failure.

It is possible that if Rommel had waited until the arrival of 15th Panzer he might have achieved more. It is also possible that if he had waited until the arrival of 15th Panzer the British would have used the time to improve the Brega position and bring 3rd Armored Brigade up to a fighting strength and thus made Rommel pay heavily to break into Cyrenaica. There is no guarantee that waiting would mean that Rommel would not make the mistake of running out of gas. If Rommel still struck out out across the desert to Mechili he was still going to suffer a high rate of equipment failures.

Even if Rommel captured Tobruk, either under the original timeline or by waiting until later, he probably was going to have to stop at the Egyptian border until he could build up supplies. I don't see capturing Tobruk in 1941 having the same effect as it did when Rommel captured it in 1942.

I think the paper is there for those who want to read it and constructively engage with it.

All the best

Andreas