Editor in Chief Bill | 11 Nov 2021 11:04 a.m. PST |
In the book Napoleon's Imperial Guard, Gabriele Esposito writes: …At the Battle of Borodino, the largest clash of the Russian campaign, Napoleon decided not to employ the Old Guard. keeping it in reserve. It is likely that, if he had have risked the life of his loyal veterans in battle, the emperor could have achieved a decisive victory over the Russians… Do you agree? |
Murvihill | 11 Nov 2021 11:25 a.m. PST |
No. The Russians would have retreated sooner and Moscow and the Russian winter still awaited him. |
Dave Jackson | 11 Nov 2021 11:53 a.m. PST |
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abelp01 | 11 Nov 2021 12:02 p.m. PST |
Also agree with Murvihill. |
Dave Jackson | 11 Nov 2021 12:03 p.m. PST |
Given how Napoleon fought the battle…they would have been committed in a frontal assault..yes, raising French morale maybe enough for the others to continue the fight…they would have lost many casualties and yes the Russians would have been forced to retreat…no substantially better outcome. The time to really make a difference was at the beginning by allowing Davout's suggested turning manoeuver |
DisasterWargamer | 11 Nov 2021 12:20 p.m. PST |
The battle versus the war – no change |
79thPA | 11 Nov 2021 12:42 p.m. PST |
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Old Contemptible | 11 Nov 2021 4:30 p.m. PST |
Yes he should have used the OG. Defeat the Russians, declare victory and immediately turn around and go home. |
robert piepenbrink | 11 Nov 2021 4:42 p.m. PST |
There was no "decisive victory" to be had by then. Even Davout's turning maneuver would only have left Bonaparte with somewhat more men in Moscow--but not the remotest notion how to feed them, or bring the war to a favorable conclusion. |
14Bore | 11 Nov 2021 6:03 p.m. PST |
Wouldn't have changed much except better bragging rights. Kutuzov wouldn't have put on a brave face after. |
Allan F Mountford | 12 Nov 2021 12:48 a.m. PST |
Achieving a breakthrough with the IG would have only been decisive if accompanied by a vigorous cavalry pursuit per Jena. I am not sure the coalition cavalry had that capacity at the time. It has been suggested that wintering in Moscow followed by a spring offensive north to St. Petersburg might have focussed the Tsars attention. Perhaps, but St. Petersburg was 700km from Moscow (cf. Smolensk to Moscow – 400km+) thus a massive task. |
setsuko | 12 Nov 2021 2:35 a.m. PST |
Agreed with above, that even if the battle had been a decisive victory that doesn't mean the campaign would have been a success. |
14Bore | 12 Nov 2021 4:19 a.m. PST |
I have pondered what if the French wintered in Moscow many times, never seen how it would have still not weakening the army. |
Sho Boki | 12 Nov 2021 5:47 a.m. PST |
"the emperor could have achieved a decisive victory over the Russians…" But Borodino was a decisive victory anyway. Kutuzov, having 3/2 superiority in numbers, lost half of his regular army. |
von Winterfeldt | 12 Nov 2021 7:34 a.m. PST |
I cannot agree that it was a decisive victory, the Russians saved at least so many soldiers that they still could field an army. They could re place losses much easier the the Allied Army of Boney, looking at the distance of the line of communication. A decisive victory would have knocked the Russian Army completely out to such an extend that they wouldn't be able to continue with the war, which obviously they did not. For me another pyrric victory. Wintering in Moscow would be no option, there Boney and his Allied Army would be completely cut off from any news during the winter and Boney knew who fragile is reign was (and he was prooved right on this). So in my view he had good reasons to preserve an intact fighting force which would cover his retreat. |
Glenn Pearce | 12 Nov 2021 7:50 a.m. PST |
No, Allen nails it. The IG "might" have been able to punch a hole in the Russian line. However, you need a strong cavalry force to exploit it. Mute point, Napoleon was a military genius who knew you never use your last/best reserve in a battle that is a stepping stone in a campaign. |
Brechtel198 | 12 Nov 2021 8:37 a.m. PST |
From A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent Esposito and John Elting Map 118: '…Then the fighting paused as Eugene's artillery displaced forward to the captured ridgeline. Napoleon rode along the French outpost line east of Semyonovskaya, studying the new Russian position that Barclay was desperately cobbling together. The Emperor considered sending Claparede and a division of the Young Guard against it, but was dissuaded by Murat and Berthier, who urged that only a major, coordinated attack would be certain of success. Napoleon then decided against committing the Old Guard ('my last reserve.).' 'In hard fact, he had some 30,000 fresh or practically fresh men ready for action. Except for its artillery, the Guard had not fired a shot. Lecchi, Delzons, Broussier, Grouchy, and Junot had done little serious fighting, while Kutusov had committed every available man. The French artillery dominated the battlefield…Noting the Russians waiting stolidly on the next ridge, he ordered his artillery to increase its fire, and returned to his headquarters, half expecting to continue the battle the next morning. Kutusov wrote to the Tsar, reporting that he had won another glorious victory. Then, in the small hours of 8 September, he bolted for Moscow.' |
Lascaris | 12 Nov 2021 9:50 a.m. PST |
The real decision would have been to winter over in Smolensk before pushing on to Moscow. Don't know if the ultimate result would change but it might have helped. People forget that the majority of non-combat losses were suffered during the summer, not the winter, in the 1812 campaign. |
Frederick | 12 Nov 2021 12:59 p.m. PST |
Agree with the general thread – I think he should have taken Moscow, declared victory and then retired back to more habitable quarters – Lacasris' idea is probably more do-able, i.e. winter in Smolensk then take Moscow in the spring |
14Bore | 12 Nov 2021 1:52 p.m. PST |
Lascaris I agree, Smolensk was a better stopping point |
Old Glory | 12 Nov 2021 4:31 p.m. PST |
I have always wondered why Napoleon did not winter in Smolensk, securing and occupy the territory to his rear as "conquered" and thus be able to bring up supply trains, depots, and reserves as a new staging area? Also declare Polands independence. Russ Dunaway |
Allan F Mountford | 12 Nov 2021 4:37 p.m. PST |
That is a long time to 'winter' at Smolensk. The Coalition took Smolensk 18 August. The first snow fell 06 November. 'Wintering' in Smolensk would require the Coalition to stay put for at least seven or eight months and recommence operations in March/April 1813. |
Legionarius | 12 Nov 2021 4:42 p.m. PST |
You do not defeat anyone until they are dead or declare themselves defeated. Russians don't usually do that. Their national characteristic is stubbornness. They have time, terrain, weather and faith as their allies. Decisive battles work only when both sides view battle as a decisive event. When the "defeated" side retreats to fight another day, there is not such thing as a decision. Yes, Napoleon knew how to win battles. Against stubborn enemies--Spanish Nationalists, Russians, Calabrians, and even Haitians--he lost wars. |
Brechtel198 | 12 Nov 2021 5:04 p.m. PST |
The real decision would have been not to invade Russia. |
Sho Boki | 12 Nov 2021 10:55 p.m. PST |
But how then you can force Russians to peace? You can't hold big concentrated army on Eastern Europe to avoid Russian invasion for long time. |
Korvessa | 13 Nov 2021 12:22 a.m. PST |
Kind of reminds me of Hannibal (a bit) He could win all the battles, but was never going to win the war because the other side would never quit. I blame the Mongols – they were never going to let that happen again. Perhaps he lost his best chance years earlier when Alexander snuffed Paul |
von Winterfeldt | 13 Nov 2021 1:09 a.m. PST |
I cannot see any way how Boney could have stayed with the army the whole winter, as being head of state of France, he was for sure needed to be back in Paris. Then who should he give the immense task to re organise the Coalition forces in Somelenks, Vitebsk or Vilnus? He failed in the past to do so, for example in 1809 – instead of Davout he nominated Berthier who ws out of his depth with this task. When desterting his army – he chose Murat to lead back the routing coallition forces. In my opinion his only way of success would be – listen to his advisors, like Davout, Berthier, Caulaincourt – re establish the full Kingdom of Poland – and keep a big fighting force at Warsaw as operational army. How he could have achieved this – there are still my doubts there already when the army was concentrating in the Duchy of Warsaw before the onslaught agains the Russian empire – logistics, food – broke down. |
Alley Richard | 13 Nov 2021 3:11 a.m. PST |
Old Guard saved the day during the retreat. Which prolonged the agony into 1813-4 and 1815. What would have happened if Napoleon had been captured during the retreat,what would the Tsar have done with him? |
Brechtel198 | 13 Nov 2021 5:30 a.m. PST |
First, the Coalition forces were the allies through the period, not the French and their allies in the Confederation of the Rhine. Second, Berthier was not the commander of the Army of Germany in 1809. He was in his usual position as Major General and chief of staff. The problems at the beginning of the campaign were the result of Napoleon commanding the army from Paris and the snarled communications from Paris-a combination of telegraphic communications and those sent by courier. They did not arrive in sequence which caused the problems. Berthier was finally tired of it and bluntly told Napoleon that he needed to get in theater. The fault was Napoleon's, not Berthier's. Napoleon did not 'desert' the wreck of the Grande Armee after crossing the Berezina, but was advised by his senior commanders that he needed to get back to Paris because of the Malet problem and to raise a new army for 1813. Murat did desert the army and it was Berthier who quite literally saved the day by convincing Eugene to take command and then advising Napoleon to confirm Eugene in that position. And Eugene performed very well, perhaps brilliantly, building up an effective army that held the eastern marches until Napoleon arrived. |
Brechtel198 | 13 Nov 2021 5:34 a.m. PST |
Perhaps someone could explain the comment about the Calabrians 'defeating' Napoleon? The Spanish did not defeat Napoleon. The presence of Wellington and an Anglo-Portuguese army was responsible for the eventual victory in the long war in the Spanish peninsula. Napoleon's short campaign in Spain in 1808 defeated the Spanish armies and drove Moore's small British army out of Spain. The Haitians were defeated by Leclerc, but most of Leclerc's army died of yellow fever. And there was also the presence of British troops on the island who suffered just as much as the French of yellow fever. The French defeated the Russians in Switzerland in 1799, in Austria and at Austerlitz in 1805, and defeated them in 1807 forcing them to make peace at Tilsit. |
Legionarius | 13 Nov 2021 6:09 a.m. PST |
Bottom line: 1) You are not defeated until you are dead or willingly surrender. 2) Battles do not necessarily win wars. 3) Enemies who are deemed militarily, "racially" or otherwise "inferior" can win over the best armies of the time because, in the famous phrase attributed to Giap "You may have won all the battles, but we won the war." Napoleon won against the old monarchies who followed the old conventions of a "gentleman's war" and had not waken up to what Clausewitz would call a "people's war." Yes, Napoleon could win battles and wars against those who believed in that battles are decisive. He could not win wars against those who did not surrender. As to other factors that influence a war such as General Winter, malaria, yellow fever, etc. That's part of the deal (friction if you will). Many of these factors favor those who are prepared for them or who adapt more quickly. Perhaps that too is a part of "generalship." |
Au pas de Charge | 13 Nov 2021 6:55 a.m. PST |
Depends what type of army one has too. The Tsar basically had a slave army he could do whatever he wanted with including grinding it into oblivion. He could also ignore popular opinion. Napoleon had to contend with a lot more politics. Borodino was decisive enough if Napoleon had pursued the Russians more aggressively after the battle. Part of his miscalculation was underestimating what an unreasonable fanatic the Tsar was. |
14Bore | 14 Nov 2021 5:00 a.m. PST |
Au pasde Charge- Unreasonable assumes Napoleon's position was correct. Signed thousands of Napoleonic figures and not a Frenchman in the house |
Brechtel198 | 14 Nov 2021 6:28 a.m. PST |
You are not defeated until you are dead or willingly surrender. Austerlitz ended the War of the Third Coalition and not all of the Austrians and Russians who fought there were dead or had surrendered. Jena was a three week campaign that resulted in the destruction of the Prussian army and the Prussian state. Not all of the Prussian soldiers were dead. And there was still Lestocq's command in East Prussia. There are more examples… Battles do not necessarily win wars. That is correct, but not necessarily true. Campaigns are comprised of battles both of which contribute winning the war. Winning battles and losing campaigns brings about losing wars. |
Au pas de Charge | 14 Nov 2021 8:23 a.m. PST |
I will take it that you accept the rest of my post and take issue only with the following:
Au pasde Charge- Unreasonable assumes Napoleon's position was correct. The Tsar's autocratic and imperialistic policies existed outside of Napoelon's "positions". There were quite a few that feared Russia more than Napoleon (Certainly more than France). Additionally, the Tsar's war against Polish culture was the stuff of legends and his own people were oppressed to the point where he had to keep them isolated, not unlike Stalin, to prevent contamination from the whiffs of western freedom. His selfishness and religious fanaticism consistently made him take an unconditional stance against Napoleon as some sort of antichrist figure. Really though, the Tsar could've gazed in the mirror. Signed thousands of Napoleonic figures and not a Frenchman in the house Impressive. Being free from chauvinism against any nation during the era, I have both sides in my Napoleonic collection. |
14Bore | 14 Nov 2021 12:24 p.m. PST |
Just started out that way and thought better to have not diverted. Not a Royalist but I play that part on the game board. Actually never even had French under my command. Kinda a bizarre record come to think about it in 40 years. But yes Alexander could be, he was in full charge of the empire answering to no one. |
Bill N | 14 Nov 2021 6:07 p.m. PST |
It was OK for Napoleon to leave the Grande Armee in December, but it was not OK for Murat to do so over a month later? It seems there is a double standard here. Murat was not simply Napoleon's satrap in southern Italy. He was king of Naples, in fact and not just in name. Given the outcome of the Russian campaign Murat had good reason to be in Naples to explore his state's options. Plus the army was in less danger when Murat left than when Napoleon did, and Eugene was an improvement. As for committing the Guard, how much cavalry did Napoleon have on hand to follow up? |
Allan F Mountford | 15 Nov 2021 2:49 a.m. PST |
@Bill N Discounting the IG cavalry, there were approximately 3000 to 4000 fresh light cavalry with Grouchy and Junot. Given a couple of hours to organise, a similar number could probably be mustered in support. Problem is, of course, you really need your fresh light cavalry available to pursue in the coming days. |
4th Cuirassier | 15 Nov 2021 3:32 a.m. PST |
Some of the supposed options set out above make it clear that what Napoleon actually did was, in fact, the best available course (well, aside from not invading Russia at all, obviously). If he had committed the Guard at Borodino, he would not have achieved more than he actually did, which was to drive a defeated Kutusov off the latter's own chosen and fortified battlefield, leaving open Napoleon's path to Moscow. Kutusov then sat around south-east of Moscow and didn't make any significant aggressive moves until the French withdrawal had begun. Getting his Guard shot up would have achieved no more but would have left Napoleon with no undamaged formations to help extract the remainder of the army later. We tend to think of 600,000 men going into Russia and 10,000 coming back, but in fact about 50,000 eventually returned, who were worth saving. If he had spent the whole winter in Smolensk, he would have had to neglect his other role as head of the French government, with results likely worse than Malet. If he had gone back to Paris, leaving someone like Murat in charge, and declared a kingdom of Poland, Austria and Prussia would have seceded from their alliance instantly. In fact, with or without such a declaration, there would certainly have been a winter campaign and a probable French Stalingrad early in 1813. Davout might have done what Manstein later could not and rescued the trapped army, but I don't know what troops he would have used. The nearest meaningful French reinforcements would have been in Warsaw, which is (gulp) 550 miles from Smolensk. What Napoleon did was the least-worst given where he was starting from. He advanced to Moscow with intact troops still in hand, and when no peace terms were available, he retreated so as to get his army out of Russia ASAP. There was clearly going to be a round two and he needed to get after preparing for it. Meanwhile, there was no point staying with an army whose mission had failed even if it was not actually beaten. So as in Egypt in 1799, Spain in 1808 and Waterloo in 1815, he bugged out and headed home to play politics. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 5:16 a.m. PST |
He did it so why not me? That isn't the way the chain of command works. Murat was left in command of the wreck of the Grande Armee by Napoleon and to desert that assignment was just that-desertion. Napoleon was advised by his senior commanders and Berthier to get back to France for various reasons. Murat was king of Naples by Napoleon's good graces and he was Murat's commander. Murat did not have that option. If it wasn't for Berthier and Eugene, Murat's actions could have added to the Russian disaster. And I haven't seen anything that shows that Murat was advised to leave. In the long run, Eugene was more reliable and much more capable than Murat. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 5:28 a.m. PST |
Napoleon left Spain in January 1809. He left because of the worsening situation with Austria who was readying herself to invade Bavaria. Austria had decided on war with France in December 1808 and the French found out about their preparations to invade in the spring, largely thanks to Davout's intelligence operations in central Europe. In March Metternich, who was the Austrian ambassador to France, informed the French government that the Austrian army was being placed on a war footing 'as a simple precautionary measure. In late March Davout sent a report stating that the Austrian army was moving. Metternich demanded his passports in early April and the French intercepted Austrian diplomatic dispatches that indicated that an Ausrian offensive was impending. Berthier, who was now in Strasbourg, sent a telegraph dispatch to Paris that the Austrians had invaded Bavaria without declaring war. As for Egypt, that has been covered ad nauseum. Napoleon was actually recalled to France twice while in Egypt. After Waterloo, as Napoleon was head of state, he judged the best way to control the situation was from his capitol, as he was head of state as well as commander of the Armee du Nord. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 6:13 a.m. PST |
No. The Russians would have retreated sooner and Moscow and the Russian winter still awaited him. If the Russians had been defeated as badly as they had been at Friedland Alexander might have at the very least requested an armistice. Again, though, invading Russia was one of Napoleon's three great mistakes. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 6:15 a.m. PST |
Part of his miscalculation was underestimating what an unreasonable fanatic the Tsar was. I don't see Alexander as a fanatic, but more the coward. He didn't want to end up like his father at the hands of assassins. |
von Winterfeldt | 15 Nov 2021 6:29 a.m. PST |
Moreover Boney was duped by the Russians to stay overlong in Moscow, but he had nothering other to do than mock people like Caulaincourt who warned him how sudden temperatures would drop, he was out of his wits and mind as well, naricissistic personal disorder, in Paris he was dreaming that after two weeks rest his Grande Armée would have recovered to strike again. |
Au pas de Charge | 15 Nov 2021 7:45 a.m. PST |
I don't see Alexander as a fanatic, but more the coward. He didn't want to end up like his father at the hands of assassins. I dont see this as excluding his religious fanaticism. He had an anti-intellectual bent that was repackaged as a sort of proof of divine righteousness. …he was out of his wits and mind as well, naricissistic personal disorder, in Paris he was dreaming that after two weeks rest his Grande Armée would have recovered to strike again. Except that he abdicated twice which means that of all the big 5 leaders, he was the only one who acted in a democratic manner. Tsar Alexander never did and would never have agreed to do so. The King of Prussia probably also shouldve abdicated. When speaking about out of ones wits, I suppose George III could serve as the era's poster boy. He actually did threaten to abdicate a couple of times but only in infantile rages when he didn't get his way. He was truly a megalomaniacal, greedy creep and his behavior is often given an historical pass because he was such a mediocrity. Additionally, it wasnt a dream that Napoleon would raise another army, he in fact did so. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 8:07 a.m. PST |
There's a new book on George III which might be of interest: The Last King of America: link |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 8:09 a.m. PST |
Frederick William, Francis, and Alexander were all autocrats and were not reformers. Napoleon was neither tyrant nor autocrat and was noted as being a reformer. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 8:12 a.m. PST |
>q>Moreover Boney was duped by the Russians to stay overlong in Moscow, but he had nothering other to do than mock people like Caulaincourt who warned him how sudden temperatures would drop, he was out of his wits and mind as well, naricissistic personal disorder, in Paris he was dreaming that after two weeks rest his Grande Armée would have recovered to strike again. A few questions: How was Napoleon 'duped' by the Russians to stay in Moscow? When and how did Napoleon 'mock' Caulaincourt? Where is the evidence of a personality disorder, narcissistic or otherwise? If Napoleon was 'dreaming' about the Grande Armee, how then did Napoleon create a new one and move east in April 1813 to face the Russians and Prussians and defeat them both and drive them to the Oder? Thanks in advance for your answers. |
Bill N | 15 Nov 2021 10:23 a.m. PST |
Napoleon did put Murat on the throne, and through 1812 he had the power to remove him. So long as Murat was king though his paramount obligation was to Naples and not to Napoleon. If it was in Naples interests that Murat return to his capital, that is where Murat should go. Didn't Caulaincourt recommend that Napoleon leave Eugene in command when Napoleon was getting ready to return to Paris? In the years leading up to the invasion of Russia there were substantial French troops in Italy. These troops were not just there to keep Murat in line when he tried to pursue policies inconsistent with Napoleon's wishes. They were also there to help defend the Kingdom of Naples from possible invasion by Anglo-Sicilian forces. The Russian campaign and the defeat of the Grand Armee meant that Murat would need to look even more so to Naples own resources to defend the kingdom, if remaining an active ally of Napoleon was even in Naples' interests. |
Brechtel198 | 15 Nov 2021 11:01 a.m. PST |
So long as Murat was king though his paramount obligation was to Naples and not to Napoleon. That wasn't the case. He was still a serving French officer and his duty was to France, Napoleon as his commander, and the Grande Armee. The French troops in Italy overwhelmingly belonged to the Armee d'Italie and Eugene was their commander, not Murat. Whatever French troops were assigned to Naples were put there by Napoleon to support Murat. When Murat turned against France, the overwhelming majority of those went home. Murat bargained with the allies in 1814 not to protect Naples, but in an attempt to keep the throne of Naples. And he was dominated by his wife, Caroline, one of Napoleon's sisters who encouraged him to turn on France and Napoleon in order to keep his throne. And Murat would turn against France and attack Eugene in 1814. That also makes him a traitor. |