"While given a few paragraphs in most of the numberless histories, novels, movies, and BBC series of Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812, the action on 5 September, two days before the climatic battle of Borodino, was itself larger in terms of forces engaged and casualties than most of the battles of the eighteenth century, certainly as large as Marengo or Arcola. Though it was completely overshadowed by the catastrophic abattoir two days later, it may have been strategically consequential to the outcome of that monster battle, and, indeed, to the whole fate of Napoleon's ill-considered invasion.
Most historians and participants (most notably the know-it-all Carl von Clausewitz, who was actually there) considered the Russian advanced position and redoubt built in front of the tiny hamlet of Shevardino a mistake on the part of the Russian commander-in-chief, Kutuzov. They say it served no purpose and only resulted in the destruction of so many men, horses, and ordnance at the cost of the subsequent battle and risk to the nation. They also blame the impetuosity of Bagration, who sent forces from his Second Army forward to defend the position on the 5th.
However, an alternate (and therefore obscure) explanation exists: That Prince Bagration, commander of the Second Army of the West and the left wing of the Russian combined army, (with the nodding approval of the somnolent and "yeah-whatever" Kutuzov) recognized that he had to delay the oncoming French so the Russian army could complete the fortifications on the main battlefield. He had served this same service during the 1805 campaign at Schöngrabern, when he delayed the French long enough for Kutuzov to get the main Russian army back across the Danube to link up with reinforcements and prepare the battleground of Austerlitz (which he then managed to lose anyway). It is my proposition that had not Bagration made this forward deployment at Shevardino, Napoleon would have been able to quickly outflank the Russian army from the south and sweep over it on open ground before they were dug in, driving it into the corner of the Kolocha and Moskva Rivers and annihilating it. I wonder if the tsk-tskers about Bagaration's "mistake" are just indulging in Monday morning quarterbacking…well…in my Tuesday morning quarterback opinion. But strategically, Bagration's tactical "mistake" may have actually saved the Russian army, and ultimately Russia…."
From Obscure Battles Blog
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Armand