"Why US generals were more successful in WWII than afterwards" Topic
10 Posts
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shadoe01 | 26 Aug 2021 5:10 p.m. PST |
Talk by Thomas E Ricks – The Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lecture, 2011 YouTube link |
John the OFM | 26 Aug 2021 6:59 p.m. PST |
I suspect it had a lot to do with Roosevelt not being a micromanager. He appointed, or kept in place, admirals and generals, and expected them to do their jobs. For the most part, it worked. He let the Army and Navy bureaucracy weed out the chaff. For the most part. This was in contrast to Hitler, Churchill and Stalin, because they thought they knew better. Roosevelt's military experience was that of a bureaucrat, and he knew it. I blame instant radio communication. It allowed Washington to micromanage. In the case of MacArthur, that was absolutely necessary. Johnson et al actually approved bombing targets during Vietnam. This was probably a sop to The Best and the Brightest who knew better. |
Oberlindes Sol LIC | 26 Aug 2021 7:27 p.m. PST |
I haven't listened to the lecture, but that won't stop me from commenting. The advent of mutually assured destruction transformed war. Nuclear-armed states just stopped entering into open hostilities against each other. The creation of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and SEATO, brought a lot of non-nuclear countries into treaties whereby a nuclear-armed country would be obligated to defend them if attacked -- effectively enlarging the scope of the transformation. So war turned into police actions and counter-insurgencies and the G WOT. The mindset, infrastructure, and technologies, and organizations that worked very well in WW2 (and WW1, too) were not optimized for the new kinds of conflicts. We hadn't figured that out by the end of the Vietnam War. The Soviets hadn't figured it out by the end of the Chechen and Afghan Wars. The generals who have been successful in the post-WW2 period -- Giap, Mao, Hekmatyar, arguably Castro -- were not trying to re-fight WW2. I mostly agree with John the OFM's comments. Instant radio communication has been at best a mixed blessing. |
Thresher01 | 26 Aug 2021 7:49 p.m. PST |
Yes, that, as well as telecvision for the masses, and a left wing media working hard against administrations in many cases, to undermine support for us in numerous conflicts. |
shadoe01 | 26 Aug 2021 8:14 p.m. PST |
Ricks is focussing more on the competency of post-WWII US generals than the 'winning' of post-WWII wars. Of course, there is some relationship between the two but it is possible to lose wars while having competent generals and to win wars with mediocre generals. For all of you who are unlikely to listen to the lecture, I'll sum it up tomorrow. |
Raynman | 26 Aug 2021 8:37 p.m. PST |
There is more politics in play on the battle field now. More PR issues to cover. Generals have to command according to what the folks back home want to see, than to what is actually happening on the battlefield. I had a Marine friend that said that his unit didn't take any casualties until the lawyers (JAG) got involved. They set up new ROE's (Rules of Engagement) that basically hamstringed his men. |
Tgerritsen | 26 Aug 2021 9:33 p.m. PST |
There is also zero body count tolerance in the US now. Our kill/loss rate is probably better than any army in history. Yet, how was Somalia viewed, or Iraq or Afghanistan? We could kill 10,000 or a hundred thousand enemy for every US loss and that US loss will always be seen as a failure in US eyes. Until today we hadn't had a single US casualty in Afghanistan in well over a year, but if you had asked the average American a week ago they would have told you that our troops were dying in droves because that is the perception here. |
gunnerphil | 27 Aug 2021 3:36 a.m. PST |
Remember reading a General saying that America would not have achieved a victory in WW2 if they used the rules of engagement that are in force today. |
shadoe01 | 27 Aug 2021 6:29 a.m. PST |
All interesting points, I'm not sure if anyone's who commented actually listened to the lecture. While irregular warfare, counter-insurgency or whatever name is used are difficult operations, Ricks takes the view that US generals since WWII have been mediocre – right up to the present. He attributes this to the fact that the army no longer relieves generals in the field who are not performing – something which started in the Korean war. About the same time the US Army started rotating generals in the field – so why relieve a general when he'll be gone in a few months. Ricks believes that this approach leads to mediocrity as generals avoid risks during their tour. The lecture is based on a book by Ricks about the topic: link In case you don't read the book here's a review which summarizes the book: link While one can't place all the blame on the generals I do think, from my first hand experience, that there's something in his argument*. Whether or not a willingness to fire poor performing generals and keep good performing commanders in the field for longer periods of time would have resulted in better strategic/political results is hard to say. * Comments on that are better left to a post on counter-insurgency, but the lack of continuity has at least two bad effects – commanders lacking good overall intelligence/knowledge of the situation and locals, whether allies or foes, exploiting the rotation policy. The results – according to Ricks – is an army with great tactics but poor strategy. |
shadoe01 | 27 Aug 2021 12:14 p.m. PST |
Ricks article which has much the same information but with detail from war in Iraq. Political issues aside, some of the issues he mentions I have observed with NATO in the Balkans – e.g., lack of accountability – or more generally, a CYA approach by senior leaders. link |
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