"[Austria 1805] Undermanned-Underled-Undertrained-Confused" Topic

I want to examine the background to comments made by Jeff Berry in his excellent series of battle analyses like :
link .

He says

Mack proceeded to order only the most superficial changes in the Habsburg forces, namely the reduction of battalions from six companies to four (on the Prussian model) and the corresponding increase of the number of battalions in a regiment from three to five.

He didn't, however, implement any new officer training to handle these new formations, or any of the tactical ideas of Charles. Nor did he make arrangements to increase the number of company officers to manage the already under-officered regiments.

So the new regiments went to war undermanned, underled, undertrained, confused, and not a little resentful. It seems he completely missed the essence of what Charles had been trying to do and ended by completely messing things up.

While I agree of course that these things were done, and badly it appears- I am left wondering why [and I have read/ examined the source documents cited where I can over the years] the latter paragraph seizes on issues that, at first glance, are overstated.

The Austrian Army, as complex as it was, was still a standing army of the same duration as the French. In fact moreso since enrolement was 'till death' in most cases.

Why did it need 'untrained' new personnel at all?; why didn't they identify the 'missing' officers and NCO's accordngly with the change in organisation and act on that need?

Would it really have been 'confused' or simply officers who were 'resentful' and thereby, lackadaisical in duty?

I guess I'm lucky to be able to model one full regiment, who despite the above, acquitted themselves well in front of the French for some time @Austerlitz.

As I can't read German, I'd be most interested to read if anyone who can has a contrasting view to offer.

I see Jeffs simple synopsis not as completely incorrect, but perhaps only indicative of parts of the army (obviously the same as I expound for the middle-officer korps).

Thoughts/ opinions/ facts..?
Welcome, regards
davew

I am making an early Austrian army. Based on Arnold's writings, the Austrian officer and command structure, rather than troop quality seems the weakness.

As a result, I play Shako and give Austrian infantry the same morale rating as other nations. However, they do not remove casualties, disorders, or get a staff officer when there division rolls a six on activation. Others reduce the morale rating of the Austrians, but I don't like the approach

In short, I agree with what you state above and play accordingly.

Agree – Austrian troop quality was just fine, and don't forget that as the longest serving and most determined enemy of the French they gave the French many a tough battle – but especially early on their staff and command structure was not up to snuff

Thanks dan
appreciate the comment.
I find far too much reliance being placed on game 'set-up' along these lines as if they are impervious rules of physics (probably not the correct analogy).

I'd never quite been keen as I read so much in early days and the old WRG rules certainly made opponents of French very scarce at times. Although guilty myself of 'following the trend' my reading and views broadened to the point I couldn't accept the degreee of victimisation.

I remember gamers preferred to play out of period simply to get a winning army.

Now, I'm perfeectly happy to accept that new conscripts were present, but in what proportions? Deploying the last numbered battalions may have been an exercise in frustration. There is also the politics of why the Hungarian Diet troops was not called. And I haven't any recent research on why, if that has been explained.
cheers d

Gunther E. Rothenberg's "Napoleon Great Adversary – Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814" makes good reading – particularly "Chapter IV Archduke Charles and the First Reform Period, 1801-5" pages 86 to 104 inclusive & "Chapter V Ulm, Caldeiro and Austerltz: the Campaigns of 1805" pages 105 to 133 inclusive.

In the section on "Army reorganisation and training, 1801-4" page 97 "Standards of training in the army varied. Because of the financial stringency, troops still remained widely scattered and, though this was undesirable for rapid mobilization, many regiments were stationed in the eastern provinces where their upkeep was cheaper. Moreover, training was impeded by the unfortunate practice of enlisted men on unpaid furlough to save money…."

"Officers and men, 1801-5" pages 92 to 96 – officers pay remained low with scales unchanged since 1748! A detailed plan of instructions had too be issued, including basic additions, subtractions and divisions. for junior officers as only a few had graduated from the academies while the rest were totally ignorant!

Nepotism existed in regiments via the Regimentsinhaber – Charles tried to change this by dismissing officers who were unable to give "effective assistance in the rehabilitation of their regiments."

Page 106 & 107 – Archdukes Charles & John (and others) in May 1805 argued preparations to place the army on a war footing should start at once because, contrary to Mack's opinion, this could not be done in a few weeks.

Page 111 et seq "Military Reforms, 1805" lack of combat readiness due to Mack's determination to delay mobilization in order not to provoke Napoleon. Mobilization & concentration was only begun in July, accelerated in August, and these leisurely proceedings were inadequate to bring units up to strength. By late August, battalions, supposed to number 800 had 500 at best, while the cavalry squadrons set at 131 troopers for heavy and 150 for light rarely reached above 100! Artillery batteries lacked draft teams and had to be moved by hastily requisitioned horses.

Page 112 talks about reform of the cavalry in April 1805, number of squadrons & strengths, plus moving to 2 ranks instead of 3 for combat!

In 1804, Mack had produced a draft of a revised infantry manual, favouring the retention of the linear order, using the 3rd rank to extend the frontage or provide skirmishers. His most perceptive observation recognised the special problems posed by a multinational army – " No other army in Europe has the problem of a rank and file differing totally not only in language but also in custom from its officers.". Austrian troops required both a longer training period as well as a larger complement of officers and NCOs than the French, who could train a soldier in 8 days & a NCO in 4 weeks yet still had only 17 officers & NCOs in each company. By contract the larger Austrian companies had only half this number of leaders which was inadequate.

These considerations should have made Mack cautious in introducing major reforms in organisation and tactics, but that was not his style. On 29 August he pressed for continued implementation of tactical, organisational, and logistic reforms even though the army was to march within a week. Many of the changes were sound and incorporated in the 1807 manual but the timing was poor and created complications.

The reorganisation of foot regiments added more complication. All units contained substantial numbers of ill-trained and poorly equipped recruits (48,000 men), none more than the Grenzer. Reorganisation in general did not improve morale. One infantry Captain complained – the reshuffling necessary created confusion so that the "common soldier no longer knew their officers and the officers did not know their men.".

Page 97 talks about training camps and the model going back to the 7 years war! A veteran remembered that at Minkenforf in Lower Austria, where 36,000 men were assembled for training, the officers spent a great deal of time banqueting, but little on training.

Thanks Ian
I have had Rothenburg since the day it was published.
I have to say when I've dived back in, very few actual definitive answers come back.

The assertions made, and commentary reported are persusive but I'm not feeling the issues actually were recognised, let alone acted upon. Or discussed by him. I know the tome is a far deeper presentation than we'd ever seen before.

Saying for instance, they couldn't adequately train, nor as fast as the French, then comparing numbers and then offsetting that with 'but they were cheaper' because they were in the East as somehow a corollary to all the woes.

I think it somewhat replace past lores with new ones- well confirmed these but heres why, as if to minimise those effects.

Still truly, it was an administrative issue and the Emperor was not competent either in this regard. He was too blinded by jealousies and the same nepotism as others below him.
d

Seemingly a lot of nonesense is written in English language, for those interested, there is no substitude to read German sources, for a start, Kraus : Der Feldzug von Ulm 1805 (should be available online, see in the usefull books thread) – here he explains the havoc Mack did created by re aranging structures and tactical units, officere appointed to units they did not know and vice versa.

Also the Austrian Army, and not only that of Mack at Ulm, of 1805 must have been the worst the Austrian took to war in the Napoleonic Period.

Karl complained at early 1805 that hardly a battery in his army had train horses.

Some of Mack's changes were quite reasonable, but implemented too late for the units to train according to them and get accostumed to it.

@vW agreed – Rothenberg footnotes references to a primary source – C.v Schonhals (who served as a junior officer in the Ulm campaign) "Der Krieg 1805 in Deutschland" Vienna, 1875 link Rothenberg, of course, also footnotes numbers of secondary sources.

Rothenberg's work is still the standard for the Austrian Army of the period in English.

My favorite army is Austria 1804-1809, when I win – it is a great victory, when I lose "well I was supposed to lose". I guess that is why I play Italians in Bolt Action.

>>for those interested, there is no substitude to read German sources, for a start, Kraus : Der Feldzug von Ulm 1805…

Yes vW I have a copy- however it is unintelligible to me. Despite 3 years HS German I cannot penetrate the language at this stage. You can only bear copy/translate so much at a time.

Why oh why hasn't a translation been done though!?
~d

I was lucky. I was at one of very few New Zealand schools that had 5 years German at high school. I'd still struggle to translate a serious tome like that though.

Better give me a call then…Johann!

One thing to keep in mind is that the Austrian planning assumed that the war in 1805 would not start before the end of October/early November. Late August through late October was anticipated as the mobilization period when reorganization and training would occur. The Austrian movement through Bavaria to camps in Habsburg enclaves in southern Germany were intended to be a deterrent to any French aggression (ROFL). The Austrians arrogantly assumed that Bavaria, part of the HRE with Franz as their emperor, would naturally fall into line as Austrian allies (again ROFL). Napoleon instructed Talleyrand to portray this movement "as if" the Austrians had invaded Bavaria, which is a bit of propaganda that continues to deceive people to this day. So much of the confusion on the Austrian side stems from being attacked a month earlier than anticipated, while still mobilizing, when their assumed ally turns out to have signed a secret alliance with their enemy some weeks before. Is it surprising that there was much confusion?

I would say the confusion was not systemic (as in the Austrians were hopelessly outmoded and incompetent as is sometimes asserted), but stems from badly misreading the Bavarians and underestimating the French, coupled with a complete lack of contingency planning. Most of which results from Mack's overconfidence and the dismissal of Charles' more cautious advice.

Also, as Hans-Karl notes, the failures of 1805 are overwhelmingly failures of the Army of Germany, not the Austrians as a whole. For the reasons noted above.

I agree with Prince of Essling on Rothenberg, the only English language account of its type that I can find. Is there a bio of Archduke Charles in English?

IMO – The Austrians fought well at Calderio in 1805, led by Charles, more or less a draw against Massena, then made a strategic withdrawal. They were good soldiers and Charles was an under-rated leader for much of his career. They fought the French longer than anyone and I think they deserve more respect than they get.

>>Austrian planning assumed…

;-)
Which is Jeffs point entirely I think.
Their optimism and machismo carried them far way beyond what was either practical or necessary for most of the combat and strategy of the era.

When they'd decided later (or via Herr Meternich) that they didn't want a weakened France at the risk of 'the others' taking place, they'd already played every card they had.

Tort
>>IMO – The Austrians fought well at Calderio in 1805,..

I don't disagree. Some of the lower echelons of command and formations performed very well all around the Empire (Kienmayer albeit cautious but every bit as dominant wherever he went like Blucher was 'rash').

I have Rothenburg as I say, but in passing I didn't get the depth of research we have now. Ascerbi aludes to the economic conditions several times, but graciously pushes them aside as not insurmountable.
Thanks d

Napoleon instructed Talleyrand to portray this movement "as if" the Austrians had invaded Bavaria, which is a bit of propaganda that continues to deceive people to this day.

Are you suggesting that Bavaria had granted Austria permission to transit their troops through Bavaria?

>>Are you suggesting that Bavaria had granted Austria permission to transit their troops through Bavaria?

They 'assumed'…

Austria's 'plan' was to move into Bavaria initially as far as the Iller River to force Bavaria into the coalition.

On 2 September the Bavarian Elector, Maximilian, was directed to put his army at the disposal of the Austrians. Instead he ordered the army to withdraw northward to the Wurzburg area where they could could avoid the Austrians.

The Austrians invaded Bavaria and Napoleon was informed of this on 13 September.

The Grande Armee began crossing the Rhine on 25 September.

>>One thing to keep in mind is that the Austrian planning assumed that the war in 1805 would not start before the end of October/early November.

Thanks Carnot, I see that but also that like every campaign, it is rooted in its' past.

1805 was determined by the actions or not taken since the demise of the Second Coalition (as much as i dislike the terms) from 1800.

I've re-read this section of Rothenburg. The competency and inherent distrust in dispersl of 'power/ authority' pervades every decision, and indecision it appears, from Francis on down.
It is the very opposite of everything Bonaparte strove for and succeeded in obtaining; including influencing neighbouring nations and securing their indifference if not support.

So in that regard

I would say the confusion was not systemic

I'd probably have to respectfully disagree. Its government and adminstration was as nebulous and inefficient as a proxy-King like Tr*mp. All wind and little positive influence or control.

The 'Hungarian' issue was dynamite given that none of their troops were called up for service. That forced an already strained 'German' army to reach for goals that simply weren't in their capability- seems the high command ignored the obvious that cannon-fodder was needed, but they didn't have enough.

And having Mack 'second' to Ferdinand was an act in management subversion played out by the Revolutionary governments of France a decade before. Regardless of Macks skill or otherwise.
cheers d

'An army of lions led by sheep is not an army of lions.'

With few exceptions, the senior Austrian leadership was poor, especially when 'commanded' by such Archdukes as Ferdinand and John.

Ferdinand was given command of the army invading Bavaria and was assigned Mack as chief of staff. In order to 'deprive the French of the honor of capturing a Hapsburg' he fled Ulm with his entourage (which included Schwarzenberg) leaving Mack holding the bag.

Mack made mistakes but he was a proven soldier-he 'had a history of hard service, repeated wounds…never fully recovered from a bad head injury during the Turkish wars.' Mack rose from the ranks, which was unusual in the Austrian service. He was court-martialed for Ulm and broken from the service in 1806-1807 and was imprisoned until 1808. Schwarzenberg secured his reinstatement in 1819

The man who should have been court-martialed was Ferdinand, but archdukes, no matter how cowardly or incompetent, were sacrosanct.

Mack was 'told' he was in charge and thought to do so, until subsumed by an appalling piece of political subterfuge that "he's the boss, but not really, you are…" and thus I'd say lost complete confidence, and that of the generals who were at any time factional.

Doomed from the start. He'd have done better to sit on the frontier and not invade am allys' space. Ferdinand at least had the gumption to get out, even if it was too little too late. True he was no Bonaparte or Moreau, or Massena.