"'The ingrate. He will be much unhappier than I.-Napoleon." Topic

Regarding Marmont's 1814 treason, the following is a short timeline of the events leading up to both Marmont's betrayal and Napoleon's abdication. What is interesting is that Marmont played both sides of the coin after giving up Paris, fell under Talleyrand's influence, and his actions-while saving no lives as Napoleon had already abdicated when Marmont's corps was given over to the allies, the act did ruin any chances for a Regency by Marie-Louise for Napoleon's son and brought back the Bourbons which was Talleyrand's goal. Marmont didn't act in any way to 'save France' but on his own behalf and it is interesting that when the troops found out what he and his subordinate generals, especially Souham, had done, they mutinied. In short, Marmont was nothing but a pawn of Talleyrand's.

When Ney, Caulaincourt, Macdonald, and Lefebvre (who were negotiating with the allies for a regency for Napoleon's son and Marie-Louise) found out what Marmont had done, they were furious, as they had no desire to bring back the Bourbons.

30-31 March 1814: Battle of Paris.

30 March 1814: Talleyrand approaches Marmont with the idea of turning against Napoleon and supporting Talleyrand.

31 March 1814: Mortier and Marmont withdraw from Paris southward. Imperial government establishes itself at Blois and continues to function efficiently. Talleyrand ordered to leave Paris by Savary, but manages to evade the order.

31 March 1814: Marmont pledges his support to Talleyrand against Napoleon.

1 April 1814: Allies enter Paris. Tsar Alexander is invited to stay at Talleyrand's home. Talleyrand forms, and heads, a ‘provisional government' which declares Napoleon ‘deposed' with only 64 of 140 senators in attendance.

2 April 1814: Napoleon learns of Talleyrand's actions.

3 April 1814: Napoleon reviews his army of 60,000 at Fontainebleu and is determined to march on Paris. The troops, regimental officers, and the younger generals are enthusiastic.

3 April 1814: Marshals Ney, Lefebvre, Macdonald, and Moncey urge Napoleon to abdicate in favor of his son, Napoleon II.

3 April 1814: Marmont agrees to support Talleyrand and turn his corps over to the allies in writing.

4 April 1814: Napoleon signs the abdication which states that he abdicates in favor of his son. Macdonald, Ney, and Caulaincourt are authorized to take the document to the allied sovereigns in Paris.

4 April 1814: Tsar Alexander, who is not in favor of the Bourbons returning to France, believes that the common people and the French army support Napoleon and seriously considers accepting the conditional abdication in favor of a regency for Napoleon II under his mother, Empress Marie-Louise.

4 April 1814: Marmont meets Macdonald, Ney, and Caulaincourt on the way to Paris to meet with Alexander and give him Napoleon's conditional abdication. He tells them of his negotiations with Schwarzenberg to turn over his corps to the allies. The three are furious, but Marmont calms them down when he tells them that he had not committed to actually perform the action. He agrees to go to Paris with them as Napoleon wanted Marmont to be one of the plenipotentiaries. General Souham, who is complicit in the conspiracy, is left in command of VI Corps. Marmont goes to Paris with the three other marshals to meet with Alexander. Marmont had told Souham not to do anything until he returns. He has lied to the other three marshals about his plot with Talleyrand and agreement with Schwarzenberg and has decided to carry it out. One of his subordinate generals, Lucotte, refuses to be part of it.

5-6 April 1814: Souham orders the VI Corps on the road and the troops are led into the allied lines at night without their knowledge. They will later mutiny over the actions of their generals. Marmont is not with the corps, but when the other plenipotentiaries learn of Marmont's actions, they condemn it, Ney being very vocal to Marmont on his treachery. Because of Marmont's actions and those of his subordinate generals, the allied sovereigns reject Napoleon's offer of abdicating in favor of his son, and the Bourbons are brought back to France ‘in the allies' baggage wagons.'

6 April 1814: Napoleon abdicates unconditionally.

11 April 1814: Treaty of Fontainebleu signed.

20 April 1814: Napoleon bids farewell to the Guard and leaves for Elba.

The war was already over and Napoleon was prepared and in the process of abdicating when Marmont's corps was led by its commanders into the allied lines. The fighting had already stopped. Marmont saved no lives and was only considering his own welfare.

This information is contained in Caulaincourt's memoirs. The translation is entitled No Peace with Napoleon! Concluding the Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt Duke of Vicenza.

Napoleon became friends with Marmont at Toulon in 1793. Marmont had graduated from the Metz artillery school that same year. Napoleon appointed Marmont as his ADC there. He served a staff and artillery officer with Napoleon in the Armee d'Italie. He was promoted to general of division in 1800 and was appointed as inspector-general of artillery in which capacity he served for two years. During his tenure the new artillery Systeme AN XI was 'discussed', argued over, and finally approved, though it never reached its intended purpose of replacing the older, sturdier Gribeauval System.

He did not make the first cut on the new marshal's list, but commanded II Corps in the 1805 campaign. He was assigned then as the civil and military governor of the new Dalmatian provinces and proved an able administrator, though there was suspicion which brought an imperial warning that he was not always 'clean-handed.'

Marmont was ordered north in 1809 and served in the Wagram campaign, but ignored Eugene's orders, desiring to maintain his independent command status. He was awarded his baton after Wagram, along with Macdonald and Oudinot. Together they could not replace Lannes.

He was assigned to replace Massena in Spain after Massena's failure there. 'He arrived with 300 horses, 100 red-liveried domestics, and a long train of vehicles. It was said that his entourage at as much fodder and food as a cavalry regiment. He did excellent work rebuilding Massena's former command but was badly wounded and defeated at Salamanca in 1812.

He missed the Russian campaign and fought well in 1813. His performance was uneven and he finally betrayed his corps to the allies.

It appears that Napoleon did quite a lot for Marmont-got him promoted to general of division and marshal, employed him continuously, and that was answered by Marmont with betrayal.

Marmont did contribute to the French language by adding the verb raguser (a play on his Napoleonic title-Duke of Ragusa), meaning to sneak, cheat, and betray.

Thanks Kevin!…

And this betrayal also brought consequences for the Grande Armée of 1815 … the feeling remained among the troops that they could be betrayed by their commanders at any moment … Marmont did not do any favors to the morale of the Imperial Army … he should have be shot …

Armand

for more see

link

'..act did ruin any chances for a Regency by Marie-Louise for Napoleon's son…'

Under Bonaparte's own Year XII constitution it was actually unlawful for a woman to hold the position of Regent. Under the existing law, Joseph Bonaparte would have become Regent – Marie-Louise would merely have been the 'Napoleon II's' guardian.

'…4 April 1814: Napoleon signs the abdication which states that he abdicates in favour of his son…'

Actually signs a piece of paper which states that he is prepared to abdicate (if he gets what he wants), not that he actually does.

'…4 April 1814: Tsar Alexander, who is not in favour of the Bourbons…seriously considers accepting the conditional abdication in favour of a regency for Napoleon II under his mother, Empress Marie-Louise…'

See the Recollections of Macdonald for an eyewitness account. Alexander made it clear that he would accept nothing without the agreement of the other Coalition powers, and then pointed the emissaries in the direction of the Provisional Government.

'…Because of Marmont's actions and those of his subordinate generals, the allied sovereigns reject Napoleon's offer of abdicating in favour of his son…'

Again, see Macdonald. The regency was refused for a very good and simple reason – no-one trusted Bonaparte any longer, or believed that a regency would be anything other than a continuation of Bonaparte. This is why the Allies declaration of 31st March contained the clause that they would not treat with Bonaparte 'or any member of his family'.

'…The war was already over and Napoleon was prepared and in the process of abdicating when Marmont's corps was led by its commanders into the allied lines. The fighting had already stopped…'

Not even remotely true. There was an lull around Paris as the Allies focussed on politics – elsewhere the war was still very much on. See Toulouse, for example. Indeed, negotiating a preliminary truce was one of the reasons that the commissioners were sent to Paris.

MacDonald, BTW:

link

But Brechtel, there were no "new Dalmatian provinces" for Marmont to administer. I know because I remember how mad you got when I mocked the French Empire for extending to what would later be Yugoslavia. (And Rome, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Hamburg and Barcelona.)

I would trust Caulaincourt's memoirs more than Macdonald's. Macdonald had a habit of remembering 'with advantages.' As an example, he magnified his assignment to the Armee d'Italie under Eugene in 1809 to being sent there as Eugene's 'military mentor.' That just wasn't the case.

If there were no 'new Dalmatian provinces' then what were they called?

I know because I remember how mad you got when I mocked the French Empire for extending to what would later be Yugoslavia. (And Rome, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Hamburg and Barcelona.)

I'm sorry, but I don't recall the alleged 'incident.' Perhaps you could post a reference where this exchange occurred?

To further amplify the unreliability of Macdonald's memoirs, his Recollections, this might be of assistance:

See the Recommended Reading List in the Esposito/Elting Atlas under the entry for Souvenirs du Marechal Macdonald:

'For a soldier whose orders and letters were crisp and clear, these memoirs have an evasive quality. This may be due to the fact that he wrote them in 1825, when he was a favorite of the restored Bourbon regime, and had every reason to with to further ingratiate himself. Obviously, there was a slippery substratum to his outwardly bluff and loyal personality. He shows it clearly in his tendency to blandly claim credit for actions where he was not present.'

See also Prince Eugene at War by Robert M Epstein, page 142:

'Macdonald's memoirs were prejudicial to Eugene, as the former wanted to discredit the Vicroy to glorify his own actions.'

From page 9:

'Macdonald was a subordinate of Eugene's in 1809 and he deliberately tried to enhance his own reputation at the Viceroy's expense.'

From pages 38-39:

'A lot of ink had been spilled over Macdonald's role in Eugene's army. In 1825 Macdonald published his memoirs, The Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, in which he pictured himself as the de facto Commander-in-Chief of the army. As will be seen in the course of this study, Macdonal claimed that it was he who served as the military instructor to a confused, inexperienced, and immature Eugene. In Macdonald's version, all of the Viceroy's successes in the campaign were due to his calm, firm, and expert advice…'

'…Macdonald was to serve as a wing commander, nothing more and nothing less, and Eugene was free to dispense with any advice that Macdonal offered. An examination of Napoleon's correspondence proves that Macdonald was sent merely as a corps commander and not as any sort of deputy Commander-in-Chief. Napoleon informed Eugene of Macdonald's appointment in a letter dated April 2…:

'My son, I have given orders for General Macdonald to serve in the Army of Italy; he is going there immediately…I suppose that he will serve you to his utmost, and that he will serve in areas that call upon his talents and previous services. I have said nothing to him. He will be employed as a general of division, but he will be given command of a wing. This favor he will receive from you will tie him to you entirely.''-Du Casse Collection, IV, 423-414. (The Du Casse Collection, Memoirs et Correspondence Politique et Militaire du Prince Eugene is the correspondence between Napoleon and Eugene in ten volumes.)

'This letter proves that Macdonald and those that relied on his Recollections were wrong about his intended role in the War of 1809. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, Macdonald would act as a corps commander and have the same influence as the other corps leaders.'

Regarding Marmont and the 'new Dalmation provinces' see John Elting's Swords Around a Throne, pages 139-140:

'After competent servoce as a corps commander in 1805, he became the civil and military governor of France's new Dalmatian provinces. There he built the first roads and public works that back country had seen since Roman times; ruined years of painstaking Russian infiltration and one Russian expeditionary force; brought Turkish raiding under control; kept his troops healthy; and dealt justly with half-savage hill tribes…'

So grateful for the "Stifle" function.

Personally, I never use it as I don't believe it to be helpful. I believe that it is useful to read everyone's opinions and postings.

'..For a soldier whose orders and letters were crisp and clear, these memoirs have an evasive quality. This may be due to the fact that he wrote them in 1825, when he was a favorite of the restored Bourbon regime, and had every reason to with to further ingratiate himself…'

Huh????

Macdonald did indeed begin writing his Recollections in 1825, after the death of his third and final wife. However, they were written as a private keepsake for his one-year-old son, whom the 60-year-old Marshal did not expect to see grow up. They were only published in the 1890's, by Macdonalds grand-daughter.
Don't suppose your Elting went on to explain precisely how Macdonald intended to 'ingratiate' himself with the Bourbons, via recollections published 50 years after Macdonalds death, and 40 years after the final dethronement of the Bourbon Monarchy?

'…As an example, he magnified his assignment to the Armee d'Italie under Eugene in 1809 to being sent there as Eugene's 'military mentor…'

If you wanted to challenge Macdonald's veracity, something involving the 1814 mission to Paris might be more relevant to the discussion.

Bottom line is that a Regency was only ever a delusion. Through Vitrolles, Talleyrand and d'Alberg had been in contact with the Allies and the Bourbons long before the Allies reached Paris. The final nail in the coffin was Emperor Francis' decision in early February not to insist on his daughter's throne (there's a good reason the old boy is sat at Dijon, and not with the other Allied Sovereigns in Paris). 'We will not treat with Napoleon Bonaparte, or any member of his family' meant exactly what it said.

I've already posted material that directly questions Macdonald's veracity from two credible sources.

Have you read Caulaincourt?

For an alternative view of the reliability of Macdonald's memoirs, Tulard describes them as "D'une authenticité indiscutable, ces mémoires contiennent des jugements très sévères sur Moreau, Talleyrand, l'armée napolitaine. Ils sont fondementaux pour la campagne de 1809, l'expédition de Russie et la bataille de Leipzig." – J. Tulard, Nouvelle Bibliographie Critique des Mémoires sur l'Époque Napoléonienne Écrits ou Traduits en Français (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1991), p.190.

link

He left this nice little gazebo behind in Trogir, a beautiful little town on the Dalmatian coast. Even twenty years ago, the locals would tell you it was associated with him.

Marmont did good work in Dalmatia, though he was warned by Napoleon about some possible 'financial irregularities.'

When he received his baton after Wagram, along with Oudinot and Macdonald, it 'was accompanied by a scathing Napoleonic critique of his sins of omission and commission.'

Marmont was one of the best-educated of the marshals, but his flawed character, an overworked vanity, made him 'ungrateful to superiors and subordinates alike.' He was not in the same class of soldier or commander as Davout, Suchet, Lannes, or Soult, and did not have the character of Berthier.

The army referred to Marmont, Oudinot, and Macdonald as 'Lannes small change' when they were promoted.

The other point is by his actions in April 1814 Marmont broke his oath of service as well as betraying his own troops.

Brechtel

What is the source for your quotations please?:

Marmont did good work in Dalmatia, though he was warned by Napoleon about some possible 'financial irregularities.'

When he received his baton after Wagram, along with Oudinot and Macdonald, it 'was accompanied by a scathing Napoleonic critique of his sins of omission and commission.'

Marmont was one of the best-educated of the marshals, but his flawed character, an overworked vanity, made him 'ungrateful to superiors and subordinates alike.' He was not in the same class of soldier or commander as Davout, Suchet, Lannes, or Soult, and did not have the character of Berthier.

The army referred to Marmont, Oudinot, and Macdonald as 'Lannes small change' when they were promoted.

You can find the information is Swords Around a Throne by John Elting.

Thanks Kevin – are the comments attributed or Elting's own views?

so this is the way Boney treats friends, he gets scathing critique, yet he is made Marshal.

Yes, those quotes without sources to follow them up – not of any use for myself.

I wonder how unhappy Boney was himself, I guess more unhappy than Marmont, Boney lost everything after his crushing defeats – living a miserable life (compared to earlier days) on St. Helena.

Well he still used this exile well, creating propaganda to the best, a real genius, that still dominates the persepctive of Napoleonic history.

I must confess to being curious as to how "(Lanne's) small change" might have been rendered in the soldier's French of 1809.

We can leave for anothe day what the phrase might actually mean.

What it means is that the three new marshals did not make one Lannes…

so this is the way Boney treats friends, he gets scathing critique, yet he is made Marshal.

Napoleon was Marmont's commander, and if there were shortcomings on Marmont's part, Napoleon was well within his 'rights' as a commander to take a subordinate to task. Friendship had nothing to do with it.

What it means is…

Quite so And in French?

Are there any quotes in French from French menoires confirming this?

The 'small change' thing is from Marbot.

'On prétendit dans l'armée que l'Empereur, ne pouvant remplacer Lannes, avait voulu en avoir la monnaie..'

-v2 p262

Marbot's veracity is, of course, beyond question.

"Marbot's veracity is, of course, beyond question."

That's always been my issue with Elting. A great read, full of fun stories, but often one person's claim gets presented as an assertion of universal truth, when all that was required was a simple citation.

Thus we get: "The army referred to Marmont, Oudinot, and Macdonald as 'Lannes small change' when they were promoted."

As opposed to:

"According to Marbot, some in the army claimed that the Emperor, being unable to replace Lannes, had saved the 'spare change.'" [footnote]

The latter would have preserved the fun anecdote and quote, but represented it more accurately and responsibly, and made clear that we can't really confirm this assertion beyond the one source cited here.

(Unless there are in fact multiple sources that assert it, in which case – as one of the posters here so routinely demands – Show Your Sources.)

Marbot should be taken and used very carefully. However, some of the material he wrote is excellent, such as the Berezina operations.

Regarding Marbot's Memoirs, the following is from the Recommended Reading List of the Esposito/Elting Atlas:

'These famous memoirs are an inextricable mixture of invaluable and colorful stories of army life-and of howling cock-and-bull inventions. Marbot saw much service. He was aide-de-camp to Bernadotte, Lannes, Augereau, and Massena, and commanded a cavalry regiment in 1812-1813. Even some of his biggest whackers must have a small basis in truth-few Frenchmen have challenged them-possibly, because they, too, had wonderful old-soldier stories to tell.'

Col Elting is an excellent historian and did his research over a thirty year period.

There are over 800 footnotes and a further 500+ citations in the text. If you don't agree with it, then that's your opinion and option. However, I haven't seen anyone factually dispute what Col Elting wrote in Swords. Perhaps you can find some and post them along with the material that disputes what Col Elting wrote?

David Chandler remarked on Swords that the book is 'A masterpiece: quite simply, John Elting's fine book is the best I have ever read on this challenging subject.'

By the way, have you read Swords?

From the Recommended Reading List in the Esposito/Elting Atlas regarding Marmont's 9-volume Memoires:

'The story of a brilliant man, trying to justify himself before a hostile generation-largely by throwing the blame on others. Marmont took an intelligent interest in soldiering and the problems of command; he book remains a must for every student of this period, both for its professional content and for its unconscious portrait of a soldier who was willing to listen to politicians and his own vanity. He remains, however, an untrustworthy witness, where his own conduct comes into question.'

We also have to consider the merit of the translation. Leaving the reliability of the good general's anecdote to one side, in 1809 there may have been an idiomatic or proverbial meaning to the phrase that doesn't altogether register in a modern translation. As it is, terms like '(loose/small) change', 'coins', or 'cash', can all have subtly different nuances.

The meaning would seem to be clear enough, though. A valuable item had been lost and the emperor "avait voulu en avoir la monnaie." i.e. was saving cash by replacing it with objects of lesser value and pocketing the difference.

In that regard,"Lannes' small change" doesn't quite make sense. Lannes has little to do with it, being out of the picture, neither influencing the decision or benefiting from it. The comment relates more to Napoleon and his new-minted marshals.

So, coming from an untrustworthy witness, we might be forgiven for wondering whether the "small change" quip is of any value at all.

By the way, have you read Swords?

Indeed, several times, as you well know, though you never tire of asking the question.

I have followed with interest the various threads over the years about errors in the text, such as the one about needing five years to train a drummer:

TMP link

You defended that obvious mistake with your customary sturm and drang because it was Elting, even when presented with copious primary and secondary sources that made it abundantly clear it was a simple mistake. You never admitted to it, comme d'habitude.

Thanks @Musketballs and yes I agree fully with Garth in the Park's assessment, Elting remains nontransparent.