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"Napoleon's 'General' Comments" Topic


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Brechtel19806 Jun 2021 5:49 p.m. PST

‘The foremost quality of a commander is to keep a cool head, to receive accurate impressions of what is happening, and never fret or be amazed or intoxicated by good news or bad. The successive or simultaneous sensations that the commander's mind receives during the course of a day are classified and occupy only as much attention as they deserve, for common sense and good judgment are products of a comparison of several sensations considered. There are men who, because of their physical or moral makeup, distort a picture of everything. No matter how much knowledge, intellect, courage, and other good qualities they might have, nature has not called upon them to command armies or to direct the great operations in war.'-Correspondence XXXII, 182-183, ‘Precis des Guerres de Frederic II.

‘Military genius is a gift from heaven…but the most essential quality for a general is firmness of character and the resolution to conquer at any price.'-Ernest Picard, quoting Montholon in Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 464.

‘Kilmaine…was an excellent cavalry officer. He possessed sangfroid and the ability to take in a military situation at a glance. He was very well-suited to command detached corps of observation and any delicate missions that required discernment, intellect, and sound judgment…'-Correspondence XXIX, 149, ‘Campagnes d'Italie de 1796 et 1797.

‘…Moreau [in 1800], three times in forty days, repeated the same demonstrations, but every time without giving them the appearance of reality. He succeeded only in emboldening his enemy and he offered him occasions to strike in isolated divisions…During the campaign the French army, which was the more numerous, was nearly always inferior in numbers on the battlefield. That is what happens to generals who are irresolute and act without principles and plans. In war tentative measures…lose everything.'-Ernest Picard, quoting Montholon in Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 464.

‘Dumouriez [in 1792] made a very audacious move by positioning himself in the midst of the Prussian army. Even though I am a more audacious warrior than he was, I would not have dared such a maneuver.'-Ernest Picard, Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 395.

‘It is said that I am daring, but Frederick was much more so. He was great especially at the most critical moments. This is the highest praise one could make of his character.'-Ernest Picard, Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 405.

‘Marshal Ney…is a brave man, zealous and all heart…Admirable for his bravery and stubbornness in retreats, he was good when it came to leading 10,000 men, but with a larger force he was a real fool…Always the first under fire, he forgot about troops who were not under his immediate command.'-Ernest Picard, Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 524.

‘I loved Murat because of his brilliant bravery, which is why I put up with so much of his foolishness. Like Ney, Murat was incomparable on the field of battle, but he always committed stupid mistakes. He understood how to conduct a campaign better than Ney and still he was a poor general. He always waged war without maps, and how many mistakes did he not commit to be able to establish his headquarters in a chateau where there would be women! As for bedding down with a woman…my woman would have died in Munich or Strasbourg and it would not have upset my projects or views by a quarter of an hour.'-Correspondence XII, Number 10074, 270; Napoleon to Berthier 10 April 1806.

‘For sharp, prolonged attacks that require great boldness Massena would be more appropriate than Reynier. To protect the kingdom against invasion, Jourdan is preferable to Massena…A division commander in the Armee d'Italie, Massena…had a strong constitution and was tireless, on his horse night and day among the boulders and in the mountains. This was the kind of war that he understood particularly well. He was determined, brave, bold, full of ambition and vanity. His distinctive characteristic was stubbornness, and he never got discouraged. He would neglect discipline and pay little attention to administration, and for this reason was not much loved by his soldiers. He was tolerably poor in his dispositions for an attack…at the first cannon shot, in the midst of bullets and dangers, his thought would acquire strength and clarity. If defeated he would start again as if he had been the victor.'-Correspondence XII, Number 10325, 440; Napoleon to Joseph 6 June 1806; Correspondence XXIX, 108, ‘Campagnes d'Italie.

‘Lannes was wise, prudent and bold. In the presence of the enemy he possessed imperturbable sangfroid. He had little education but real natural ability. On the battlefield he was superior to all of the French generals when it came to maneuvering 15,000 men. He was still young and he would have continued to improve; perhaps he would have been clever even at Grand Tactics.'-Correspondence XXXI, 380, ‘Notes sur l'art de guerre.'

‘Berthier, the chief of staff, always spent the day around me in combat and the night at his desk: it is impossible to combine more activity, goodwill, courage, and knowledge. He was very active and followed his general on all reconnaissances without neglecting any of his work at the bureau. He possessed an indecisive character and was little fit for command, but he had all the qualities of a good chief of staff. He knew topography well, understood reconnaissance detachments, attended personally to the expedition of orders, and was accustomed to briefing the most complicated movements of an army with simplicity.'-Correspondence I, Number 338, 238, Napoleon to the Executive Directory, 6 May 1796; Correspondence XXIX, 107-108, Campagnes d'Italie.

‘Desaix was the most capable of commanding large armies. Better than the others, he understood la grande guerre as I understand it. In my judgment Kleber was second in this respect, and Lannes perhaps third.'-Ernest Picard, Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 383.

‘Turenne is the only general whose boldness increased with age and experience…His last campaigns are superb.'- Ernest Picard, Precepts et jugements de Napoleon, 560.

‘General Reynier…had been trained to be a topographical engineer. He understood maps thoroughly, had waged campaigns with the armies of the North and of the Rhine, where he acquired the reputation of being a man of sound advice, but he lacked the most essential qualities of a commander in chief. He loved solitude, was by nature cold and silent and not very communicative, and he knew neither how to electrify or to dominate men.'-Correspondence XXX, 130, ‘Campagnes d'Egypte et de Syrie.


This material can be found in Napoleon and the Art of War, Chapter V, by Jay Luvaas. It is a most helpful volume on Napoleon thought and ideas.

Sparta07 Jun 2021 2:09 a.m. PST

Thank you for the pointer – a lot of great quotes!

One of my favourites is when Napoleon writes to Davout in 1813 to take care of Vandamme, allthough he is headstrong and a difficult subordinat, he is also an "homme de guerre", and as Napoleon instructs Ney – such men are becoming a rare commodity…

Green Tiger07 Jun 2021 3:10 a.m. PST

Poor old Kilmaine. Always thought he got a rough deal.

Brechtel19807 Jun 2021 4:24 a.m. PST

Kilmaine certainly wasn't Stengel, but he wasn't an incompetent either.

von Winterfeldt07 Jun 2021 5:18 a.m. PST

for more see

link

my say on this is that you get the view Boney wants you to get, you see those generals as he did see him when on exile and he had to character asassinate them


Boney's remarks are well known and well trodden, and of course written with a well calculated agenda behind it and have to be seen in context.


I could cite other comments of Nabulieone for example about Berthier where he is offending him.


In case to avoid falling into the usual Napoleon centered point of view and myth making, see what professor emeritus Charles Esdaile has to say on this, I am interested to read what other contemporary persons have to say about those men.

Just to show – that without context and cherry picking – manipulation is easy

Lorsque, par exemple, il écrit à propos de Davout:
Tout ce que ce maréchal a fait à Dresde et dans la retraite, prouve qu'il a les idées les plus erronées et les plus folles de la guerre (2) Corresp., XXV, n° 19778 (au prince Eugène, Paris, 28 mars 1813),


Préceptes et jugements;
by Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821; Picard, Ernest, 1863-1913

Préface IX


and yes

Ces assertions appellent quelques réserves. Malgré de sincères efforts, Napoléon, à Sainte-Hélène, ne réussit pas toujours à juger d'une manière absolument impartiale : en se remémorant quelque grave faute tactique d'un de ses maréchaux qui a compromis une savante combinaison, ou au souvenir d'une pénible défection, il lui arrivera de ne pas pouvoir se maîtriser et d'être même souverainement injuste. C'est Ney, par exemple, qu'il accable des épithètes les plus dures; c'est Davout, qu'il accuse d'avoir, en 1815, « fini par trahir comme les autres »


source as above

préface X


so Davout a traitor then?

the winds of change – Moreau


» C'est Moreau aussi que le Premier Consul a félicité, après Hohenlinden, de ses « belles et savantes manœuvres » et de s'être « encore surpassé dans cette campagne » (1), et au sujet duquel Napoléon s'exprime tout différemment à Sainte- Hélène : « La bataille de Hohenlinden a été une rencontre heureuse; le sort de la campagne y a été joué sans aucune combinaison… C'est une des plus décisives de la guerre; mais elle ne doit être attribuée à aucune manœuvre, à aucune combinaison, à aucun génie militaire (2). » Pour s'expliquer ces deux jugements contradictoires, il faut se souvenir de la conspiration de l'an XII et de la présence de Moreau au quartier général des Alliés en 1813.

Again directly from Picard and not by Luvaas

préface X – XI

JMcCarroll07 Jun 2021 7:38 a.m. PST

If you take Berthier away from Napoleon, Davout was the better general! Napoleon knew this.

Brechtel19807 Jun 2021 8:25 a.m. PST

Where is that documented or from which source or sources did you come to that conclusion, that 'Napoleon knew this'?

JMcCarroll09 Jun 2021 4:22 p.m. PST

Why do you think he keep Davout out of the main fighting in 1813-1815. He always down played Auerstädt. How did 1815 go for him without Berthier.

Brechtel19810 Jun 2021 4:56 a.m. PST

Napoleon's choice of marshals for independent commands in 1813 was curious. Oudinot and Ney, who were not able to command more than a corps well, were given command on the Berlin front while Davout was assigned to Hamburg.

Napoleon knew he could rely on Davout and Hamburg was undoubtedly important. He was made Minister of War in 1815 for exactly that reason. It was Davout that got the Armee du Nord ready to take the field.

Napoleon later said that if Berthier had been chief of staff in 1815 he 'would not have met misfortune.' Berthier was the one indispensable marshal and the outstanding chief of staff of the period.

When did Napoleon 'downplay Auerstadt'?

Napoleon to Davout after Auerstadt:

‘I congratulate you with all my heart on your splendid conduct. I regret the brave men you have lost; but they are dead on the field of honor. Inform your corps and your generals of my satisfaction. They have forever acquired a claim on my esteem and gratitude.'

Napoleon to the III Corps after Auerstadt:

‘Generals, officers and non-commissioned officers of the III Corps, I have gathered you here together to tell you in person that I am satisfied with your splendid conduct at the battle on October 14. I have lost brave men; I regret their loss as if they were my own children, but they died on the field of honor as true soldiers. You have rendered to me a great service in this particular circumstance; it has been particularly the brilliant conduct of the III Corps of the army which has produced the results you now see. Tell your men that I have been satisfied with their courage. Generals, officers, non-commissioned officers, you have acquired an everlasting right to my gratitude and favor.'

Davout's reply to Napoleon:

‘The III Corps would always be worthy of the confidence of their sovereign and that it would be for him, in every circumstance, that which the X Legion had been for Caesar.'

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